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1. Bundling as a leveraging concern
This thesis is about bundling and leveraging under EC antitrust law. Bundling is the situation in which 
goods A and B are offered together as one ‘bundle.’  ̂ The most important types of bundling are; pure 
and mixed bundling. Pure bundling pertains to the situation in which goods A and B cannot be 
purchased on a standalone basis, only as a bundle. For instance, a  newspaper bundles Its stories with 
its ads and a hospital typically bundles surgery with anaesthesia. Neither ads nor anaesthesia are 
offered as standalones. Mixed bundling differs from pure bundling in that goods A and B remain, next to 
the bundle itself, available on a standalone basis. Examples of mixed bundles are: monthly passes on 
trains or buses; round-trip airline tickets; all-included vacation packages; and, film-with-camera. A third 
type of bundling is tying. This refers to the situation in which a customer who wants to buy A must also 
buy B, or vice versa. For instance, Coca-Cola might make the supply of its Coca-Cola drink conditional 
upon the purchase of other soft drinks that it carries. As a m atter of terminology, I use the term 
‘bundling’ to denote bundling (pure and mixed) or tying in general. W here a specific type is relevant, this 
will be specified.
Under EC and US competition law, an old and persistent fear is that bundling can result in leveraging of 
market power. Taken abstractly, bundling cases tend to follow a recurring pattern. The main market is 
dominated by one undertaking, and a second ancillary market is also relevant to the examination. This 
pattern is illustrated by the following figure:
1 For completeness sake, it should be noted that a bundle may also concern services or a combination o f services and 
goods.
L ib i l i  t t iL - ii •MUiiàlèiii
MAIN MARKET A ANCILLARY  
MARKET B
The antitaist concern is that bundling the two markets enables the dominant undertaking to transfer its 
market position in the main market A into the second market B with the aim of extending it into B or to  
protect its original position in A. In this thesis, I call this concern the leveraging theory.
2. Increasing attention fo r bundling as a leveraging device
Under EC law, the leveraging theory has recently (re)gained greater prominence In m erger and abuse 
cases dealing with bundling. For instance, the European Commission ("Commission") has addressed 
bundling in Microsofi^ and General Electric/Honeywell.^ It condemned and heavily fined Microsoft under 
Article 82 EC Treaty for bundling its Windows Media Player (“WMP") with its dominant Windows 
operating system. General Electric/Honeywell involved the merger between General Electric (“GE”) and  
Honeywell. One of the objections put forward by the Commission was the possibility that the new entity 
would offer a package of GE engines and Honeywell avionics and non-avionic systems. The Court o f 
First Instance (“C FI”) expressly discussed for the first time the fear of leveraging due to bundling in Tetra 
Laval.^ The case concerned the appeal against the Commission’s decision to block the m erger between 
the French polyethylene terephthalate (“PET") packaging company Sidel and the Tetra Laval group. 
One o f the antitrust concerns put forward by the Commission was that the combination of Tetra Laval’s 
dominant position in carton packaging and Sidel's leading position in PET packaging equipment would 
provide the new group with the ability to leverage its dominant carton position into the PET packaging 
equipment market by bundling both markets  ̂The CFI accepted the Commission’s theory in principle, 
but quashed the decision on the facts. On appeal, the C Fl’s findings were upheld by the European Court 
of Justice ("ECJ").®
^Case CO M P/37.792, Microsoft/W 2000, decision o f 24 March 2004, 
www.euroDa.eu.int/comm/comDetition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.Ddf 
3 Case COM P/M .2220. GE/Honeywell [20041OJ L48/1.
* Cases T-5/02 & T-80/02, Tetra Laval BV v  Commission [2002] E C R 11-4381.
5 Case COM P/M .2416. Tetra Lavai/Sidel [2004] OJ L43/13.
6 Case C -12/03 P, Commission v. Tetra Laval BV, decision of 15 February 2005. not yet reported.
3. The concept o f leveraging
At this point, it is opportune to consider more closely the concept of leveraging. A first, important 
distinction must be made between direct and indirect leveraging. Direct leveraging focuses on 
transferring market power from the main market to the ancillary market by denying consumers the 
possibility to buy any or only one of the goods of the bundle on a standalone basis. For instance, a tying 
arrangement results in an obvious dental as one of the products cannot be bought as a standalone. The 
same effect could be achieved by charging a higher price for the individual products than for the bundle 
of the products involved. By contrast, indirect leveraging focuses on the legality of the price of the 
bundle itself. The price of the bundle is usually at a discount to that of acquiring the products separately. 
As a result, the price itself could be so low that it might be illegal under competition law. For instance, 
the price of a bundle could result in predatory pricing^ or price squeezing.^ Antitrust issues relating to 
the price of the bundle as such are beyond the scope of this thesis. In this thesis I will focus only on 
direct leveraging.
Direct leveraging can be divided into two broad categories: leveraging in the short term and in the long 
term. In the short term, a firm with market power may engage in leveraging to immediately extend its 
market power from the main market A to the ancillary market B. Antitrust analysis focuses on the 
immediate ability of the bundling undertaking to raise prices for good B. Even in the case that an 
immediate increase of B’s price is not feasible, bundling could lead to leveraging in the long term. By 
bundling both markets, the undertaking can raise entry barriers in the second market and foreclose that 
market in order to extend its original position or protect that position in the main. I will discuss both 
categories in this thesis. The emphasis of this thesis is Illustrated by the following figure:
 ̂ Predatory pricing is the pricing of goods at a very low level for the express purpose of driving out rivals from the market 
The leading case in this area is Case C-62/86 AKZO  [1991] ECR 1-3359. In that case, the ECJ stated that “[pjrices below 
average costs [...] by means of which a dominant undertaking seeks to eliminate a competitor must be regarded as abusive’ 
(at 71) and ’ prices below average total cost, that is to say, fixed costs plus variable costs, but above average variable cots, 
must be regarded abusive if they are determined as part of a plan for eliminating a competitor" (at 72). See also Case C- 
395/96 P, Compagnie Maritime Beige v. Commission [1996] ECR 1-5951. For details, see Goyder, EC Competition Law 
(Oxford, 2003). pp. 286-289.
A firm that is dominant In the markets for both a  raw material and a derived product may commit an abuse by charging an 
inflated price for the raw material to companies that compete with the dominant firm in the production of the derived product. 
Such a price squeeze applied by a dominant firm can constitute an abuse wifriin the meaning of Artide 82 EC Treaty. This 
description reflects Commission practice in Case IV/30.178, Napier Brown v. British Sugar [1988] OJ L284/41, referring to a 
price margin that is ’insufficient to reflect that dominant com pan/s own costs transformation’  (at 66) and the Commission 
Notice on Application of Competition Rules to Access Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector, [1998] OJ C264/2, 
stating that ’a  price squeeze could also be demonstrated by showing that the margin between the price charged to 
competitors on the downstream market for access and the price which the network operator charges in the downstream 
market is sufficient to allow a reasonably efficient service provider in the downstream market [...] to obtain a  norma) profif (at 
118). For a succinct general review, see Crodoni and Veljanovski, “Price Squeezes, Foreclosure and Competition Law", JNI 
28 (2003), and, for a regulatory insight, see Sauter, “The Sector Inquiries into Leases Lines and Mobile Roaming", speech, 
IBC Conference, Brussels, 17 September 2001.
Short-term and long-term leveraging can take place in a horizontal or vertical context. Horizontal 
leveraging refers to the situation in which a  company that Is dominant in one market (m arket A) attempts 
to leverage that position into a horizontally-related market (market B). Market B is horizontally-related to  
market A  when its competitive conditions depend on the competitive conditions in m arket A. In that 
context, the only existing leveraging practice is bundling. It can be done at wholesale as well as at retail 
level.
Vertical leveraging pertains to a situation in which a company holds a dominant position in the m arket 
for an essential input (market A) that is necessary for upstream or downstream firms to exert their 
activity in the downstream market (market C). The behaviour of the upstream company is intended to  
use its dominant position in order to acquire market power in the downstream market. Leveraging can 
be achieved by refusal to supply, denying interoperability, exclusive purchasing arrangements, o r 
bundling. Vertical leveraging can only take place at the wholesale level. The following figure 
summarises these concerns;
As the above figure shows, bundling is one of the leveraging practices available in a vertical context. 
However, it is important to understand that this categorisation is not absolute. Likewise, the other 
business practices identified can sometimes result in bundling. For Instance, the supplier of goods A 
and B can effectively bundle both goods by refusing to supply them on a standalone basis. Another 
example is denying interoperability that can effectively result in technical bundling of two goods. In the 
event of overlap, I consider for the purpose of this thesis the practice to constitute bundling.
4. The leveraging theory as a well-told horror story or a realistic tale?
As Motta writes in his recent textbook on antitrust economics, whether anti-competitive leveraging is a 
feasible practice is *[o]ne of the most passionate and intriguing debates in the anti-trust field."® It is 
Indeed easy for this debate among lawyers and economists to move from sober to perhaps zealous. 
The opposing arguments are easy to state, even to caricature by slogans.
In order to avoid communication failure, I will use the legal framework favoured primarily in the US to 
discuss the various views. This framework distinguishes perse  tests from the rule of reason tests.“'® It is
® See Motta, Competition P o licy- Theory and Practice {Cambridge, 2004), p. 362.
For details on this framework, see Evans, *How Economists Can Help Courts Design Competition Rules: An EU and US 
Perspective", W.Comp. 93 (2005), pp. 94-95. Recently, this framework was also advanced in the EU: EAGCP Report An 
Economic Approach to Article 82  (Brussels, 2005),
httD://euroDa.eu.int/comm/comDetition/publicatiQns/studies/eaQCD iulv 21 05.pdf. For a different view, see Vogelaar, The 
European Competitbn Rules -  Landmark Cases o f the European Courts and the Commissbn (Groningen, 2004), arguing 
that the ECJ has made clear that under Article 81(1) EC Treaty there is no question of infringements p erse  (pp. 33-46). In 
the line of Vogelaar, see Manzini, T h e  European Rule of Reason -  Crossing t ie  Sea of Doubts”. ECLR 392 (2002).
also helpful to make a distinction between perse  legal and per se illegal. The perse  tests can further be  
divided into modified and absolute tests. Absolute per se illegal means that the practice is always 
unlawful. With modified per se illegal, a business practice is permitted under specified exceptional 
circumstances, whereas modified p er se legal means that the practice is legal unless certain 
requirements are met.
Finally, it is useful to distinguish between unstructured and structured rules of reason. The unstructured 
rule concerns a direct balancing of the positive and negative effects of business behaviour involved.'*^ 
By contrast, the structured rule examines the conduct under investigation through a series of screens 
that sort out the legal from illegal.''^ First, the rule supports a sort of safe harbour clause, under which 
some types of the behaviour under investigation would be legal, per se. Behaviour not covered by th e  
proposed safe harbour is assessed under a second filter addressing its possible anti-competitive impact. 
In the absence o f this effect, the practice would be deemed legal. If the anti-competitive effects a re  
found to be possible and likely to harm consumers, then, as a third filter, an assessment of the possible 
pro-competitive explanations Is carried out. In the absence of positive effects, the practice would be  
considered illegal. If there are positive effects, it is necessary to balance the anti-competitive impact and  
the pro-competitive explanations.
In this thesis, I will show that the legal picture of the ever-enlarging kingdom of corporate scoundrel 
sounds like a well-told horror story. In the early days o f antitrust in the US, this was translated into an  
absolute per se ban for bundling. This arguably extreme position was succinctly phrased by US Judge 
Wyzanski in United Shoe. He claimed that a firm with sufficient market power leverages “whenever it 
does business."i3 Under the EEC Treaty, and later the EC Treaty, this harsh approach was likewise 
visible. In British Sugar, for instance, the Commission found the mere fact that British Sugar had  
“[r)serv[ed] for its e lf the market for the delivery of sugar sufficient grounds for condemning the refusal to  
give its customers the option of purchasing sugar on an ex-factory or delivered price basis.'’^
There has been criticism. Economists in particular have long challenged the persistent legal absolutism. 
The writings of prominent Chicagoans like Posner and Bork have cast serious doubt on the reality of the
For an example of this type of application in the case o f retroactive rebates, see Federico, “When Are Rebates 
Exclusionary?’ , ECLR 477 (2005), arguing that there are “simple and economically meaningful analyses of retroactive rebate  
schemes“ (p. 480) allowing for the balancing of the positive and negative effects.
For the application of a structured rule of reason to loyalty rebates, see Spector, “Loyalty Rebates; An Assessment o f 
Competition Concerns and a Proposed Structured Rule of Reason", Comp. Pol’y Intem’l 89 (2005), pp. 108-114.
13 United States v. United Shoe Machinery, 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass., 1953), at 24.
1̂  Case iV/30.178, Napier Brown v. British Sugar [1988] OJ L284/41, at 71.
legal tale. Their 'one-monopoly profit theorem’ was considered fatal, or so it appeared, to leveraging in 
the short term. In combination with an initial understanding of the efficiencies of bundling, the legal 
community reacted by transforming the legal standard Into a modified per se illegality test, permitting 
bundling under exceptional circumstances. Recent contributions by post-Chicagoans have nuanced the 
sweeping Chicago predictions with a revitalising effect on the leveraging theory. The Chicago 
arguments only hold weight under restrictive assumptions like the presence of a competitive market 
structure and of perfectly informed consumers. In addition, recent research on antitrust economics has 
shifted its emphasis to the leveraging effects in the long term, taking into account the foreclosing effects 
of bundling. Today there is an increasing awareness that bundling Is often pro-competitive. The current 
debate appears to concern choosing between a modified per se legality test or a structured rule of 
reason test. In this thesis, I will propose to apply the latter test.
5. The rules of the game
In the EU and US, bundling is primarily controlled under ex post competition mles. Articles 81 and 82 
EC are the basic instruments under European antitrust law to address bundling. Article 81 EC is 
concerned with restrictions of competition that are the result of cooperation between two or more 
undertakings, whether horizontal or vertical.'’® Article 82 EC Is essentially concerned with the 
repercussions on competition of behaviour by one company.''® In order for Article 82 EC to be 
applicable, the undertaking is required to hold a dominant position.''̂  The undertaking in question must 
abuse this dominant position. The core of the US antitrust regime is § 3  of the Clayton Act̂ ® and § 1 and 
2 of the Sherman Act.''® Within its mandate preventing unfair competitive practices, the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) can also move against bundling under § 5 of the FTC Act.20
15 Article 81 EC Treaty prohibits 'all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between member states and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market."
15 Article 82 EC Treaty prohibits '[a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market 
[...] in so far as it may affect trade between member states."
1  ̂ The wording of Artcle 82 EC Treaty (‘one or more undertakings') lends to the view that the provision may be used to 
control also the abuses by oligolpolists that collectively hold a dominant position. For a review of the concept of collective 
dominance, see Stroux, EC Oligopoly Control {E\M Thesis, 2003).
15 Clayton Act § 3 states that It is unlawful to “lease or sell goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, and other 
commodities, whether patented or unpatented, on the condition that the lessee or purchaser shall not use the goods of a 
competitor of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such a condition may be a substantially lessen competition or tend to 
create a monopoly."
15 Sherman Act § 1 states that "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal’ and it proscribes in § 2 that it is 
illegal to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other persons to monopolize any part of the 
trade or commerce among several states."
20 FTC Act § 5 reads as follows: “unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
commerce, are declared unlawful."
b b b
m m m iÈ È É ìlìÈ S È
Bundling is also addressed under the ex ante rules of merger control In the EU and US. In Europe, the 
present M erger Regulation 139/2004 was adopted by the Council pursuant to Article 83  and Article 308  
of the EC Treaty.21 It replaced, with effect from 1 may 2004, the original Merger Regulation. Regulation 
4064/89.22 The merger rules require the Commission to apply a Significant Impediment of Effective 
Competition (“S IE C ”) to merger concentrations. Under this test, the Commission can block a m erger 
when it “significantly impede[sj effective competition in the common market.“23
In the US, mergers are assessed under the Clayton Act. The Clayton Act is comprised of sections 12 -  
27 of Title 15 of the U.S. Code. It was first enacted in 1914 and was significantly amended in 1936 by 
the Robinson-Patman Act, and later in 1950 by the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act. Section 7 of the  
Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions where the effect "may be substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
6. The main characteristics of the current EC approach
The EC approach towards bundling can be summarised in three points: (1) the current approach is 
form-based; (2 ) the separate-product question is answered by a one-single factor analysis: (3) there is 
an increasing reliance on ex ante merger control to address bundling.
6.1. The current approach is form-based
In the EC, there has been a clear tendency to focus the antitrust analysis on the form o f the practice and  
to qualify it based on formal characteristics rather than by its effects.2+ This form-based approach has  
two negative results. First, it insufficiently appreciates the positive effects of bundling. Second, it 
assumes too easily negative effects by merely characterising a particular business practice as bundling.
2̂  See Regulation 139/2004 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, [2004] L24/1.
22 See Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, [1989] L395/1.
23 See Article 2(3) o f Regulation 139/2004.
2* This reproach has also been made as a general criticism in relation to the existing case law of Article 82 EC Treaty. For a 
very strong claim, see Rousseva, “Modernizing by Eradicating; How the Commission’s New Approach to Article 81 EC  
Dispenses with the Need to Apply Article 82 EC to Vertical Restraints", CMLRev 587 (2005), arguing that neither the 
Commission nor the Community Courts have ever examined the degree o f foreclosure of actual competitors or of the 
likelihood of new entry in Article 82-cases (p. 605). For similar but less dramatic claims, see also Kallaugher and Sher, 
“Rebates Revisited: Anti-Competitive Effects and Exclusionary Abuse under Article 82’, ECLR 263 (2004), stressing “ttie  
persistence o f a ‘structuralist approach’ to Art. 82, in contrast to Art. 81 where a more economics based approach now  
prevails" (p. 263, also pp. 276-277).
For business, this is a bad position, for bundling is a fundamental part of many economic activities. In a 
certain sense, as the renowned Bork observes in his book, T h e M itru s t Paradox:
Every person who sells anything im poses a  tying arrangem ent. This is true because every  
product or source could be broken down into sm aller com ponents capable o f being sold 
separately, and  every seller refuses at som e point to break the m arket down any further.^s
Bundling is often good for consumers. Because bundled goods are in the same place, it can reduce 
search costs as well as the producer’s distribution costs. Producers may likewise be a more efficient 
bundler than the consumer. For instance, few of us would choose to buy the individual parts of a car and 
assemble them ourselves. The current form-based approach downplays, and sometimes even neglects, 
these market realities and concludes too easily that a bundle leads to leveraging.
6.2. The separate-product question is answered by a one-single factor analysis
A second characteristic of EC law relates to the separate-product question in bundling cases. The 
concept of leveraging presupposes that a separate market to which the market power can be 
transferred exists. At first glance, the issue is deceptively simple. Virtually everyone agrees that a cup 
and plate make up a single product, as do a car and its tires. However, persistent controversy exists 
with regard to many other combinations. Are nail guns and the nails used in those guns separate 
products? Are constitute hardware systems and their maintenance services one product, or are they 
distinct?
With the advent of software bundles and other technologically-linked products in particular, this analysis 
becomes very complicated. An illustrative example for this complexity is the recent suit against Apple 
alleging that It unlawfully bundled Its iPod with the ¡Tunes Music Store.^e Computer users who buy 
music from the iTunes Store are forced to use Apple’s iPod. The lawsuit cuts to the heart of the 
separate-products question. It would be necessary to convince a court that a single brand like iTunes is 
a market in itself, separate from the rest of the online music market.
The separate-product question raises the issue where one should draw the line between a bundle of 
individual components and an integrated product with new features. The European Courts, along with 
the Commission, have applied a range of tests to answer this question. These tests have in common
25 See Bork, The Antitrust Paradox -  A Policy at War with Itself (New York, 1978), pp. 378-379. 
25 See www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technolOQV/4151009.stm.
that they apply a one-single factor analysis. They focus on one particular factor in order to determ ine 
whether there are separate products. These tests applied focus on factors like interchangeability, 
consumer dem and, inherent links or m arket practices. The principal objection against these tests is th a t 
they exclude information that can be very useful and essential in order to determine the separability o f  
products. In my view, the separate-product issue is complex, and no one-single factor test is sufficient to  
answer that question.2̂
6.3. There is an increasing reliance on ex ante  m erger contro l to address bundling
In a string o f recent merger cases, the Commission has been greatly concerned with the ability o f th e  
new entity to start b u n d l in g .These cases concern typically, but not exclusively, conglom erate 
mergers.23 Conglomerate mergers are mergers where a company with a strong pre-existing position in  
one or more markets acquires another undertaking that has activities in one or more related markets.
It is important to recognise that leveraging concerns are of a different nature from the kind that th e  
Commission normally has about mergers. For instance, horizontal mergers reduce the number of firm s  
active in a m arket. The increase in market concentration could lead to price increases or a higher risk o f  
tacit collusion in oligopolistic market structures.^ Conglomerate mergers are different. Unlike th e  
horizontal structure, these do not result from the merger creating an anti-competitive outcome, b u t 
rather, future conduct
This means that leveraging will occur only after a given time. It will result from post-merger practices lik e  
bundling engaged by the new undertaking. In this context, one should keep in mind that bundling d o e s  
not normally involve immediate price Increases to consumers. Conversely, it often implies p ric e  
reductions for consumers. It may, at the sam e time, potentially affect rivals by diverting demand to th e  
combined entity, thus lowering their profits. Of course, where leveraging concerns are raised, th e  
Commission emphasises that any price reduction or output expansion directly following the merger is o f
2̂  To my knowledge, the literafejre has also hardly paid any systematic attention to this question. For the bundling-specific 
literature, see Jansen, Die Kopplungsverträge im Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Berlin, 1968), ignoring com petely  
the separate-product issue. Nor reference works elaborate extensively on this issue: see Jones and Sufrin, EC Com petition 
Law (Oxford, 2004), pp. 452-462; and, Faull and Nikpay, The EC  Law of Competition (Oxford, 1999), pp. 166-167.
2® For instance, see Case COMP/M.2220, GE/Honeywell [2004] OJ L48/1 and Case COMP/M.1879, Boeing/Hughes [2 0 0 4 ] 
OJ L63/53.
29 Other examples are mergers in the telecommunications sector: for instance, see Case COM P/M .1845, AOL/Ttme W a rn e r 
[2001] O JL 268/28.
30 Notably, vertical mergers are likewise analysed for their immediate negative effect on prices and output in term s o f 
consumer welfare. The principal concern is that the new entity would have the ability to deny access to key inputs fo r its  
competitors. See Navarro et a i, M erger Control in the EU  (Oxford, 2005), pp. 148-150,273-277.
10
a merely strategic nature. The theory is that reductions are of short duration: consumer welfare will 
ultimately suffer as competitors are ultimately eliminated in the second market.
The Commission approach seems to have found fertile soil in the Community Courts. In Tetra Laval, for 
instance, the ECJ confirmed the Commission’s competence to address leveraging effects resulting from 
mergers.31 More generally, the Court also confirmed that the Commission should not only examine 
direct and immediate effects resulting from mergers, but also indirect effects occurring in the 
foreseeable future.
7. The context of regulatory reform
It must be stressed that this thesis was written at the time of a regulatory reform of EC competition law. 
The law has changed dramatically over the last ten years. Under former Commissioners Monti and Van 
Miert, major reforms regarding enforcement of Article 81 EC and Community merger control were 
initiated and ultimately c o m p le te d .32 In striking contrast, Article 82 EC has thus far largely escaped the 
“revisionary zeal" of DG c o m p etitio n .33 At the same time, the Commission is under pressure to give 
clear guidance to the national competition authorities that, on 1 May 2004, became the principal 
enforcers of the competition rules.3^
In these circumstances, DG Competition has felt the need to review its approach towards Article 82. 
Director General Lowe indeed confirmed in 2004 that its services have started an internal review on the 
policy on abuses of dominant positions.3s The reforms aim to develop an enforcement policy where, as 
Commissioner Kroes recently observed, the "exercise of market power must be assessed essentially on 
the basis of its effects in the m arket."36 This implies that the assessment of each specific case will not
31 Case C-12/03 P, Commission v. Tetra Laval BV.
32 For details, see Ehlermann and Ratliff, “Mario Monti’s Legacy for Competition Policy in Article 82", (2005) Comp. Pol’y 
Intem’l. 79; and, Wesseling, The Modemisahon ofEC A ntitnist (London, 2000).
33 See Eilmansberger, op. cit., p. 129. The belated lack of interest and necessity to reform Article 82 EC can be explained by 
the fact that, for one, the provision itself was hardly applied by the Commission and that, on other hand, there were 
significant enforcement problems with Article 81 EC, calling for a more economic approach. For details, see Hawk, “System 
Failure: Vertical Restraints, Their Motivation and Justification', CMLRev. (1995) 973, stressing that the Commission too 
broadly applies Article 81 EC to agreements having little or no anti-competitive effect, lacking an “inadequate economic 
analysis’  (pp. 974-975).
^  For a detailed overview of the modernised system, see Steenbergen and Van der Woude, “Het EU-mededingingsrecht na 
1 mei 2004: Verordening 1/2003’ , SEW 26 (2004).
35 See Lowe, “DG Competition’s Review of the Policy on Abuse of Dominance’ , Fordham Corp. L. Inst. (2004), p. 163.
36 See Kroes, Tackling Exclusionary Practices to Avoid Exploitation of market Power -  Some Preliminary Thoughts on the 
Policy Review of Article 82". speech 05/537,23 September 2005.
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be undertaken on the basis o f the form that a particular business practice takes. Rather, it will be based  
on the assessment of the anti-competitive effects generated by business behaviour.
That said, the tools available for modernising Article 82 EC are limited. Article 81 EC and the European 
m erger rules were reformed by the revision of Council regulations^^ and soft law guidelines.^^ However, 
Article 82 EC cannot be changed by legislation, other than by an amendment of the T r e a t y T h e r e  is 
no 'Article 82(3) EC,’ and so no room for block exemptions. However, the Commission has a  
prosecutorial discretion. The Commission has announced to publish in 2006 guidelines explaining its  
enforcement ideas.
Bearing in mind these difficulties, in this thesis I will make a modest attempt to develop a modernised 
approach for the evaluation o f bundling. In the concluding chapter, I will draft a framework that could b e  
applied when developing guidelines on bundling.
8. The objective and methodology of this thesis
The central research question of this thesis is to analyse when and how bundling results in an ti­
competitive leveraging under EC competition law in light of recent economic theory. Put more precisely, 
the question posed is actually two-fold:
o  First, what should be the standard for illegal bundling taking into account the recent 
economic literature on the topic, and how does it relate to the current standard applied? 
o  Second, what should be the appropriate legal instmment to implement the proposed 
standard, and what is presently the most applied legal Instrument?
In order to accomplish this examination, this thesis will focus on the relevant legal-economic doctrine, 
laws, their interpretations and applications by the European Courts, the Commission, along with som e  
national courts and antitrust agencies.
^  See Regulation 139/2004 on the Control of Conœntrations between Undertakings, [2004] OJ L24/1, replacing Regulation 
4064/89. [1989] O JL395/1.
3« For instance, Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, [2000] OJ C291/1.
® Amendments of the text of Article 82 EC are unrealistic. The newly drafted Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
signed on 29 October 2004 has kept the original text of the provision. See [2004] OJ C310. Article III-162 of the new Treaty  
reproduces Article 82 word for word. There is in my view one small exception tiiat does not change the substance of th e  
provision. Article 82 speaks of the 'common m arkef, whereas Article 111-162 refers to ‘internal market.’
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This thesis is legal in nature, not in the Law & Economics tradition. That latter movement states legal 
issues in economic term s.^ For its proponents, the legal system is just one among many instruments 
used to achieve economic objectives. By contrast, 1 will use economic insights and theories to 
supplement legal considerations.^^ Economic analysis, in particular macro-economic doctrine, is useful 
for competition lawyers in many ways.
First, it may help set lavi/yers’ pr/orbe/zef about the consequences of bundling. In such, economics can 
help lawyers devise, refine, and perhaps reform the legal test applicable to bundling. Second, the 
competition rules regulate business conduct. They are to be applied to facts that are economic in 
nature. A correct application of the law therefore requires a sound understanding of these facts. Third, 
EC law also worries about the alteration of the market structure and the dynamics of competition.̂ 2 a 
prognosis of such effects must be based on sound economics. Fourth, intent analysis plays an 
important role under competition law. It will often be impossible for even experienced lawyers or 
Commission officials to verify the plausibility of a certain business justification brought forward to deny 
anti-competitive intent. More sophisticated micro-economic expertise may frequently be necessary to 
evaluate whether such claims are justified.
A comparison is made with US iaw, its interpretation and its application, as this legal system has a long­
standing enforcement history with bundling. The Sherman Act dates back to 1890, while the Clayton Act 
was passed in 1914. From the early days, bundling has been scrutinised under these Acts. Although the 
European approach is likely to occasionally result in a different outcome than the US regime, the 
antitrust issues are similar on both sides of the Atlantic. The American legal solutions and development 
of the case law therefore offer an invaluable source of information for EC lawyers. For this reason, the 
analysis of US law precedes the analysis of EC law.
^  For the basics, see Holzhauer and TeijI, Inleiding Rechtseconomie (Gouda, 1995).
For a similar approach, see Van Duijvenvoorde, Informatietechnologie en Europees Mededingingsrecht (Deventer, 1996), 
writing that *[h]et gaat om een juridisch probleem waarvoor een oplossing wordt geax;ht en waarvoor de economie als 
hulpwetenschap kan dienen’  (p. 13). See also Bavasso, T h e  Role of Intent Under Article 82 EC; From ‘Flushing the Turkeys’ 
to 'Spotting Lionesses in Regent’s Park*, ECLR 616 (2005), describing the interdisciplinary nature as follows: ‘antitrust law 
[which] seeks to apply economic prindples to legal concepts* (p. 620).
2̂ For instance, see Gyselen, “Rebates: Competition on the Merits or Exclusionary Practice?", paper, 8*’ EU Competition Law 
and Policy Workshop, June 2003, p. 4; and, Fox, “What is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anti­
competitive Effects’ , ^ltit^ust L  J. 371 (2002), p. 392.
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9. The outline of the thesis
The structure and basic findings of this thesis are as follows. The thesis is in three parts. Part A is o f a  
general nature, while Part B focuses on ex post regulation of bundling, and Part C focuses on ex ante
regulation.
Chapters 1 and 2 form Part A. In Chapter 1 , 1 will explore the economics of bundling. It describes and  
examines the development of economic thought on bundling over the last decades. This chapter is tw o­
fold. On the one hand, I will look at the pro-competitive explanations of bundling, and, on other, discuss 
the anti-competitive impact of bundling. This chapter makes clear that the economic literature is  
complex. Although its result is sometimes ambiguous, it provides valuable insights Into the reasons and  
ability of a firm to engage in leveraging by bundling products. On the basis of these economic insights, I 
seek to develop a structured rule of reason that can distinguish anti-competitive from pro-competitive 
bundling. This rule forms the basis for my assessment throughout the remainder of the thesis.
Chapter 2 discusses the general legal position of the leveraging theory under Article 82 EC. Leveraging 
requires a multi-market context: without a separate market to which the market power can b e  
transferred, leveraging cannot exist. Article 82 EC clearly applies to situations in which the dom inant 
position and the abuse are confined to sam e relevant market. In Chapter 2 , 1 will examine if and how  
extensively Article 82 EC can be applied to these multi-market situations and seeks to categorise these  
various scenarios.
After having examined the leveraging theory on an economic-theoretical and abstract-legal level, I w ill 
move to the practical level of assessment for the remainder of the thesis. Chapters 3 and 4  form Part B , 
and concentrate on ex post regulation of bundling.
In Chapter 3, I will assess the American case law regarding bundling arrangements. This chapter 
focuses on three aspects in order to m ake a proper comparison and draw some lessons for EC law . I 
will first examine the various separate-product tests that have been suggested or applied in U S  
academic and legal circles. These US tests apply a single-factor analysis. I will discuss the advantages 
and disadvantages of those tests, and assess whether and what kind of a multi-factor test would b e  
advisable under US law. Second, I will describe the gradual erosion of the per se antirust liability fo r 
dominant firms bundling two products. I will discuss the reasons articulated in the case law and literature 
for initially having a very strict approach and later one that is significantly more lenient. My examination
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shows that US law appears to move to an unstructured nile of reason test for bundling. Finally. I focus 
especially on the pro-competitive explanations for bundling. I seek to categorise the various 
explanations accepted in the case law.
The EC approach is discussed in Chapter 4 .1 will examine in this chapter the legal standard for bundling 
applied under Articles 81 and 82 EC. As Article 81 EC has already been modernised a great deal, there 
is some divergence between Articles 81 and 82 EC. Under the former, some attempts have been made 
to embrace an effects-based approach. Nonetheless, EC law continues to be form-based and hostile 
towards bundling when taking into account economic insights. The fourth chapter discusses three main 
elements. First, I will discuss the separate-product tests applied by the European Courts and the 
Commission. After discussing the advantages and disadvantages of those single-factor tests, I will 
propose to apply a multi-factor test to determine separability under EC law. The multi-factor test 
proposed is appraised by applying it to the Microsoft case. Second, I will argue that EC law appears to 
apply a test resembling an unstructured nile o f reason. This approach is ideologically based on the 
leveraging theory. I will make a legal-economic assessment of the Commission decisions in Hifti, Tetra 
Pak II and Microsoft. My examination suggests that there may have been different conclusions from 
those reached by the Commission. Finally, I will discuss the various bundling standards that have been 
proposed in the literature and case law. All these suggestions will be dismissed and I propose to apply a 
structured rule of reason.
Part C Is the final part of this thesis. It consists of Chapter 5, and deals with ex ante regulation of 
bundling. In this chapter, 1 will discuss the role of merger control in order to prevent market structures 
facilitating anti-competitive bundling from being and/or coming into existence. This chapter has a two­
fold character. First, I will examine in depth the Commission practice and Court decisions in this area. 
This will show the increasing tendency to rely on ex ante merger regulation under EC law. Second, I will 
discuss the necessity and consequences of this approach. In the concluding chapter, 1 will weave 
together the various threads that can be found throughout the thesis.
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“[A] lawyer who has not studied economics,” a famous judge of the US Supreme Court once wrote, “is 
very apt to become a public e n e m y A s  an essential economic background for the rest of this w ork, 
Chapter 1 discusses the economic literature on bundling and its legal implications.^ The interplay o f 
economic and legal thinking is a  reality. This interrelation applies very clearly to competition or antitrust 
law. The world o f competition law, for decades driven by legal practice, is now increasingly influenced  
by economists and economically sophisticated practitioners. It goes without say that antitrust econom ics 
has been a subject with a long history in the US.^^ o v e r the past ten or so years, economics have a lso  
assumed greater prominence in EC competition analysis.̂ s
This chapter has two objectives. First, it seeks to identify the economic circumstances under w hich  
bundling can lead to anti-competitive effects, and how inten/ention against bundling can be justified a s  a  
legitimate remedy. Second, it also attempts to sketch the legal implications of these economic insights.
See Brandeis, “The Living Law", in; Frankel, The Curse o f Bigness, Misceiianeous Papers o f Louis Brandeis (New Y o rk, 
1934), p. 316.
^  At the outset, an important caveat should be made. This chapter is written by a lawyer. It is an attem pt to understand the  
economic literature through the eyes of a lawyer, and to deduce those aspects that, in my view, are important for lawyers.
In particular, see Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (New York, 1978).
^  For recent discussions on this relationship, see Hutchings, “The Competition Between Law and Economics*, ECLR 531  
(2004); Vickers, “Competition Economics and Policy*. ECLR 95 (2003); and, Hildebrand, T h e  European School in EC  
Competition Law", W.Comp. 3 (2002).
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This is not an easy undertaking^ On the basis of the current status o f literature, I will reject both the per 
se legal ban and the per se illegality test, whether modified or not. I support the view that bundling 
should be submitted to a structured rule of reason. This chapter is particularly influenced by the writings 
of post-Chicago scholars.^
2. A categorisation of bundling
Because the practice of ‘bundling’ comes in various ways, with multiple motivations and a range of 
consequences, it is useful to categorise the term.-̂  ̂jh e  most important types of bundling are: pure and 
rriixed bundling.^ A third type of bundling is called fy/ng.si k
2.1. Pure bundling
The simplest case of bundling is pure bundling. It pertains to the situation in which different goods A and 
B are sold together in fixed proportions. A and B cannot be purchased on a stand-alone basis. They are 
sold together for a single price per bundle. If a consumer wants to purchase A, he must also buy B, or 
vice versa. This form of bundling is sometimes called “package tie-ins."52 Many pure bundles are so 
commonplace that they go unnoticed. For instance, mandatory warranties, bed with breakfast included 
in hotel accommodations, or a car with tyres, steering wheel, radio, engine and brakes are all bundles. A 
newspaper bundles its stories with ads and a hospital bundles surgery with anaesthesia.
A special form of pure bundling arises when the two products are linked technically in such a way that it 
is physically impossible for the consumer to separate them. This form of pure bundling is called
<7 See Bauer, “A Simplified Approach to Tying Arrangements: a Legal and Economic Analysis", Vanderbilt L. Rev. 283 
(1980), noting that “the objectives of tying arrangements are often intermingled and, any event, will be difficult to identify“ (p. 
303).
^  Antitrust economics may be divided into roughly three development periods: ‘Classical', 'Chicago School’, ‘post-Chicago’. 
See Baker, ‘A Preface to Post-Chicago Antitrusr, in: Cudnotta and Pardolesi ef al. (eds.), Post-Chicago Developments in 
Antitrust Law (Cheltenham, 2002), p. 60.
Some commentators would be happy with this attempt to categorise bundling. See Mitchell, Die Rechtliche und 
Wirts(^añ¡iche Bedeuting von Tying (k>ntracts -  E n e vergleichende Darstellung nach deutschem und amerikanischem Rec/if 
(Cologne. 1961), noting that tying contracts as such occupy a very small niche in economic literature and that he has been 
“unable to find any highly theoretical writer who takes the trouble to manufacture a condse definition' (p. 5).
® See Motta, Competition Policy -  Theory and Practice (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 460461; Bishop and Walker, The 
Economics o f Competition Law (London, 2002), pp. 209-210; and, Tiróle, The Theory o f Industrial Organization (Cambridge, 
2001), pp. 172-173.
51 For instance, see Jones and Sufrin, E C  Competition Law  (Oxford, 2004), p. 452; and, Faull and Nikpay, The EC Law of
Competition (Oxford, 1999), p. 165.
52 See Motta, op. cit., p. 460.
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‘technical bundling.’53 With a contractual pure bundle, there may be the possibility of disposing of the 
unwanted part o f the bundle. By contrast, the disposal of the bundled good in a technical bundle may be 
costly or impractical, as it Involves some form of lasting product design decisions. A good example of 
this Is Microsoft’s technological integration o f Windows and Internet Explorer.
Another form o f pure bundling occurs when a seller requires the buyer to purchase not only a certain 
good, but all units that the latter wishes to buy of another good. In this situation, different goods are sold 
together in variable proportions. This means that the quantity of B is not fixed, as it m ay vary from 
customer to customer. The items for sale are A-B, A-2B, A -3 B ... packages. This form o f pure bundling 
may be referred to as “dynamic tying."5^ An illustrative example of this form is a  producer of 
photocopiers selling his copy machines under the condition that the purchaser buys toner only from him.
2.2. Mixed bundling
A second type of bundling is mixed bundling, which is sometimes referred to as “commercial tying.’ss 
The main difference with pure bundling is that the products A and B remain available on a stand-alone 
basis in a mixed bundle. This means that the consumers have the choice between the bundle and the 
separate components of the bundle. The key feature of mixed bundling is that the bundle of A and B is 
sold at a discount to the separate components.56 This means that the price of the bundle is lower than 
the sum of the stand-alone prices of the products separateiy.s^ For instance, fixed menus in a restaurant 
are typically offered at a discount compared to orders a la carte. Other examples of mixed bundles are: 
monthly passes on trains or buses; round-trip airline tickets; all-included vacation packages; and, film - 
with-camera.
As for the differences between pure and mixed bundling, it should be noted that the distinction is not 
necessarily clear-cut. Mixed bundling may come close to pure bundling when the prices charged for the
53 For a discussion o f technical design issues, see Rahnasto, Intellectual Property Rights, External Effects and Anti-Trust 
L a w - Leveraging IPR s in the Communications Industry {Oxford, 2003), pp. 156-163.
^  See Slade, The Leverage Theory o f Tying Revisited (GREQAM paper, 1997). p. 1. Other commentators refer to this form  
of pure bundling as “requirement tying.* See Motta, op. cit., p. 460.
55 See Giotakos, “GE/Honeywell: A Theoretic Bundle Assessing Conglomerate Mergers Across the Atlantic", U. Pa. J. Int'l 
Econ. L. 469 (2002), p. 483.
® See Nalebuff, Bundling, Tying and Portfolio Effects (DTI paper, 2003), p. 14.
^  It should be noted that if a mixed bundle is not sold at a discount, it is not classified as bundling, and not considered in this 
thesis. In rare cases, a mixed bundle might even be sold at a premium to the sum of the individual components. This may 
happen with tickets for a series of summer concerts. Typically, Individual tickets go on sale after the programme tickets are  
sold out. If consumers expect the concert to be sold out, they may be willing to pay more for the series of tickets than an  
individual ticket for one concert See Mohammed and DeGraba, “Intertemporal Mixed Bundling and Buying Frenzies". Rand 
J. Econ. 694 (1999).
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individual offerings are high. Under these circumstances, it would not be rational for customers to buy 
individual products from the bundle in order to match them with a product produced by a competitor.
2.3. Tying
Tying may be described as a case between pure and mixed bundling. The term refers to the situation in 
which a customer who wants to buy A must also buy In other words, it is not possible to buy B 
without A, which explains why this is a tie, not a bundle. Thus, the items for sale are B alone or the A-B 
package. When the sale of A is tied to the purchase of B, A is the tying product and B is the tied 
product.
Tying can be achieved in various ways. Contractual tying, which is the most common form, involves 
imposing a direct obligation to purchase the tied product when buying the tying product. The same result 
m ay also be indirectly achieved through conditions inducing customers to purchase the tied product 
through granting bonuses, rebates, discounts or any other commercial advantage. Instances of ties are: 
a supplier of metal containers might insist that its customers also use its can-closing equipment; Coca- 
Cola might make the supply of its Coca-Cola drink conditional upon the purchase of other soft drinks 
which it carries: and, a telephone company might require that purchasers of telephone services also 
obtain their telephone equipment from the operating company.
58 See Full-Line Forcing and Tie-In Sales (The House of Commons Report, 1981), p. 5. Confusingly, Nalebuff sees tying as a 








2.4. The various types and forms of bundling in overview
The preceding sections have discussed three types of bundling; pure bundling, mixed bundling and 
tying. Dynamic tying and technical bundling are two specific forms of pure bundling. The following table 
illustrates the differences between these concepts. It shows the availability of products A and B, 















In the left column, the table Indicates whether the products are available alone (A or B), in fixed 
proportions (A-B), or in variable combinations (A-B, A-2B, A-3B). In the top row, the type, or form of 
bundling (pure bundling, technical bundling, dynamic tying, tying, or mixed bundling) is determined. For 
instance, in the case of tying, customers may buy either B or only the A-B package.
As for the consumer effects, the following preliminary comment may be made. In the case o f mixed 
bundling, three items (A, B, A-B) are available, whereas under pure or technical bundling, only one item 
is available (A-B). This conclusion may already be seen as indicative of a more lenient approach to 
mixed bundling.
3. Discussion of the efficiency reasons
In Section 3. I will examine the pro-competitive explanations for bundling. “Many products," Van den 
Bergh and Cam esasca write, “are naturally and efficiently tied together or bundled."^^ Selling products




together may indeed generate efficiencies. The recognition of this proposition can primarily be attributed 
to the influence of the Chicago school.®^
However, it is important to carefully assess the Chicago arguments for two reasons. First, some 
commentators seem to mistakenly make a claim of large generalised efficiencies due to bundling. To be 
sure, bundling may result in efficiencies, but It would appear that the scope for legitimate efficiency 
allegations is sometimes narrower than some writings suggest.®^ Second, efficiencies that are often 
attributed to bundling can be achieved without bundling.
The following alleged efficiencies are critically discussed: (1) cost savings; (2) product quality and 
product improvements; (3) reduction of the double marginalisation problem; and, (4) bundling as a price 
discrimination device.®^ This section ends with two caveats that should be taken into consideration when 
assessing the plausibility of potential efficiencies.
3,1. Cost savings
When legally challenged, firms often claim that their bundling arrangements result in cost savings. For 
one, there is ample literature that confirms these claims.®® For instance, Salinger recognises that cost 
synergies are most valuable when consumer valuations are positively correlated.®^ If most consumers 
would buy both goods A and B when sold separately, any cost savings from selling together creates an 
incentive for a monopolist to bundle the goods when the product valuations are positively correlated.
® For reference work, see Eastefbrook, T h e  Limits of Antitrust*, Tex. L  Rev. 1 (1984); Bork, op. cit.; and, Posner, Antitrust 
Law: an Economic Perspective (Chicago, 1976). For a  provoking critique, see Fox, T h e  Modernization of Antitrust: A New 
Equilibrium", Cornell L  Rev. 1140 (1981).
These commentators suggest a per se legality rule for bundling on the basis that the efficiency effects of bundling are 
ubiquitous, while the anti-oompetitive effects are highly unlikely. For instance, see Ahlbom, Evans and Padilla, The Antitrust 
Economics of Tying -  A Farewell to Per se Illegality (AEI-Brookings paper, 2003).
62 Recent work empirically suggests tiiat a bundling strategy may also be seen as a promotional device. Analysing the Italian 
newspaper market where weekly supplements are sold with the newspaper at a higher price, Argentesia shows that people 
who would not buy the newspaper do indeed purchase it because they are attracted by the supplement. See Argentesia, 
Demand Estimation for Italian Newspaper The Impact o f Weekly Supplements (E U I paper, 2003).
63 For references, see Slade, op. cH., p. 4.
^  See Salinger, "A Graphical Analysis of Bundling*, J. Bus. 85 (1995). There is a positive correlation between the goods A 
and B, when customers with a high valuation for good A also have a  high valuation for good B.
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On the other hand, the literature also doubts whether those savings would be significant.®^ Cost savings 
may be grouped into two main categories: (1) those coming from consumption, and (2) those arising 
from benefits on the production side.®®
3.1.1. Consumption efficiencies
Consumption efficiencies relate to the advantages for the customer in purchasing products from the 
same company rather than from separate suppliers. This benefit may be particularly prevalent when 
consumers purchase complementary goods from the same producer,®^ The leading rationale is 
transaction-cost economics. Williamson was one of the first to emphasise the need to take into account 
transaction costs in the antitrust analysis o f business practices.®® Transaction costs concern the costs of 
trading with others above and beyond the price of a product, such as the cost of drafting and enforcing 
the contract.®^
A common type of economies of scope on the consumer-side is generated by search costs. Bundling 
reduces the costs o f searching for the most appropriate combinations of products that satisfy a complex 
need.7® “Tying is," Tiróle nicely summarises, "a ubiquitous feature of economic activities, simply 
because it economizes on transaction costs.”̂  ̂ Thus, purchasing various products at once may be 
beneficial for consumers.
Notably, it is by no means obvious that efficiencies arising from joint distribution are always clear-cut. 
For instance, Ahibom, Evans and Padilla claim that integrated software is an illustrative example of 
consumer-side economies of scope because it is “a response to consumers who value the ease of use 
of bundled software.’̂  ̂ when assessing a claim of consumption-side efficiencies, it is important to 
analyse whether bundling is necessary to realise these economies. It may be the case that supplying
See Scherer and Ross, op. cit., noting that “it is doubtful that the savings realized in this way could be very significanf (p. 
565): and, Utton, Market Dominance and Antitrust Policy (Cheltenham, 2003), p. 243.
“  See Kühn, Stillman and Caffarra, “Economic Theories of Bundling and Their Policy Implications in Abuse Cases: An 
Assessment in Light of the Microsoft Case’ , ECJ 85 (2005), p. 103.
Complementary goods are goods which are typically consumed or resold together.
® See Williamson, “Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach*, U. Pa. 
L  Rev. 953 (1979). In his classic essay, The Nature o f the Firm (1937), Cease laid the foundations for the transaction-cost 
economics. For reference work, see Schmalensee and Willig (eds.), Handbook o f Industrial Organisation (Amsterdam, 1989).
See Buttery, “Blanket Licensing: a Proposal for the Protection and Encouragement of Artiste Endeavour*, Col. L. Rev. 
1245(1983).
See Ahibom, Evans and Padilla, op. cit., p. 40.
See Tirole, “Tiie Analysis of Tying Case: A  Primer", Comp. Pol’y. Int’l. 1 (2005), p. 15.
^  See Ahibom, Evans and Padilla, op. cit., pp. 40-41. They refer to Evans, Padilla and Polo, Tying in Platform Software: 
Reasons for a Rule of Reason Standard in European Competition Law", W.Comp. 509 (2002).
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the products together is sufficient to satisfy consumer demand rather than offering a technically 
integrated product. Returning to Ahibom, Evans and Padilla’s example, it may not be necessary for the 
existence of the alleged efficiencies for the programme codes to be intermingled. Rather, software firms 





Among economists, it is normally accepted that bundling may lead to a reduction of the supplier’s costs 
o f producing and distributing products by achieving economies of scope.^3 jh e  simple argument is that 
bundling is a way to achieve cost savings within the portfolio of a firm. For instance, it is cheaper for an 
undertaking to distribute their software packages on one single CD than to distribute all software 
separately. Another example is that supplies of special copying machine toner or paper may be 
delivered by maintenance personnel during routine servicing in order to save the costs of separate 
visits.
Some economists seem to defend those efficiencies quite easily. For instance, Ahibom, Evans and 
Padilla claim, as an example for such efficiencies, that "machines may be utilised to manufacture two or 
more products allowing the producer to reduce the size or complexity of its factories.’’̂  ̂ Because 
bundling Is primarily a sales strategy, it should be noted that it is very likely that potential efficiencies 
arise on the consumer side. This does not mean that production-side economies do not occur, but they 
are only present if consumers clearly have an interest in purchasing the products together because of 
their preferences for joint consumption. In other words, there is no reason why goods that are jointly 
produced must necessarily be supplied or sold together.
There could be a case for bundling when assembling the complementary parts of a product.̂ 5 por 
instance, it may be cheaper for a car manufacturer to assemble a car than an individual customer 
purchasing the parts separately. In itself, this conclusion is not sufficient reason for bundling, It is 
commonplace for customers to choose the components and then have the manufacturer put them 
together. However, there are limited possibilities to do this at low cost given the costs of product design.
3̂ See Whinston, “Exclusivity and Tying in US v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know", J. Econ. Pers. 63 (2001), p. 
64; Cariton and Perloff, Modem Industrial Organization (Reading MA, 1999), pp. 303-304; Scherer and Ross, Industrial 
Market Structure and Economic Performance (Boston, 1990), pp. 565-566.
”  See Ahibom, Evans and Padilla, op. cit., p. 39. See Kühn, Stillman and Caffarra, op. c i ,  calling this the “joint production 
fallacy" (p. 107).
75 See Nalebuff (2003), op. cit., pp. 31-32.
li V. t
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Therefore, it appears easy to make a claim for efficiencies, but it is not necessarily the case that 
economies of scope in assembly lead to bundling at the sales level.
3.2. Product quality and product improvements
Typically, economists assert that bundling may assure product quality by neutralising: (1) the confusion 
externality regarding the source of poor performance, and (2) the cost-sharing externality when 
consumers knowingly use inferior products with the bundling good. Another pro-competitive reason 
mentioned in the literature is that bundling may result in product improvements.
3.2.1. Quality assurance
The quality-assurance explanation for bundling arrangements is widely accepted in the literature.^^ In 
general, the explanation appears to make sense when: (1 ) it concerns complementary inputs for a  
particular product package; (2) consumers are imperfectly infonned; and, (3) there is a potential for 
competitive suppliers of the bundled good to free-ride on the reputation of the firm supplying the 
bundling good. Firms often rely on this argument in relation to aftermarkets, where the original 
equipment already purchased may be used in conjunction with spare parts and maintenance services 
offered by independent suppliers.^
3 .2 .I.I. The confusion externality
Let us suppose a firm producing a bundle consisting of complementary goods A and B. Because the 
benefits of bundle accrue to the bundling producer itself, independent producers of B do not realise the 
benefits associated with A’s reputation. As a result, independent producers do not have the incentive to 
produce high quality bundled goods because they do not account for the dangers of a low quality 
bundle. If inferior bundled goods are used in conjunction with the bundling good, poor joint performance 
may occur. The problem Is that users of the bundle are unable to distinguish whether the poor 
performance reflects a poor quality bundling good, or a  poor quality bundled good. Under these 
circumstances, bundling may assure that inferior goods do not hurt the seller’s reputation for the  
bundling good because it would remove confusion about the source o f poor performance. It is doubtful
76 See Viscusi, Vernon, Harrington, Economics ofRegutation and M itn is t (London, 1995), pp. 255-256; Carlton and Perloff, 
op. cit., p. 305; Baxter and Kessler, Tow ard a Consistent Ttieory of the Welfare Analysis of Agreements’, Stan. L  Rev. 615  
(1995), p. 621; and, Bork, op. cit., pp, 379-380.
^  For instance, see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Sennces, 504 U.S. 451.
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whether a mixed bundle could really guarantee quality in such a case. Because products are supplied 
separately as well, the production process does not leave much room for quality control. Quality 
justifications are thus more plausible for pure bundling and tying arrangements.
In recent years, the general application of the confusion-externality argument has arguably been 
nuanced.̂ ® lacobucci provides a simple, analytical framework showing that the explanation may often 
be rejected because It fails to account for “buyer rationality."^® The confusion externality requires 
consumers to be unable to distinguish between the quality of A and the inferior B prior to the purchasing 
decision and añer B has been used in conjunction with A.®o Furthermore, it is necessary, in order to 
cause harm, that a reputation for quality is valuable.
It should be noted that these conditions are fairly restrictive. First, if reputation is irrelevant, there is no 
need to bundle because it is not necessary to protect it. This may be the case, perhaps, when buyers do 
not care about high quality products. Second, buyers that value high quality bundled goods will buy from 
the producer of A because they recognise that independent suppliers have a relatively weak incentive to 
provide high quality bundled goods. Consumers that care for high quality render the externality between 
independent suppliers and the bundling good producer unimportant.
Thus far, it concerned our case that consumers unknowingly bought inferior bundled good products. 
There is also some suggestion that bundling may be useful when they knowingly purchase low quality 
bundled goods. As consumers do not account for the potential harm to the reputation of the producer of 
A, they impose an externality on the producer of the bundling good. Given the stochastic nature of the 
relationship between quality and performance, this argument should be nuanced.®^ When using an 
inferior good, this may lead to poor performance, leading to a lower assessment of the likely quality of A.
On the other hand, if there is no breakdown, there may be an upgrade of the perceived quality because 
consumers may infer that there is greater chance that the good is of high quality. This implies that the 
expected reputation and profits associated with a high quality machine will in some circumstances be 
enhanced if low quality is purchased. Thus, If this positive effect dominates, then the confusion- 
externality may not apply.
™ See Nalebuff (2003), op. cit., suggesting a critical approach as he notes: “[sjafety and quality may be the last refuge of a 
scoundrel" {p. 21).
™ See lacobucci, Tying as Quality Control: a Legal and Econoinic Analysis (University of Toronto paper, 2004), pp. 1-2.
80 See lacobucci, op. cit., pp. 6-8.








3.2.1.2. The cost-sharing externality
In addition to the confusion externality, there may be a different externality that cx)uld be neutralised: the 
cost-sharing e x te r n a li ty Bundling may knowingly address the perverse incentives of purchasers to buy 
inferior bundled goods where the supplier directly bears some of the costs related to the bundling good’s 
performance. This may happen when, for instance, the supplier of A guarantees satisfactory 
performance. Purchasing sub-optimal quality B from independent providers allows the buyer to impose 
costs on the supplier of A. To anticipate this, such supplier may charge a higher price for its agreement 
to bear part of the costs of the bad performance. Rather than setting a higher price, the same result 
could be achieved by imposing a bundle, which commits the purchaser to buy only high quality goods.
Notably, the cost-sharing externality is not based on the inability o f purchasers of A and B to distinguish 
between high and low quality bundled goods either ex ante or ex post It is based on the incentives that 
arise when the purchaser can share the costs of knowingly purchased inferior bundled goods. Even if 
the use of inferior bundled goods results in poor performance that may clearly be attributed to the 
inferior bundled goods, the supplier of the bundling good may prefer a bundle in order to avoid sharing 
the direct costs of poor performance.
3.2.2. Product improvements
When goods A  and B are bundled, the combined product may offer benefits to consumers above and 
beyond the individual components. Efficiencies may particularly arise from higher expected quality or 
functionality when components of a product must function together.s^ The caveat is that such claims 
should be assessed carefully. While consumers may think that using two products from the same 
producer would be more convenient or better, this does not imply that bundling is necessary in order to  
realise these possible efficiencies.
^  See lacobucd, op. d t., pp. 39-42.
See Ahibom, Evans and Padilla, op. cit., pp. 41-42.
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3.3. Reduction of the double marginalisation problem
Another potential efficiency reason articulated in the literature is that bundling may be used to avoid 
double marginalisation.84 The issue of double marginalisation has been discussed extensively in the 
context of vertical restraints.®5 Let us suppose a manufacturer and a retailer with significant market 
power. Under these circumstances, the manufacturer will mark up wrholesale price based on marginal 
cost, while the retailer is expected to mark up the retail price accordingly with his input price. As a result, 
the retail price is higher, which in turn leads to a  lower output for the manufacturer’s product. Imposing 
vertical restraints would, many economists argue, avoid this problem.
The theoretical foundation for this rationale is the so-called ‘Cournot effect.’̂ s Cournot argues that 
single-product monopolists for one of the complementary products will set, when acting independently, 
an inefficiently high price. The reason is that each individual firm ignores that a price cut would increase 
the demand for complementary products of other firms. If they were to merge or coordinate their pricing, 
they would lower their prices and consequently make higher profits.
The seductive simplicity of this argument appears to have led to some confusion about when it is 
applicable. For instance, Ahibom, Evans and Padilla claim that bundling also allows the realisation of 
the Cournot effect.®  ̂ Following the intuition of Cournot, their argument is that, if two monopolists get 
together, they would price the bundle of their goods lower than they would when acting individually. Let 
us suppose two producers of separate complementary goods. Because these producers will not take 
into account the impact of pricing based on each other's demand, each firm causes a negative 
externality on the complementary products by raising price. If and when the two firms bundle, this 
negative effect would be internalised and profits and consumer surplus would thereby increase.
However, Ahibom, Evans and Padilla’s understanding of the Cournot effect appears to be somewhat 
flawed.88 Arguably, the principle does not offer any efficiency explanation. First, the actual price effect is 
achieved simply because all of the products are sold by the same firm. The alleged efficiency does not
w  See Ahibom, Evans and Padilla, op, cit., pp. 42-43; and, Nalebuff (2003), op. cit., pp. 37-38.
See Tirale, op. cit., pp. 333-335.
See Cournot, Researches into the Mathematical Principles o f the Tfteo/y of W ealth (New York, 1929, translated by Bacon), 
See Ahibom, Evans and Padilla, op. cit., pp. 42-43. To illustrate their argum ent they dte Owen and Waldman, Video 
Economics (Cambridge MA, 1992). Referring to media markets, Owen and Waldman note, 'in an unbundled system, a 
change in the price charged to subscribers for a given program senrice will affect not merely the demand for that service but 
also demand for transmission, and possibly the demand for complementary program senrices* (p. 219), making, arguably, it 
more efficient to bundle content with delivery,
8® See Kühn, Stillman and Caffarra, op. cit., writing that ‘ [cjertian claims on general efficiency benefits of bundling also 














seem to depend on bundling at all. When selling complementary products, a monopolist will set lower 
prices compared to independent suppliers. This is due to internalisation of the complementarity between 
products, not due to bundling.
Second, contrary to Ahlbom, Evans and Padilla’s claimed result, bundling may sometimes even achieve 
the opposite result. Nalebuff provides an analytical framework showing that bundling may result in a 
significant reduction of price competition between the components of a bundle. As a result, Nalebuff 
argues that the individual prices may actually increase.®^
Let us assume a firm that offers all complementary goods of a bundle and that faces competition for 
each component. When bundling is not allowed, price competition is happening component by 
component. Consumers purchase each component of the bundle from the firm offering the best deal for 
that specific component. But, when bundling is allowed, a price cut by one of the single-product 
suppliers makes marginal customers switch from purchasing the bundle of the multi-product company to  
buying the individual components from the competition. This would also means that part of the benefits 
of inducing consumers to switch is gained by other single-product firms. The reason for this is that 
consumers with a strong preference for one or more of the components offered by the bundling firm will 
not easily switch in the event of a price cut by one of the competitors. As a consequence, the individual 
firms have less of an incentive to cut prices than if all competitors of individually produced components 
would be producing as a single firm.̂ ®
In sum, Nalebuffs observation that bundling may lead to significant price increases is interesting.si 
While competition was effective in the absence of coordination, bundling makes the coordination 
reappear and prevents an aggressive competitive response to the prices of the bundling firm.
® In particular, see Nalebuff, "Competing Against Bundles', in: Hammond and Myles (eds.), incentives. Organization an d  
Public Economics: Papers in Honour o f James M irriees (Oxford, 2000), p. 321. For earlier related work, see Matutes and  
Regibeau, “Compatibility and Bundling of Complementary Goods in a  D uopol/, J. Ind, Econ. 37 (1992).
“  See Nalebuff (2000), op. cH., pp. 329-331. The flip-side of the Nalebuffs prediction is that if rivals can offer a competing 
bundle, then the ensuing bundle-versus-bundle competition is the most competitive outcome of all. See Nalebuff, T ie d  and  
True Exclusion", Comp. Pol’y. Intem’l, 41 (2005), p. 50.
See Nalebuff (2000), op. cit., pp. 332-333.
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3.4. Price discrimination
The last prominent efficiency rationale stated in the literature is price discrimination Bundling is a 
useful tool to reduce the heterogeneity in customer valuations. Stigler has assessed the argument very 
perceptively in his classical analysis of the sale of films to TV stations in packages during the 1940s and 
1950S.33 vvhile distinct, but comparable buyers of films may similarly valúate the entire package of the 
films, they may have different valuations of individual films in the package. By setting a single-package 
price, Stigler explains, the seller does not have to determine these relative values for individual 
components. Yet, the seller can price discriminate between buyers in terms of the implicit prices paid by 
different buyers on individual films within the package.
Stigler's major contribution lies in showing that it may be in principle profitable for a multi-product 
monopolist of independent products to bundle them together. It is now widely accepted that bundling 
(pure and mixed) and dynamic tying allow firms to increase profits by working as a price discrimination 
device. To be precise, it functions as a second-degree price discrimination device because it is 
practised via consumers' self-selection.®^
3.4.1, Pure and mixed bundling as a price discrimination device
Adams and Yellen extend Stigler's analysis of multi-product monopoly with independent goods.®^ They 
describe a simple framework for analysing the benefits to a multi-product monopolist o f bundling 
independently produced goods when consumers have differing tastes.®®
See Posner, op. cit., noting that ‘ [p]rice discrimination by means of tie-ins or otherwise is the most important but not the 
only form' (p. 183). See also Motta, op.c/f., pp. 462-463: Tiróle (2001), op. cit., p. 146; Van den Bergh and Camesasca, op. 
cit., p. 280; Scherer and Ross, op. cit., p. 565; and, Borit, op. cit., p. 376. For a sceptical view, see Nalebuff (2003), op. cit., 
writing that “[wjhile we are not convinced this is the most important application of bundling, either for films or for antitrust 
authorities, it is surely the most studied and best understood" (p. 33).
33 See Stigler, "United States v. LoeWs Inc.: a Note on Block Booking", Sup. C rt Rev. 152 (1963). Stigleris price 
discrimination explanation came under attack by Kenney and Klein, T h e  Economics of Block Booking", J. L  & Econ. 345 
(1983). They argue that, as the films were sold to only one TV station in each separate market, it was not necessary for 
sellers to set prices on films. Sellers could leave it up to competition among TV stations in each market to set relative prices 
of individual films.
^  For reference work, see Philips, The Economics o f Price Discrimination (Cambridge, 1993). First-degree price 
discrimination Is simply perfect price discrimination, where a firm can vary price by unit and by consumers in order to extract 
all consumer rent Second-degree price discrimination relies on consumer self-selection, as it pertains to the situation where 
an undertaking uses selling practices to induce consumers to reveal whether they have high or low willingness to pay. Third- 
degree price discrimination represents the variation of uniform prices across groups of distinguishable consumers such as 
demand-elasticity, time of day, or location.
35 In case of independent goods, there is no systematic relationship between the goods A and B.






A typical rendition of their research goes as follows. Let us assume a firm with a monopoly for goods A 
and B; the products are independent: and, they are produced at zero costs. The monopolist sells the 
goods to two consumers, 1 and 2. Consumer 1 is willing to pay at most €  900 for A and €  300 for B. 
Consumer 2 is willing to pay at most €  1000 for A and €  200 for B. Both consumers are willing to pay € 
1200 at most for the A-B package. The following table gives an overview of the willingness to pay for the 
products available:




When selling the products individually, the monopolist would sell A for €  900, sell it to both consumers, 
and make a profit of €  1800. He would sell B for €  200 and make a profit of €  400. The total profit from 
selling A and B separately would be €  2200. If the monopolist were to sell the products as a bundle, he 
could charge €  1200 per bundle and make a profit of €  2400. Therefore, bundling allows the monopolist 
to extract more consumer surplus and make more profit.
One major limitation of Adams and Yellen’s work is that it concerns a multi-product monopolist. A single­
product monopolist may not have the incentive to bundle independent products because it has only 
monopolised one good instead of both goods.̂ ^ This point is stressed by Schmalensee.®® Following the 
formal set-up of Adam and Yellen, he investigates the economic implications of bundling of independent 
goods by a  single-product monopolist. His model shows that pure bundling is never more advantageous 
for such a monopolist than simply selling its products separately.
Assume a monopoly over A, whereas B is competitively produced. If it were profitable for the single­
product monopolist to bundle B to A, then any competitive good could be bundled to A  because A and B 
are independent products. By contrast, mixed bundling may still enhance profits.^^ Arguably, the 
advantage of mixed bundling should especially be apparent when consumers’ values for the involved 
components are highly negatively correlated. This happens when consumers with a high valuation for 
one component typically have a low valuation for the other component. Under these circumstances,
^  See Carlton and Perioff, op. dt., pp. 312-313.
98 See Schmalensee, “Commodity Bundling by Single-Product Monopolies", J. L. & Econ. 67 (1982), pp. 68-69. 
“  See Schmalensee (1982), op. cit., pp. 69-71.
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mixed bundling significantly reduces the heterogeneity in valuations allowing the firm to extract more 
consumer surplus.
Another limitation is that their model and its follow-ups assume away resale markets.’ oo a  firm engaging 
in price discrimination must be able to prevent resale by customers who pay the lower price either on 
the whole or on one of the components to those who pay the higher price. When claiming price 
discrimination, it is therefore important to carefully assess whether resale may take place. A  final and 
related reason why price discrimination may be imperfect is that no firm has a perfect monopoly. This 
means that consumers may find ways to create substitutes. Consumers will do their best, notes 
Nalebuff, to avoid being subjected to price discrimination. These efforts may result in costs for the 
bundling firm that are particularly large in the case of high-value consumers. 101
Nalebuff illustrates his point with the case of airline pricing. When offering discounted tickets to leisure 
customers, air companies typically impose Saturday night stay-over restrictions, whereas business 
traveilers are still supposed to pay full fare for the flight. In response, some business traveliers extend 
their stays in order to Include a Saturday night. These efforts may result in social losses, well above the 
incremental gains from the extra demand by leisure travellers.'*02
3A2. Dynamic tying as a metering device
Beginning with Bowman in 1957, it has long been understood that bundling may be used as a metering 
device.‘‘03 if consumers use a good in a more or less intensive way, the supplier of that good may want 
to sort consumers according to their intensity of use. In doing so, a firm can determine the consumers’ 
willingness to pay, make them pay accordingly and therefore extract as much as surplus as possible 
from them. Metering may be done directly or through bundling. As for the former, users are charged a 
per-use or metered fee that is typically linear. For instance, a taxi m eter often has a fixed charge for the 
first distance and then a linear charge thereafter. As for bundling, metering is based on the use of a 
related product.
See Schmalensee, 'Pricing of Product Bundles*, J. Bus. 211 (1984), pp. 211-212.
’01 See Nalebuff (2003), op. c/f., pp. 77-79.
102 See Nalebuff (2003), op. c/f., p. 78.
103 See Bowman, “Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem*, Yale L  J. 19 (1957), noting that “the use of a tie-in sale 





Dynamic tying in particular allows a firm with monopoly power to m eter consumers' intensity of use.̂ M 
Suppose th at one user of a copier makes 5 .000 copies per month, while another user makes 25.000 
copies per month. It would be difficult for a company selling only copiers to price its machines in such a 
way that it would extract more revenues from the intensive user.'<05 But, if the supplier of the copier 
could bundle the purchase of special ink to the purchase of its machine, and if he can price the supplies 
so as to realise a supra-normal profit margin on them, he would extract additional profits from the 
intensive user. In this way, the sale of supplies for the copier serves as a substitute for placing a meter 
on the m achine itself.
There are som e noteworthy implications within this example. First, it is important to assess whether the 
metering firm  is not in the position to monitor directly high-intensive customers by asking them a higher 
fee or by placing a counter on the copier. Bundling Is only an option when direct monitoring is costly. 
Second, metering is only a possible explanation in the case of complementary products. Third, although 
economists generally view metering as a benign practice, the practice’s long-term effects should not be 
underestimated.
In the context of aftermarkets, for instance, metering may result in a  direct demise of independent 
service providers and thereby eliminate a previously competitive complements market.''i^ As a result, 
only copier com panies would service their own brand of copier. This would affect the ability of new firms 
to enter the copier market. A new entrant to the copier market would have to incur all of the costs of 
designing, manufacturing and selling copiers, but would also have to set up an entire servicing network. 
This would clearly create high entry barriers to the copier marketio^
3.4.3. General observations
At this point, some general observations with regards to price discrimination can be made. First, 
bundling can only play a meaningful role if a firm cannot engage in first-degree discrimination. For one, 
when selling to individual consumers, first-degree price discrimination Is not a feasible strategy. On the 
other hand, the situation where price and quantities are determined by bilateral negotiations (e.g. large 
firms, industrial goods) provides a means to price discriminate between individual buyers. Suppose a
104 See Carlton and Perioff, op. cit., pp. 316-318; and, Scherer and Ross, op. cit., pp. 565-566.
0̂5 See Bowman, op. cit., p. 23. For other examples, see Bork. op. cit., pp. 376-377.
106 See Nalebuff (2003), op. cit., pp. 75-76.
1°̂  It should be noted tfiat entry barriers increase the potential ability for a firm to unilaterally raise prices, but it may also 
facilitate a collusive outcome.
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firm  selling its output through independent retailers. In that case, it could be argued that the firm should 
offer all components individually and leave the possible packaging to the retailers, which have possibly 
better information about final demand. Therefore, bundling as a means of price discrimination should 
play no role.
Second, the literature offers no general results when bundling increases or reduces total welfare. 
Adams and Yellen do not derive general conditions under which pure bundling increases either the profit 
or social welfare of the firm. They only state that a "prohibition of bundling without more might make 
society worse o ff and that “the deadweight losses associated with bundling might also exceed the 
corresponding loss associated with simple monopoly pricing."^“  Scherer and Ross stress that sellers 
clearly gain at the expense of buyers in case of bundling, but the sum of producer and consumer 
surplus may either rise or fall, depending upon the particular facts of the case.^*^
There also is little empirical work on the usefulness of bundling for price discrimination. To mention one 
recent contribution, Crawford shows in a study on the US cable television market that demand becomes 
more elastic the larger the bundle.̂ ^^ With these meagre results, it is difficult to evaluate the welfare 
effects. The key of price discrimination is that it provides the monopolist with an incentive to set prices at 
a level which allows more consumers to be supplied. This means that not being able to price 
discriminate could result in the exclusion of some consumers. To the extent that bundling leads to more 
consumers purchasing the bundling or bundled good, it is likely to increase social welfare.
ijii
108 See Adams and Yellen, op, c l ,  p. 495.
109 See Scherer and Ross, op .c l., p. 567.
110 See Crawford, The D/scrim;nafo/y Incentives to Bundle: The Case o f Cable Television (University of Arizona paper, 
2001). This paper tests the theory that bundling may reduce consumer heterogeneity. The results provide support for the 
theory and suggest that bundling a top-15 cable network yields an average heterogeneity reduction equal to a 4 .0  % 
increase in firm profits, but also a reduction of 3.3 % in consumer surplus. See also Leslie, ‘Price Discrimination in Broadway 
Theatre", Rand J. Econ. 520 (2004). Using data from a Broadway, Leslie suggests that price discrimination improves the 
firms profit by around 5.0 %, virhile the difference for aggregate consumer welfare is negligible.
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3.5. In terim  conclusions on efficiencies
The preceding discussion makes clear that bundling may lead to important efficiency benefits. However, 
this does not imply that bundling generally leads to large efficiencies. From an economic perspective, it 
would be unhealthy antitrust policy to draw strong conclusions from the fact that bundling may be often 
beneficial for consumers.“'W h e n  companies claim efficiencies, it is important to carefully scrutinise 
their arguments because they may be unwarranted.
First, the alleged efficiencies may be irrelevant because bundling is not needed to achieve them. As 
discussed above, for instance, there is no reason why products that are jointly produced should 
necessarily be sold together in all circumstances.
Second, It is salutary to adopt an ex ante perspective when scrutinising efficiency claims.“' when 
legally challenged, firms often take the view that unbundling is too costly. Economic wisdom supports 
the dismissal o f this argum ent It is necessary to examine whether ex ante there were efficiencies to be 
achieved by bundling, If there were no ex ante bundling reasons, it would create perverse incentives to 
allow a bundling firm to justify an anti-competitive practice because ex post unbundling would be too 
costly.
This flaw is reinforced by the fact some commentators tend to selectively focus on some examples that seem support 
their ideas on efficiencies. For such an arguably misguided approach, see Ahibom, Evans and Padilla, op. elf., pp. 43-44.
^̂ 2 See Kühn, Stillman and Caffarra, op. cit., p. 106; and, Caffarra, “Bundling Functìonalitìes into Products: Technical 
Improvement or Anti-CompetitVe Bundling?’, seminar, Brussels, 19 May 2004.
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4. Discussion of the strategic reasons
4,1. introductory remarks
The preceding sections show that bundling may be used for benign purposes. Economists have also 
established that bundling may have strategic reasons.'*^^ jp©  original and essential concern is the 
theory of le v e r a g in g The debate over the ability of firms to use bundling in order to leverage their 
monopoly power from one market to another has continued throughout the history of antitrust 
economics.
Very broadly speaking, antitrust cases regarding bundling tend to follow a recurring pattern. The main 
m arket for A is dominated by a firm, and an ancillary market for B is also relevant to the examination. 
This pattern is illustrated by the following figure:
In my view, the literature can be divided into two broad categories: leveraging in the short term and in 
the long term.^^  ̂ In the short term, a firm with market power may engage in bundling in order to directly 
extend its market power from the main market to the market for B. In the long term, a  company may 
attem pt to raise entry barriers in market for B in order (1) to achieve or strengthen a market position in 
that market, or (2) to protect its original market power in the main market A. The latter long-term  
mechanism is also known as ‘defensive leveraging.’!̂ ®
This chapter focuses on the leveraging theory. It does not discuss other strategic reasons mentioned in the literature such 
as evasion of price controls, facilitating tadt collusion or obscuring prices. For details on those theories, see Carlton and 
Perloff, op. c l, pp. 304-305; and, Viscusi, Vernon and Harrington, op. c l,  p. 257.
11̂  Most of these commentators suggest a per se ban for bundling. For instance, see Turner, "The Validity o f Tying 
Arrangements under the Antitrust Laws’, Harv. L  Rev. 50 (1958).
113 It should be noted that the literature does not explicitly make this distinction, although some authors distinguish between 
‘leveraging’ and 'defensive leveraging.’ Most economists appear to distinguish between 'leveraging' and foreclosing’ or 
‘exclusionary effects.’ Arguably, their analytical flaw is that they confuse the mechanism (/.e. leveraging in the short and long 
term ) and the potential negative effects that leveraging in the long term may have {/.e. fbredosure or exdusion due to 
creating entry barriers). For instance, see Bishop and Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law (Oxford, 2002), pp. 25- 
27. By contrast, Tiróle takes a completely different position. He argues that "[ip is difficult to think of reasons that tying should 
be considered a separate offense [...] Competition policy should therefore analyze tying cases through the more general lens 
of a predation te s t’ See Tiróle (2005), op. c l ,  p. 25. Tirole's suggestion has merit; leveraging in the long term resembles a 
predation scheme. However, I respectfully reject his approach as bundling offers, unlike predatory pricing, a monopolist the 
ability to engage in no-cost predation, and there is, contrary to the predation, no need to establish recoupment 
11® See Carlton and Waldman, T h e  Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries’ , 
Rand J.Econ. 194 (2002).
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4.2. Leveraging in the short term
4.2.1. M onopoly p ro fits  in both  m arkets A  and B
The main negative attitude in the literature has its origin in the intuitive theory of leveraging.“*̂  ̂
According to this theory, bundling arrangements serve as a device for “monopolistic exploitation."”  ̂
Supposing A and B are  bundled together, the main concern is that a multi-product firm with a monopoly 
in the m arket for A could extend some market power inhering in A to market B, so that it could obtain 
two monopolies. The idea is that a monopolist's use of its power in its own market to control activities in 
market B typically represents an attempt to spread its power to the other market. Bundling would then 
permit the monopolist to transfer additional wealth from consumers beyond the amount that it could 
secure from simply setting a monopoly price for A .” 9 In other words, the monopolist obtains a monopoly 
profit twice because there are two dead-weight losses. Therefore, antitrust policy has been to look for 
the evidence of raising prices by a  dominant company in the market for B.
4.2.2. The Chicago critique
While the simplicity o f the leveraging theory resulted in its use for a long period, Chicagoans proclaimed 
the “death of [the] leverage theory" during the 1970s and 1980s,‘’2o They assert that the leveraging 
hypothesis, while appealing on the surface, m akes no economic sense. “The lever is not," as 
Hovenkamp writes, “a plausible way to increase monopoly profits.”''2i
The Chicago criticism is based on the ‘one-monopoly profit theorem.”22 The first attack came from the 
founding father of the Chicago tradition. Director. 123 He argues that, even if a firm is a monopolist in the 
bundling good market, it cannot create a second monopoly profit elsewhere. Assuming that A and B are 
complements, he reasons that the bundling firm might, at most, possess a monopoly over the A-B
See Nalebuff (2003), op. cit., pp. 19-20; Tiróle (2001), op. cif., pp. 333-335; Van den Bergh and Camesasca, op. cit., p. 
278; Slade, op. cit., pp. 2-3; Vtscusi, Vernon and Harrington, op. cit., p. 248. It is noteworthy that neither Carlton and Perioff 
nor Scherer and Ross mention the leveraging theory.
See Report o f the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Law  (1955), p. 145.
113 See Van den Bergh and Camesasca, op. cH., p. 278.
120 See Kaplow, ‘&ctension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage', Col. L. Rev. 515 (1985), writing that “[tjhere are a 
number of deficiencies in the analysis of recent commentators who have attempted to proclaim èie death of leverage theory” 
(P .15).
121 See Hovenkamp, Federal Antitnist Policy -  The Law o f Competition and its Practice (S t Paul, 1994), p. 371.
122 See Ahibom, Evans and Padilla, op. cit., p, 44.
123 See Director and Levi, “The Law and the Future: Trade Regulation”, North. U. L  Rev. 281 (1956), pp. 290-292.
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package. The total amount of restriction that the monopolist will profitably be able to impose is fix e d  
regardless of the practice is used. Otherwise put, for a given amount of power, indirect exploitation can 
cause no more damage than direct exploitation. Director’s criticism is followed by Posner and Bork. 
Posner elegantly writes the following:
A fata! w eakness o f the leverage theo7  is its inability to explain why a  firm with a monopoly o f 
one product would w ant to monopolize com plem entary products as w ell. It m ay seem  obvious 
that two monopolies are better than o ne, but since the products by hypothesis used in 
conjunction with one another [...] it is not obvious at all. If the price o f the tied product is higher 
than the purchaser would have had to pay in the open market, the difference will represent an  
increase in the price o f the final product o r service to him, and he will dem and less o f it, and will, 
therefore, buy less o f the tying product^24
Bork calls it the “fallacy o f double counting.“̂25 He notes that a “tying arrangement, whatever else it may 
accomplish, is obviously not a means for gaining two monopoly profits from a single monopoly.’ ^26 
Som e Chicagoans argue that neither independent nor complementary goods allow for leveraging.127
In my view, the Chicago critique is cogently appealing. Consider the case of complementary goods A 
and B, used in fixed proportions. Suppose that A is priced at a  profit-maximising monopoly price of €  
200  and B is priced competitively at €  30. In order to achieve a double monopoly profit, the sale of A  
m ust be made conditional upon the purchase of B and the price of B must be increased by, for instance, 
€  50 . As a result, consumers will value B less, and therefore will perceive the package price as being 
too high. They are not willing to pay €  250 for the A-B bundle. This means the bundling firm must reduce 
its package price to maximise its profits. Any attempt to charge monopoly prices for B serves to increase 
the price of the A-B bundle as a whole. Pricing in the market for B is thus disciplined because increasing 
the bundle’s price reduces the demand for A.
4.2.3. Critical examination of the Chicago predictions
It should be noted that the result of the Chicago theory is hardly surprising. If A and B are used in fixed 
proportions, they can be effectively considered as one product. Although a profound attack, the 
sweeping Chicago predictions can be criticised. The Chicago argument that leveraging is not possible is 
based on restrictive assumptions.
124 See Posner, AntHm t Law: An Economic Perspective (Chicago, 1976), p. 173 (emphasis author).
125 See Bork, op. cit., p. 140.
126 See Bork, op. cH., p. 373.








Arguably, these assumptions are often unrealistic. The first assumption is that the bundled good market 
is competitive.''^^ This position ignores a number of obvious realities.''^^ For instance, the position 
assumes that there are low or no entry bamers, that no substantial risk rises from the fact that the new 
entrant is inexperienced, and that there Is no greater risk of failure when the two new ventures must be 
launched. The second assumption is that A and B are used in fixed proportions. In many situations, like 
dynamic tying, this is not the case.‘'3o Another crucial assumption Is that consumers must be perfectly 
informed-''^! If they are not able to calculate the price of the A-B package, there is the risk that they are 
exploited. W hen these assumptions are relaxed, bundling may have strategic motivations, which may 
lead to welfare reductions.^32
In sum, the Chicago critique makes clear, though perhaps very strongly worded, that the leveraging 
motivation needs a more profound analysis.
4,3. Leveraging in the long term
Although the Chicago theorem is persuasive in a static context, its major limitation is that it does not 
take into account dynamic considerations. This observation was introduced in 1958 by Kaplow.''^ A firm 
may be willing to incur costs from a static perspective in order to achieve greater overall profits after 
taking into account long-run effects. Refemng to the one-monopoly profit theorem, Kaplow stresses that 
firms may be willing to accept some losses in the short term, in particular when they can be offset with 
some efficiency gains, in order to have advantages in the long run.*'^
Recently, post-Chicago research developed a number of models in order to understand the competitive 
implications of bundling when the structure o f the bundled m arket is oligopolistic, rather than perfectly 
competitive. These theories have a long-term perspective and focus on exclusionary effects. They can
128 See Kaplow, op. cit., describing this the tendency to assume perfect markets’ {p. 536).
129 See Porter, ‘Strategic Interactions: Some Lessons from Industry Histories for Theo ^ and Antitrust Policy’ , in: Salop et al.. 
Strategy, Predation and Antitnjst Analysis (FTC, 1981), making a similar point about Imperfections in the capital market (p. 
466).
See Ahibom, Evans and Padilla, op. cit., p. 45. For instance, see also Slade, op. cit., arguing that leveraging by a single 
monopolist is generically profitable regardless the structure of demand and even without excluding competitors completely 
from the bundled m arket Note that Slade’s study excludes pure bundling in fixed proportions and does not assess the 
welfare implications, however.
‘'31 See Van den Bergh and Camesasca, op. cit.. p. 276.
3̂2 See Lofaro and Ridyard, ’Beyond Bork: New Economic Theories of Exclusion in Merger Cases", ECLR 151 (2002), p. 
151.
3̂3 See Kaplow, op. cit., writing that “f it  is hard to understand why so much of the criticism of leverage theory operates 
primarily in a static framework" (p. 530).
3̂» See Kaplow, op. cit.. pp. 526-527.
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be grouped under two headings depending on the market they are focusing on: (1) bundling may lead to 
entry deterrence in the market for B; and (2) bundling may affect future competitiveness of rivals in the 
m arket for A.
4.3.1. Entry deterrence in market B
4.3.1.1 Bundling increases the stakes of competition; Whinston
A first attempt to identify the possible entry deterring effects of bundling was undertaken by W hinstonJ^ 
In a simple, analytical framework, Whinston shows that bundling is a commitment to sell in the future 
only in a bundled form. Such a commitment may deter entry in the market for B. Suppose that A and B 
are independent goods and that there is a monopolistic market for A and an oligopolistic market for B. 
By bundling these goods, the monopolist raises the stakes of the competition game in the bundled good 
m arket because losing sales in market B also implies losing sales in market A. In turn, this signals to 
competitors in market B that pricing will be aggressive. Fiercer competition in market B will decrease 
rivals’ profits and may force them to exit market B.
Three important conditions need to be satisfied in order to achieve the welfare-reducing effects that 
W hinston p re d ic te d .F irs t, the bundling firm must enjoy market power in the market for A.‘>37 Without 
such power, the undertaking does not have the bargaining leverage required to impose a bundle on its 
customers. Second, the bundling firm must be able to commit itself to the bundling strategy. This means 
that the firm must be able to credibly threaten to refuse supplying customers unless they comply with 
the bundle.̂ ^s if an undertaking is unable to pre-commit itself, re-entry may be expected to take place 
when the bundling firm tries to increase prices in the market for B. Credibility depends on genuine 
commitment to bundle. This is difficult for undertakings because there is always a tendency, in order to 
keep sales up in the market for A, to relax the bundle once sales are lost in the market for B. Technical 
bundling is considered to be a credible commitment.'>39 Third, bundling must result in the complete exit 
of rivals from the bundled good market.
135 See Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure and Exclusions (NBER paper, 1989). A variant o f Whinston’s approach was submitted 
by Seidmann. He argues that bundling as a leveraging device is not foreclosing the bundled market, but facilitating evasion 
of competition for the bundled good sales and thereby getting supra-competitive prices. See Seidmann, "Bundling as a 
Facilitating Device: a Reinterpretation of the Leverage Theory", Fconomfoa 491 (1991).
13S See also Lofaro and Ridyard, op. cit., pp. 153-154.
137 See Whinston (1989), op. c/f., pp. 6-8.
138 See Lofaro and Ridyard, op. cit., pp. 151-152.
139 See Motta, op. cit., p. 464.
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Focusing on the long-term effects, Whinston offers a convincing explanation for leveraging by bundling, 
although his model has some limitations. It should be recognised that the exclusion of the rival is not 
necessarily profitable for the monopolist under all circumstances. If a monopolist sells a bundle, it may 
well be that some consumers who have bought A in combination with the competing B will not even buy 
the A-B bundle supplied by the monopolist This could happen when consumers do not value A very 
highly and prefer the rival’s product
Furthermore, Whinston’s model does not take, by assumption, into account efficiency gains. When 
making an overall assessment, the possible efficiency gains o f bundling must be weighed against the s 
welfare-reducing foreclosure effects of the arrangem ent The final limitation of Whinston’s model is that 
it holds position depending on the interrelationship between the demands for goods A  and B. If A and B 
were complements and sold in fixed proportions, the monopolist’s incentive to bundle these goods 
would be reduced.''^'' This is because the one-monopoly profit theorem holds. However, Whinston notes 
two instances where a  monopolist may successfully exclude competitors In a complementary market.'’^̂  
Bundling complementary goods m ay make economic sense when: (1) the monopolised good is no 
longer essential for ail uses of other components; and, (2) there exists only an inferior alternative to A.
One strand of economic analysis doubts whether the work o f Whinston may form a strong basis for 
antitrust policy. On an analytical level, the theory that bundling may raise barriers to entry is generally 
susceptible to the sam e criticism that can be raised against all entry barrier arguments. Demsetz, for 
example, stresses the fact that while something may be an entry barrier, this says nothing about 
whether it is socially harmful or beneficial.'*^^ o n  a doctrinal level, Ahibom, Evans and Padilla criticise 
the theory for being fragile because minor changes in the assumptions could result in a different 
outcome."'^ For instance, the assumptions o f pre-commitment and the exit of rivals are strong. If they 
are not m et, the monopolist’s strategy may fail and even increase the intensity of price competition 
instead.
See Motta, op. cit., p. 465.
See Whinston (1989), op. cit., pp. 21-41.
See Whinston (1989), op. cit., pp. 30-41,
See Demsetz, ‘Barriers to E n t^ , Am. Ec. Rev. 47 (1982). 
See Ahitwm, Evans and Padilla, op. d t., p. 48.
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4.3.1.2. Bundling deprives entrants of adequate scale: Nalebuff
In a reœ nt article, Nalebuff develops a variant o f the Whinston model that aims to relax, in the case of 
complementary goods, the conditions under which bundling may be welfare-detrimentaU^s Looking at 
the case for bundling arrangements in an oligopolistic environment, Nalebuffs contribution constructs a 
model for a multi-product monopolist holding perfectly complementary goods A and B. Nalebuff shows 
that bundling makes it harder for rivals with only one of these goods to enter the market because it 
allows an incumbent to deprive the entrant of an adequate scale. Although Nalebuff recognises that 
price discrimination provides a reason to bundle, he argues that the gains are small compared with the 
those from entry-deterrent effect.“*̂ ® Referring to the latter effect, Nalebuff notes that “[i]t is in this role 
that bundling truly shines."^^/
Let us consider a company with market power in complements A and B. The monopolist sells A and B 
as a bundle and the entrant sells only B. Under these circumstances, the monopolist attracts those 
customers with a high valuation for the bundle and charges a high price for them. The entrant sells to 
those consumers of B who have a low valuation for good A and charges them a low price. As a result, 
the new entrants’ profit is reduced, which may result in foreclosure of market B. In contrast to 
Whinston’s theory, credibility is no issue in the Nalebuff model because even when entry is not 
foreclosed, the price for B and the monopolist’s profits are higher with a bundle than without
a-
Although the Nalebuff model gives useful insight into how bundling may function, it has limited 
importance for the present discussion. Its major limitation is that it assumes monopoly power in both 
markets, which is often not the case.
4.3.1.3. Bundling affects R&D incentives: Choi
Another recent theoretical breakthrough is accredited to Choi.“*^  Considering independent goods, his 
work analyses the effect o f bundling arrangements on R&D incentives. He shows that bundling can be a
«5 See Nalebuff, 'Bundling as an Entry Barrier", Quart J. Bus. Econ. 159 (2004). See also Carbajo, De Meza and Seidman, 
‘A  Strategic Motivation for Commodi^ Bundling', J. Ind. Econ. 283 (1999). In their analysis, product A is produced by 
monopolist while B, an independent product, is produced by the monopolist of A  and another firm. In the absence of 
bundling, normal competition forces the price of B down to marginal cost while bundling by the monopolist introduces the 
equivalent of product differentiab'on into B. The result is that bundling allows the monopolist to capture some profits in market 
B and can also cause a corresponding reduction in social welfare.
See Nalebuff, op. cif., p. 160.
«7 See Nalebuff (2004), op. c/f., p. 183.
See Choi, Tying and Innovation: a Dynamic Analysis o f Tying Arrangements (Columbia University paper, 1998).
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profitable strategy via its long-term effects on innovation, even in the absence of rivals’ The 
simple model by Choi gives credence to Kaplow’s contention that the Chicago criticism is beside the 
point because it attempts to disprove the existence of long-term leveraging effects by using static 
anatysisT^o He basically extends Whinston’s theory by allowing for the possibility of R&D investments 
that precede any price game.
The Choi model does not consider whether the increased market share in market B due to bundling is a 
profitable strategy in itself. Choi sees bundling as a means through which a firm can commit to more 
aggressive R&D investment in market B. Considering innovation in the analysis o f bundling, he 
describes two effects. On the one hand, bundling increases the R&D incentives o f the bundling firm In 
market B because the undertaking can spread out its R&D costs over a larger number o f units. On the 
other hand, the bundling strategy takes sales away from the bundling firm’s competitors in the bundled 
good market. This market effect then translates into reduced R&D incentives for competing firms.‘'5i In 
sum. bundling is a  profitable strategy if the gains, via an increased share of dynamic rents in market B, 
exceed the losses that result from intensified price competition as Chicagoans predict.
Likewise, Choi, together now with Stefanadis, considers the innovation effects of bundling arrangements 
in the case of complementary goods.̂ 52 (n their paper, a firm has a monopoly in the components A and 
B and faces an entrant in each market. Each potential entrant can enter the market for one component if 
it has a successful innovation. If the monopolist commits to bundling, entry Into one component m arket 
is possible only if both innovations are simultaneously successful.
The explanation is simple. If only one entrant obtains the innovation, there is no demand for its good 
because A and B are complements. Bundling makes the prospect of recouping an investment less 
certain, which will reduce the rivals’ incentive for innovation. This means that it will be unlikely that 
innovations by competing component producers will out-compete the bundling monopolist. In 
conclusion, the models of Choi clarify that the loss of rivals in the competitive market may change the  
incentive for innovation, thus potentially harming consumers.
i<9 See Choi, op. e ft, p. 3.
See Kaplow, op. eft., p. 526. See also Choi, op. e ft, pp. 6-9.
This result is consistent with the empirical evidence in Vanderwerfs paper shoviring that most innovations in electronic 
wire preparation equipment have come from firms who also produce parts effectively bundled to the equipment. S e e  
Vanderwerf, ‘Product Tying and Innovation in US W ire Preparation Equipm enf, Research Policy B3 (1990).
152 See Choi and Stefanadis, Tying, Investment and the Dynamic Leverage Theory", Rand J. Econ 52 (2001).
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4 .3 .2 . Future com petitiveness o f rivals in m arket A: Carlton and W aldm an
Bundling may also affect future competitiveness of rivals in market A, The use of bundling to preserve 
monopoly in the bundling market seems to be a  prevalent strategy by firms in industries subject to rapid 
technological change such as IBM and Microsoft.'’^̂
The most important paper on this issue is presented by Carlton and Waldman. Their work is related to 
Whinston’s in that they also focus on bundling and entry deterrence. They do not, however, concentrate 
on the monopolist’s ability to use bundling so as to increase current profitability in market B. Rather, 
they provide a dynamic model explaining that a  monopolist may leverage through bundling in order to 
deter future entry into the monopoly market because of the effect on overall profitability.''̂ ^
The Carlton and W aldman model is based on the idea that complements to current products may 
develop into substitute products of current or future products of the monopolist. By reducing the market 
presence of the current complements, the monopolist could prevent the emergence o f serious 
competitive threats in the future. Let us consider a two-period setting in which there is a  monopolist of a 
primary product in the first period. In the first period, both the monopolist and an alternative producer 
can produce a complementary product whose use requires the primary product. In the second period, 
both firms can again produce the complementary product, but, in addition, the alternative producer can 
also enter the primary market. Carlton and Waldman cite as an example a computer (primary good) and 
a printer (complementary good).
Their model shows that bundling can be profitable for the monopolist in such a setting, supposing that 
the alternative producer faces entry costs for both the primary and complementary markets or that there 
are network effects for the complementary good rather than costs. By bundling, the monopolist stops the 
alternative producer from selling any complementary units in the first period, which reduces the 
alternative producer’s chances of returning to the complementary market. In turn, this reduction can stop 
the alternative producer from entering either the primary or complementary markets in the second 
period, allowing the monopolist to preserve its primary market monopoly. As for antitrust policy, the key 
factor is establishing whether bundling shifts demand away from rivals with potential future gains is
153 See Carlton and Waldman, “How Economics Can Improve Antitrust Doctrine towards Tie-In Sales', Comp. Pol’y In fl 27 
(2005), pp. 31-32.
See Carlton and Waldman (2002), op. c/f., noting that ‘strategic use of tying to deter the entry of effident firms that raises 















possible in relation to a particular product market. This means that it m ust be assessed whether there 
are plausible mechanisms that generate a link from current market share to future advantages.
However, there are some limitations to the Waldman and Carlton model. Although recognising the 
conceptual simplicity of the Waldman and Carlton model, Ahibom, Evans and Padilla stress that its 
validity depends on strong assumptions.^^s First, the theory requires that entry into the bundled good 
market is very costly. Second, the model does not apply when consumers have a demand for only the 
monopoly good. Another shortcoming is that it is not clear if bundling is detrimental to the ultimate 
consumers. After all. the model predicts a price drop at least for buyers purchasing the bundle. The 
model thus involves an inherently difficult trade-off between price drops and the likely negative effects of 
entry deterrence.
In sum, these sections clarify that leveraging in the long term is ordinarily not possible in the absence of 
significant foreclosure in market B.
5. Special topics
Two special topics with regards to bundling m erit a separate evaluation. These are: (1) bundling in a 
network environment and (2) the remedies after anti-competitive impact has been established.
5.1. Bundling and network effects
The theory of network effects means that there is a greater benefit to a good or service when the 
number o f users lncreases.‘*56 For instance, as the number of users of a mobile network increases, the 
membership of this network becomes more valuable because any user can call more destinations and 
be called by more users. Bundling may be used to broaden the scope o f an existing network because it 
may stimulate product sales via a network externality effectisr Compared to the ample literature on the 
general effects of bundling, there are only a few references to bundling and network effects in the 
literature.
See Ahibom, Evans and Padilla, op, c/f., p. 50. For similar review, see Bishop, *A Note on the Economics of the Microsoft 
Decision", Competiüon Law  Insight, May 2004, p. 14.
156 Por a general discussion, see Katz and Shapiro, “Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility", Am. Econ. Rev. 
424 (1985); and, Liebowitz and Margolis, "Network Effects and Extemalit'es", in: Newman (ed.). The New Paigrave 
Diciionary o f Economics and Law  (London, 1998).
5̂7 See Nalebuff (2003), op. cÆ, pp. 53-56. In relation to the decision in Microsoft, Ehlermann and Ratliff, “Mario Monti's 
Legacy for Competition Policy in Artide 82", Comp. Pol’y Int’i 79 (2005), p. 85.
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For instance, Nalebuff provides an interesting example of bundling and network effects in the mobile 
sector.“*®« He shows that bundling comes into play when finms offer discounted access to the bundle of 
the users on their netwoiic. Let us consider four mobile phone operators with 25% market share and a 
potential entrant. The network operators charge each other a  common temiination fee across the 
network. Consumers typically do no care which network is used by the person they call. The incumbent 
operators may change this situation by introducing a variety bundle in which calls within the same 
network will not be charged a termination fee. As a result, consumer prices for calls on the same 
network will be lower than calls outside the network. Networks with a large number of users have an 
advantage over small entrants. The idea is that the more people one can call at lower prices, the larger 
the number of people will be connected to the network. A new entrant is not in the position to lower its 
prices for calls on the same network because most of its calls will be outside its network. In other words, 
the bundle extends the network effect for the four incumbent networks.
Bundling by pricing may therefore deny the new entrant network effects along with denying the entrant 
sufficient scale to become economically viable. Therefore, the incumbents may create barriers to enter 
the market. In a recent article, Dolmans and Graf, two lawyers, summarise Nalebuffs concern very well:
Markets characterised by network effects m ay be particularly vulnerable to tying. In such 
markets, the num ber o f custom ers who acquire the product influences future dem and for th a t 
product. The w ider the product’s distribution, the m ore dem and will there be for the product. In  
such cases, a tie will have an im pact beyond  the tied cu sb m er because the increased  
distribution share resulting from the tie will also im pact on future dem and for the tied product*®^
Notably, Nalebuffs argument could also be reversed. Bundling can be used to deny network effects to 
rivals. The general idea here is that bundling is used as a way to deny rivals access to some large 
fraction of the market. As a result, they are denied a minimum efficient scale. For instance, bundling as 
a metering device may have this result. As discussed above, metering the use of photocopying 
machines may result in the disappearance of spare parts or of the servicing market. In turn, this makes 
entry in the copy machine business harder because a firm wanting to enter would also have to build up 
a service network.
158 See Nalebuff (2003), op. cit., p. 54. Another example given by Nalebuff is the bundled upgrading of Word and the other 
application programs of Windows Office.
159 See Dolmans and Graf. “Analysis of Tying under 82 EC: The European Commission’s Microsoft Decision in Perspective", 
W.Comp. 225 (2004), p. 234 (emphasis added).
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The literature suggests furthermore that defensive leveraging is particularly likely in industries 
characterised by network effects and substantial innovation virtiere product lifetimes are short.''“  
Typically, it is hard to find a credible link between bundling today and competition tomorrow. However, 
network effects are a powerful mechanism by which leveraging strategies from one period can have 
permanent effects in the future.
This can be explained by the Windows-IE bundle offered by M i c r o s o f t . T h e  analysis should focus on 
the incentives of application developers. Essentially, by bundling the operating system with its own 
Internet browser, Microsoft can generate a sunk cost effect on the consumer. The consumer will only 
purchase the software supplied by the competition, in addition to the bundled product, if to him, the price 
is lower than the value of the quality differential. In a world without bundling, the consumer would be 
willing to pay the marginal cost of production plus the perceived quality differential to competitors. This 
means that the price that can be extracted by competitors is lower, and thus the sales quantity is 
reduced.
As a consequence, the proportion of users for the rival software is reduced, and this leads to a situation 
where applications software offered in the future is more likely to be developed for the Windows system. 
This means that relatively small disadvantages to rivals generated by bundling can have very large 
effects on excluding competition.
5.2. Bundling and remedies
If bundling has an anti-competitive impact, it is important to look for remedies that would solve the 
antitrust problem.''®  ̂ These remedies may be structural or behavioural.''®® The key requirement is that 
remedies are adequate to deal with the adverse effects identified in the most proportionate way.
The economic literature provides useful insight into the effects of a  particular remedy in the event of 
bundling. The following remedies are discussed: (1) blocking a m erger or requesting divesture; (2) 
refraining from bundling: (3) commitment to limit the discount of the bundle; and, (4) participation of 
rivals in the bundle.
See Kühn, Stillman, Caffarra, op. c/f., pp. 98-101.
This example is borrowed from Kühn, Stillman, Caffarra, op. a t., pp. 98-103.
152 See Nalebuff (2003), op. cit., pp. 65-69.
163 For details on structural remedies, see Shelanski and Sidak, “Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries', U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 
(2001).
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5.2.1 Blocking a merger or requesting divestiture
A  structural approach to bundling in the form of blocking a merger or requesting a divesture has as its 
m ajor advantage that it is a simple and direct remedy. For one, it can be easily imposed, and monitoring 
is not required. On the other hand, it is often loo broad. First, it may make consumers worse off because 
they have no access to product improvements or distribution efficiencies. Second, such a remedy 
unnecessarily sacrifices efficiencies because anti-competitive bundling could also be addressed under 
antitrust laws. In this respect, Heiner duly notes that “blocking a merger because the merged firm may 
engage in unlawful tying is like banning the sale o f Ferrari cars because some owners will not respect 
the speed limit."̂ ®^
5.2.2. Refraining from bundling
A simple behavioural remedy is that a firm commits itself not to bundle. A firm can do that by having to 
provide an itemised breakdown of the package price, giving a price for each component in the package. 
The advantage of this commitment Is that it is quite simple to Implement. The firm will violate this 
commitment when the component elements are not itemised or add up to more than the package price.
The major disadvantage of this remedy is that it makes some consumers worse off, particularly in the 
case of mixed bundling. Another disadvantage is that it may be hard to monitor. The individual prices of 
the components should not add up to more than the bundle price. Two observations are possible in this 
context.
First, as prices are generally negotiated, buyers alleging an illegal bundle must demonstrate that the 
supplier was trying to bundle two products. Second, another reason why it may be difficult to enforce the 
commitment is that the incentive to bundle might come from the buyer rather than from the seller. 
Buyers are generally tempted to receive a larger discount. Therefore, they will agree to buy both goods 
A and B if they are better off.
154 See OECD, Portfolio Effects in Congionierate Mergers (Paris, 2002), p. 237.
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5.2.3. Commitment to limit the discount of the bundle
A variant o f the commitment to refrain from bundling is that the company under Investigation limits the 
extent o f the bundle discount. The major advantage of this remedy is that firms may continue bundling. 
Because bundling may function as an entry deterring device, there m ay be, however, a need to reduce 
the adverse effects of such practice. The greater the discount offered, the more difficult it becomes for a 
entrant to compete.
The obvious disadvantage is that reducing the bundle discount results in a price increase for 
consumers. Another disadvantage is that the Commission would intervene in the undertaking’s 
independent pricing policy.
5.2.4. Participation of rivals in the bundle
A final solution is to allow bundling but to require that competing component suppliers participate in the 
bundle. For instance, this approach may work well In the case of a  ski pass ticket for a number of 
mountains or an unlimited cinema pass including many c in e m a s .‘'®5 The advantage is that it provides 
consumers the efficiency gains of the variety bundle without causing the exclusion effect to firms left out 
of the bundle. The major disadvantage is that it may result in practical issues like access and 
monitoring.
A variant of participation in the bundle is a must-carry obligation. Under this remedy, the accused 
company is forced to carry a component offered by a rival. This rem edy may be useful in the case of 
bundling and network effects because it helps increase the availability of rival products and thus restore 
some of the level playing field. The disadvantage is that it may incur costs on the bundling firm.
See Nalebuff (2003), op. cit., pp. 65-69.
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6. Discussion of the legal implications
6.1. The doctrinal debate
There has been persistent controversy in legal-economic literature about the legal standard for bundling. 
Drafting a legal framework on the basis of the economic literature discussed in the preceding sections is 
not an easy undertaking. There have been marked differences of opinion and fierce debates concerning 
the scope and rationale of such standard.
The doctrinal debate can be summarily handled as follows: one string of commentators submits 
bundling arrangements to a per se (modified) rule of legality, while other scholars favour a p e r se 
(modified) rule of illegality.
6.1.1. The per $e legal rule
Predominantly In the US, there is an important current of opinion that advocates a very lenient approach 
towards bundling. This recognition is introduced by Bowman in 1957.“'®® Bowman is skeptical whether 
monopoly power could be leveraged because in most cases, any increase in the profits realised in 
m arket B is offset by the losses in market A. He believes that the pro-competitive effects normally 
account for the use of bundling practices. Likewise, Bork and Posner advance a per se rule of legality 
for bundiing.̂ s^
One of the first to analyse bundling in Europe was Jaeger.̂ ®® He sees bundling as bolting together the 
main obligation of a contract with a supplementary obligation. His reasoning is that only in very rare 
cases where there is absolutely no connection between the main and supplementary obligation do we 
find an unlawful bundling clause. As bundling is unlikely to extend m arket power, Korah suggests that
See Bowman, op. cH., claiming that a per se ban for bundling *has been based upon an imprecise evaluation of the 
economic effects o f tying practice in extending monopoly” (p. 34).
167 See Bork, op. cif., noting that “there is no viable theory of a means by which tying anangements injure competition" (p. 
381); and, Posner, op. cH., suggesting that the legal ban for bundling should be *radically curtailed” (pp. 182-183). See also 
Carson W. Bays, "Tying Arrangements Should Be Per Se Legal”, Am. Bus. L  J. 625 (1989).
168 See Jaeger, “Illiceità dei c.d. Tying Contracts nel Trattato Istitutivo della CEE e nelle Leggi Americana Antitrusf, Riv. Dir. 
Ind. 474 (1958).
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firms bundle for benign objectives, like measuring royalties and quality controI.‘'69 These authors 
suggest that bundling should be virtually always perse  legal.
In recent days, Ahibom, Evans and Padilla have been the main proponents of this laissez-faire 
school.‘'7o They suggest a modified per se legal rule for bundling on the basis that the efficiency effects 
of bundling are ubiquitous, while the anti-competitive effects are highly unlikely. The rare instances that 
antitrust inten/ention is required necessarily involves a delicate assessm ent of the parameters of the 
relevant economic theories. On the basis of a decision-theoretic argument, Hylton and Salinger come to 
the same conclusion. They argue for an antitrust approach that effectively results in a p erse  legality of 
bundling.‘'7i Based on examples from many competitive markets, they assert that benign bundling is so 
prevalent that the probability of anti-competitive effects arising is very sm all. The legal implication of this 
observation is that the optimal competition policy should assume as a prior belief that bundling is not 
anti-competitive.
Other commentators suggest a legal standard of per se legality for specific forms of bundling. For 
instance, Sidak proposes, in his earlier work, antitrust immunity for product design decisions resulting in 
technical bundling.“'^
6.1.2. The perse ban
On the other side of the spectrum, there is the hard-line position taken by some scholars who appear to 
treat a bundling practice as prima facie evidence of anti-competitive behaviour.‘>73
The classical articulation of this approach is found in Turner's seminal work, published in 1958."'74 He 
claims that market power in market A could be leveraged into m arket B. Therefore, bundling must
1®® See Korah and Rothnie, Exclusive Distribution and the EEC Competition Rules (London, 1992), p. 187. For similar view, 
see Zanon, T ie s  in Patent Licensing Agreements’ , ELRev. 391 (1980), noting that “ties do not allow a firm to extend its 
monopoly, in order to reap double monopoly profits' (p. 393). 
iro See Ahibom, Evans. Padilla, op. cit.
See Hylton and Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A  Decision Theoretic Approach’ , Antitnjsl L  J. 69 (2001), noting that “a 
superior mle would be one of per se legality" (p. 20). For a similar approach, see Padilla, “A Practical Approach to Analysing 
Bundling and Portfolio Effects cases’ , 8 * EU Competition Law and Policy EUl Workshop, June 2003.
See Sidak, "Debunking Predatory Innovation’ , Col. L  Rev. 1121 (1983).
173 For many years, this has been the legal position in the EU. For details, see Chapter 4.
i7< See Turner, op. cit., p. 59. For similar claims, see Nalebuff (2005), op. cit., p. 53; Celnicker, "A Response to Carson W . 
Bays’ Call for Per Se Legality o f Tying Arrangements’ , Am. Bus. L  J. 145 (1990); Slawson, “A Stronger, Simpler Tte-ln 
Doctrine’, Antitnjst Bulletin 671 (1980), p. 672; and, Chesterfield and Oppenheim, “Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts 
to a Revised National Antitrust Policy", Mich. L  Rev. 1139 (1952), p. 1181
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always be prohibited under antitrust law. The same legal response is advocated by Bauer.'i^s He is 
convinced that bundling does not produce any economic benefit. A perse  ban provides a “clear line for 
businessmen and courts, and will simplify the judicial application of the rule” and is “quicker, cheaper 
and surer for the courts to enforce, it has greater deterrent value, thereby broadening the scope of 
conduct that never reaches the courts.'̂ ^^
Campell even argues that technical bundling in software markets should be submitted to a p e r se 
b a n .!^  Authors like W ollenberg and Baker argue that bundling should be subjected to the rule of reason 
tesl.''̂ ® At first blush, their approach seems to be different, but a closer analysis reveals that, in fact, they 
advance a perse  ban given the very restrictive conditions, if not the impossibility, of their test.
The common objection in the EU is that bundling results in the extension of market power. 
Distinguishing between the main and supplementary obligation of a contract, Jansen focuses on the 
effects of a bundling arrangement on the secondary market relating to the supplementary obiigation.^^ 
He argues that bundling should in general be prohibited unless the tied product in itself has no value 
independent of the bundling product. In his standard work, Mestmacker also emphasises the third party 
effects of bundling.'iso He concedes that bundling typically restricts competition in the bundled market by 
excluding third parties or by raising higher bamers, suggesting a strict approach to bundling. In a recent 
contribution, Eilmansberger advances that tying is one of business practices that are in themselves 
abusive because it concerns an instrument to leverage market power.''®^
6.1.3. Evaluation of both approaches
ITS See Bauer, op. cit., noting that “tie-ins in general do not produce any economic benefits, except in certain specific 
situations, and may lead to other societal losses' and, therefore, claiming that “there will be no economic loss from 
condemning a//tying arrangements, regardless of the seller's motivations" (p. 286).
176 See Bauer, op. cH., p. 286.
1^ See Campell, “Fit to Be Tied: How United States v. Microsoft Incorrectly Changed the Standard for Sherman Act Tying 
Violations Involving Software", Loy. L  A. Ent. L. Rev. 583 (2002), p. 603.
178 See Wollenberg, 'An Economic Analysis of Tie-In Sales; Re-Examining the Leverage Theory", Stan. L  Rev. 737 (1987); 
and, Baker, 'The Supreme Court and the Per Se Tying Rule: Cutting the Gordian Knof, Vir. L. Rev. 1235 (1980).
179 See Jansen, Die Kopplungsverträge im Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Berlin, 1968), pp. 158-165.
180 See Mestmâcker, Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht (München, 1974), p. 189.
181 See Eilmansberger, “How to Distinguish Good from Bad Competition under Article 82 EC: in Search of Clearer and More 




In view o f the literature discussed, I argue that neither approach can be a basis for sound competition
policy.''®^
On the one hand, competition policy should not be based on the assumption of a per se  legality of 
bundling, whether absolute or modified for four reasons.
First, the blanket assertion of efficiencies due to bundling should be nuanced. For instance, as 
discussed before, efficiencies that are typically attributed to bundling may often be achieved without 
bundling. Another flaw  is that the proponents of the per se legal test focus selectively on certain markets 
where efficiencies appear to be supported. Contrary to their claim, steady-fast tying of products that 
could be sold separately in competitive markets is no basis for the conclusion that bundling almost 
invariably produces consumer benefits.̂ ®® As Kuhn, Stillman and Caffarra rightly note. “[b]asing strong 
conclusions on casual empiricism is a dangerous exercise.’ ®̂̂
Second, bundling allegations merit careful Investigation because the effects on competition can be very 
large. Put simply, it is doubtful that the arithmetic suggested by the Chicagoans reflects the reality of the 
market under all circumstances. In the long tem i, a dominant firm may have a clear interest to bundle 
the sale o f products for which it is subjected to competition to the sale of a product on which it has a 
monopoly. It may be interested to do so, even if, in the short term, this should not allow it to ask a higher 
price for bundled goods together. As W aelbroeck rightly comments, bundling may "serve the purpose of 
foreclosing competitors and thus, in the end, of asking higher prices also for the tied product."^®®
Third, it is arguable that Hylton and Salinger have wrongly applied decision theory to support a per se 
legality approach.‘•®® In my view, they should focus on the appropriate probability of anti-competitive 
effects rather than recognising that there is an ex  ante probability that bundling may be anti-competitive. 
Furthermore, they neglect the probability that bundling generates efficiencies and the magnitude of 
these effects. A final, fourth observation relates to the potential spill-over effects of a very cautious
182 Already, some commentators have suggested such an intermediate approach for technical bundling. See Sidak, An 
AntiUust Rufe for Software Integration (Yale paper, 2001); and, Brief of Lesstg As Amicus Curiae, United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D .D .C . 2000) (No. 98-1232).
For such claims, see Evans and Salinger, “Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and 
Implications for Tying Law", Yale J. on Reg. 37 (2005).
See Kühn, Stillman, and Caffarra. op. cit., p. 107.
See Dents W aelbroeck, “The Compatibility of Tying Agreements with Antitrust Rules: A Comparative Study of American 
and European Rules’ , Oxf. YEL 39 (1987), p. 54 (emphasis added).
For a serious critique, see Kühn, Stillman, Caffarra, op. cit., pp. 111-112.
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enforcem ent approach for bundling. Such a policy could namely encourage firms with anti-competitive 
motives to implement their agenda by bundling, rather than more clear-cut abusive practices.‘‘87
On the other hand, competition authorities and complaining rivals should prove that a bundling 
arrangem ent results in leveraging. They must not assume negative effects by applying a per se ban to 
bundling.“'®® Two important observations can be made.
First, such a policy seriously downplays and sometimes even neglects the potential efficiency gains of 
bundling. Economic literature clarifies that bundling may result in efficiencies, but these have to be 
claim ed and proven by the defendant.
Second, a  per se ban appears to rely simply on the theoretical possibility of leveraging effects 
articulated in some models in order to claim such effects in specific cases. Indeed, post-Chicagoans 
show that leveraging may be a profitable business strategy, especially in the long term. It is submitted 
that the plausibility of leveraging must be carefully verified in each specific case. However, contrary to 
Ahlbom , Evans and Padilla, this does not imply that antitrust Inten/ention necessarily requires a delicate 
assessm ent of whether the parameters and assumptions of the relevant economic theory fit the case.
In sum , both approaches are flawed and must not form, in my view, the basis for antitrust intervention.
6.2. The rule of reason test
Typically, courts and competition authorities are not so explicit about their logic when they articulate 
their legal tests. I wish to contend that they always adopt prior beliefs about the likelihood of specific 
business practices restricting competition. As a starting point for their legal analysis, this is a valid 
position. Arguably, the prior expectations of the consequences of bundling should be based on the 
economic insights discussed in this chapter.“'®® On the one hand, bundling may have serious anti­
competitive effects, particularly in the long term, if the tying firm has significant market power. On the 
other hand, it may generate efficiencies, though not as large and general as claimed by some authors.
This recognition was introduced by Williams, economist, in a conference speech. H e notes that ^ a n y  types of abusive 
behaviour can be replicated by bundling.* See Williams, ‘ Economic Effects from Bundling*, speech, Oxford Competition 
Policy Conference, 15 September, 2004.
See Klein and Saft, op. a t., correctly noting that most legal and economical analysis has been 'arbitrary and incorrecf (p. 
346).
189 See also Evans, op. a t., p. 95.
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These characteristics, along with the flaws of the other approaches, suggests adopting a rule of reason 
test. Essentially, there are two types; an unstructured test and a structured test.
6.2.1. The unstructured test
The reliance on the unstructured rule of reason test is very problematic and requires a direct weighing of 
the pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects o f the business practice. In practice, courts rarely 
quantify the positive and negative effects. They simply assert that one side or the other has no impact or 
is unrealistic. In fact, it is doubtful that, even with the help of economists, courts could correctly weigh 
the negative and positive effects of a particular practice. W hile theoretically the test has merit, it does 
not ultimately offer what the courts, antitrust authorities or businesses really need: operational and 
predictable rules that account for the possibility o f error. Therefore, the test is to be rejected.
6.2.2. The structured test
The structured test offers a functional and predictable legal standard for parties involved. The problem is 
that none of economic theories discussed are designed to answer the question whether or not the 
strategic use of bundling is likely in a particular m arket with firms selling multiple products. In fact, the 
real debate is about identifying the circumstances under which anti-competitive effects of bundling are 
likely to occur. An effective antitrust policy for bundling should focus on those specific features that the 
literature recognises as necessary conditions for generating anti-competitive leveraging. In order to 
incorporate the theoretical insights of the literature, the following approach is suggested.
6.2.2.I. Safe harbour rules
It is first necessary to create safe harbour rules that can quickly filter out obviously innocent cases of 
bundling,'*9i This saves enforcement costs. Such an initial filter should be based on the most easily 
observable characteristics. Two elements are important here: market power and nature of the products.
As for market power, bundling should never be attacked if the firm engaging in bundling does not have a 
significant degree of market power in market A  or one of the bundled components. Without market
The framework o i assessment Is borrowed from Kühn, Stillman, and Caffarra, op. a t., pp. 112-120.
For similar approach, see Regulation 772/2004 on the Application o f Artide 81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of 
Technology Transfer Agreements, [20041OJ L 123/11, Imposing safe harbours on the basis of market share thresholds.
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power, the bundling undertaking has no strategic incentive to bundle. Any aim to exclude competitors by 
means of bundling would be thwarted by its rivals.
As for the products involved, bundling should not, even when market power is present, be attacked 
when it concerns substitutes and in principle complements.
I
First, if products are substitutes, they belong to the same relevant market, so there is only one market. 
Bundling two substitutes does not make economic sense, unless there are efficiency reasons such as 
economies of scale or scope.''̂ ^ Bundling two goods together may prompt aggressive pricing responses 
by rivals, yielding lower profits to all market participants. By bundling substitutes, the bundling firm would 
create this cannibalisation effect and incur high losses. Second, considering the Chicago critique on the 
leveraging theory, bundling of complements is unlikely to have anti-competitive results, unless one of 
the markets involved is characterised by demonstrable network effects or a  significant number of rivals 
is foreclosed from the tied market.
B .2.2.2. Likelihood of anti-com petitive effects
After a firm is not protected under the safe harbour rules, it is necessary to produce criteria that make it 
possible to decide whether bundling is sufficiently likely to have anti-competitive effects. It is not 
possible to develop a simple checklist that allows competition authorities to distinguish hamiful from 
benign bundling.
However, there are some characteristics that help in making a preliminary decision concerning the 
probability that bundling may reduce economic welfare. That probability is likely to be significant if:
-  There is market power;
-  There is a strong commitment to bundle;
-  Competitors are unable to match the bundle;
- Rivals are likely to exit the tied market;
-  There are entry bamers in the tied market;
-  There is no buyer power;
- Demonstrable network effects are present;
I i
192 See OPTA, Bundling: The Economic Theory and a Frameworfc for Ex-Ante Regulatory Assessment (The Hague, 2004), 
pp. 18-19, http://www.ODta.nl/downloatl/EPN04.Ddf.
57
-  The bundled goods are R&D intensive or branded products: or,
-  The bundled complements have the potential of becoming future substitutes
In the end, the plausibility o f leveraging effects being at play should be carefully verified in each specific 
case. The key requirement of the investigation is to identify either that there are monopoly profits in the 
short term or that there are entry-deterrent effects in the long term. For the latter, it is important to 
establish that bundling is used to reduce the profits of existing or potential competitors, so as to either 
monopolise a market or to sustain an existing monopoly. An important elem ent in such an assessment 
is documentary evidence o f exclusionary intent. The absence of convincing efficiency arguments should 
be taken as evidence that bundling is more likely to have been driven by antkom petitive motives.
6.2.2.S. Efficiencies
The literature makes clear that bundling may result in efficiencies. Antitrust analysis should, in my view, 
be open for pro-competitive explanations. These benefits should be taken into consideration after the 
anti-competitive effects of the bundling arrangement have been established.
To be sure, efficiency benefits could off-set the competition analysis. It is important to assess whether 
ex ante efficiencies are to be achieved. The defendant’s argument that unbundling would be costly or 
impractical must be in principle rejected. Efficiency claims must be assessed carefully because they 
often can be achieved without bundling. As the bundling firm is better informed, competition authorities 
should only consider those efficiencies that are explicitly submitted by the bundling firm. Likewise, 
because the defendant company has better information about how it achieves these efficiencies, the 
burden of proof should be placed on the defendant.
58
l i U
6 ^ 3 . Framework of assessment
The structured rule of reason that I propose can be summarised in the following figure.''®^ This figure 
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The economic literature makes clear that antitrust scaitiny remains warranted in bundling cases. The  
question whether intervention is required demands a balanced answer. Wherever there is m arket 
power, authorities have reason to be watchful. Bundling a monopoly product with one that is 
competitively provided may result in the competitive market being distorted, particularly when there are 
network effects. It offers a way to extend monopoly in market B and to raise entry costs in that m arket in 
order to protect market A.
193 My figure is an adaptation o f a mulfr-step approach developed by Evans. For details, see Evans, The Jefferson-Parish 
Tying Test: An Artifact from the Pre-Chicago Era ofAntitnjst, 12 May 2 X 5 , 
www.aei.brookinas.orQ/admin/authorDdfs/paae.DhD?id=1146.
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However, bundling may also offer efficiencies. Sorting out such benefits and costs o f bundling will be 
particularly challenging for the courts and authorities, as the balance of benefits and costs will differ 
significantly case to case. The main economic rule of thumb is that the plausibility of leveraging 
potentially at play should be carefully verified in each specific case. Essential pre-condition is a position 
of market power in one of the markets involved. There are no bundles o f substitute goods, just like, in 
principle, there are no bundles of complementary products. Beyond this observation, conditions under 
which these effects may occur differ considerably.
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“The leverage issue,” write Areeda and Kaplow, “permeates antitrust law.'i^^ Their statement is not only 
true for US law, but the issue has likewise been a major theme under EC law.̂ ^s in sharp contrast, 
however, there is virtually no discussion in legal writings on this topic. More extensive commentaries 
dedicate usually only a short chapter (or even none) to the leveraging is s u e .C h a p te r 2  discusses in 
detail the leveraging theory as a general antitnist concern under EC law.
1« See Areeda and Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis-Problems, Text, Cases (Boston, 1988), p. 705.
This is acknowledged in the literature. See Howarth, ‘Tetra Laval/Sidel: Microeconomics or Microlaw*, ECMR 369 (2005), 
p. 372; and, Eilmansberger, “How to Distinguish Good from Bad Competifon under Article 82 EC: in Search of Clearer and 
More Coherent Standards for Anti-Competitive Abuses’ , CMLRev. 129 (2005), pp. 153-166.
Exceptionally, a few authors have a brief discussion of the leveraging issue: Whish, Competition Law (London, 2003), pp. 
200-202; Jones and Sufrin, EC  Compefffion Law (Oxford, 2004), pp. 373-378; and, M égret Cömmenfaire -  le Droit de la CE  -  
Concurrence (Brussels, 1997), pp. 285-287. Generally, the literature appears to blur the distinction between the alleged 
competition concern and the attadced practice. Most standard text books are structured according to practices, not concerns. 
For instance, see Mestmacker and Schweitzer, Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht (München, 2004); Korah, An Introductory 
Guide to EC Competäion Law and Practice (Oxford, 1997); and, Goyder, EC Competition Law (Oxford, 2003). The 
Commission seems to apply the same approach. In its Notice on the Application of the Competition Rules to Access 
Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector, [1998] OJ C 265/2, it identified as competition problems in the 
telecommunications sector, leveraging, bundling, and discrimination (at 82).
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Leveraging concerns the transfer of power from the main market to an ancillary market. The concept of 
leveraging thus requires a multi-market context.'’^̂  This chapter aims to examine if and how far Article 
82 EC can be applied to these multi-market situations in order to capture the leveraging concern.
2. The connection between dom inance and abuse
The application of Article 82 EC appears to presuppose a kind of link between the dominant position 
and the abuse of such a position. After all, the syntax of the expression 'abuse of a dominant position’ 
makes it likely that it is not necessary to merely establish the existence of both ‘abuse’ and ‘dominance.’
The literature and the Commission have undoubtedly advanced this reading. In its 1956 Memorandum  
on the Conœntration o f Enterprises in the Common Market, the Commission wrote that “an improper 
exploitation of a  dominant position must be assumed when the dominant firm utilizes the opportunities 
resulting from its dominance to gain advantages it could not gain in the face of practicable and 
sufficiently effective compefition.”̂ ®̂ W hile commenting on the Memorandum. Joliet remarks that the 
“abuse consists of taking advantage of the d o m i n a t i o n M o r e  recently, Gyselen likewise writes that:
a correct implementation of Article [82] requires that one distinguishes cases whereby a 
monopolist seeks to outcompete rival competitors through ‘superior skill, foresight and industry’ 
from cases where it actuates its monopoly power to overcome these compefitors.^
In a very recent contribution, Eilmansberger concedes that the contention that abuse and dominance 
must be somehow connected finds additional support in the definition of dominance used by the 
Community Courts.201 According to Hoffmann-La Roche, "the dominant position [...] relates to a position 
of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being 
maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of the consum ers . ” 202 Thus, the literature 
appears to have accepted the need to establish som e link.
9̂̂  On the term ‘multi-market situations', see Larouche, Competition Law and Regulation in European Telecommunications 
(Oxford, 2000), pp. 268-269.
See 1956 Memorandum on the Concentration o f Enterprises in the Common Market, a t 24 (emphasis added).
1»  See Joliet, Monopolization and Abuse o f Dominant Position (The Hague, 1970), p. 232 (emphasis added).
200 See Gyselen, "Abuse of Monopoly Power within the Meaning of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty: Recent Developments", 
Fordham Corp. L  Inst 597 (1990), p. 598 (emphasis added).
See Eilmansberger, op. cit., p. 142.
“ 2 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche [19791ECR 461, a t 138 (emphasis added by Eilmansberger).
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Ultimately, the Courts have confirmed that some kind of link is Indeed required. In Tetra Pak II, the ECJ 
observed flatly that the “application of Article 86 presupposes a link between the dominant position and 
the alleged abusive conduct."203 In Insh Sugar, the CFl emphasised with regard to the possible abuses 
of a collective dominant position that the abuse “has to be capable of being identified as one of the 
manifestations of such a joint dominant position."204
Having settled the issue in principal, this conclusion subsequently raises the question of what kind of 
link needs to be established.205 Despite references that could be drawn from the text of Article 82, it 
seem s that a causal relationship between the dominant position and the abuse is not required.206 In 
Continental Can, the applicant defended its abusive acquisition of two rival companies with the 
argument that it had not used its market power to effect the merger in question. It submitted that 
causation was essential:
Article [82] reveals that the use of economic power linked with a dominant position can be 
regarded as an abuse of this position only if it constitutes the means through which the abuse is 
effected. But stnictural measures of undertakings -  such as strengthening a dominant position by 
way of merger -  do not amount to abuse of this position within the meaning of Article [82] of the 
Treaty.
Advocate General Roemer purported the same view. In his opinion, he argued that the wording of 
Article 82 appears to hint that its application could be considered only if the position in the market was 
used as an instrumentaos
In sharp contrast, the Commission recognised that the use of market power merely plays a part in the 
examples of discrimination, excessive pricing and tying that were mentioned in Article 82 EC. According 
to the Commission, market power clearly receded as a factual characteristic to the prejudice of 
consumers in the case of limitations of production, markets or technical developments. In these cases.
203 Case C-333/94P, Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission (Tetra Pak II) [1996] E C R 1-59521, at 27. Notably, the cited 
statement was almost verbatim repeated by the Commission in its 1998 Notice on Access Agreements in the 
Telecommunications Sector (at 81).
204 Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar v. Commission [1999] ECR II-2969, at 66.
205 For an extensive review, see Vogelenzang, "Abuse of a Dominant Position in Article 86; The Problem of Causality and 
Some Applications", CMLRev. 61 (1976), pp. 66-72
206 See Mestmacker and Schweitzer, op. a t., p. 388; Whish, op. off., pp. 197-198; Van Bael and Beilis, Competition Law of 
the European Community (Oxfordshire, 1994), pp. 576-577; and, Fierstra, Europees Mededingingsrecht (Deventer, 1993), p. 
130. For a different view, see Groeben and Sciiroter, KommentarZum EV/EG-Vetrag 2/1 (Baden-Baden, 1999), pp. 831-832. 
202 Case 6/72, Continental Can [1973] ECR 215, at 19.
208 See Advocate General Roemer in Case 6/72, Continental Can [1973] ECR 215, concluding that "if this is indeed so, then 






there only needs to be harm to the consumer reflected in the conduct of the dominant firm having an 
effect on the market.209
However, the ECJ rejected the Interpretations brought forward.210 The Court found that it was possible 
to abuse a dominant position without actually exercising or bringing the market power held by the 
dominant undertaking into play.211 It justified the application of Article 82 EC to Continental Can's 
acquisition of rival competitors on the basis that the provision must have been intended to cover all 
conduct that has an impact on an effective competitive structure as required by Article 3{g). From a 
teleological perspective, this approach is, in my view, wholly convincing. The scope of Article 82 EC  
would be seriously reduced if the Commission could apply it only to practices that were attributable to 
the exercise of m arket power enjoyed by a dominant undertaking.
In the late 1970s, the ECJ and Advocate General Reischl confirmed the causation point in Hoffmann-La 
RocheP^ The case concerned the tying of purchases by means of an obligation to obtain all or most of 
the requirements exclusively from the dominant company, or by means of fidelity rebates. In defence, 
Hoffmann-La Roche claimed that the requirements had been established at the request of its 
customers. As the behaviour of a dominant company could only fall under Article 82 EC if it depends on 
the use of the dominant firm's market power, It maintained that the provision was not applicable. The 
Advocate General rejected the “Machtbedingt" argum ent of Hoffmann-La Roche.213 Likewise, the Court 
concluded that th e  interpretation suggested by the applicant that an abuse implies that the use of the 
economic power bestowed by a dominant position is the means whereby the abuse has been brought 
about cannot be accepted.“2i4
In sum, the application of Article 82 EC does not require causation, but some kind of relationship 
between dominance and abuse must necessarily be established.
2® Case 6/72, Continental Can, Report for the Hearing, pp. 226-227.
210 Case 6/72, Continental Can, at 23-26.
21 ' Case 6/72, Continental Can, at 27.
212 Case 85/76, Hofhnann-La Roche. See also Case 27/76, United Brands [1978] ECR 207, stating that “(i]t is advisable 
therefore to ascertain whether the dominant undertaking has made use of the opportunities arising out of its dominant 
position in such a way as to reap trading benefits which it would not have reaped if there had been nonnal and sufficiently 
effective competilion" (a t 249).
213 See Advocate General Reischl in Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche, stating that th e  criterion is not the exercise of market 
power but that there is abuse where an undertaking in a dominant position influences the structure of competition by its acts' 
(p. 583).
2”  Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche, at 91.
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3. Com paring the US and EC models
If some kind of relationship between abuse and dominance suffices, the question arises how much 
connection is necessary. In my view, there is a sufficient link between the dominant position and the 
abuse in one-single market situations The one-single market situations are generally referred to as 
“the typical example of the application of Article [82]."216 in such cases, dominance, the abuse and its 
effects are confined to the same relevant market. The Community Courts have always accepted that 
A rticle 82 EC applies in such cases.̂ ^^
For multi-market situations, two distinct models concerning the required connection between dominance 
and abuse can be identified: (1) the very close link model adhered to under US law; and, (2) the EC 
m odel of close M .218 A comparison between the US and EC model shines a spotlight on some real 
divergence between the law and practice on the two sides of the Atlantic.
3 .1 . The very close link  model under US law
T h e  US model requires a very close link between market power and allegedly illegal behaviour. The US 
m odel concentrates on the situation where the dominant firm is already dominant in the ancillary market, 
or on the situation where the dominant player is close to becoming dominant in the aforementioned 
ancillary market. Ultimately, the dominant position held in the main market becomes irrelevant for the 
antitrust analysis. This model is generally substantiated by concrete evidence of anti-competitive 
conduct.
T h e  case law under Sherman Act § 2 regarding monopolisation is illustrative of the US approach.2i9 The 
claim  of monopolisation is broadly defined as (1) the wilful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly 
pow er (2) by the use of anti-competitive conduct.^ US law appears to require a very close link before a
S ee Sanfilippo. "Abuse of Freedom of Conduct Neighbouring Markets and Application of Article 86*, EBLR 71 (1995), 
writing that *[i]f not causality, then what is the relationship between market power and abuse? Until now a  reasonable answer 
to this question was that both abuse and dominance had to be found in the same market and during the same time period’  
(p .7 1 ).
216 S ee Advocate General Colomer in Case C-333/94P, Tetra Pak II [1996J ECR 1-5951, at 39. Instances of one-single 
m arket cases: Case 85/79, Hoffmann-La Roche\ and, Case 27/76, United Brands.
217 This was also acknowledged by Advocate General Colomer in Case C-333/94P, Tetra Pak II, at 39.
216 This categorisation is borrowed from Larouche. Notably, he identifies a third model that is specifically applicable in sector- 
specific regulation: a  loose link model. See Larouche, op. d f.. pp. 272-275.
216 Sherman Act § 2 provides: 'every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with 
any other person or person, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among several States, or with foreign nations, 
shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”
220 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 US 585 (1985), at 602.
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monopolist would violate Sherman Act § 2 for leveraging concems.221 To be sure, this has not always 
been the legal position. The American case law  has seen an expansion, and finally a decline, of the
leveraging theory.222
The origins of the leveraging theory may be traced back to GriWth. In that case, the Supreme Court held 
that a movie exhibitor had violated Sherman A ct § 2  by obtaining exclusive distribution rights covering a 
group of cities including some in which it was the dominant exhibitor.223 It stated, arguably in dictum, 
that § 2 prohibited “the use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose competition, to 
gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor.‘'224 This statement appears to place the 
antitrust liability in the abuse of m arket power already held in the first market rather than the threat that 
market power would be created in the second market.
Another prominent exam ple was Berkey Photo.^^  Kodak developed a new camera and new film to 
accompany it. Berkey found itself at a disadvantage. It could not process the new film, only Kodak 
could. Berkey alleged that Kodak had used its dominant position in the camera production market to 
gain an advantage in the film processing m arket. The Second Circuit Court found that “a firm violates § 
2 if by using its monopoly power in one market to gain a competitive advantage in another, albeit without 
an attempt to monopolize the second market."226 Under the doctrine espoused, a monopolist violates 
Sherman Act § 2  when it uses its monopoly power to its advantage in a market outside the relevant 
market, even if the defendant is not a monopolist in that market or has no dangerous possibility of 
obtaining a monopoly position. Of course, this approach was met with great scrutiny. It was argued that 
the Court’s formulation was difficult to reconcile with the text of the Sherman Act that proscribes 
monopolisation and attempted monopolisation, not “the abuse of one’s dominant position .“227
Notably, Berkey Photo was delivered in 1979, and the case law has changed since then. Now it appears 
that a dominant firm is generally left free to enjoy the links between markets.228 For one, the Berkey
^  Under US law, leveraging is generally known as 'monopoly leveraging.’ For a detailed account, see Kaltan, T h e  Decline 
of the Monopoly Leveraging Doctrine", /ir tih js tA i (1994).
222 See Facey and Assaf, "Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance in Canada, The United States, and The European 
Union: A Sun/ey", Antitrust L  J. 513 (2002), p. 563. For detailed historical overview, see Clarke-Smith, T h e  Development of 
the Monopolistic Leveraging Theory and its Appropriate Role in Antitrust Law", Cath. U. L. Rev. 179 (2002).
223 United States v. G r im . 334 US 100 (1948).
22< United States v. Griffith, a t 107.
225 Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F 2d 263 (2™* Cir. 1979), cert den/ed444 US 1903.
225 Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., at 275, citing further Griffith for the proposition that “a firm may not employ its 
market position as a lever to create or attem pt to a e a te  a  monopoly in another m arket"
22T See Areeda and Hovenkamp, Fundamentals ofA niittvst Law  (New York, 2002), p. 89.
228 See Jebsen and Stevens, "Assumptions. Goals and Dominant Undertakings: The Regulation of Competition under Article 
86 of the European Union", Antitrust L J . 443 (1996), p. 476.
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doctrine has generally not been accepted outside the Second Circuit Court that handed down the 
ruling.229
The decision in Alaska Airlines is illustrative for this last observation.23o The case concerned the alleged 
excessive pricing fees Alaska Airlines was forced to pay in order to access United Airlines' computer 
reservation systems. The view of the Ninth Circuit Court was clear:
We now reject Berkey's monopoly leveraging doctrine as an independent theory of liability under 
§ 2. Even in the two-market situation, a plaintiff cannot establish a violation of § 2 without proving 
that the defendant used its monopoly power in one market to obtain, or attempt to attain, a 
monopoly in the downstream, or leveraged, market We believe that Berkey Photo misapplied ttie 
elements of § 2 by concluding that a firm violates § 2 merely by obtaining a competitive 
advantage in the second market, even in the absence of an attempt to monopolize the leveraged 
market.23^
The Court's reasoning for rejecting the leveraging theory was arguably based on Chicago-thinking. It 
explained that:
[t]hus, such [leveraging] activity may tend to undemiine monopoly power, just tike monopoly 
pricing. Every time the monopolist asserts its market dominance on a firm in the leveraged 
market, the leveraged firm has more incentive to find an alternative supplier, which in turn gives 
alternate suppliers more reason to think that they can compete with the monopolist.̂ ^^
The Court’s reasoning appears to have been founded on the single monopoly profit theory popularised 
by Chicago economists and commentators in the late seventies and eighties.233
Although the Supreme Court appears to have breathed new life into the leveraging theory in Kodak, 
the doctrine suffered a severe blow in Spectrum S p o rts .^  In the latter case, the Supreme Court stated 
that the Sherman Act "makes the conduct of a  single firm unlawful only when it adually monopolizes or
229 See Clarke-Smitii, op. cit., calling this *the Circuit split on the monopolistic leveraging issue" (p.185).
239 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Grünes, 948 F 2d 536 (9“' Cir. 1991). See also Catlin v. Washington Energy Co., 791 F.2d 
1343 Cir. 1986), where the Court expressed extreme doubts about the validity of the leveraging theory.
231 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, at 548.
232 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, at 549.
233 See Director and Levi, “Law and the Future: Trade Regulation", North. U. L  Rev. 281 (1956), pp. 290-292. For more 
details, see Chapter 1.
23* Eastman Kodak Co. v. Im age Technical Services 504 U S 451 (1992), suggesting that the antitrust liability may be found if 
“a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the nexT (a t 479480, fn. 29).
235 See Kattan, op. c i,  p. 43.
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dangerously threatens to do $uch a requirement would mean the demise of the leveraging 
theory.
However, some commentators claimed that the leveraging theory might continue to survive.̂ ^? This 
soon turned out to be false hope. In 2001, the Second Circuit Court clarified matters in Virgin Airways v. 
British Airways:
In Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., we stated it would also be a violation of § 2 to use 
monopoly power in one market to gain a competitive advantage in another, even without an 
attempt to monopolize the second market. Since Berkey Photo, we have questioned this 
proposition In Spectrum Sports, the Supreme Court stated that § 2 of the Sherman Act 
‘makes the conduct of a single firm unlawful only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously 
threatens to do so'. Such a requirement goes beyond ‘gainfing] a competitive advantage' as set 
out in the Berkey Photo.^
Recently, the Suprem e Court’s decision in Trinko sounds the end for the leveraging theory under 
Sherman Act § 2.239 This judgment may be seen as the ‘final’ triumph of the Chicago school. The case 
involved the unilateral refusal to deal with competitors. Verizon was the exclusive local exchange carrier 
for the state of New  York, until the Telecommunications Act o f 1996 uprooted its monopoly by 
introducing competition into the market. Under the 1996 Act, Verizon was compelled to share its 
network with new rivals in exchange for obtaining the right to enter the long-distance telephone 
business.
In 1999, several o f the entrants complained that their orders for access were going unfilled. Verizon 
entered into a consent degree with regulators and paid fines. The day after the consent degree was 
signed, the Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, which bought services from one of the new entrants, filed an 
antitrust complaint against Verizon. It claimed that Verizon had violated § 2 by falling to provide service 
to the new entrants in a timely manner. The District Court dismissed Trinko’s antitrust claim, but the
235 Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 US 447 (1993), at 891 (emphasis added). The legal standard was repeated in United 
States M. Microsoft, 253 F. 3d 34 (D .C . Cir. 2001), On the facts, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s 
determination of liability under Sherman Act § 2 because it had merely recycled the facts demonstrated under the Sherman 
Act § 1  claim.
23̂  See Kareff, T h e  European Approach to Monopoly Leveraging’, L  & Pol. in In fL  Bus. 549 (1997), p. 552. There was 
continued ambiguity in the case law. In Howerton v. Grace Hospital, 96 F.3d 1438 (4'̂ ' Cir 1996), the Fourth Circuit Court 
observed that it had not yet decided whether a leveraging claim is legally possible, whereas in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Arch 
Assoc. Corp., 908 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Pa. 1995), the Court refused to dismiss a complaint of monopoly leveraging.
238 Virgin At!. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 2001 US App Lexis 16590, a t 14 (emphasis added). See also Twin Labs. 
Inc. V. W eider Health  & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1990), in which the Second Circuit Court already observed that the 
Berkey theory of obtaining advantages in the second market was mere dictum (a t 570).
239 Verizon Óìmmunications Inc. v. Law Offices o f Curtis V. Trinko (Trinko), 540 US 682 (2004).
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Court of Appeals reversed this decision holding that Verizon’s refusal to deal with potential rivals could 
be an act of monopolisation under Sherman Act § 2. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court appears to have used this case to put the final nail in the leveraging coffin. W hile 
recognising the continuing importance o f the Sherman Act, the Court clearly disapproved of Trinko’s 
proposed use of § 2 as too expansive:
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is 
not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the f^ m a rk e t system. The opportunity to 
charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts 'business acumen’ In the 
first place; it induces risk taking that produces Innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the 
incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is 
accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conducf.^^
Concerned with the facts, Trinko asserted that Verizon’s behaviour mirrored the dispute in Aspen Skiing 
where the defendant had ceased marketing a multi-mountain ski lift pass in a joint effort with its rival.̂ ^^ 
According to the Supreme Court, this refusal violated Sherman A ct§ 2.
Conversely, the Court observed in Trinko that Aspen Skiing was "at or near the outer boundary of §2 
liability."^« Notably, the defendant had terminated a profitable cooperation in Aspen Skiing. It preferred, 
the Court stressed, short-term profits in hopes of long-term monopoly profits, even turning down cash 
for the sale of its lift tickets at full retail price. Essentially, Verizon had not previously provided service to 
the new entrant. In addition, its refusal was not an exit from a mutually beneficial business activity. 
Pushing Aspen Skiing further out on the § 2 limb, the Court suggested that a monopolist’s obligation to 
deal with a rival only emerges in limited circumstances.
For our purposes, the most significant aspect of Trinko was the Supreme Court’s treatment of the 
plaintiff’s leveraging claim. Although relegated to a footnote, the Court held that the Second Circuit had 
erred "[t]o the extent that the Court of Appeals dispensed with a requirement that there be a 'dangerous 
probability of success’ in monopolizing a second market" in the context of leveraging. In so doing, the 
Supreme Court effectively oveiruled, in my view, the Second Circuit’s decision in Berkey Photo. In other 
words, it indicated that a monopolist’s efforts to extend its monopoly power must do more than merely 
result in a competitive advantage in another market.
2«  Veiizcm Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtís v. Trinko, at 879 (emphasis added). 
2̂ 1 /Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.
2«  Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices o f Curtís v. Trinko, at 883.
ili!
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In sum, the main focus of the US model appears to be on the second market. Leveraging can only 
constitute an infringement of Sherman Act §  2  if the defendant is already dominant in the second market 
or if there is a dangerous probability of acquiring monopoly power in that m arket
3.2. The close link model of the EC
T h e  link between the dominated market and the market affected by the abuse," obsen/ed Advocate 
General Colomer, “must be a close one."^^^ According to the Community Courts, a close link between 
dominance and abuse indeed appears to be sufficient Under the EC model, markets are closely linked 
when there is a probable proposition that the behaviour of the dominant company would likely have anti­
competitive effects on another market.^^^
Essentially, this approach assesses the risk that a company might successfully leverage its market 
power. Compared to  the US model, EC  law does not require dominance on the ancillary market or intent 
to gain a dominant position in that market. In addition, there is no need to put forward concrete evidence 
as to the dominant position in the second market, but rather, evidence substantiating the risk of 
leveraging effects.
Arguably, requiring a  very close link comparable to the US model would be contrary to the general 
principles of European competition law.^^ For one, EC law usually focuses on the effects of m arket 
behaviour.246 The companies’ intent is less important for antitrust intervention. Article 81(1) EC prohibits 
cooperation that has as its ‘object or effect’ the restriction of competition. It is dear from the judgment in 
Maschinenbau Uim  that the wording of Article 81(1) EC is to be read disjunctively.247 if the object o f the 
agreement is anti-competitive, then it can be condemned without pressing further.^^s W here the anti-
2« See Advocate General Colomer in Case C-333/94P. Tetra Pak /ƒ, at 57.
2« For different view, see Howarth, op. d t., p. 372.
2<5 Confusingly, the Commission appears to suggest the adoption of the US model in the 1998 Notice on Access Agreements 
in the Telecommunications Sector, where it referred to 'extrem ely close links between the dominated and non-dominated 
market" (at 65). It has not repeated that position. Notably, Advocate General Lenz in Case 311/84, Télémarketing, also  
appears to favour a very dose link approach (p. 3268). For a similar reading of the jurisprudence, see Larouche, op. cit., pp. 
272-275.
2« See Case 5/69, Vôlk v. Vervaeke Î1969] ECR 295; and, Cases 29 & 30/83, Rheinzink v. Commission [1984J E C R 1679, at 
20.
2<̂  Case 56/65, Société Technique M inëre v. Maschinenbau Uim [1966] ECR 235, stating that *[t]he fact that these are not 
cumulative but alternative requirements, indicated by the conjunction *or̂ , leads first to the n e ^  to consider the predse  
purpose of the agreement, in the economic context in which it is to be applied [...] Where, however, an analysis o f the said 
dauses does not reveal the effect on competition to be suftidently deleterious, the consequences of the agreement should 
then be considered’  (a t 249).
24S Agreements that a re  particularly heinous and indefensible are condemned without any further analysis o f the m arket 
drcumstances. Case 4 5 /85 , Verband der SachversicherereV v. Commission [1987] ECR 405, stating that “[a]s the Court has
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competitive quality of an agreement is not evident from its object, one must consider the effects o f the 
agreement, as emphasised by the ECJ in Delimitis.^^^
Although Article 82 EC does not contain the terms ‘object or effect,’ it has also been established in the 
case law that the existence of an abuse depends on the objective effect on competition Going back 
to Hoffman-La Roche, the ECJ made it clear that the concept of abuse is objective. Abuse does not 
depend on the ill will of the dominant firm.^si The ruling describes abuse as “recourse to methods 
different from those which condition normal competition [...J which has the effect of hindering the 
maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that 
competition."252 As for merger control, it concentrates on “a prospective analysis of the effects" of a 
notified concentration .253
A  second important principle of EC law is that a dominant undertaking has a “special responsibility" not 
to allow its market behaviour to impair genuine competition.25̂  The concept of special responsibility 
suggests that particular legitimate conduct may become illegal when employed by a dominant 
company.255 The actual scope of the special responsibility must be considered in light of the specific 
circumstances of each case  2S6 A dominant undertaking does not have the responsibility to refrain from 
particular activities. Rather, the undertaking must refrain from those activities that, given all 
circumstances of the case, are inappropriate with relation to its degree of dominance.
Thus, the threshold at which a dominant undertaking may infringe European law is lower than under US 
law . As soon as competition is hindered, even if it concerns a market on which the undertaking is not 
dominant, an abuse may have taken place.
consistently held, it is unnecessary to consider the actual effects of an agreement if it is apparent that it has the object of 
preventing, restricting or distorting competition* (at 39).
2̂ 3 Case C-234/89, Defimitis v. Henniger Bräu AG  [1991] E C R 1-935, where the ECJ said, when considering a beer supply 
agreement, that '[ejven if such agreements do not have the object of restricting competition within the meaning of Article 
8 5 (1 ) [now 81(1)1, it is nevertheless necessa7  to ascertain whether they have the effect of preventing, restricting or distorting 
competition" (at 13).
250 For similar view, see Sinclair, ‘Abuse of Dominance a t a  Crossroads -  Potential Effect, Object and Appredability under 
Article 82 EC*, ECLR 491 (2004), pp. 497-500.
251 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, stating that '[t]he concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to 
the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position* (at 91).
252 Case 85/76, HoffmanrhLa Roche v. Commission, at 91.
253 Case T-80/02, Tetra Lavai v. Commission [2002] ECR 11-4519, at 153.
25̂  Case 322/81, Michelin v. Commission (Micheiin i) [1983] ECR 3461, at 57; and, Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar v. 
Commission, at 112.
255 See Gyselen, op. cff., p. 597.
256 See Case C-333/94, Tetra Pak II, at 24.
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4. The legal position of the muiti-market requirement
The very concept o f leveraging presupposes that a separate market to which the market power can be 
transferred exits. It is therefore a bit surprising that the relevance of this condition was only recently 
confirmed conclusively by the ECJ in ¡M S Health.^^^
That case involved a typical instance of leveraging through a refusal to supply. The dispute concerned 
access to IM S' proprietary structure for collecting and distributing dmg sales data in Germany. IMS 
refused to license the use of the structure to a competitor. As a result, the latter could not offer 
competing sales reports on the basis of IM S' structure that had become the industry standard. Prior to 
the Commission’s decision in IM S Health, antitrust cases concerning refusals to deal by dominant 
companies, whether or not IP rights were im plicated, involved situations virhere two distinct markets 
could implicitly be Identified.^^ In all such cases, the company refusing to deal was dominant in a 
market for a  raw materia! or an input for a second derivative market.^ss
Another reason favouring the multi-market requirem ent seems to lie within the structure of Article 82 EC 
itself. This provision does not prohibit a dom inant position, but only the abuse thereof. This means that a 
company holding a dominant position in a m arket fo r a certain product cannot be compelled to yield a  
share of this market. In other words, under Article 8 2  EC, a dominant company is not obliged to assign a 
certain share of customers of the dominated m arket to its rivals in order to improve competition.
This argument can be illustrated by the following exam ple. Let us assume that there is market for a soft 
drink X produced with a unique and secret form ula, and that manufacturer A has a dominant position on 
that market because of the strong consumer preferences for the taste of this special drink. Rival B could 
not rely on Article 82 EC to force A to provide him with A ’s formula. This would amount to directly 
attacking the dominant position of A. By contrast, if B wanted to produce its own soft drink with its own
257 Case C-418/01, IM S Health v. NDC Health [2004] ECR I-5039. For detailed reviews, see Stothers, “IMS Health and its 
implications for Compulsory Licensing in Europe", E IP R  467 (2004); and, Derdaye, “Abuses of a Dominant Position and 
Intellectual Property Rights: A Suggestion to Reconcile the Community Courts Case Law", W.Comp. 685 (2003).
258 vVith regard to refusal to supply, the literature has recognised the multi-market requirement See Lang, ‘Anticompetitive 
Abuses under Article 82 involving Intellectual Property Rights’ , 8*" EU Compeftion Law and Policy EDI Workshop, 2003, p. 
16. For the illogical view not requiring two markets, see Fine, ‘ NDC/IMS: A Logical Application of Essential Facilities 
Doctrine", EC LR 457 (2002), p. 461.
259 This list of classic cases includes: Cases 6 & 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano v. Commìsson [1974] ECR 223; Case 
311/84, Centre beige d'études de marché v. CLT (Télém arketing) [1985] ECR 3261; Cases C-241 & 242/91P, R TE v. 
Commissbn (Magifi) [1995] ECR 1-743; and, Case C -7/97, Bronnerv. Mediaprint [1998] ECR 1-7791.
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formula, and A controlled of the supply of an essential raw material, then A could be forced to supply it 
to B as the essential component constitutes a separate market. It appears reasonable to conclude that 
there is some logic in the multi-market scheme in leveraging cases.
In IM S/Health, the Commission had tried to overcome the multi-market requirement by applying an 
illogical one-market approach.^eo it appears to consider the identification of two markets to be an 
irrelevant issue. Instead, the Commission focused on the fact that IMS’ structure was “an indispensable 
input to allow an undertaking to compete in the market for regional sales data sen/ices in Germany."26i 
The Commission noted that “refusing access to this structure to competitors on the relevant market 
would exclude all competition from this market, and [...] therefore IMS’ refusal to license the [...] 
structure involve[edl abusive conduct."262 |t concluded that IMS was abusing its dominant position in a 
given market by refusing to license to rivals active in the same market a structure that was an input for 
this market. It did not attempt to maintain that there were two markets, one upstream market for the 
structure and one downstream market for regional sales data.
Likewise, in its suspension order, the CFl President seems to have agreed that the absence of two 
m arkets was not dispositive. In fact, President Vesterdorf considered the IMS structure to constitute a 
separate product, as it is an “indispensable [element] to the supply of a separate service and of no utility 
unless incorporated in the latter."263
Arguably, implicit in these decisions is the idea that there is no market where the element concerned 
serves no purpose other than as a component of a downstream product In other words, the component 
has no use and no commercial life of its own. unless integrated with another product. One has to 
recognise that the Commission’s approach comes very close to punishing the IMS’ dominant position 
itself, and not the abuse of that position. If there were only the market for the provision of regional sales 
data services in Germany, and IMS had a prime product, the obligation to grant a compulsory license on 
one Ingredient of the product may be interpreted as compelling IMS to yield a share of its market to its 
competitors. However, the rivals of IMS were not asking to be supplied with the sales reports issued by
2M C aseC O M P /38.044 , NDC Health/IM S Health, decision o f3  July 2001, 
httD://euroDa.eu.int/comm/comDetition/antitaist/cases/decisions/38044/en.Ddf.
261 Case COMP/38.044, NDC H ealth/IM S Health, at 184.
262 Case COMP/38.044, NDC Health/IM S Health, at 185.
263 Case T-184/01 R, /MS Health v. Commis&on, decision of 26 October 2001, not yet reported, at 84.
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IMS based on its structure. In fact, they were simply asking for permission, in order to distribute their 
own sales reports, to use a given reporting structure that had become the industry standard.
In my view, the multi-market scheme based on a distinction between the final product and the inputs 
could have helped solve the case. IM S’ structure is a  simple grid of territories. The sales reports are the 
final product, consisting of the form o f IMS’ structure and the substance o f the sales information. By 
taking such an explicit multi-market approach, the Commission could have avoided a lot o f criticism and 
property applied a  leveraging scheme.^^^
Advocate General lizzan o  in IMS  also reached the result of a multi-m arket approach, but through a very 
broad interpretation of the notion ‘market.’ According to the Advocate General, it is sufficient to identify a 
market for the input that is situated at an upstream level in the production chain even where such a 
market is only *potential.'’265 The term ‘potential’ is defined by Advocate General Tizzano as a market in 
which a monopolist company decides not to market separately for its own use in a downstream market, 
thereby restricting or totally eliminating competition in the downstream m arket.266 Arguably, compared to 
the Commission’s approach, Mr Tizzano satisfactorily m eets, a t least in result, the multi-market 
requirement by adopting a broad interpretation of the concept o f ’market’ including ‘potential’ markets.
Finally, all uncertainties were solved by the ECJ’s clear-cut statem ent requiring a multi-market setting. 
Considering the exclusion of all competition in a  secondary market due to the refusal by IM S, the ECJ 
stated that “it is determinative that two different stages of production may be identified."267 j^ e  ruling 
also brought another welcome clarification in this context. The Court affirmed that the identification o f a 
separate upstream market is not precluded by the fact the product or service in question was not 
intended to be marketed s e p a r a t e l y T h e  Court’s ruling is an important conceptual clarification. For 
one, it confirms that leveraging applies to a duplication of market power by capturing a new market^ss
For criticism, see Eiimansberger, op. cit., pp. 161-162.
265 See Advocate General Tizzano in Case C -418/01, IM S Health v. NDC Health, at 57.
266 See Advocate General Tizzano in Case C-418/01, IM S Health v. NDC Health, at 57-59.
267 Case C -418/01, IM S  Health v. NDC Health, at 45 (emphasis added).
268 Case C-418/01, IM S  Health v. NDC Health, when discussing the ruling in Case 7 /97, Bmnner, it noted that “[t]he feet that 
the home-delivery service was not marlteted separately was not regarded as precluding, from the outset the possibility of 
identifying a  separate market* (at 43}.
269 The US Supreme Court in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Service, Inc., 504 US 451 (1992) refers to a  new  
empire. It notes that “[we have] held many times that power gained through som e natural advantage such as a paten t 
copyright or business acumen can give rise to liability if a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his 
empire into the next" (a t 480, fn 29, emphasis added).
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The ruling also makes it clear that leveraging applies to the case of transfer of market power to a further 
production stage, often downstream.
5. Discussion of the multi-market scenarios under EC law
Broadly speaking, three possibilities of multi-market scenarios are open under EC law: (1) the abuse of 
a dominant position has effects on another market; (2) the abuse in another market has effects on the 
dominated market; and, (3) abuse and effects are in a market other than the dominated one.270 For the 
leveraging theory, I will argue that the first two scenarios are essential.
5.1. The abuse of a dominant position has effects in another market
Under the first scenario, the dominance and the abuse are in the main market, whereas the effects are 
felt in an ancillary market. This scenario is best illustrated by the following figure:
r
DOMINANCE EFFECTSABUSE
1__ ^ ^ ________ L ■ ___ J
Originally, this scenario was propounded in Commercial Sofvents,^^ Commercial Solvent was dominant 
on the market for aminobutanol, a raw material used in the production of ethambutol, an anti­
tuberculosis drug. The relationship between the markets was vertical. After having entered the market 
for ethambutol, Commercial Solvent ceased the supply of aminobutanol to independent manufacturers.
Following Advocate General W arner,2^2 the ECJ upheld the contested decision that Commercial 
Solvent’s conduct constituted an abuse of its dominant position on the market for aminobutanol. This 
conclusion was reached regardless that the effects of the abuse were in the market for ethambutol. The 
Court appears to have focused on the risk of eliminating competition in the second market:
^  See also the 1998 Notice on Access Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector, at 81.
Other instances of this version of multi-market situations: Case COMP/37.859, De Pose-La Poste [2002] OJ L61/32, at 
36-51, which concerned the statutory monopolist in the basic letter service market tying to exdude competition on the 
business-to-business market; and, Case IV/32.318, London European [1974] L 317/47, at 30, dealing with die refusal by 
Sabena to give access to its computerised reservation services which was aimed at driving out London European, a  private 
BriÜsh airline company, from the air transport route between Bmssels and London-Luton.
^  See Advocate General Warner in Cases 6 & 7/73, Commerdal Solvent, pp. 268-270.
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an undertaking being in a dominant position as regards the production of raw material and 
therefore able to control the supply of manufacturers of derivatives, cannot, just because it 
decides to start manufacturing these derivatives (in competition with its former customers) act in 
such a way as to eliminate one of the principal manufacturers of ethambutol in the common 
market Since such conduct is contrary to the objectives expressed in Article [3(g)] of the Treaty 
and set out in greater detail in Articles [81 and 82], it follows that an undertaking which has a 
dominant position in the market for manufacturing its own derivatives, refuses to supply a 
customer, which is itself a manufacturer of these derivatives, and therefore risks eliminating all 
competition on the part of this customer, is abusing its dominant position within the meaning of 
Article [82].2T3
Likewise, Télém arketing endorsed a sœ nario w here the effects of the alleged abuse took place in 
another m arket In that case, the ECJ condemned the refusal of RTL television station to sell television 
time to a telephone marketing company that competed with RTL’s own telephone marketing activities, 
unless the telephone num ber listed in the advertisements was that of television station’s subsidiary. The 
abuse of RTL may be seen both as a refusal to supply and as an illegal bundling arrangement. Either 
way, RTL was intending to exclude other undertakings from competing with its own subsidiary on the 
downstream telem arketing market.
After recalling Com mercial Solvents, the ECJ found that "telemarketing activities constitute a separate 
market from that of the chosen advertising medium, although c/ose/yassoc/afed with it."̂ ^  ̂RTL’s refusal 
to supply to CBEM was “intended to reserve to the agent any telemarketing operation broadcast by the 
said station, with the possibility o f eliminating all competition from another u n d e rta k in g .Therefore, it 
concluded that:
an abuse within the meaning of Article 86 [now 82] is committed where, without any objective 
necessity, an undertaking holding a dominant position on a particular market reserves to itself or 
to an undertaking belonging to the same group an ancillary activity which might be carried out by 
another undertaking as part of its activities on a neightouring but separate market, with the 
possibility of eliminating all competition from such undertaking.̂ ^
One has to contrast the Court’s approach with Advocate General Lenz’s opinion. His analysis did not 
focus on the required link between the markets identified at all. Basically, he suggested following the US
2^ Cases 6 & 7/73, Commercial Solvent, at 25.
Case 311/84, Télémarketing, at 7  and 26 (emphasis added). See also Case C -260/89, Elliniki Radtophonia Tileorasi v. 
DEP [1991] E C R I-2935, a t 37-38, concerning a TV company pursuing a discriminatory broadcasting policy favouring its own 
programmes.
275 Case 311/84, Télém arketing, at 26 (emphasis added).
276 Case 311/84, Télémarketing, at 27.
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model, as he stressed the need to establish that the dominance of the main market is actively used to 
eliminate rivals in the second market.^^
In both cases discussed, the abuse took place in the dominated market but its effects were felt in 
another market. Commercial Solvents and RTL engaged in abusive practices on the dominated markets 
in order to resen/e for themselves an ancillary activity in another market in which they did not hold a  
dominant position, in both cases, the defendants’ behaviour was condemned for the risk of eliminating 
all competition in the non-dominated market.
5.2. The abuse in another market has effects in the dominated market
The second scenario relates to the situation where the abuse takes place in a market other than the 





The scenario is grounded in BPBP^ in this case, the markets involved were related, though not 
vertically. British Gypsum was dominant in the market for plasterboard, where it granted fidelity rebates 
to its distributors. In the market for plasters, where it was not dominant, British Gypsum had adopted a 
practice by which it granted priority to orders for plaster from those distributors who were 'loyal' in the 
plasterboard market.
The CFl considered British Gypsum’s priority conduct to be abusive although, unlike previous case law, 
the abuse was committed outside the relevant market. According to the C Fl, the practice of preferential 
orders was certainly intended to strengthen British Gypsum’s dominant position in the plasterboard 
market. Article 82 prohibits a dominant undertaking from "strengthening its position by having recourse
^  See Advocate General Lenz in Case 311^84, Télémarketing, stating that ‘an undertaking abuses its dominant position in 
the market if it uses that position to force its way into a neighbouring market and does not confíne itself to partic/paf/ng in that 
market but simultaneously aifempfs [ ...]  to eliminate competition of those already active in the market* (p. 3268) (emphasis 
added).
278 Case T-65/89, BPB industries Pic. v. Commission [1993] ECR 11-389. The appeal was on procedural grounds and 
dismissed by the ECJ. See Case C-310/93 P, BPB Industries Pic. v. Commission [1995] ECR 1-865.
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to means other than those falling within competition based on merits."279 That requirement was not met 
by the preferential criterion adopted by British Gypsum. Refem'ng back to the objective concept of 
abuse, the CFl concluded;
where the competitive structure of a market has already been weakened by the conduct of an 
undertaking in a dominant position, any additional restriction on that competitive structure is 
liable to constitute abuse of the dominant position thus acquired [...] It follows that British 
Gypsum's attempt to exclude its competitors, by giving priority to orders for plaster placed by 
customers constitutes an abuse [...] of its dominant position in the market for the supply of 
plasterboard. 28O
It is sometimes claimed that AKZO  involved a multi-market situation like The Commission 
indeed believes that AKZO  dealt with two different markets. This is noticeable in the 1998 Notice on 
Access Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector, which treats both cases as instances where the 
abuse on a market other than the dominated had effects on the dominated market.282 in its decision in 
Tetra P ak  //. the Commission expressly explained that “[the AKZO] judgment dealt with [..,] the 
commission of an abuse on a m arket other than that on which the undertaking undoubtedly has a 
dominant position."2S3
Likewise, Advocate General Colomer saw both rulings as instances where the abuse is committed on a 
market in which the undertaking does not hold a dominant position, but whose effects were still to 
strengthen the dominant position it |s doubtful whether Advocate General Colomer was truly 
convinced about his categorisation, as he stated that “[t]he AKZO judgment rests on facts which, with 
certain nuances, fall within that c a t e g o r y i n d e e d ,  there are good reasons to distinguish AKZO from 
BPS.
In AKZO, the ECJ discussed (albeit rather confusingly) two distinct segments in the market for organic 
peroxides: the plastics and flour segments.^^e AKZO undertook a predatory pricing campaign against 
the complainant, ECS in the flour additives segm ent. The market for flour additives was essential for 
ECS, but only of limited importance to AKZO. The price reductions were intended to prevent ECS from
279 Case T-65/89, BPS Industries Pic. v. Commissbn, a t 94.
Case T-65/89, BPB Industries Pic. v. Commission, a t 95-96. The CFl annulled the contested decision on a non-related 
point (at 98 ).
281 Case C -62/86, AKZO v. Commisson [1991] ECR1-3359. See also Case IV/30.178, Napier Brown v. British Sugar, [1988] 
L 284/41.
282 See also the 1998 Notice on Access Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector, at 81.
283 Case IV /31.043, Tetra Pak It. [1992] OJ L72/1, at 104.
28̂  See Advocate Genera! Colomer in Case C -333/94P, Tetra Pak II, at 45.
285 See Advocate General Colomer in Case C-333/94P, Tetra Pak II, at 45 (emphasis added).
288 Case C -62/86, AKZO  v. C o m m is i, at 40-45.
78
entering the plastics segment. AKZO could subsidise any losses made in the flour additives segment by 
profits made in the plastics segment, a possibility which was not available to ECS. Despite the fact that 
organic peroxides had various uses, the Court accepted that it was all one mari<et. This means that the 
m arket of dominance and the market in which the abuse was conducted were one and the same: the 
m arket for organic peroxides. Therefore, AKZO  did not concern a multi-market situation.
Although BPB was issued by the CFI, the ECJ and Advocate General Colomer cited the ruling, thereby 
suggesting that they agree with it.2S7 The situation in BPB appears to be just opposite of that in 
Com m ercial Solvents and Télémarketing. In the latter cases, the refusal to deal occurred within the main 
m arket and its effects were perceived in a derivative market. In BPB, the practice considered abusive 
took place in a related market and its effects were perceived in the main market. Although the CFI did 
not refer explicitly to the risk or possibility of strengthening, it focused on the possible future 
consequences of British Gypsum’s behaviour. A close examination of the Court's considerations reveals 
the striking fact that the Court is only interested in the possible effects of the conduct of the dominant 
firm , and much less in the actual effects.^ss
In conclusion, the picture that emerges is that the scope of Article 82 EC clearly covers any abusive 
behaviour having an effect on the dominated relevant market, regardless of whether it takes place on a  
separate market. This conclusion may be explained as an understandable application of the doctrine 
th at construes abuse as an objective concept, as held in HoffmanrhLa Roche.
5.3. Abuse and effects are In a market other than the dominated market
T h e  final scenario to consider surely extends the application of Article 82 EC even beyond British 
Gypsum . This scenario considers the situation that both the abusive behaviour and the effects are in a 





L :______^ J __ J
287 See Advocate General Colomer in Case C-333/94P, Tetra Pak II. at 45.




The scenario was addressed in Tetra Pak 11.̂ ^ In that case, the ECJ concluded that Tetra Pak had 
infringed Article 82 EC by predatory pricing and bundling in the m arket for non-aseptic cartons and 
packaging machines. Tetra Pak held a quasl-monopolistic position in the market for aseptic cartons and 
packaging machinery. The abusive behaviour was intended to benefit Tetra Pak’s position in the non­
aseptic market. In the overall market for packaging both aseptic and non-aseptic cartons, Tetra Pak held 
a market share of 78% .
It was remarkable that Tetra Pak was not found dominant in the m arket for non-aseptic cartons and 
packaging machinery. Likewise, it could have easily been found dom inant in that market given its 
market shares ranging from 48 to 52% . It should be stressed that the decision against Tetra Pak was 
issued 3 weeks after the ruling in AKZO. Notably in that case, the ECJ had established that a market 
share of 50%  is in itself evidence of a dominant position.^^ Notwithstanding its express reference to this 
formulation, the Commission did not find Tetra Pak dominant in the non-aseptic market.29i
After citing Commercial Solvents, Télémarketing, AKZO  and British Gypsum, the ECJ stressed in Tetra 
Pak II that the scenario of abuse and effects in a m arket other than the dominated market “can only be 
justified in special circumstances.“292 Upholding the findings of the C FI, it found that the special 
circumstances arose from; (1) the close associations between the main aseptic market and the 
ancillary non-aseptic market; (2) the quasi-monopolislic position held by Tetra Pak on the relevant 
market; and, (3) its leading position on the non-dominated market.293
These circumstances justified the application o f Article 82 EC to behaviour taking place outside the 
dominated market and having effects in the ancillary market. When describing the “close associative 
links" between the main and ancillary market, it discussed the fact that customers in one market are 
also potential customers in another, as 35% of Tetra Pak customers bought aseptic and non-aseptic 
systems.254 noted also that Tetra Pak and its most important competitors were present in all markets 
identified and that Tetra Pak, given its complete domination of the aseptic market, could concentrate its 
efforts on the non-aseptic markets by acting independently of the other economic operators.
2® Case C -333/94 P, Tetra Pak IL 
2»C aseC -62/86,iA K ZO .at60.
231 Mysteriously, the Commission daimed that ‘such an approach would be too restrictive in the case at hand.” See COMP 
m ^  M 2 , Tetra Pak II, a t m .
292 Case C -333/94 P. Tetra Pak II, at 27.
293 Case C -333/94 P. Tetra Pak II, at 31.




Essentially, Tetra Pak if extends the previous law because the abuse was committed on a non- 
dominated market in order to gain advantage in that latter market. Tetra Pak was not protecting its 
dom inant position in the main market, but was trying to gain a competitive advantage on another 
m arket. Given the uniqueness of this type of multi-market situation, the Court emphasised that Article 
82 EC  may be applied only where it is justified by ‘special circumstances.* These circumstances were 
considered to create sufficient link between dominance and abuse. The fact that the ECJ referred to its 
earlier decisions in Commercial Solvents and Télémarketing appears to indicate that it was concerned 
with the risk of eliminating all competition in the non-dominated market^s®
In my view, this final scenario has the potential risk o f undennining the bedrock requirement of having a 
link between dominance and the abuse. There is no doubt that the situation of Tetra Pak II marks the 
furthest extent to which it is possible to relax the essential connection between both elements. Going 
any further would surely be unreasonable. In fact, the next scenario would have been the situation 
w here the dominant position and the abuse are on different and unrelated markets. The necessity of a 
link between dominance and abuse was succinctly emphasised by Advocate General Colomen
an absolute disjuncture o f a dom inant position and the abuse, to  such an  exten t that they m ay 
occur on com pletely different and separate m arkets, is not acceptable. Such an  approach would 
m ean that an undertaking holding a dom inant position on any one m arket would be unable to 
com pete under conditions o f equality with o ther undertakings on other m arkets, because the 
comm ercial practices required to penetrate those other m arkets would in m ost cases constitute 
an abuse o f its dom inant position. Nor, m oreover, does a dom inant position on one m arket 
necessarily place th e  undertaking which holds it in a  better position than other undertakings to 
act on other m arkets [...] It is therefore unreasonable that the latter should have to bear the 
special responsibility imposed by Article 82 E C  w hen it participates in m arkets com pletely 
separate from  the dom inated market®®
Not surprisingly, the ruling in Tetra Pak II was not received with unmitigated enthusiasm in legal circles. 
For some, the judgment indicates “distrust for dominant undertakings."297 others like Korah and 
Subiotto emphasise the differences between the earlier case law and the circumstances that lead to the 
ruling in Tetra Pak As the case was concerned with a new set of circumstances that had never 
been before the Court, it is not remarkable at all that this scenario could be isolated from earlier cases.
295 Case 0 3 3 3 ^ 4  P. Tetra Pak II, at 25.
296 See Advocate General Colomer, in Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak II, at 42,
297 See Art and Liedekerke, ‘Developments in EC Competition Law in 1996 -  An Overview’, CMLRev. 895 (1997). p. 896.
298 See Korah, Tetra Pak II -  Lack of Reasoning in Courts Judgment*, ECLR 98 (1997), pp. 100-102; and, Subiotto, T h e  
Spedai Responsibility of Dominant Undertakings Not to Impair Genuine Undistorted Competition", W.Comp. 5 (1996), pp. 8- 
12.
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Arguably, the Court’s case law could be seen as an evolutionary body o f law.̂ ss The extension appears 
to be logical in light of the objective definition o f the concept of a b u s e M o r e o v e r ,  the importance 
accorded in Tetra Pak II to the quasi-monopolistic position should be noted. It reflects the added 
responsibility for undertakings that enjoy a position o f dominance. A dominant fimi should be aware of 
its duty not to impair genuine competition in those markets where its very presence has weakened 
competition.
However, a final remark relates to the limited scope of the judgment. The ruling emphasised that the 
following factors, taken together, gave rise to a  close association between the market of dominance 
and the market in which the abuse took place: (1 ) the abusive commercial conduct took place in a 
neighbouring non-dominated market; (2) there w ere close links between the two markets identified; (3) 
Tetra Pak was active in both markets; (4) Tetra Pak was significantly stronger than any of its rivals; (5) 
Tetra Pak’s customers were active in both markets. In practice, the coincidence of these factors occurs 
only rarely, as Levy duly notes.^oi
Without doubt, the ECJ can be criticised for not properly motivating its approach. For one, it is 
remarkable that the Court cited AKZO  as that case concerned ultimately a one-single market 
situation.302 Moreover, paragraph 28 o f the ruling was a conclusion, not a reason for the extended 
application of Article 82 EC. Notably, the ECJ did not inquire whether the special circumstances were 
indeed sufficient for the alleged behaviour.^w it failed to provide any indication as to the relevance of 
these links to the characterisation of the impugned practices. In sharp contrast, the Commission 
recognised the need to show that Tetra Pak's dom inance on the aseptic markets permitted it to act 
abusively on the non-aseptic markets. During the hearing, it stated: “where the conduct of a dominant 
undertaking on a m arket where it is not dominant is not facilitated by that dominant position on another 
market, that conduct does not preclude the normal play of competition and cannot therefore be
abusive.’3M
Unfortunately, the evidence put forward by the Commission was not convincing. The Commission 
stressed that Tetra Pak’s dominance in the aseptic market gave it the financial resources to price below
299 For similar view, see Advocate Genera) Colomer in Case C -333/94 P, Tetra Pak U, a t 52-54. 
Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, at 91.
See Levy, •Tetra Pak II: Stretching the limits of Article 86?“, E C L R 104 (1995), p. 109.
»2 Case 0 3 3 3 /9 4  P, Tetra Pak II, at 25.
303 See Levy, op. cit., pp. 107-108.
3W See Report for the Hearing, Case 0 3 3 3 /9 4  P, Tetra Pak II. a t 78.
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cost in the non-aseptic market.305 This point was repeated during the hearing when it stated that 
predation in the non-aseptic markets “was made possible by the profits realized on the sales of aseptic 
cartons."306 Arguably, this factor is not entirely conclusive. As Tetra Pak rightly noted, pricing below cost 
on the non-aseptic markets could have been a sound commercial decision, even In the absence of the 
dominant position in the aseptic markets.^o^ The Court appears to have agreed with the applicant, as the 
Commission's argument was not developed any further.
Recently, the approach espoused in Tetra Pak II was applied by the Commission In a dispute between 
Virgin and British Ainways (“BA"). The case involved two unusually related markets: the market for air 
travel agency services and the air transport market. Virgin had complained to the Commission that BA 
was trying to stop it from expanding in the air transport market. BA was accused of paying commission 
to travel agents selling BA tickets. In the Commission’s decision, BA was found dominant in the UK 
market for air travel agency services.^® It had abused this dominant position in order to gain anti­
competitive advantages in the air transport market.®®®
On appeal, the CFI upheld the contested decision because there was an “undeniabify] close connection” 
between the two markets Identified.®^® For this conclusion, the Court stressed: (1) the vital retail function 
of travel agents for airlines; (2) the fact that 85% of all air tickets are sold through travel agents; and, (3) 
the reduced sales of these agents has an effect on BA’s revenues. Therefore, it held that the 
Commission was right to hold that the “nexus required by Article 82 EC existed between the United 
Kingdom market for the travel agency services which airlines purchase from travel agents and the 
United Kingdom airtransport market."®î
At first glance, the case appears to closely resemble the decision in Commercial Solvents. On the 
contrary, the reality was quite different. For one, the case arose from the intense competition In the air 
transport market. BA was held dominant in a rather artificial market. In addition, the effects of BA’s 
abuse were noticeable on another market where BA’s powerful position was in fact the source of its
I I
3« Case IV/31.043, Tetra Pak ¡1, noting that *[oJwing to its dominant posit'on on the aseptic packaging market, from which it 
drew virtually all its resources, Tetra Pak could afford to sell at prices which must be described as "ellminatory' in a sector 
which was of marginal importance to it" (at 149).
3« See Report for the Hearing, Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak 1!, at 80.
30̂  See Report for the Hearing, Case 0 3 3 3 /94  P, Tetra Pak II, in which Tetra Pak argued that “[a]ny financially sound 
undertaking is in a position to support losses which [...] are relatively limited, without resorting to such cross-financing" (at 
80).
308 Case COMP 34.780, Virgin/British Airways [2000] OJ L 30/1, at 47 and 84.
3M Case COMP 34.780, Virgin/British Airways, at 96-111.
310 Case T-219/99, British Airways v. Commission, at 132.
311 Case T-219/99, British Airways v. Commission, at 135.
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dominance on the first market. Arguably, both the CFI and Commission improperly relied on the theory 
developed in Tetra Pak II.
In sum, the doctrine that abuse and effects in the non-dominated m arket are also caught by Article 82 
has to be applied with due care.
5.4. The multi-market scenarios discussed and strategic bundling
At this point, it is useful to evaluate how strategic bundling relates to the multi-market scenarios 
discussed in the preceding sections. For one, identifying dominance is usually the easy part of the 
analysis. The company under investigation typically holds a dominant position is the bundling or tying 
market. Yet, placing bundling as an abuse is more difficult. Arguably, the abusive behaviour takes place 
in the market where the company also holds a dominant position. Like with refusal to supply, it concerns 
conduct that is directly linked to the dominant position held by the com p any .312
As for the effects, it is recalled that bundling concerns the transfer of power from the main market to 
other markets in order to achieve anti-compefitive advantages in the short or long term.3^3 Short-tenn 
leveraging is in clear accordance with the scenarios in Commercial Solvents and Télémarketing. Like in 
those cases, the bundling abuse takes place on the dominated market but is effects are felt on another 
market. The same reasoning applies to long-temri leveraging aimed at entry deterrence in the ancillary 
market.
As for defensive leveraging, it appears not to fit neatly one of the scenarios discussed.^i^ Rather, it falls, 
with certain nuances, in two categories. On the one hand, it could likewise be categorised as a 
Commercial Solvents scenario as the first effects are felt on another market. On the other hand, it 
resembles the scenario discussed in BPS, as the final effects on competition are discemable in the main 
market. The difference is that the abuse takes place in the main market, not the ancillary market. 
Remarkably, the final scenario that abuse and effects are in a market outside the dominated one,is 
therefore not essential for leveraging cases.
312 Por overiap between both practices, see Case 311/84. Télémarketing. 
3« For details, see Chapter 1.
31̂  Arguably, it m ay also be called a ‘convoluted’ one-single market case.
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6. Conclusions
This chapter has shown that EC law witnessed the steady extension of the scope of application of 
Article 82 EC. It has become clear from the case law of the Community Courts and from the decisional 
practice of the Commission that it is not necessary for the dominance, abuse and the effects of the 
abuse to all be in the same market. It is now trite that Article 82 EC can be infringed if a dominant 
undertaking uses its position in one market in order to obtain an advantage in another market. Of all 
multi-market scenarios discussed, the first two scenarios are relevant for the leveraging theory with 





EX POST CONTROL OF BUNDUNG
86

C H A P TE R S
BUNDLING UNDER US ANTITRUST U W
1. Introduction
2 . A  trilogy o f antitrust scrutiny
3. The chequered history of the bundling analysis
3.1. The patent misuse origin of the leveraging theory
3.2. The early riays o f the Clayton Act
3.3. The increased emphasis on perse principles in bitanatìonal Saff and Northern Pacifìe Railway
3.4. The evolution to a modified per se test




3.5.3.1. Introductory remarks and facts 
3.5.3JZ. The judgment by the District Court
3.S.3.3. The ruling of the Court of Appeals
4. The separate-product issue
4.1. The simple-product test
4.2. The consumer-demand test
4.3. The technological-integration test
4.4. The market-practices test
4.5. The economic-measurement test
4.6. The multi-factor test as an altemative test
4.6.1. The foundations for a new test
4.6.2. The legal precedents
4.6.3. The elements of the new test
5. Discussion of the legal standard for bundling
5.1. The application o fa  competition test
5.2. Legal-economic analysis of some Supreme Court decisions
5.3. Clarifying the law on bundling
5.3.1. Adapting d ie modified perse test
5.3.2. Applying the rule of reason test
6. Efficiencies and bundling
6.1. Introductory remarks
6JL Efficiencyjustifications in detail
6 2 .1 . The justification promotes competition
6 .22 . The justification favours intent over possible negative effects
6 2 2 .1 . Goodwill protection
62.2.2. Trademark protection















































In the first part, my. examination o f the leveraging theory started on an economic-theoretical and 
abstract-legal level. A t this point, this research moves to analyse the practical implications of these 
insights. Part B concentrates on ex post regulation of bundling. To make a useful comparative study, 
Chapter 3  presents a capsule history of the bundling analysis under U S  law.^is Tying agreements," the 
US Supreme Court noted in 1949, “serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition."^!^ 
This statement expresses plainly the main rationale that was noticeable under US law for many 
decades. This thinking has resulted in a p e r se  illegality test for bundling. The pervading theme of this 
third chapter is the gradual erosion o f the p e rs e  test. Today US law  appears to prefer an unstructured 
rule of reason test.
2. A  trilogy o f an titru st scru tiny
A complex trilogy o f antitrust rules applies to bundling. The basic U S  statute on bundling is § 3 o f the 
Clayton AcU^^ it does not mention bundling or tying by name. Rather, It prohibits certain kinds of sales 
and leases made on the condition that the purchaser or lessee not to deal with others. As § 3 only deals 
with sales or leases of “goods, wares, m erchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities," it does 
not cover a substantial range of possible practices involving, for instance, the sale of land or senrices. In 
sharp contrast, the Sherman Act applies to both goods and services. As a result, authorities and private 
litigants have been forced to rely on § 1 and 2  of the Sherman Act.̂ ^® Typically, bundling proceeds 
under Sherman Act §  1 because it is often in the form of a 'contract," and thus easily classifiable as “a
Recently, no extensive comparative writings have been published in the EU. There is some older work: Frey, Tying 
Arrangement - Tying Arrangement als Typus einer vertikalen Wettbewerbsbeschränkung im amerikanischen Antitrustrecht 
(Munich, 1982); Jansen, Die Kopplungsverträge im Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschräkungen (Berlin, 1968); and, Mitchell, Die  
Rechtliche und Wirtschaftliche Bedeuting von Tying Contracts -  G ne vergleichende Darstellung nach deutschem und 
amerikanischem Recht (Cologne, 1961).
316 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337  US 293 (1949), at 305.
31̂  Clayton Act § 3 states that it is unlawful to le a s e  or sell goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, and other 
commc^ities, whether patented or unpatented, on the condition that the lessee o r purchaser shall not use the goods o f a  
competitor of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such a condition may be a substantially lessen competition or tend to 
create a monopoly."
318 Sherman Act § 1 slates that "every contract, combination in the fbnn of tu s t or otherwise, or conspiracy, in resfraint of 
frade or commerce among several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal" and it proscribes in § 2 that it is 
illegal to “monopolize, or attem pt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other persons to monopolize any part o f the 
trade or commerce among several states."
J
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restraint of trade." Bundling may also constitute a method by which a defendant monopolises or 
attem pts to monopolise a particular market.
On the other hand, Sherman Act § 2 is rarely used to combat anti-competitive bundling due to its very 
high threshold for a monopolisation claim Given the more pointed language of Clayton Act § 3, it has 
been a vexing issue whether the Clayton Act was intended to be more strict than the Sherman Act.32o 
Notably, the terms “may be to" and “tend to" suggest a legal standard that is triggered at a stage prior to 
the actual realisation of anti-competitive effects 221 At one point, the case law appeared to confirm this 
reading. In Times-Picayune, the Supreme Court suggested that a tying arrangement could be 
condemned under more aggressive standards under Clayton Act § 3 than under Sherman Act § I .322 a  
few  courts have adhered to this approach .323 Today the standard under both statutes is the same,
however.324
W ithin its mandate to prevent unfair competitive practices, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC") can 
move against bundling under § 5 of the FTC Act.325 Likewise, the provision contains no express 
reference to bundling or tying. Initially, the Supreme Court appeared to accept broader standards under 
the FTC Act. In Brown Shoe, for instance, the Supreme Court upheld FTC’s condemnation of a practice 
under which Brown provided special services to franchisees in exchange for a promise they would 
concentrate their sales efforts on Brown Shoes.326 in backing up FTC, it rejected the argument that 
proof of anti-competitive effects was necessary. FTC Is allowed, the Court noted, to attack trade
319 For more details, see Chapter 2. For a rare success under Sherman Act § 2: UnHed States v. United Shoe Machines Co., 
110 F. Supp. 295 (D . Mass. 1953), a/Td, 347 US 521 (1954).
320 See Kramer, T h e  Supreme Court and Tying Arrangements: Antitrust as History", Minn. L  Rev. 1013 (1985), p. 1023.
321 For details, see Lazaroff, ‘Reflections on Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.: Continued Confusion 
Regarding Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Jurisprudence", Wash. L  Rev. 101 (1994).
322 Times-Picayune v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), suggesting that the Clayton Act must have broader coverage than 
the Sherman Act because otherwise Clayton Act § 3 would have been superfluous (at 608-609). The Clayton Act applied, the 
Court reasons, to every agreement the effect of which “may be substantially to lessen competition", whereas the Sherman 
Act only reached agreements actually "in restraint of trade." For the latter, the plaintiff must show both that tiie seller had 
sufficient market power in the tying market and that the tie-in restrained a substantial volume of competition in the tied 
m arket However, if the plaintiff could show only one of these, then the bundle might still be in violation of Clayton Act § 3.
323 T o m  Sound and Customs Tops v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 506 US 868 (1992), 
suggesting that market power is not required under the Clayton Act (at 485): and. Ware v. Trailer Marl, Inc., 623 F.2d 1150 
(6 *  Cir. 1980), noting that the market power in the tying market is “relevant only if [the plaintiff] intends to prove a p erse  
violation of Section 1 * of the Sherman Act, but not in a § 3 Clayton Act case (at 1153).
324 Grappane v. Subaru o f New England, 858 F.2d 792 (1®̂  Cir. 1988), noting that the same test applies “regardless of 
whether a plaintiff charges a violation of Sherman Act § 1 or Clayton Act § 3" (at 794).
325 FTC Act § 5 reads as follows: ‘unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
commerce, are declared unlawful.“
326 FTC  V. Brown Shoe Co., 384 US 316 (1966).
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restraints “in their incipiency without proof that they amount to an outright violation of § 3 of the Clayton 
Act or other provisions of the antitrust laws."327
However, despite the prior expansive readings of § 5, FTC’s ability to condemn conduct that falls 
outside of the law’s coverage w as significantly curtailed in Du Pont de Nemours.^“̂  A District Court 
reversed the finding that FTC Act § 5 had been violated by uniform pricing practices, independently 
reached by manufacturers of anti-knock gasoline additives. The undertakings sold their products on a 
delivered-price basis. They provided customers 30 days’ advance notice of price changes and notified 
the press of price increases before they took effect They also employed 'most favoured nations’- 
clauses guaranteeing customers that they would receive the same price.
In holding that no violation of §  5  occurred, the Court ruled that Congress did not give the agency the 
power “to bar any business practice found to have an adverse effect on competition. Instead, the 
Commission could proscribe only unfair practices or methods of com petition."^ It required R C  to find 
“at least some indicia of oppressiveness [...] such as (1) evidence o f anticompetitive intent or purpose 
on the part of the producer charged, or (2) the absence of an Independent legitimate business reason 
for its conduct."33o in sum, the standard under § 5  R C  Act was brought in line with the analysis followed 
under the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
3. The chequered history of bundling analysis
“There is reason," writes Lessig, “to believe that the law in this area is unsettled."33i Although referring in 
particular to technological bundling, Lessig’s obsenration has a general application and appeal. Despite 
its long tradition, the Supreme Court has never settled upon a coherent approach to distinguish between 
benign and harmful bundles. The Court has swung from one extreme to another.332 The legal oscillation 
has resulted in a sort of middle ground between some of the more extreme approaches now purporting 
a modified perse  test. The recent proceedings against Microsoft signal, at least at the level of the circuit 
court, a clear shift to an unstructured rule o f reason.
327 FTC  V. Brown Shoe Co., at 322.
328 E l  da Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F. 2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984). See also B h y l Corp., 101 FTC 425 (1983).
328 £ƒ. da Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, at 136.
338 E l. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, at 139.
331 See Brief of Lessig As Amicus Curiae, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232), 
p. 1. For reference work, see Areeda and Hovenkamp, Fundamentals of Antitrust Law  (New York, 2002), pp. 733- 888; 
Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy -  The Law o f Competition and Its Practice (S t Paul, 1994), pp. 351-381; and, Gellhom 
and Kovadc, Antitrust Law and Economics (S t Paul, 1994), pp. 325-340.
332 See Bauer, “A  Simplified Approach to Tying Arrangements: a Legal and Economic Analysis*, Vanderbilt L. Rev. 283 
(1980), writing that *[t]here is as much heat as light in this area” (p. 284).
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3.1. The patent m isuse origin of the leveraging theory
The origin of the analysis o f bundling is espoused throughout the course of defining patent infringement 
allegations.333 These cases involved the efforts of a patent holder to tie its patented product to a second, 
often unpatented product.
In Button Fastening, for instance, the plaintiff sold a patented machine for fastening buttons with staples 
to shoes under the restriction that the machine could only be used with staples purchased from \ l ^  The 
defendant sold compatible staples to the users of the machines. He was sued for patent infringement. 
Upholding the lower court’s decision, the Court of Appeals ruled that the defendant had infringed the 
patent by breaching the bundle. Other lower courts have followed this approach. They held that patent 
holders were allowed to tie a riveting machine with unpatented rivets335, a copying machine with the 
supplies of unpatented ink336, and a bottle-handling machine with bottle caps.337
The tying question was not presented to the Supreme Court until 1912. In Henry v. Dick, the plaintiff 
sold its patented stencil-duplicating machines on the condition that they could only be used with stencil 
paper, ink and other supplies produced by it.338 Holding that it was permitted for a patentee to bundle a 
second unpatented product to its patented invention, the Supreme Court noted:
[i]f it be that the ingenuity o f patentees in devising ways in which to reap benefits of their 
discoveries requires to be restrained. Congress alone has the power to determine w hat restraint 
shall be im posed. A s the law stands it contains none, and the duty which rests upon this and very 
court is to  expound the law as it is written.̂ ^^
A vigorous dissent was entered by Judge White. Stripped to its essential logic, he advanced the 
proposition that a tie to a patented commodity was equivalent to allowing a monopoly over the second
333 Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2  v. Hyde, 466 US 2 (1984), noting that *[t]he fools* of the per se m le against 
bundling date to patent infringement suits (at 9).
33< Heaton Peninsula Button Fastening Co. v. Eureka Spedafty Co., 77 Fed. 288 (6 * Cir. 1896).
335 Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. O ’Brien. 93 Fed. 200 (D. Mass 1898).
335 Cortetyouv. Carter's Ink Co.. 118Fed. 1022(S.D.N.Y. 1902).
337 Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. BrooWyn Bottle Stopper Co., 172 Fed. 225 (E.D.N.Y. 1909).
338 Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
339 Henry v. A  B. Dick Co., at 35.
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good. This additional monopoly, he reasoned, went beyond the one granted to the holder and should 
not be protected by the patent law.̂ ^o
In response to the significant consequences of Henry v. Dick, the Congress passed the Clayton Act in 
1914. O ne of reasons to adopt the Act was due to the risk o f leveraging. Mentioning the behaviour of 
two successful companies at that time (United Shoe and General Film), Congress considered that 
bundling is *one of the greatest agencies and instrumentalists of monopoly ever devised by the brain of 
man. It completely shuts out competitors, not only from trade in which they are already engaged, but 
from the opportunities to build up trade in any community where these great and powerful combinations 
are operating under this system and practice."34i
Ultimately, the Supreme Court overruled its overly lenient approach in 1917. In Motion Picture, the Court 
saw that the patent holder of a motion picture projector licensed it with the restriction that the projector 
could solely be used to project the holder’s unpatented films.^ 2  yy^en a licensee used the projector to 
show other films, the holder sued him for patent infringement. Although the Court observed that the 
Clayton Act constituted *a most persuasive expression of the public policy of our country with respect to 
the question,” it did not apply the Act.̂ ^  ̂ instead, it considered the holder’s exclusive right to use the 
machine and found that “the materials with which the machine is operated are no part of the patented 
machine.”3^ Its rationale was to prevent that firms may “extend the scope of its patent monopoly by 
restricting the use of it to materials necessary in Its operation, but which are not part of the patented
invention,*3̂ 5
Later, in 1931, the decision in Carbice re-emphasised that bundling another unpatented good with a 
patented good was outside the scope of the patent m onopoly.^ Arguably, the evil that the Court sought 
to forestall was likewise the extension of monopoly power. Allowing a patent holder to tie an unpatented 
good might allow the owner of a patent to “secure a partial monopoly on the unpatented supplies 
consumed in its operations."^^^
^  Henry v. A  6 . Dick Co., in which Judge White wrote that *[t]hat which was not embraced by the patent, which could not 
have been embraced therein and which if mistakenly allowed and included in an express claim would have been 
inefficacious, is now by the effect of a contract held to be embraced by the patent and covered by the patent (aw* (at 51).
See H .R . Rep. No. 6 2 7 ,63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914), pp. 12-13.
3̂ 2 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., 243 US 502 (1917).
3̂ 3 Motton Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., at 517-518.
3« Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., at 513.
3« Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., at 517.
3« Carbice Corp. o f America Patent Devetopment Corp., 283 US 27 (1931). For sim ilar ruling, see also Mercoid Corp. v. Mid- 
Continent Investment Co., 320 US 661 (1944).
3̂ 7 Carbice Corp. o f America Patent Development Corp., at 32.
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3.2. The early days of the Clayton Act
A fter the strict patent misuse doctrine, the earfy judicial scrutiny under the Clayton Act appears to have 
gone in the opposite direction.^« The Supreme Court seems to have followed a kind of rule of reason 
analysis in deciding whether bundling adversely affects competition.
O ne of the early cases is United Shoe. In that case of 1922, the Court affirmed an injunction against the 
conditions that United Shoe used for leasing its shoe making machines.^® Its leases did not explicitly 
forbid shoe manufacturers from using machines supplied by rivals with United Shoe’s machines. But, 
th e contract also stipulated that United Shoe could cancel the lease if the licensee failed to comply with 
a  set of provisions that effectively prohibited the use of rival m a c h i n e s N o t i n g  that "United Shoe 
occupies a dominant position in the production of such machineiy^si, the Supreme Court was satisfied 
to  conclude that “such restrictive and tying agreements must necessarily lessen competition and tend to 
monopoly is, we believe, equally apparent,"352 jh e  word ‘such’ suggests that the Court was convinced 
th at not all bundling is bad, but that the leasing contract at hand was anti-competitive.
Another important case is the oiling in IBM, delivered In 1936. The IBM Corporation conditioned the sale 
o f its business machines upon the lessee’s agreement to exclusively purchase tabulating cards from 
it.353 As IBM’s rivals were very small, the Court inferred monopoly power in the tying m arket.^  Finding 
th at the $ 3 million annual sales of the tabulating cards were a substantial amount of commerce, the 
Court held that the effect of the arrangement “may be to substantially lessen competition." IBM claimed 
that it could only by the use of its own cards assure the proper operation of the machines. In response, 
th e Supreme Court said that it would only be willing to entertain such a defense if no other reasonable 
and less competitively harmful alternative was available. As the evidence indicated that rivals were able 
to produce cards with no adverse effect, IBM’s claim was turned down.^s
3^  See Mitciiell, op. cit., referring to these cases as “exceptions' (p, 49).
3̂ 9 United Shoe Machinery Corp, v. United States, 258 US 451 (1922).
350 United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, referring to the “practical effect“ of United Shoe's behaviour (at 457).
351 UnHed Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, at 455.
352 United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United ̂ ates, at 457 (emphasis added).
353 international Business Machines v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
354 Internationa! B u ^ ess  Machines v. United States, stating that “lalppellant makes and sells 3.000.000,000 cards annually, 
81 per cent of the total, indicating that the sales by the Remington Rand Company, its only competitor, representing the 
remaining 19 percent, are approximately 600.000.000'(at 136).
355 International Busness Machines v. Un^ed States, rejecting the asserted business justification by stating '[t]he suggestion 
that without the tying dause an adequate supply of cards would not be forthcoming from competitive resources is not 
supported by the evidence“ (at 138-139).
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For one, these early cases under the Clayton Act did not explicitly spell out a legal standard. It could be 
argued, however, that the requirement of market power and analysis of the competitive effects, along 
with the discussion of justifications, suggests an assessment quite similar to the rule of reason test.^» 
Under this abbreviated form, the Court would examine: (1) whether the defendant has market power in 
the tying product market; (2) the effects of the bundle on the market for the tied good; and, (3) the 
availability of less restrictive alternatives
3.3. The increased em phasis on p e r se principles in Internationa! Salt and Northern Pacific 
Railway
Obsenrers who expected the Supreme Court to continue to apply this kind o f rule o f reason test were 
promptly treated to a rude shock. The earlier hostile attitude of the patent cases was soon carried over 
into a per se testes« However, that is not to say that the Supreme Court treated bundling in precisely the 
same manner as it did when treating classic perse violations like as price-fixing.
The legal standard was first enunciated in International SaltP^  International Salt leased its patented 
salt-dispensing machines on the condition that its machines are used to only deposit salt purchased 
from It. Under an English clause, licensees were also allowed to use salt of rival suppliers if they offered 
better conditions. International Salt was found to hold a limited monopoly in the market for the tying 
product because its products were patented and it was “the country’s largest producer for industrial 
uses."3®° The Supreme Court stressed that, as a result of the bundle, a substantia! amount of business 
was foreclosed in the tied good market.
Based on these facts, the Court unanimously condemned International Saifs  tying practices under 
Sherman Act §  1 and Clayton Act §  3  because “it is unreasonable, perse, to foreclose competitors from  
any substantial market.“36i Without explaining how the defendant could foreclose more salt sales than it 
already had, it held that “[b]y contracting to close this market for salt against competition. International
356 This is observation is recognised in the literature. See Aniauf, “Severing Ties With ttie Strained Per Se Test for Antitrust 
Tying Liability: The Economic and Legal Rationale for a Rule of Reason’ , Ham line L. Rev. 477 (2000), pp. 486-487; Gellhom  
and Kovadc, op. cff., p. 329; and, Frey, op. cH., p. 140.
357 See Hylton, Antitrust Law -E conom ic Theory and Common Law Evolution (Cambridge MA, 2003), p. 286.
358 The first indication of this rigid approach was Pick Mfjg. Corp. v. Genera/ Motors Corp., 80 F. 2d 641 (7** Cir. 1935), a ffd ., 
299 US 3, where the Court refused a defense with the words: ’[e]ven if we are free to make an exception" (at 10).
359 International Sait Co. v. United States, 332 U .S . 392 (1947).
3M International Salt Co. v. United States, at 394-395.
35’ Internationa! Salt Co. v. United States, at 396
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Salt has engaged in a restraint of trade for which its patents afford no immunity from the anti-trust 
laws/362 International Salt argued that, since the lease contracts required it to repair and maintain 
machines, it should be permitted to require lessees to comply with use specifications. The salt that the 
company required its lessees to use was purer than many grades on the market, and therefore posed 
less risk of damaging the machines. Like in IBM, the Court held that the company had the less 
restrictive alternative available of requiring lessees to use salt of a certain quality.^
The per se language continued in Standard Although not a bundling case, the Supreme Court 
gave an important explanation for its unsympathetic treatment of bundling. It noted that “[t]ying 
agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition."^ The per se test was 
developed further in Northern Pacific Railway. The case concerned the question whether preferential 
routing contracts violated Sherman Act § Northern Pacific leased and sold land situated near its rail 
lines on the condition that licensees ship the products produced on those lands unless other carriers 
offered better rates or services. The Supreme Court affirmed the perse test:
Among the practices which the courts have heretofore deemed to be unlawful in and of 
themselves are [...] tying arrangements [...] Indeed tying arrangements serve hardly any purpose 
beyond the suppression of competition [...] They are unreasonable in and of themselves 
whenever a party has sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably 
restrain free competition in the market for the tied product and a not insubstantial amount of 
interstate commerce is affected.^
The Court appears to give two reasons for its hostility. First, the Court appears to have focused on the 
arrangement's effects on competition In the bundled goods market. The Court recalled that bundling 
practices “deny competitors free access to the market for the tied product, not because the party 
imposing the tying requirement has a better product or a lower price, but because of his power or 
leverage in another m arket."^
*2 International Salt Co. v. United States, at 396.
363 International Salt Co. v. United States, at 139-140.
36* Standard O// Co. v. United States, concerning exclusive supply contracts for petroleum products between Standard Oil 
and Independent service stations and industrial users.
365 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, at 305.
366 It should be noted that the Clayton Act § 3 did not apply because the tying product was land that is not a commodity.
36̂  Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 US 1 (1958), at 5-6.
368 Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, at 6,
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Second, it expressed some concern about the effects of bundling on consumers.^^ It objected to the 
fact that they are forced to “forego their free choice between competing products.”37o O f course, any 
long-term contract restricts in some way the purchaser’s freedom of choice, so it seems inappropriate to 
attribute the concern to this restraint in and of itself. However, the Court appears to have specifically 
addressed the concern in relation to bundling. Bundling may force buyers to choose differently, thus 
leading the economy to produce a different mix of goods and services This point was explained in 
greater detail in Times-Picayune:
Basic to a faith that a free economy best promotes the public weal is that goods must stand the 
cold test of competition; that the public, acting through the market’s impersonal judgment, shall 
allocate the Nation’s resources and thus direct the course its economic development will take [...]
By conditioning his sale of one commodity on the purchase of another, a seller coerces the 
abdication of buyers’ independent judgment as to the ‘tied’ product’s merit and insulates it from 
the competitive stresses of the open market372
Some observations can be made at this point. First, the clear trend was to make bundling illegal with 
practically no proof of its ill effects. The law prevents a monopolist from bundling two truly separate 
products, even if the bundle produces no anti-competitive effects or is, on the whole, pro-competitive.373 
This means that plaintiffs did not need to assemble elaborate economic proof of market power or of 
probable restraint on trade, and the economic justifications of a defendant therefore went unheeded.
Second, the judicial hostility appears to have been a blend of concerns for the effects on both 
competition and consumers. Apart from the competition effects, the Court’s concern seems to have 
rested on the belief that there is something inherently inferior or undesirable about bundling.37̂  From 
this standpoint, bundling would have to be seen akin to tort suits as deceptive advertising or other unfair 
business actions. This analysis prompts the question of whether antitnjst law should deal with these 
issues regardless of whether they led to any increase in monopoly power in the second market.
See Grimes, T h e  Antirust Tying Law Schism: A  Critique of MicrosoU IH and a Response to Hylton and Salinger", Antitnjst 
L  J. 199 (2003), pp. 200-201; and, Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection 
Issues’ . B.U. L  Rev. 661 (1982), pp. 666-668.
370 Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, at 6.
371 See Flyn, “Antitrust Protection of the Consumer Myth or Reality”, Fomm 939 (1978), arguing that consumers are not 
benefited when forced to buy a product they otherwise would not buy (p. 959).
372 Times-Picayune v. United States, a t 605.
373 See Mitchell, op. d t., p. 35.
37* For similar view, see Sullivan, Handbook o f the Law o f Antitnjst (SL Paul, 1977), writing that “the hostility to tying 
embodied in the Act and reflected in the cases may have more to do with notions of appropriate competitive behaviour 
(conceptions about fair opportunity or access) and with the polar concepts of coercion and free choice, than it has to do with 
the efficiency or allocation consequences of competitive structure and process” (p. 445). More recenfly, see Bauer, op. c/f., 
noting that, besides effects on competition, a second effect of “all tie-ins is the deprivation of the buyer's free choice' (p. 300) 
and, even if economics are right that this effect may not occur, th e  buyer may still have his purchasing decisions distorted' 
by the bundle (p. 301).
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Third, some lower courts allow sellers to justify bundles, albeit unlawful per s e At  any rate, even 
those courts that purportedly allow sellers to justify bundling usually subject such attempts at justification 
to the strictest scrutiny. Typically, courts have decided that per se means what it says.̂ ^e Likewise, the 
Suprem e Court has never endorsed the assertion of an affirmative defense to a bundle otherwise 
deem ed per se unlawful. Rnally, the p e rs e  test was distilled down to the following elements; (1) a 
substantial volume of commerce is affected; (2) two distinguishable products are bundled; and (3 ) the 
defendant has market power in the bundling product market.
3 .4 . The evolution to  a modified p er se tes t
Despite the trend advancing a harsh treatment of bundling, the Supreme Court began to shy away from 
repudiation of bundling in the 70s and 80s. The case law appears to have shifted to a modified per se 
test. To be sure, the per se framework was preserved, but the Court required a more extensive inquiry 
into the facts surrounding the case and in particuiar the market power requirement was taken more 
seriously.377 This shift can undoubtedly be attributed to the influence of the Chicago School.
Although the perse  approach found an even stricter application in the first of the two Fortner decisions, 
the Court’s second decision shows a remarkable change.^^s In both cases, U.S. Steel was charged with 
making attractive advantageous credit facilities for home builders purchasing land on the condition that 
they also purchase its prefabricated houses. The tying product was credit and the tied good was 
prefabricated housing.
Fortner I was a review of a summary judgment. The case was remanded to the Supreme Court to 
determ ine whether US Steel could be proven to hold economic power in the credit market. The ruling 
w as delivered in 1969. The Court considered the defendant's credit terms sufficiently "unique" to 
establish market power in the credit market as they were well-below normal market rates.̂ ^® It also 
found that the sales of more than $ 9 million of prefabricated houses over a three-year period foreclosed
375 M ozart Co, v. Mercedes-Benz ofN . Am, ¡nc., 833 F. 2d 1342 (9** Cir. 1987), entertaining a business justification defense 
(a t 1348-1351).
376 Fox Motors, Inc. v. Mazda Distnbution, Inc., 806 F. 2d 953 (10"’ Cir. 1986), noting that affirmative defences are not 
available when a bundle is perse unlawful (at 957-58).
377 See Lazaroff, op. cit., describing this trend as *lhe recent retreat from per se principles* (p. 113).
378 Fortner Enters, v. United States Steel Corp. {Fortner I), 394 U.S. 495 (1969); and, United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner 
Enterprises, 429 US 610 (1977) (Fortner//).
378 Fortner Enters, v. United States Steel Corp., 394 US 495, at 502-503.
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a “non insubstantiar part of commerce in the bundled product market.3ao it rejected the defendanfs 
attempted justification that its attractive credit terms resulted from economies of scale and reduced 
risk.3®i
Eight years later, the Court was called in Fortner II to review the lower court’s ruling that the defendant 
had sufficient economic power in the credit market. Giving a narrow interpretation of its earlier 
jurisprudence, it clearly backed away from  the rigid p e r se test by performing a detailed economic 
assessment of the facts. Although the defendanfs bundle affected only a small faction of the total 
market for prefabricated housing, it found that volume in dollars was sufficient to satisfy the non- 
insubstantial commerce requirement. The remaining question was whether the defendant had sufficient 
power in the tying market in order to appreciably restrain competition in the tied market.
The Court considered the price charged for the houses, the num ber of purchasers affected by the 
bundle, the character and relation of the two bundled products and the size and profitability of the 
defendant.3»2 it concluded that the unusual 100%-financing at low interest offered by US Steel was 
nothing more than a reflection o f its willingness to provide cheap financing In order to sell expensive 
housing.283 Absent proof of significant cost advantages or evidence that the defendant could provide 
different financing than that offered by its competitors would not be the kind of uniqueness constituting a 
Sherman Act §  1 violation.
At first blush, the result of Fortner II appears to be consistent with earlier precedents. On other hand, it 
could be argued that ’money’ is a fungible commodity, distinguishable, for instance, from a patented 
machine, copyrighted film, or strategically located land. Moreover, consumer preferences for 100- 
percent financing was evident, as was the creation of a number of bundles. These factors were 
important in earlier cases but seemed to be unpersuasive in this case. The Court’s attitude of increased 
tolerance for bundling and a subtle departure from automatic p e rs e  illegality underscored a gradual shift 
in the legal doctrine.^s^
380 Fortner Enters, v. United States Steel Corp., 394 US 495, at 502.
381 Fortner Enters, v. United States Steel Corp., 394 US 495, at 507.
382 United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, 429 US 610, at 617-620,
383 United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, 429 US 610, noting that ‘ if the evidence merely shows that credit terms 
are unique because the seller is willing to accept a lesser profit or to incur greater risks than its competitors, that kind of 
uniqueness will not give rise to any inference of economic power in the aed it market" (at 621-622).
38< See Lazaroff, op. cit., writing that the Court seemed to “turn the dock back to the earliest days of tie-in analysis and 
signal a  departure from a p e rs e  approach and a rejuvenation of a more careful inspection of the anticompetitive effects of a 
tie’ (p. 114-115).
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A further entrenchment of the per se  test became strikingly evident in Jeffersori P arish .^  The case 
involved bundling of surgery senrices with anesthesiologiocal services. Patients wanting an operation in 
East Jefferson Hospital were required to use the hospital’s anesthesiologiocal services. The defendant 
alleged that bundling the two services reduced costs and improved quality. The Supreme Court 
unanimously held that the defendant’s practice did not violate Sherman Act §  1, but the judges could not 
agree on why.̂ ss Although noting that bundling could be pro-competitive^fl^ the Court’s majority 
reiterated that “[i]t is far too late in the history o f our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition 
that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are 
unreasonable per se.”̂
For the first time, it referred to 'certain tying arrangements’ being caught by the perse  test. These words 
suggest that not all bundling falls under the test.389 This reading is confirmed by the Court’s statement 
that "[njot every refusal to sell two products separately can be said to restrain competition.’'39o
As for the facts, the Court’s analysis considered in detail the actual economic effects of the bundling 
arrangement. The Court found that the hospital did indeed bundle the sale of two separate products 
together, based on consumer’s separate demand for them.^si Lj^g Fortner //, it insisted upon proof of 
sufficient market power in the tying market.392 However, it found that the hospital lacked sufficient 
m arket power to adversely affect competition in the market for anesthesiologiocal services, as it 
attracted merely 30 percent of the patients in its district.393 Without the necessary market power, 
Jefferson Parish thus avoided bundling liability.
Closely related to the inquiry into Jefferson Parish’s market power, the Court emphasised that whether 
consumers are forced to accept the bundle due to the hospital’s m arket power should also be
385 Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 US 2 (1984). See Kramer, op. cit., describing Jefferson Parish as 
“another swing in judicial attitude on the validity of tying arrangements* (p. 1063).
386 Notably, 4 judges favoured the rule of reason test, while the majoriy applied the conventional perse tes t See Jefferson 
Parish HospHa! District No. 2 v. Hyde, at 35-44.
387 Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, at 19.
388 Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, at 14 (emphasis added).
389 For similar conclusion, see United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, at 457.
390 Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, at 19.
38'' Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, at 22-23.
382 Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, recognising that generally “application of the per se rule focuses on the 
probability of anticompetitive consequences' (at 15-16).
383 Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, noting that “[sjventy per cent of the patients residing in Jefferson Parish 
enter hospitals other than East Jefferson [...] thus East Jefferson’s dominance over persons residing in Jefferson Parish is 
far from overwhelming’ (at 20-21 ).
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considered.39< The Court’s analysis was predominantly ajar to whether consumers were harmed by the 
arrangement by stating that the “p erse prohibition is appropriate if anticompetitive forcing is likely.’ ŝs
The Court stressed that if patients were forced to purchase the anesthesiologiocal services because of 
“a result of the hospital’s m arket power would the arrangement have anticompetitive consequences, if 
no forcing is present, patients are free to enter a competing hospital and to use another 
anesthesiologist.“39® Again, the Court appears to have been concerned with the consumers’ choice. 
Ultimately, it held that this type of coercion was not present. It stated that “[tjhere is no evidence that the 
price, the quality, or the supply or demand for either the ‘tying product’ or the ‘tied product’ involved in 
this case has been adversely affected."397
3.5. Microsoft and its call for an unstructured rule of reason test
Formally, the law of bundling is easy to state. If a  seller has any appreciable market power in the market 
for the bundling good, and if the arrangem ent affects more than an insignificant amount of commerce in 
the market for the bundled good, the arrangem ent violates antitrust law. Of course, this formal statement 
of law masks a good deal o f complexity. Measuring the degree of market power or the amount of 
commerce affected is not always easy.
The examination of the case law shows that the Supreme Court requires an increasingly detailed 
economic analysis of these requirements. Many other issues may emerge. For instance, does the 
‘bundle’ really involve the sale o f two separate products, or are the two items in fact an integrated 
product? Or, how does the p e r se  test deal with possible pro-competitive bundles? These issues were 
already somewhat at hand in the earlier case law, but came under the spotlight particularly in 
M icrosoft.^
^  Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, at 16.
3» Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, at 16. The Court’s focus on purchaser’s choice was also illustrated when 
it explained that *when a purchaser is forced to buy a product he would not have otherwise bought even from another seller 
in the tied product m arket there can be no adverse impact on competition because no portion of the market which would 
otherwise have been available to other sellers has been foreclosed.”
396 Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, a t 21-22.
397 Jefferson Parish HospHat District No. 2  v. Hyde, a t 31.
398 For interesting revievre, see Greve, “US versus Microsoft: Wie Won Wat? Een Overzicht van het Amerikaanse Hoofdstuk 
van de Microsoft saga", SEW 43 (2004): Cohen, “Surveying the Microsoft Antitrust Universe", Berkeley Tech. L. J. 333 
(2004); Larger, ‘De Microsoft-zaak: de Schikking Tussen het Amerikaanse Ministerie van Justitie en Microsoft", AM 28 
(2003): Areeda and Hovenkamp, op. cit., pp. 1189-1223; Stocky and Levary, “Windows XP: Another Court Battle for 
Microsoft?”, J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L  193 (2002); Baker, “Lessons From Microsoft", Sedona Conf. J. 41 (2001); 
Geier, “United States v. Microsoft”, Berkeley Tech. L  J. 297 (2001); and, Evans ef al., Did Microsoft Harm Consumers? Two 




In 1994, the DoJ filed a complaint claiming that Miaosoft's practices with Original Equipment 
Manufacturers {“OEMs") were exclusionary and anti-competitive. It was claimed that Microsoft hindered 
its rivals by: (1) requiring computer manufacturers 'per processor* payments regardless of whether 
Microsoft’s operating system was included in a computer; (2) using long-term contracts that magnified 
the exclusionary effect o f other requirements; and, (3) imposing unnecessarily restrictive non-disclosure 
requirements on application developers that precluded them from working with competitors. Their 
purpose, claimed the DoJ, was to maintain its monopoly in the Windows market. The DoJ and Microsoft 
settled the case by entering in a conduct-oriented consent decree.̂ ss
The decree prohibited Microsoft from, among other things, calculating its licensing fees based on the 
number of personal computers a manufacturer ships and requiring OEMs to take any other software 
product as a condition of their license for Windows. The consent decree was widely criticised as being 
too weak.^® jh e  consent decree also included an anti-bundling provision. The decree stated in § IV (E) 
that "Microsoft shall not enter into any License Agreement in which the terms of that agreement are 
expressly or impliedly conditional upon: (i) the licensing of any other Covered Product, Operating 
System Software product, or other product (provided, however, that this provision in and of itself shall 
not be construed to prohibit Microsoft from developing integrated products); or (ii) the OEM not 
licensing, purchasing, using or distributing any non-Microsoft product." In retrospect, it is clear that the 
‘integrated product’ caveat would eventually lead to conflict, given the inherent difficulties of determining 
whether a bundle is one integrated product or two bundled items.
3.5.2. Microsoft It
In 1997, the DoJ alleged that Microsoft’s technological and contractual bundling of Internet Explorer 
(“IE") 3.0 and 4 .0  with Windows 95 was in violation of § IV (E) of the 1995 consent decree. Microsoft 
supplied Windows 95 and IE 3.0 on the same disk, and the former would not function unless the latter 
was also i n s t a l l e d O n c e  IE was installed, Its eventual deletion would disable the operating system.
399 United States v. M/crosoff. 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) [Microsoft J).
^  For instance, see Baseman et at., “Microsoft Plays Hardball: The Use of Exclusionary Pricing and Technical 
Incompatibility to Maintain Monopoly Power in Markets for Operating System Software', Antitrust Bull. 265 (1995), observing 
that th e  remedies prescribed In the consent decree are likely to be inadequate' (p. 299).
^  United States v. Microsoft, 147 F.3d 935 {D.C. Cir. 1998) (Microsoft //). at 940-941.
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Later, the bundle became contractual in nature, as Microsoft required OEMs to purchase IE 4.0 that was 
supplied separately as a condition of licensing Windows 95. Microsoft relied on the ‘integrated product" 
caveat to argue that any time it added a  feature to the operating system it was creating a new product
Interpreting the decree, the Court of Appeals found that the bundles of Windows 95 and IE 3.0 and 4,0 
did not offend it but instead fell within its explicit exception for “integrated products."402 fh e  combination 
of IE and Windows, observed the Court, appears to have produced benefits not available if. for instance, 
Windows 95 were combined with Netscape's browser/03 The Court rejected Judge W ald’s dissenting 
contention that the test applied gave Microsoft boundless discretion to bundle other products with its 
Windows system .^  A “plausible claim" that integration o f two item s was beneficial, the Court insisted, 
would establish that Windows 95 and IE were not simply "bolted together" for the purpose of injuring 
competition, but advantageous for consumers.-^os yvhile the Court remanded the case to the District 
Court, it clearly signalled its own belief that the benefits w ere present.^^®
Described as a “major victory for Microsoff^o^ in the press, a consensus immediately formed that the 
Court of Appeals had given the DoJ a serious setback in its efforts to enforce the 1995 decree. Wrongly, 
it was also assumed that the decision would constitute an important precedent for bundling law in 
g en era l.^  This becomes clear in the third stage o f the Microsoñ saga.
«2 Microsoft, 147 F.3d 935, at 945-953.
«3 Microsoft, 147 F.3d 935. at 950-951. 
w  Microsoft, 147 F.3d 935, at 952.
^  Microsoft, 147 F.3d 935, noting that "the limited competence o f courts to evaluate high-tech product designs and the high 
cost of error should make them wary of second guessing the claimed beneSts o f a particular design decision” (at 950). 
Microsoft, 147 F.3d 935, expressing the tentative view" that the bundle was a “genuine* integration {at 952-953).
See Biester, “What Lessons Result from the Appeals Court in Microsoft Case?", Legal Intelligencer {2  July 1998), p. 7.
^  See Flaherty, “DOJ’s Microsoft Strategy Gutted", The Recorder (24 June 1998), writing that “[t]he court has held that 
product design and integration is effectively exempt from tie-in claim s' (p. 1); and, Corcoran, “Microsoft Scores a Court 
Victory In Rght with Justice*, Washington Posi (24  June 1998), noting that "(Ijegal experts said the miing would force Justice 
to rework the strategy in its broader antitrust case against Microsoft's next version, Windows 98, which bundles the operating 
system more tightly with the browser" (p. C09).
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3.5.3 M icrosoñill
3.5.3.1 . Introductory rem arks and facts
In 1998, the DoJ and a group of nineteen state plaintiffs filed a new antitrust suit against MicrosofL^*^ 
The plaintiffs alleged four types of antitrust violations: unlawful exclusive-dealing arrangements and 
unlawful bundling In violation of Sherman Act § 1, and unlawful monopoly maintenance and attempted 
monopolization in violation of Sherman Act § 2. The accusations sprang from Microsoft’s efforts to 
maintain its monopoly in operating system market by destroying threats posed by Netscape Navigator 
and a cross-platform programming language, Sun Java. Both Navigator and Java are so-called 
'middleware software.’
These programs can serve as platforms for other software applications. Operating systems are 
characterised by network effects. This means that computer users want an operating system that will 
permit them to run all the applications they wish to use and that developers tend to write applications for 
the most popular operating system. Microsoft's high market share has led to even more applications 
being written for Windows, and so on.
Such positive feedback, or the ‘applications barrier to entry,’ has made it difficult or impossible for rival 
operating systems to compete effectively with Microsoft by gaining more than a niche market.̂ ^° Since 
the triumph of Windows 95, roughly 90% of the operating systems were installed on PCs. Indeed, as 
this suggests, Microsoft has monopoly power in Windows. To the extent that middleware itself exposes 
programming interfaces for applications. It supports applications independent of Windows. By lessening 
reliance on Windows, it poses a direct threat to Windows.̂ ^^
Microsoft responded to this threat by adopting a strategy aimed at extending its dominance over 
Windows to Internet browsers in order to protect the application. In 1995, Microsoft tried to convince 
Netscape not to release a version of its browser that would act as an applications platfomn.^^2 when  
Netscape refused, Microsoft allegedly decided to reduce Netscape’s share of the browser market by 
making IE number one in the market. In order to do so, it pursued a number of strategies, including
United States v. Microsoft, 87 F.Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
<10 See Fisher and Rubinfeld, ‘United States v. Microsoft An Economic Analysis*, in: Evans ef a l, op. eri, pp. 10-11.
United States v. Microsoft, 87 F.Supp. 2d 30, at 39-44.
<12 See Fisher and Rubinfeld, in: Evans et a i, op, cit, p. 16. It should be noted that Microsoft also engaged in similar conduct 
with Intel and Apple {pp. 16-18).
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entering into exclusive-dealing contracts with OEMs and Internet Access Providers, and pressuring 
Apple to stop using Netscape. It is important to emphasise that Microsoft made the decision to bundle IE 
and Windows even though there is demand for browsers separate from demand for operating systems 
and IE was not originally tied with the retail version of Windows 95 when it was first released.^^^
DoJ claimed that the contractual and technological bundles of Windows 95/1E 3.0 and Windows 98/1E 
4.0 were illegal.
3.5.3.2. The judgment by the District Court
On the issue of bundling, in 2000 the District Court found that Microsoft’s bundle of Windows 95 and 98 
with IE  had violated perse  Sherman Act §  It found that bundling both prevented OEMs from pre­
installing other browsers and deterred consumers from using them.^^s jh e  key acts constituting illegal 
bundling were that: (1) Microsoft required licensees of both Windows 95 and 98 to license IE at a single 
price; (2) it refused to allow OEMs to uninstall or remove IE from the Windows desktop; (3) it designed 
Windows 98 in a  way that withheld consumers the ability to remove IE by use of the 'Add/Remove 
Programs’ utility; and, (4) it designed Windows 98 to override the user's choice of default web browser 
in certain circumstances. On the surface, as M eese noted, the government appears to have an easy
case.^ 5̂
The District Court Judge Jackson applied a four-part test^i^ Keeping with Jefferson Parish, he 
concluded that browsers and operating systems are separate products because they are 
"distinguishable in the eyes of buyers" and there is separate demand for each product. He found that 
Microsoft mandated OEMs install IE on all new computers to the licensing agreement. Microsoft was 
also found to have refused licenses to O EM s for Windows distribution unless they agreed not to remove
<13 United States v. Microsoft, 84 F.Supp. 2d 9 (D .D.C . 1999) (Rnding of Fact). The District Court found, “(m]any consumer 
desire to separate their choice of a W eb browser from their choice of an operating system' (at 152) and “[mjoreover, many 
consumers who need an operating system, including a substantial percentage of corporate consumers, do not want a 
browser at a ir {at 152).
<i< United States v. Microsoft, 87 F.Supp. 2d 30, at 47-51.
<is The Court o f Appeals summarised in United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) that this licensing practice 
would increase OEM’s product testing costs because *OEM[s] must test and train support staff to answer calls related to 
every product preinstalled on the machine' (at 64). Furthermore, “pre-installing a [second] broivser in addition to IE would to 
many OEMs be a questionable use of the scarce [but] valuable space on a PC’s hard drive” (at 65).
<13 See Meese, “Monopoly Bundling in Cyberspace: How Many Products Does Microsoft Sell?', Antitrust Bull. 65 (1999), p. 
68.
<1̂  United States v. Microsoft, 87 F.Supp. 2d 30, stating the test applied: (1 ) two separate products are involved; (2) the 
defendant affords its customers no choice but to take the tied product in order to obtain the tying product; (3) the 
arrangement affects a substantial volume pf commerce; and. (4) the defendant has market power in the tying product market 
(at 47).
<13 United States v. Microsoft, 84 F.Supp. 2d 9. at 152 and United States v. Microsoft, 87 F.Supp. 2d 30, at 50.
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IE icons from the Windows desktop. As for consumers, he held that Microsoft had forced consumers to 
acquire IE with the purchase of Windows because they were unable to remove IE, even if they so 
desired. Ignoring Microsoft’s claim that IE was included at no charge, he observed that Microsoft forced 
customers to “pay" for the bundled product.̂ ^  ̂ Although other firms also bundled browsers and 
operating systems, Microsoft was the only vendor not to give OEMs the option to sell a browser-less 
version of Windows. After holding Microsoft that had a monopoly in the operating system market, the 
Court applied the conclusion in Fortner II that market power is the ability to tie products together.^20
According to Judge Jackson, the bundle foreclosed a substantial amount of commerce to competitors 
because Navigator’s usage share and revenues dropped significantly from 1995 to 1998. Playing down 
the importance of these figures, Microsoft asserted that Its anti-competitive practices do not result in 
foreclosure, as users could download browsers for free from the lntemet.^21 |t ¡s important to remember 
that users prefer to get their browsers installed on their computers, considering they pay in terms of time 
and trouble to download a browser, indeed, Microsoft’s own studies demonstrate that most Internet 
users have never downloaded a browser.^22 j j jg e  Jackson also emphasised Microsoft’s intent being a 
“deliberate and purposeful choice to quell incipient competition before it reached tnily minatory 
proportions."423 in conclusion, he held that Microsoft’s bundle Infringed the Sherman Act §1.
3.S.3.3. The ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals’ most provocative holding concerned bundling.^24 Confronting the question 
whether the Windows-IE bundle concerned one or two products, the Court of Appeals faced a situation 
in which the rationale of the relevant precedent was no longer supported by current economic insights. 
Noting that “not all ties are bad”. It relied upon economic theory for the idea that bundling can produce 
efficiencies.̂ 25 \\ stressed that Jefferson Parish cannot always differentiate between pn>competitive and 
anti-competitive bundles.^26 as a result, it overturned the District Court’s holding that Microsoft’s
United States v. Microsoft, 87 F.Supp. 2d 30, at 50.
2̂0 United States v. Microsoft, 87 F.Supp. 2d 30. at 37.
2̂1 See Evans and Schmalensee, "Be Nice to Your Rivals: How the Government Is Selling an Antitrust Case W ithout 
Consumer Harm in United States v. Af/croso/T, in: Evans et a l, pp. 77-79.
422 See Fisher and Rubinfeld, in: Evans et a l, op. ciL, stressing that '[w]hat is important is not whether users can download a 
competitor's browser, but whether users will download a competitor’s browser under prevailing market conditions* (pp. 36-37) 
(emphasis authors).
423 United States v. Microsoft, 87 F.Supp. 2d 30, at 51.
424 United States v. Microsoft. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
425 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, at 87.
425 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, at 84.
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bundling practice was illegal and announced a new legal standard for situations “involving platform
software products."^27
Rather than judging Microsoft’s behaviour under the per se modified test, it posited that the case should 
be decided under the rule of reason test. In order to condemn Microsoft’s conduct, the Court suggested 
the plaintiffs would have to demonstrate that “Microsoft’s conduct unreasonably restrained 
competition/'̂ 28 ^ t the same time, it explicitly refused to find that the Windows-IE bundle was "welfare­
enhancing" or that it “absolved [Microsoft] o f tying liability.'^^g
The Court justified its special exception to the Supreme Court’s regime by referring to the general case 
law on the applicability of per se  tests. The purpose of a p er se test is to avoid spending judicial 
resources in cases involving behaviour that “are presumed to be unreasonable" because of their 
“pernicious effect on competition and lack o f any redeeming virtue."^3i> The Court stressed that such a  
presumption can only be made once courts have had “considerable experience with certain business 
relationships."^^! \[ concluded that “technological integration of added functionality Into software that 
serves as a platform for third-party applications" is not a  business relationship as such.^ 2  \\ also held 
that the rule of reason test is essential because bundling in software markets produces efficiencies that 
courts are not yet trained to recognise and that are not accompanied for by the perse  ru le .'^
Ultimately, the Court required that an unstructured rule of reason test would be applied on remand. First, 
the plaintiffs must show that Microsoft’s behaviour “unreasonably restrained com petition."^ Second, 
Microsoft may, of course, offer pro-competitive justifications. Third, it is the plaintiffs’ burden to show that 
the anti-competitive effect of the behaviour outweighs the benefit. They must prove that “Microsoft’s 
conduct was, on balance, anticompetitive." The DoJ decided not to pursue the bundling claim. As a 
result, the claim was left open. This was also confirmed by Judge Kollar-Kotelly, who approved the 
settlement negotiated with Microsoft. Notably, she made it clear that the settlement could not be
<27 United States v. Microsolt, 253 F.3d 34, at 84.
<28 United States v. Microsoit, 253 F.3d 34. at 95.
<29 United Siafes v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, at 89.
<38 Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, a t 5. 
<31 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, at 84.
<32 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, at 84.
<33 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, at 93.
<3< United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, at 96.
<35 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, at 96.
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interpreted as a •form of absolutism for Microsoft from any liability for the illegal tying of two distinct 
products based upon the design of its Windows operating system product
4. The separate-product issue
As a matter of law, bundling may exist when two separate products are bundled together/^? jh e  
separate-product issue is at first blush deceptively simple. However, as Fortner II accurately notes, 
“[t]here is at the outset of every tie-in case [...] the problem of determining whether two separate 
products are in fact involved."^^® The Supreme Court can surely be criticised for not articulating a 
satisfactory legal standard for evaluating this key question.̂ ŝ Court has explicitly addressed the 
issue, but has never set forth any criteria that could be universally applied.
Times-Picayune is symptomatic of this observation.^ In this case, the defendant required anyone 
wishing to place an advertisement in its morning nevrepaper to also place an advertisement in its 
evening paper. Without explanation, the Supreme Court opined that advertising in both newspapers was 
all part of a single product, namely readership.^^ As a result, the lack of a clear standard led lower 
courts to adopt a patchwork of inconsistent tests.
Essentially, the separate-product issue is, as Sidak elegantly writes, •the linchpin of antitrust 
jurisprudence."̂  ̂ if the defendant can show that two products do not exist, the remaining elements of 
the analysis evaporate. This observation must be read in conjunction with the modified per se test. The 
analysis of bundling has been overinclusive for quite some time. It voided any bundle of separate 
products, even those that were competitively neutral or beneficial. Many lower courts tempered the 
overinclusiveness through manipulation of the separate-product question.^3 They folded into the
*36 New  York v. M/croso/f Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2002); and, Utiited States v. Mfcrosoft Corp., F. Supp. 2d 2002 
W L 31439450 (D.D.C. 2002).
*37 See Mitchell, op. cit., noting thatTtjhe American Courts have made an important quatilication [...] in insisting that the tying 
product and the tied product be different products* {p. 10).
*3® Enterprise Inc. v. US Steel Corp., 395 US 495, at 507.
*39 N M  Controls, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 333 F. Supp. 493 (D. Del. 1971), stating that Tantitrustj decisions and 
literature contain astonishingly little discussion of the criteria to applied to distinguish between component parts of a single 
product and a multiplicity of products* (at 501).
**o 77mes-P/cayune v. United States.
**i Times-Picayune v. United States, at 613-614.
**2 See Sidak, An Antitrust Rule for Software integration (Yale paper, 2001). p. 20.
**3 Hirsh V. Martindate-Hubbeii, ine., 674 F.2d 1343 (9* Cir. 1982), determining whether two items were separate products by 
asking “whether the aggregation serves to fadlilate services by promoting product quality* (at 1347-1348); and, Dehydrating-^ 
Process Co. v. A O . Sm'rth Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1®* Cir. 1961), holding that mechanical unloaders and storage silos wéfe a -y -  
single product and ‘beyond antitrust scrutiny* (at 655-656). f  ^  i
v \ #
question the issue whether or not the tie under investigation created significant efficiencies.^ In doing 
so, courts saw commonly perceived separate items as a bundle.
The US courts and academics have since proposed a range o f tests to help distinguish between two 
products. These tests fall into five major categories; (1) simple-product test; (2) consumer-demand test; 
(3) the technological-integration test; (4) m arket-practices test; and, (5) economic-measurement test.^5 
Ultimately, this section proposes a  multi-factor proxy test.
4.1. The simple-product test
Some courts decided that separate products existed with little or no analysis. Their simple-product test 
primarily centres on intuition. For instance, the early patent and antitrust cases involved products that 
were intuitively separate; copying machines and ink^®, projectors and motion pictures^^, tabulating 
machines and punch card s^ , salt-dispensing machines and salt^^, or land and transport senrices.̂ ô 
The courts did not elaborate on why products w ere separate, even though the individual results of their 
analyses make sense.
In later cases, courts decided whether two allegedly tied items really constitute a single product by way 
of simple logic. In Automatic Radio, the court held that “bumpers, hang-on fender lights o f automobiles, 
outside auto trunks and luggage racks [...] becam e parts of automobiles and lost their identities as 
accessories," while “radios have retained their identity as separate products" from cars.-̂ ^i Although the 
court gave no analysis supporting this conclusion, its result makes sense. While apparently sold 
separately at one time, the uniform competitive m arket practice became bundling bumpers, lights and 
trunks into cars. A blanket single-product conclusion was thus appropriate. By contrast, car radios were
^  See Hovenkamp, op. cit., noting that 'creative courts have manipulated the judicial test so as to distinguish effident from 
Ineflident forces sales’  (p. 366); and, Frey, op. cit., writing that *[d]ie fehlende Eindeugtigkeit fer die Abgrenzung [...] 
provodert die Gefahr der Verlagerung des Streites über die Legalität von Koppulungsverträgen auf die Tatbestandsebene* 
(p .17 ).
Some terminology used is borrowed from W einstein, “Bundles of Trouble: The Possibilities for a New Separate-Product 
Test in Technological Tying Cases*, Cal. L  Rev. 903 (2002), pp. 918-935; and, Anlauf, op. cit., pp. 502-505.
^C orte iyouv. Carter's Ink Co., 118 Fed. 1022 (S .D .N .Y . 1902).
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.
iBM V. United States.
International Salt Co. v. United States.
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, 429  U.S. 610.
Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Ford M otor Co., 272 F. Supp. 744 (D.Mass. 1967), affd, 390 F.2d 113 (1*^ Cir. 1968), cert. 
denied, 391 US 914 (1968), at 748.
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often sold unbundled and the very defendant sold cars “without radios and radios without
automobiles.''^52
Although the courts’ intuitive conclusions may often match those that would be drawn from more 
directed analyses, the simple-product test as genera! policy should be rejected. Rrst, intuition may 
dispose of many cases because potential plaintiffs rarely challenge strong, widely-held intuitions about 
w hat constitutes a product bundle. Such intuitions generally reflect >what is customary, and those 
customs generally manifest whether the market has offered the products separately or as a bundle. This 
does not necessarily mean that a bundle is efficient, or, on balance, pro-competitive.
Second, as the factual premises relied upon are obscure, judgments are more likely to be based on 
erroneous assumptions about the underlying facts. For these reasons, intuitive rulings are less likely to 
offer the necessary predictability for business planning and compliance. To be sure, the simple-product 
analysis can be a first indication of a competition problem, but a more sophisticated inquiry is necessary 
for actual intervention.
4 .2 . The consumer-demand test
Jefferson Parish was the first to offer an extensive discussion of product definition. Instead of 
instinctively determining whether there is a one-single product, the Supreme Court held that the 
question whether or not two products were involved did not turn “on the functional relation between 
them, but rather on the character of demand for the two items.“̂ “  Under the aforementioned test, courts 
should rely on one, single factor: establishing whether there is sufficient demand for the individual 
items.-̂ s  ̂The fact that linking surgery services and anesthesiologiocal services in Jefferson Parish can 
make sense from the provider’s point of view or from an efficiency point is irrelevant if there is separate 
demand.̂ 55 The actual application of the test was fairly simple. The Court noted that there was “ample 
[...] testimony that patients or surgeons often request specific anaesthesiologists to come to the
<52 Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., at 748.
<53 Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, at 19.
<5< For a different view, see Woodrow De Vries. “United States v. MicrosofT, Berkeley Tech. L. J. 303 (1999), stressing that 
Jefferson P a ii^  looks at consumer demand and market structure as the primary means o f distinguishing between products 
(p .311).
<“  Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2  v. Hyde, concluding that “(l]n this case, no tying arrangement can exist unless 
there Is a sufficient demand for the purchase o f anesthesiologiocal services separate from hospital services to identify a 
distinct product market in which it is efiident to offer separately from hospital services* (at 21).
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hospitaI."̂ 56 This fact was sufficient to show that separate demand existed for anaesthesiology and
therefore, that anaesthesiology and surgery w ere two products rather than one.
The Supreme Court expanded upon the test in Koda/f.^sz |n that case, the question was whether the 
parts and services used to repair copiers were separate products. Kodak argued that parts and services 
were not distinct products because there was no demand for parts separate from services.̂ 58 |n making 
this assertion, Kodak relied on an argum ent similar to the one made by Judge O ’Conner in her 
concurrence in Jefferson Parish.^^ There, O ’Conner had argued that anesthesia and surgery must not 
be considered separate products because “[platients are interested in purchasing anesthesia only in 
conjunction with hospital services."^
Taking the Chicago approach, O ’Conner’s argum ent was based on the single-monopoly rent theorem. 
Judge O ’Conner argued that the link between the two services involved would affect neither the amount 
of anesthesia provided nor the combined price of surgery and anesthesia. The Court rejected both 
Kodak’s justification and Judge O ’Conner’s argument. It responded to these points by noting that '[b]y 
that logic, we would be forced to conclude that there can never be separate markets [...] for cameras 
and film, computers and software."^s^ As a  consequence, the Court held that there is no reason to deny 
the existence of a bundle between “two functionally linked products", even when one of them “is useless 
without the o th e r."^
The type of evidence relied upon in Jefferson Parish and Kodak is instructive. In both instances, the 
Court looked at evidence of actual market practices rather than engineering models, cost accounting 
techniques or presumptions based on economic theory. In Jefferson Parish, it noted that the hospital 
billed the anesthesiologiocal services separately from its other services.^  The hospital’s own 
anesthesiologist reinforced this fact by testifying that consumers do in fact “differentiate between 
hospital services and anesthesiologiocal services, and request specific anesthesiologists."^®^ In Kodak,
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2  v. Hyde, a t 22.
£asfn7an Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U .S. 451. 
^  Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, at 463. 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Sendees, at 463. 
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, a t 43.
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Sendees, at 463.
6̂2 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Sendees, at 463.
^  Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, at 23.
^  Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, a t 23, n. 36.
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the Court relied on the fact that the defendant sold senrice and parts separately in the past and 
continued to sell parts separately to customers who serviced their own equipm ent.^
Leading US scholars have endorsed the consumer-demand test to the single-product question.*®^ It has 
been argued that the consumer-demand test is relatively simple in determining whether the bundle at 
issue produces significant efficiencies. As the District Court explained in Microsoft III, the logic is that 
separate demand for products will exist when the benefits of product choice outweigh the efficiencies of 
product integration.^^ Where firms with no market power commonly sell the items in question 
separately, a common and properly established presumption that unbundled sale of the items is efficient 
arises. On the other hand, where all such firms bundle, the combination must reflect cost savings when 
com pared to separate provision.^“
How ever, it is doubtful whether the test is an effective proxy in all cases. It has some deficiencies. First, 
although the absence of demand for individual items in a competitive market is sufficient to show that 
bundling can produce efficiencies, it is by no means necessary. Instead, bundling may reduce costs 
faced by some firms but not those faced by others. In the latter situation, the test will nonetheless lead 
to the conclusion that two products are involved.
Second, the lest is a one-single factor analysis. It drastically limits the amount of useful information 
available to a court in making a difficult determination. Although consumer demand is relevant, 
manufacturers also have useful information to disclose. For instance, they can recognise efficiencies 
th at consumers cannot yet see because they are not knowledgeable. This shortcoming increases in 
relation to the technical sophistication of the bundle. The test also fails to consider the functionality of 
the product itself. For instance, evidence that two products need to be sold as a bundle in order to 
function properly must be crucial to the analysis.
^  Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, at 462.
«6 See Lam, ‘Revisiting The Separate Products Issue’ , Yale L  J. 1441 (1999). writing that Jefferson Parish provides 'a  dear 
standard for judges to folIovV (p. 1448); Hawker, ’Consistently Wrong: The Single Product Issue And The Tying Claims 
Against Microsoff, Cal. W. L  Rev. 1 (1998), noting that current antilrust doctrine leaves the determination of a  single 
product issue where it belongs, in the hands of consumers’ (p. 39): and, Strasser, 'An Antitrust Policy for Tying 
Arrangements’ , Emory L  J. 253 (19985), writing that ’ [the consumer demand test] is consistent with tying law’s goal of 
avoiding foredosure and entry barriers. Defining product markets by buyer demand will direct attention to whether any 
competitive harms are occurring" (p. 257).
^  Unked States v. Microsoft Corp. (D. C. Cir. 2001), stating that the Jefferson Parish test is a *prox[y] for net efficiency" (at 
88).
See Hovenkamp, op. c/f., noting that ’ if the arrangement is efficient, then we would exped it to be ubiquitous* (p. 360).
I l l
The third criticism echoed is that consumer perceptions are a poor standard in technologically dynamic 
markets.'*®^ Such markets tend to have four defining characteristics: strong economies of scale; the 
tendency toward lock-in effect for successful technologies: and, the tendency toward rapid technological 
change.̂ ^o When a market is in constant flux due to the high rate of innovation, it is difficult and 
sometimes misleading to decide whether a  product is entirely new, one product, or two items bundled 
together.̂ î Gastle and Boughs succinctly argue that the “mechanistic nature" of the test is such that 
even the open source solutions are “vulnerable" to constituting bundling.̂ 72
Arguably, this is bad policy given the open source's gift culture and lack of traditional managerial control, 
A final point is that consumers may not always be able to correctly evaluate the efficiencies of a 
particular product Mariotti stresses that consumer perceptions are significantly affected by marketing 
and packaging. There is the risk that consumers will believe that products are not separate simply 
because the supplier promotes an integration of the two as a unified product.^^ In this way, the 
consumer perceptions standard provides, for instance, an incentive for Microsoft to run lots of 
advertisements that portray the Windows/IE bundle as a single product. “Legal standards," Mariotti 
notes acutely, “should not be based on upon advertising campaigns."^^^
In my view, the Court of Appeals in Microsoft III has voiced some o f these concerns. Noting the “poor fit 
between the separate products test and the facts of this case," the Court pointed out the possibility that 
the consumer-demand test may not be able to identify all efficiency-enhancing bundles and that it 
therefore has the potential to deter Innovationit held that this risk is particularly high in the context of 
“newly integrated products."^^®
In conclusion, the consumers’ view is pertinent but it has limited value as a single factor.
^  See Katz and Shapiro, ‘Antitrust in Software Markets", In: Eisenach and Lenard (eds.), Competition, Innovation and the 
Microsoft Monopoly: Antitmst in the Digital Marketplace (Boston, 1999), noting that the consumer-demand test does not 
reflect some economists’ understanding of bundling (pp. 72-73).
For detailed discussion, see Litan, "Antitrust and the New Economy", U. PitL L  Rev. 429 (2001), pp. 429-430.
See Sidak, op. cit., stressing that in technologically dynamic markets, ‘ it is misguided (and potentially hannful to 
consumer welfare) to dwell on the question of whether A  and B are or are not separate products for the purpose of tying law, 
since the very definition o f the relevant product may be in constant flux” (pp. 26-27).
7̂2 See Gastle and Boughs, 'Microsoft III and the Metes and Bounds o f Software Design and Technological Tying Doctrine*, 
Va. J. L. & Tech. 1 (2001), emphasising that the test neglects efficiencies (pp. 35-40). They write that ‘ [t]he need to consider 
the efficiencies in circumstances of software design is suggested by the implications of the consumer demand test when it is 
taken to an extreme case" (p. 35).
7̂3 See Mariotti, “Rethinking Software Tying", Yale J. on Reg. 367 (2000), referring to the browsers and operating systems 
(pp. 377-379).
*7̂  See Mariotti, op. cit., p. 378.
*7̂  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, at 85.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, at 92.
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4.3. The technological-integration test
The technological-integration concentrates on the attributes of the bundle itself. The test has been 
suggested in particular for technological bundles. The best-known example is Microsoft //. In that case, 
the Court of Appeals held that any "genuine technological integration" should be treated as one product 
“regardless of whether elements of the integrated package are marketed separately."*^ The Court 
defined a genuine technological integration as any ‘product that combines functionalities [...] in a way 
that offers advantages unavailable if the functionalities are bought separately and combined by the 
purchaser."*^®
In this case, the Court arguably set a low threshold for determining whether a product meets this test. All 
the defendant has to demonstrate Is “a plausible claim" that the bundle “brings some advantage."*^ Any 
plausible claim of advantage satisfies this definition. For instance, it is not even necessary to show that 
the combined product is better than its standalone rivals. As a result, the test surely favours potential 
innovation over protection of competition.
The test seems to be consonant with the apparent feeling among courts that product design decisions 
involving technological products are uniquely beyond the ken of antitrust scrutiny. The Courts’ 
underlying assumption is that product integration generates normally efficiencies. In Leasco, for 
instance, the Court of Appeals found the computer time-sharing franchise consisting of computer 
hardware, system software and application software to constitute a single product.*^^ In order to claim  
bundling, a plaintiff had to show that the product integration was merely “for the purpose of tying the 
products, rather than to achieve some technologically beneficial result."*^'' In other words, a plaintiff 
m ust establish that the design decision was for the sole purpose of bundling.
T h e  same approach is supported in a string of cases dealing with IBM’s integration of peripheral devices 
into the central processing unit of its computers.*®^ in /LC Periphals Leasing, the plaintiff alleged that
<77 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d, a t 948.
<78 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d, at 948.
<73 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d, a t 950.
<80 Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5 * Cir. 1976). The first indication of a different 
standard for technological bundling can be found in Telex Corp. v. International Business Machmes Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 
(N .D . Okla. 1973).
<81 Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc, a t 1330.
<82 Innovatbn Date processing, Inc. v. IBM, 585 F. Supp. 1470 (D. N. J. 1984), noting that the integration of a dump-restore 
utility into the operating system was a lawful package of technologically components (at 1476); Calif. Computer Rrtxfs., Inc. 
V. IBM, 613 F. 2d (9“' Cir. 1979), holding that the defendant's product design dedsions were a cost saving effort rather than 
an attempt to monopolise (at 727).
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IBM’s practice o f selling disk-drives and the head/disk assembly for a single price amounted to an 
antitrust violation «3 Based on the facts, the District Court found that disk-drivers and head/disk 
assembly was a single product because the new technology increased the storage capacity of disk- 
storage devices.
The major advantage of the technological-integration test is its clear guidance for deciding whether 
products are distinct. *Any plausible claim ," W eistein accurately notes, "wins the day for the 
defendant."^ Compared to Jefferson Parish, a second advantage is the lower risk of erroneously 
finding a pro-competitive bundling illegal because there is ‘some’ separate demand for one of the Items 
of the bundle. The test is advocated in the literature. Lopatka and Page point out that bundling Windows 
and application programs provides consumers with a m ore efficient product.̂ ® jhe critical point Is that 
“the line between the operating system and the applications is indistinct and permeable "̂ 8® They 
observe that the technological-integration test preserves this distinct line between both items and 
ensures further innovation. They argue further that judicial interference in this process may result in 
errors.̂ 8̂
Likewise, Baker argues that courts should not “second-guess such [bundling] decisions, regardless of 
whether the conclusion is expressed in term s o f one product or otherwise."^® They must follow 
Microsoft H, Baker concludes. Other commentators have proposed a test that closely resembles 
Microsoft //. Hovenkamp suggests that the single-product conclusion is correct in all cases in which “the 
code for two programs Is interspersed such that the purchaser cannot readily separate them.’^
However, a serious case could be made that the test is flawed. First, it also offers a one-single factor 
analysis. W hereas the consumer-demand test ignores the functionality of integration, Microsoñ II only 
evaluates functionality. The test thus ignores worthwhile information from both consumers and 
producers. Second, on a doctrinal level, Microsoft II was not “consistent with tying law" as claimed by
^  JLC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 448 F . Supp. 228 (N .D . Cal. 1978). For interesting overview, see Harchuck, 
‘Microsoft IV; The Dangers to Innovation Posed by the Irresponsible Application of A Rule of Reason Analysis to Product 
Design Claims", Nw, U. L  Rev. 395 (2002), pp. 401-416.
See Weinstein, op. cit., p. 930.
^  See Lopatka and Page, ‘Antitrust on Internet Time: Microsoft and the Law and Economics of Exclusion", Sup. Ct. Econ. 
Rev. 157 (1999), p. 192.
^  See Lopatka and Page, op. a t., p. 193.
See lopatka and Page, op. cit., p. 200. Similarly, Gasile and Boughs, op. eft., noting that “the consumer demand test is 
consistent with tying doctrine, but the plausible claim test is justified in technological tying cases involving software* (p. 2).
«8 See Baker, op. eft., p. 15.
«9 See Areeda, Antitrust Law  (Aspen, 1999), at 1746.1 (emphasis added).
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the Court of Appeals.̂ ®® It failed to adhere to Jeñerson Parísh to examine consumer perception» not 
functionalities/^'' Third, on an analytical level, the test conflated the definitional dispute of the bundle’s 
existence, questioning whether or not a bundle should be permissible. It thereby unwisely transformed 
the separate-product test into an inquiry that directs courts to solely examine the efficiencies and other 
benefits of the challenged bundle.
Perhaps the fatal shortcoming is that the test opens the door to increased anti-competitive behaviour by 
monopolists.̂ 92 jh e  test looks only at the benefits of bundling, and assumes that if the bundle brings 
even  a minimal benefit it should be legal. No effort is made to measure costs associated with loss of 
consum er choice. In her dissent toward M/croso/f II, Judge Wald correctly pointed out that the majority 
ru le would create “too safe a harbour with too easily navigable an entrance.'̂ ^^
O ther courts have also struggled virith this final shortcoming. In Caldera, the plaintiff claimed that 
M icrosoft had illegally tied MS-DOS and Windows.̂ ^  ̂The Court was reluctant to give Microsoft "green 
lig h f to bundle whatever products it wanted by simply pointing to some "plausible advantage" in its new  
design.̂ 95 clearly, it recognised the conflicting policy issues of chilling innovation and protecting 
com petition from unlawful activities that can surround bundling claims. The Court stressed that applying 
Microsoñ ¡I would give "too much deference to the technology argument" and it is therefore "not the 
appropriate standard.”̂ ^ Companies are allowed to build a "better mousetrap," but "just as courts have 
th e potential to stifle technological advancements by second guessing product design, so too can 
product innovation be stifled if companies are allowed to dampen competition by unlawfully tying 
products together and escape antitrust liability by simply claiming a ‘plausible* technological 
advancement."^9^
United States v. Microsoñ Corp., 147 F.3d, at 950.
9̂1 See Lam, op. dt., referring to this shortcoming (pp. 1444-1447); and, Hawker, op. cit., noting that since Jefferson Parish 
courts have consistently rejected functional approaches to the single product issue in favour of the consumer demand test
(pp. 11-16).
See Weinstein, op. cit., writing that the test in fact seems to *pave the road for increased anticompetitive behaviour on the 
part o f technology monopolists” (p. 923).
Unñed States v. Microsoñ Corp., 147 F.3d, at 956-957.
Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoñ Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D. Utah 1999).
Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., at 1320.
4 »  Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., at 1323.
«7  Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., at 1323. It should be noted that Ihe Court’s alternative test is still flawed. The Court found 
that if evidence shows that the defendant created valid, not insignificant technological improvement by integrating two 
previously separate products, then in essence, the defendant created a new product and is not guilty of illegal bundling under 
the Sherman Act § 1 (at 1325). The Court stated that it must determine whether the new product is simply Ihe former 
product upgraded and packaged together, or rather, is a legitimate technology that created an entirely new product The 
technological improvements must have 'demonstrated efficiencies*, which the court stressed is a higher standard of proof 
than the plausible daim test (at 1325).
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Indeed, in my view, the proposed test does little to maintain competitive markets. As Woodrow De Vries 
observes, the test “wholly ignored the competitive consequences" of the bundle.̂ ^® Any monopolist 
could then integrate products and survive antitrust scrutiny merely by making a claim of some potential 
benefits. The same criticism applies to Hovenkamp’s proposal because any software producer could 
comply with it by interspersing software code.
Lessig suggests a useful albeit deficient variation of the Microsoft II approach. Lessig views software 
products as "functionality separately valued by consumers," not as separate code.̂ ® simply put, the 
consumer does not care if the IE functionality Is provided by one or more files. Courts must focus on 
“the perspective o f the consum er.’ soo Lessig believes that software code can even be used better than 
other technologies in order to hide strategic bundling. That Is why any legal test must be neutral 
between contract-based and code-based restrictions.50^
Applying these criteria, Lessig argues that cumently, browser functionality Is considered to be a separate 
product by consumers, but Microsoft’s consolidation of its browser with its operating system should be 
treated presumptively as a single product under antitrust law, “unless an independent reason exists why 
this type of bundle raises special anticompetitive concem s."502 The latter may be case when the bundle 
concerns partial substitutes.so3 If the products are partial substitutes, a  company with market power may 
use bundling to ensure that the bundled good does not become a  competitive threat to the market 
position in the bundling market. In this way, this undertaking engenders a specific competitive threat.
Therefore, Lessig suggests that the single-product presumption o f the Windows 98/IE bundle could be 
rebutted .504 However, Lessig stresses that a  browser bundled with an operating system could 
nonetheless be treated as a single product if the software is configured so as to give consumers an 
option to refuse the partial substitute.sos
9̂® See Woodrow D e Vries, op. a t, p. 314.
See Lessig (2000), op. ctf., pp. 19-20.
5® See Lessig (2000), op. cit., p. 20.
See Lessig (2000), op. cit., p. 39.
See Lessig (2000), op. cit., p. 40.
5® See Lessig (2000), op. eût., recognising rightly that bundling of complete substitutes is typically not harmful to the 
competitive process (p. 40).
^  See Lessig (2000), op. crt., concluding that th e  two software products of an operating system and browser functionality 
should be considered as 'two products' for purposes of antitrust tying.” (p. 42).
See Lessig (2000), op. cit., p. 42. Lessig notes that many of Microsoft’s competitors bundle their operating systems with 
browsers, and that there is noting anti-competitive about it  Indeed, combining the two iunctionalities offers many benefits. 
However, these competitors have not required consumers to take the bundle, and in fact they simultaneously offer their 
operating systems for sale either without a  browser or in a manner that permits the consumer to remove the browser.
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The major contribution of Lessig’s work is the insight that any legal lest should be neutral between 
contract-based and co d e-b ased A n titru s t analysis should aim at “anticompetitive ends, not whether 
the bundle achieves its interlinkage through contract or software.’so? Another important contribution is 
that the Court should consider the nature of the underlying products in terms of functionality rather than 
as lines of code. Although defining the exact 'functionality' of software products Is more complex than 
Lessig suggests, and courts may well be reluctant to perform these detailed inquiries, they must still be 
required to make this assessment.̂ o® Finally, his test is an improvement over Microsoft II as it m akes it 
more likely that anti-competitive bundles will be rooted out.
Regardless, Lessig’s test must still be dismissed.®®® First, it is a one-single factor analysis, and thus 
unnecessarily reduces the amount of information available. Second, its fatal shortcoming is the fact that 
the test sets a too low bar leaving a lot of room for “strategic bundling.“®̂® The test may create an 
incentive for software producers to modify their code in order to fit within the terms of the rule. Lessig 
openly recognises this “significant weakness* of his test. He also notes that it may create “an incentive 
for the bundler to hide that bundle In code.*® î
4.4. The market-practices test
Unlike the technological-integration test, the market-practices test focuses on the business actions of 
other participants in the applicable markets.®!^ Areeda and Hovenkamp have formulated such a test. 
Their test assesses whether bundling is uriiversal in the relevant market.®^® They argue that universal 
bundling “demonstrates that the items [of the bundle] should be deemed a single product incapable of 
being tied together.’®̂^
Universal bundling “dictates* either that consumers prefer the bundle over the standalone items, that 
producing the bundle shows cost savings, or that the bundle signals a quality improvement that
5“  For an excellent discussion about ‘code’ in the modem worid, see Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyber Space (New  
York, 1999).
See Lessig (2000), op. cit., p. 39.
Telex Corp, v. Interriationat Bus/ness Machines Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), noting that I t  would otherwise 
enmesh the courts with teciinical and uncertain inquiry into the technological justifiability of functional integration and case 
unfortunate doubt on the legality of product innovations in serious detriment to the industry and without any legitimate 
antitrust purpose’  (at 347).
For a very critical review, see Sidak, op. cit., pp. 58-71.
510 See Lessig (2000), op. cH., p. 39.
511 See Lessig (2000), op. cit., p. 42.
512 See Mariotti, op. a t., pp. 374-377.
512 See Hovenkamp and Areeda. op. c#., pp. 835-846.
51̂  See Hovenkamp and Areeda, op. cit., p. 837.
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outweighs loss o f product choice |f the m arket under investigation is not competitive, they suggest 
that “analogous markets” can be used to make the proposed analysis  Analogues may include similar 
markets in different geographic regions, markets for buyers who are not locked in, or historical markets. 
They suggest applying the test also when bundling is predominant Predominant bundling occurs when 
less than ten percent of the bundling items are sold unbundled
For one, a  major advantage of Areeda and Hovenkamp’s test is its reliance on easily measurable and 
available proxies. On the other hand, the first shortcoming is that many markets are not competitive 
because of network effects, economies o f scale and lock-ins. This applies particularly to software 
markets. As a result, in many cases, the test merely offers a second-best solution of an indirect 
measurement of the cost and benefits o f a bundle. In Jefferson Parish, for instance, there were 
thousands of hospitals comperable to those in the same district. In contrast, software products almost 
always have one or two serious rivals.
Second, if markets are not competitive, courts must identify analogous markets. This, by definition, is a 
tricky enterprise. An illustrative example is the market for Windows. Other geographical markets are not 
available considering the worldwide spread of the Windows market. A third shortcoming is the neglect 
that an undertaking with market power m ay engage in bundling fo r different reasons and with different 
effects from those vrithout m arket power. Economic insights m ake clear that the fact all market 
participants in a particular market bundle does not necessarily indicate that a manufacturer with market 
power is not engaging in anti-competitive bundling
Finally, the market-practices test also fails to produce the correct result for the same reason that the 
preceding tests failed. It relies on only one-single factor. This unnecessarily reduces the amount of 
information available to courts for determining whether there are separate products.
In sum, the market-practices should also be dismissed.
See Hovenkamp and Areeda, op, a t., p. 837.
516 See Hovenkamp and Areeda, op. a t., pp. 837-840.
517 See Hovenkamp and Areeda, op. a t., pp. 840-841.
518 See Rubinfeid, "Antitrust Enforcement in Dynamic Network Industries’ , Antitrust Bull. 859 (1998), p. 872.
118
4 .5 . The econom ic-m easurem ent tes t
Econom ists in particular suggest ending reliance on the two-product inquiry as in Jefferson Parish. 
Instead, they propose to focus on the “overall impact of tying on the total cost to consumers of the tying 
and tied products."si9 Their test is called the economic-measurement test. Whereas the consumer- 
dem and test and market-practices test rely on proxy variables, this test attempts to directly assess the 
costs and benefits of bundling.
Sidak has proposed such a test.^^ He suggests a four-part test for determining whether product 
integration in a technologically dynamic market violates the antitrust laws. Sidak’s first step Is to ask 
w hether the market in question is technologically mature or technologically dynamic.521 If the market is 
technologically mature, the traditional Jefferson Parish approach is applicable. If the market is 
technologically dynamic, the next step Is determining whether consumers will benefit from the 
integration, with benefits measured by increased consumer demand, lowered costs of production, or 
both.^^ Markets are technologically dynamic when technological innovation is the driving impetus and 
the product involved Is novel.523 Unlike Areeda and Hovenkamp’s test, these benefits are not measured 
in comparison with a hypothetical worid in which products have not been integrated. Sidak argues that 
the only question is whether some actual benefits have been created by the integration.524
The third step is to determine whether the integration will preserve a monopoly over the bundling 
m arket.“  ̂ Referring to Microsoft III, this concern rests on the theoretical possibility that software 
integration may tend to preserve a monopoly over operating systems by discouraging the development 
o f alternative platforms made possible by middleware. If no reduction in competition is discernible, the 
inquiry ceases and the bundle is deemed lawful. If competition is affected, the fourth step is to balance 
the integration's consumer benefits against the losses in consumer welfare by any reduction in
5̂ ® See Katz and Shapiro, op. d f., p. 75. Other supporters; Gasile and Boughs, op. c/f., pp 48-49.
520 See Sidak, op. c/f., pp, 80-81. For similar test see Ordover and Willig, “Access and Bundling in High-Technology 
Markets’ , in; Eisenach and Lenard, op. c/f., suggesting a similar three-step approach applying to situations in which the 
defendant has “bottleneck power’ In the primary market (pp. 103-113); and, Mariotti, suggesting a test balancing the gains in 
innovation and reduction in transaction costs for consumers who want both the bundling and bundled good against the costs 
of consumers who only want the bundling good (p. 367).
521 See Sidak, op. ctf., pp. 27-29.
522 See Sidak, op, c/f., pp. 29-31.
523 See Sidak, op. c/f., stressing some facts that may illuminate the degree to which a market is more properly characterised 
as technologically dynamic; patent applications, expertditures on R&O, pattern of new business format, existence of highly 
mobile market for skilled workers (p. 26-27).
52* See Sidak, op. c l,  p. 31.
525 See Sidak, op. c l,  p. 31-32.
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competition.526 Applying a Williamsonian tradeK)ff, a finding of liability follows only if the first amount 
outweighs the secondA27
The major contribution of Sidak’s test is that it directly attempts to measure the costs and benefits of a 
bundle. A  bundling arrangement offering higher costs than benefits will be anti-competitive. While the 
spirit of the test may be consistent with modem economic insights, the test is flawed on two ievels. On a 
practical level, it suffers, like Areeda and Hovenkamp’s test, from implementation problems. The test is 
not judicially manageable. An analysis that requires courts to m ake suppositions about costs and 
benefits and to make a Williamsonian trade-off is difficult to administer.
On an analytical level, the framework of the test conflates the separate-products issue with the 
assessment of the effects of the bundle. Like the technological-integration test, it transformed a simple 
definitional inquiry into a question of whether bundling should be permissible on economic grounds. 
Although Microsoft U solely focuses on the alleged efficiencies, Sidak’s test seeks to fully balance the 
pro-competitive effects against the arrangement’s anti-competitive effects. Even If the Supreme Court 
eventually decides to apply the rule of reason to bundling, the separate-product question should be kept 
separate from the question of whether a  bundle is permissible. Collapsing the two would make the rule 
of reason superfluous because courts would have to examine the arrangement’s efficiencies at the 
levels of both the separate-product issue and the rule of reason test.528
Other economic-measurement tests have also been proposed. For instance, the Court of Appeals’ 
decision in Microsoft II sparked rather sharp and cogent dissent by Judge Wald. She found the Court’s 
interpretation conflicted with antitnjst law and offered her own interpretation as more consonant with 
Ih e  weight o f antitrust law.”529 Judge W ald recommended an efficiency calculus, balancing the 
“synergies” generated by bundling two software products against the evidence that separate markets 
exist for the two individual items.̂ ^o The greater the evidence of distinct markets, the more a showing of 
synergies must make in order to merely incorporate distinct products. The test assesses whether 
integration “confers benefits on the consumer that justify a product’s bridging of two formerly separate 
markets.’’53i
526 See Sidak, op. cit., p. 32-33.
527 See Williamson, “Economics as An Antitrust Defense: The W elfare Tradeoff, Am. Econ. Rev. 18 (1968).
528 Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, confirming that the fact that consumers “are required to purchase two 
separate items is only the beginning of the appropriate inquiry“ (at 25).
529 United States v. Microsoff Corp., 147 F.3d, at 956.
5» United States v. Microsoff Corp., 147 F.3d, at 958-959.
58i United States v. Microsoff Coip., 147 F.3d, a t 958.
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The first shortcoming is that Judge Wald’s interpretation of the consent decree is not entirely consistent 
with antirust law either.532 Criticising the Court of Appeals for failing to adhere to Jefferson Parish and 
for effectively exempting software products from antitrust analysis, Wald likewise departed from the 
consumer-demand test by calling for a two-factor balancing test. The second deficiency of the test is 
that it also seeks to directly measure the arrangement’s benefits. Likewise, it is hardly possible to 
implement this test in practice. How is a court to arcurately assess the possible synergies? Wald had 
suggested using “affidavits, consumer surveys [...] as well as testimony from experls.'̂ ^a ii could be 
argued that these factors hardly provide conclusive answers.
Finally, the test requires Microsoft to counter evidence of historically separate markets with evidence of 
synergistic efficiency gains that courts are not equipped to evaluate. The real problem with the test is 
that it adds an unnecessary degree of complexity to the analysis. As a consequence, it may produce the 
wrong result in some cases. In sum, the majority in M/crosoft II rightly countered that the Wald's test “is 
not feasible in any predictable or useful way."534
4.6. The multi-factor test as an alternative test
4.6.1. The foundations for a new test
The tests discussed are flawed in and of themselves. It is obvious that the simple-product test should be 
dismissed. Intuition is never a proper basis for antitrust intervention. It may be useful for tentatively 
selecting cases for further investigation, if at all. It is also dear that the technological-integration test of 
Microsoft II is inferior to the other tests proposed. This test does not make any effort to measure costs 
associated with loss of consumer choice, whereas the other approaches are designed to evaluate, 
either by proxy or directly, the costs and benefits of bundling. By contrast, it may even promote strategic 
bundling. A legal objection is that the technological-integration test is not consonant with earlier case 
law.
For one, the economic-measurement test appears to be theoretically superior to the proxy tests like the 
consumer-demand test and the market-practices test as it directly measures the effects of bundling.
532 See Hawker, op. crt., pp. 27-30.
533 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d, at 958, n 3. 
53< United States v. Microsoft Co/p., 147 F.3d, at 952.
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Economists surely prefer this test. In my view, lawyers may think differently. The test is flawed because 
one must analytically distinguish the separate-product issue that is often “entangled" in tying.535 More 
importantly, the test’s fatal shortcoming is that it is not judicially m anageable. The proxy tests have the 
potential to be more judicially m anageable because they concentrate on proxies that are relatively easy 
to measure. Arguably, these tests provide clearer guidelines to both courts and companies. On the other 
hand, the proxy tests offer a one-single factor analysis.
Evaluating the competitive impact o f bundles is complex, and no one-single factor test will be sufficient 
in most cases. It is necessary to have a multi-factor test, combining at least the consumer-demand test 
and market-practices test. Although the Microsoft II approach HseJf should be rejected, the test 
highlights the need to consider the attributes of the bundle itself. A  multi-factor will achieve more 
accurate results than either individual test. The test contains various categories of potentially useful 
information helping us determine whether a  bundle is one product o r two.
In conclusion, i would like to attem pt an answer to the separate-product question based on a multi-factor 
proxy test.
4.6.2, The legal precedents
Proposing a multi-factor proxy test in turn leads to the question whether American case law could 
recognise such a test. The first attempt to give content to this test may be found in Jerrold 
Electronics.^  Jerrold was the leading seller of community television antenna systems during the 50s. It 
sold antenna systems requiring the purchaser to only let Jerrold install and service the system. The 
Jerrold system consisted of four parts: an antenna site; a device carrying the signal from the antenna to 
the local community; a system distributing the signal through the community; and, a tap-off system 
carrying the signal to the individual homes. The contracts also provided for the exclusive use of Jerrold 
equipment whenever extra capacity was needed. Jerrold further forbade installation of extra equipment 
without its approval.
The government charged that the full-system sales violated Clayton Act § 3, as well as Sherman Act § 
1, because they bundled different commodities. Jerrold argued th at the fiill-system sales were not a
535 See Lam, op. cit., p. 1448.
5» United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 167 F . Supp 645 (E.D. Pa. 1960), afTd per cuiiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). See 
also Siegel v. Chicken Delight, In c , 448 F . 2d 4 3 ,4 7  (9«» Cir. 1971). cert denied, 405 US 955 (1972).
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combination of individual items, but a single commodity. While determining whether the system was one 
product or not, Judge Van Dusen considered several factors.^^ He noted that (1) other manufacturers 
sold parts of full systems as well as complete systems, (2) the number of pieces in Jerrold’s systems 
varied considerably according to the specific needs of the community. (3) Jerrold charged the customer 
separately for each item in a system rather than for the entire system, and (4) Jerrold allowed customers 
to substitute antennas and cable from other resources.
In light of these factors, Judge Van Dusen claimed the evidence suggested that Jerrold had tied distinct 
products. The case was confirmed in 1961 by the Supreme Court. Although Van Dusen's analysis was 
fragmented and not well-developeds^s, his approach appears to introduce a test relying on three factors: 
(1 ) consumer perceptions; (2) the manufacturer’s view; and, (3) product functionality,“ ^
W ith respect to consumers, the ruling emphasised that some consumers wanted to buy the entire 
system  and others just separate parts.®^ By charging for each element separately, Jerrold indicated that 
it viewed the system as a bundle of different items.^^ In addition, it was clear that the defendant's 
competitors were also selling the systems piece-by-piece and as one complete antenna system. As for 
product functionality, he noted that the system configuration differed from community to community.̂ <2 
This indicates that bundling was not necessary for the combination to function correctly.
Another case that seems to support a multi-factor proxy test is Data GeneraL^^ Data General, a 
software company, was charged with bundling its CPUs with memory equipment.̂ ^^ Like in Jerroid, the 
District Court applied a multi-factor test. Noting that neither of these products could function 
independentiy from the other, Judge Orrick assessed whether the items needed to be supplied by the 
sam e company.^^
537 United States v. Jerrold Bectronics Corp., at 559-560.
538 See Frey, op. cH., calling Jerrold 'eine pragmatische Lösung' (p. 22) and noting that it gives l)rauchbare Anhaltspunkte* 
(P -3 1 ).
539 For similar conclusion, Weinstein, op. at., p. 943-944; and, Frey, op. c/i., calling Jerrold '[dpe eigentliche Basis- 
Entscheidung' in relation to the separate-product question.
548 Unäed States v. Jenoft/ B ertonics Corp., at 559.
541 United States v. Jerrold Bedronics Corp., at 559.
542 United States v. Jerrold Bectronics Corp., at 559.
543 R e Data General Corp. Antitiust Litigation, 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
544 Data General was also charged with bundling its operating system software with CPUs. It should be noted that Judge 
Orrick applied the same separate-product analysis to both daims.
545 Re D da General Corp. Antitrust Litigation, at 1107.
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Notably, he considered Data General’s point of view and the attitudes of other manufacturers. For 
instance, evidence indicated that the defendant’s own marketing practices implied that CPUs and 
memory broads were separate broads.s^e This observation was reinforced by the fact that Data 
General’s competitors also sold memory boards separately.s^^ The fact that some consumers 
consistently removed the memory boards bundled with the CPUs and replaced them with competing 
boards indicated that some customers viewed the products as sep arate .^  Considering whether 
bundling was functionally more efficient than selling the items separately, Judge Orrick observed that 
the defendant had produced no evidence that bundling would lead to cost savings.^^s
In sum, I think that the analysis of Jerrold and Data General suggests that American case law could 
recognise and benefit from a multi-factor test^so
4.6.3. The elem ents o f the new tes t
In order to answer the separate-product question, courts should turn to the sources that best know the 
products involved: consumers and manufacturers. As for consumers, Jefferson Parish makes clear that 
consumer demand is useful in determining whether a bundle is one product or two. However, when 
considering dem and at the time of bundling, it is not adequate for a  court to simply state that some 
separate demand existed. Courts should clearly identify the consumers involved. Recalling the critical 
comments about the consumer-demand test, courts should also take into account the sophistication of 
the consumers identified. More knowledgeable consumers will be more likely to spot the efficiencies of a 
new bundle. Post-bundling consumer demand m ay also disclose useful information about the merits of a 
bundle. Arguably, courts should therefore assess whether there is continued separate demand for the 
standalone items a fte r bundling.
As for manufacturers, an evaluation of their point of view should have two distinct elements. As in 
Jerrold and Data General, information regarding other manufacturers in the relevant market is very 
useful.551 Manufacturers typically have a good understanding of their markets. If other manufacturers in
^  Re Data Genera! Corp. Antitmst Litigation, at 1107.
Re Data Genera! Corp. Antitrust Litigation, at 1108.
^  Re Data General Corp. Antrtnjst Litigation, at 1109.
Re Data General Corp. Antitrust Litigation, at 1110.
5» Other application o f the multi-factor tes t NW  Controls Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 333 F. Supp. 493 {D. Del. 1971), 
holding that an outside boat engine and a cable-connected remote control system are separate products on the basis of the 
demand prior to bundling, internal documents, and the existence of independent suppliers of remote control systems.
For a critical position, see Harchuck, op. c'rt., noting that courts and juries are generally incapable of addressing the 
technical merits or anti-competìtìve and therefore tfiey quickly make the relevant turn on intent {pp. 431-433).
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the market continue to offer both standalones and the bundle, this strongly indicates that products are 
separate. In that case, manufacturers believe that the value of consumer choice outweighs the 
increased efficiency of the bundle. While it is clear that intent alone is not suffident. the defendant’s 
point of view may also disclose worthwhile information and inform other relevant facts.
Internal categorisations as separate products, or the use of separate marketing techniques for the 
bundle’s items may be indicative for the intrafirm perceptions of the products involved. Furthermore, if a 
court can determine that the main reason for bundling was to dominate the bundled good market rather 
than to achieve efficiency, this forms strong evidence suggesting the existence of two separate 
markets.552 The rationale behind this is that if the manufacturer does not expect to generate efficiencies, 
the bundle is probably anti-competitive.
For instance, Microsoft III would have been fundamentally different and enormously more difficult for the 
DoJ if it were not for the 3 million pages of e-mails the authorities reportedly obtained from the software 
giant.553 it goes without say that e-mails are actually better than the handwritten notes, commonly the 
'smoking gun’ in an antitrust case. They have all of the unguarded, spontaneous, and irreverent qualities 
that handwritten notes have, and the added bonus of being easily retrievable and readable by lawyers 
and courts.
To account for the possibility that both these sources were mistaken, courts must also consider the 
advantages of bundling itself. Although it might be difficult for courts to determine whether the bundle 
represents genuine progress, courts must still address this issue. If both the consumer and 
manufacturer evidence suggest a bundle, only overwhelming evidence that the bundle is a genuinely 
innovative should lead the court to find that it concerns one, single product. The threshold of 'some 
advantages’ under Microsoft II is arguably too lenient, as it neglects the strategic effects of bundling.
“ 2 See Fisher e t aL, Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated: Economic Analysis and US v. IBM (Cambridge MA, 1983). warning 
that the defendant’s subjective intent 'will usually reflect nothing more ttian a determination to win all possible business from 
rivals -  a determination consistent with competition', but also recognising that where the defendant claims to have taken its 
actions for prcKXjmpetitive reasons, then dear and contemporaneous statements about intent can assist in evaluating that 
daim  (p. 272).
^  See Fisher and Rubinfeld, 'Misconceptions, Misdirections and Mistakes', in: Evans eta l., pp. 94-95.
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5. D iscussion o f the legal standard fo r bundling
5.1 The application of a competition test
There appears to be a close link between the rationale for condemning bundling and the chosen legal 
rule to apply that rationale. Changes In legal-economic thought have influenced the Supreme Court’s 
rulings by varying degrees over the years, though not always with immediate effect.
In the beginning, the Court appears to have adopted the per se approach in its entirety. The main 
concern was the fear for leveraging. In 1949, the Supreme Court’s rationale was that “[t]ying 
agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition."554 The Court’s view is 
founded on the assumption that bundling is “inherently anticompetitive'sss and that “[t]he evil of tying 
agreements is the suppression of competition" in the bundled good market.556 “The pertinent issue"5S7 ¡s 
the exclusion of competitors from the tied market, as those rivals are not excluded based on price or 
quality but due to “power or leverage."®“  At the same time, the Court appears to have relied on some 
kind of consumer choice rationale. It worried about the effect on buyers because the “forced purchase of 
a second distinct commodity with a desired purchase of a dominant tying product, resulting in economic 
harm to competition in the tied market."“ ®
Closely related to this fact was the nature of the assessment whether the defendant had market power. 
Typically, the Court quite easily presumed sufficient market, and thus per se illegality without a “full 
scale factual inquiry into the scope of the relevant market for the tying product."“ ® For instance, in the 
early patent cases, there was the presumption of economic power for patented and copyrighted 
products.“  ̂ The fact that the threshold for market power in bundling cases was lower than in most 
‘normal’ antitrust cases was another indication for the Court’s consumer choice rationale.562
^  standard Oil Co. v. United States, at 305.
555 Brown Shoe v. US, at 329.
556 Aluminium Co. o f America Inc. v. Sperry Prods., Inc., 285 F. 2d 911 (6** Cir. 1969), at 926.
557 Osborn V. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F. 2d 832 (4®* Cir. 1960), at 838.
558 Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. US, at 6.
559 Times-Picayune v. United States, at 614.
560 United States v. Ljoew’s, at 45.
561 Very recently, this controversial assumption has been confirmed: independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. and 
Trident, Inc., Court of Appeals California, 25 January 25 2005, httD://feddr.oov/opinions/04-1196.pdf. Finding against the 
literature and Independent, the Court concluded that Ih e  Supreme Court has held that there is a presumption of marttet 
power in patent tying cases, and we are obliged to follow the Supreme Court’s direction in this respect The time may have 
come to abandon the doctrine, but it is up to the Congress or the Supreme Court to make this judgm enr (p. 14).
562 See Denis Waelbroeck, “The Compatibility of Tying Agreements with Antitrust Rules: A Comparative Study of American 
and European Rules", QxYel 39 (1987), pp. 44-45; and, Craswell, op. cit., pp. 670-671.
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A fter Sfandarci 0/7, the Supreme Court appears to have backed dovm, if only slightly, from the extrem e  
assertion that all bundling is the result of the exercise of market power. In Fortner l/ll and Northern 
Pacific Railway, the Court seems to suggest that market power was an independent requirement, 
although relatively easy to p ro ve .^  By the mid-1970s, the Court appears to have tightened up this 
requirement, rejecting the implication of some earlier cases that the mere existence of a bundle created  
a  presumption of economic pow er.^
In Jefferson Parish, this departure was made explicit. Here, the Supreme Court held that there could be 
no danger of forcing unless the seller possessed independently-proven market power.s^s Arguably, this 
shift places more emphasis on the assessment o f the arrangements’ competition effects and less on the 
consum er choice rationale. Later, Microsoft III focused exclusively on competition effects. For the 
rem and, the Court of Appeals expressly noted to assess the "actual effect of Microsoft’s conduct on 
competition in the tied good market-’’̂ ®® The bundling injury must be demonstrated on a “careful 
definition of the tied good market and a showing of barriers to entry other than the lying arrangement 
itself."567
Jefferson Parish had also shifted the emphasis in bundling cases away from short-term leveraging and 
tow ard the degree to which the bundle denies market access to rivals. This is consonant particularly 
with the Chicago insights that the leverage theory does not always work in short term. As the Court of 
Appeals noted in Microsoft III, “[fjirms without market power have no incentive to package different 
pieces of software together unless there are efficiency gains from doing so."568 It also opens the antitrust 
analysis to the possibility of negative long-term effects.
I- !'S
T h e  Supreme Court thus wavered over the years in its acceptance of economic assumptions of the per 
se  test resulting in a modified per se test. W hat was initially an antitrust blend of assessing the
563 Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 US 495, suggesting that the “proper focus of concern is whether the 
seller has power to raise prices’ (at 504); Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. US, noting that “[t]he very existence of this host of 
tying arrangements is itself compelling evidence of defendant's great power* (at 7-8). For a similar conclusion, see Craswetl, 
op.cit., writing that ‘ [a]t one time, the Supreme Court seemed to indicate that the fact that the seller was able to insist on a  tie 
was itself sufficient evidence of martcet power" (p. 671).
56* United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 US 610, holding that the mere existence of the bundling contract is 
insufficient to establish “kind of economic power which F o rtier has the burden of proving [...] to prevail in this litigation’ (at 
610).
565 Jefferson Parish HospHat District No. 2 v. Hyde, at 16-18.
566 United States v. Microsoft, 87 F.Supp. 2d 30, at 96 (emphasis added).
56r United States v. Microsoft, 67 F.Supp. 2d 30, at 96 (emphasis added).
568 United States v. Microsoft, 87 F.Supp. 2d 30, at 73.
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competition and consumer effects, appears to have now moved to a competition test. The Court of 
Appeals in Microsoft HI went further. Expressly, it called for an unstructured rule of reason. The nub of 
the problem is that the Supreme Court has to finally decide which test to apply.
5.2. Legal-econom ic analysis o f som e Suprem e Court decisions
The result of the current approach can be quite harsh in some respects. Usually, bundling should be 
limited to the case o f sellers with monopoly power. This is logical in light of the issue’s roots in antitrust 
and economic t h e o r y However, many cases discussed have involved unconcentrated markets where 
analyses based on an assumption of monopoly power fit poorly, if at all. Courts have explicitly noted the 
implausibility of leveraging theory in only a few  judicial opinions,.57o
Arguably, neither IB M  nor International Salt are fully persuasive. Due to the extent that IBM occupied 
the tabulating machine market, they probably also gained a monopoly in the sale of tabulating cards. 
However, it does not follow, as the Court presumed, that IBM would make a  monopoly profit in the 
second market. It should be stressed that the two products were complementary, and therefore both 
were necessary fo r any tabulating service. In International Salt, it does not follow that International Salt's 
patents on salt dispensing machines necessarily gave it a monopoly in that field. The Court did not 
consider how m any other machines were available, what International Salt’s market share was, or the 
availability of brine and canners to users.
Typically, commentators suggest that IBM and Internationa) Sait have imposed bundling so as to 
discriminate among users based on the intensity of their use of the products involved.s^i For instance, 
Petennan has persuasively argued that the evidence in International Salt Is inconsistent with that claim 
of price discrimination572
First, arbitrage appears to have made discrimination between users unlikely. International Salt leased its 
machines requiring the lessee purchase salt only In areas of the country in virfiich IS actually sold salt In 
areas w here It did not sell salt, it only sold the salt-dispensing machines. In other words, users who did 
not want the bundling contract could buy the machine in another location.
5® See Chapter 1.
5™ For instance, Hirzch v. Martindale-Hubbell. Inc., 674 F .2 1343 (S'“ Cir. 1982), at 1349.
5̂ '' See Hytton, op. c/f., pp. 289-290; Gellhom and Kovadc, op. cit., p. 331; Bauer, op. cit., pp. 294-295.
^  See Peterman, T h e  International Salt case", J. Law & Econ. 351 (1979), pp. 363-364. See also Golberg, T ie  
International Salt Puzzle", Res. Law & Econ. 31 (1991).
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Second, price discrimination assumes that the price incorporates the monopoly profit. Because 
International Salt’s arrangement also provided for an English clause, it would have been unlikely that the 
salt was sold above m arket prices. Instead, bundling allowed the company to reduce its selling 
expenses by achieving som e distribution efficiencies. Likewise, Cummings and Ruhter made it clear that 
price discrimination in Northern Pacific Railway was unlikely. They concluded that the clause waiving 
the bundle when the railroad could not meet a rival’s price prevented the plausibility of the leveraging 
theory.®^
Some commentators argue that the decision in Kodak falsely condemned bundling.574 in 1987, a 
number of Independent Service Organisations ("ISO’!  sued Kodak for bundling its spare parts for Kodak 
copiers with servicing of these machines. In an effort to combat the growing competition from ISOs, 
Kodak implemented a policy of selling spare parts to users who could service the copiers themselves or 
servicing the copiers itself. Importantly, it refused to sell its parts to ISOs that provide maintenance on 
the Kodak copiers. In support of this new policy, Kodak also tried to prevent ISOs from acquiring Kodak 
parts from other sources.
For instance, Kodak agreed with OEMs that they would not sell Kodak parts to anyone but Kodak. 
Because Kodak had only a 23% share of the copier market, ISOs claimed that the bundling product was 
Kodak replacement parts. It was alleged that Kodak used its monopoly power in the Kodak parts 
m arket, where it essentially had a 100% market share, in order to gain control of the Kodak service 
m arket through illegal bundling. Basically, Kodak’s defence was based on the argument that if there is 
competition in the primary market of copiers, aftermarket power cannot negatively affect consumers.
In 1991, after the Supreme Court granted certionari to review the Court of Appeals’ decision, scholars 
becam e hopeful that the Court would seize opportunity to clarify its bundling case law.57s Arguably, the 6 
to 3 decision In Kodak resolved very little. Instead, it promised to raise more questions than it answers. 
The Court found that Kodak had unlawfully bundled the sale of service for Kodak machines to the sale 
o f replacement parts in violation of Shemian Act § 1. The Court recognised that the manufacturer’s
^  See Cummings and Ruhter, "The Northern Pacific Case", J.L & Econ. 329 (1979). pp. 341-344. They argue that the 
bundle should sfili be prohibited because it could have been a device for monitoring competitor's prices and thus facilitating 
tad t collusion. For similar conclusion, see Aniauf, op. cit., p. 489.
574 See Carlton and Waldman, “How Economics Can Improve Antitrust Doctrine Towards Tie-in Sales’ , Comp. Pol’y In fl 27 
(2005), pp. 34-35; and, Carlton, "A General Analysis of Exdusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal -  Why Aspen and Kodak 
are Misguided’, Antitrust L  J. 659 (2001), pp. 659-683.

























ability to raise prices in aftermarkets would be constrained by the possibility of consumers purchasing 
alternative equipm ent from another m anufacturer.576 However, if consumers lack the necessary 
information to calculate the likely lifetime costs of competing producers’ copiers, they may find 
themselves locked-in to a particular brand o f equipment after they have made their initial equipment 
purchase.
t ' •
The Court rejected the defendant’s theory o f fully informed consumers.®^ It found that consumers could 
not make a full assessment of the lifetime package cost before making the purchase. However, it is 
doubtful whether the assumption o f imperfect information coincided with r e a l i t y Many of Kodak’s 
customers were large, sophisticated business firms able to properly consider lifetime costs.s^s
At first glance, the criticism of the Supreme Court’s theory may make sense, at least with regards to the 
short term  leveraging. On other hand, Kodak’s policy could have long-term negative consequences on 
the copier market.®^ Kodak’s conduct would effectively drive ISOs out of the market for providing 
service to Kodak copiers. As a consequence, only the copier companies would service their own brand 
of copier. This would affect the ability of new firms to enter the copier market. A new entrant to the 
copier m arket would have to incur all of the costs of designing, manufacturing and selling copiers, but 
would also have to set up an entire servicing network. This would clearly create high entry barriers to 
the copier m arket^si The Supreme Court appears to have recognised this long-term effect when it 
concluded “one of the evils proscribed by the antitrust laws is the creation of entry barriers to potential 
competitors by requiring them to enter two markets simultaneously.“582
^  Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, responding to Kodak's highly theoretical argument and emphasising the 
Court’s preference for a case-by-case fact intensive approach: “(negai presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather 
than actual market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law* (at 467).
5^ Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, at 475-481.
Notably, some commentators argue that aftermarket hold-up is not possible, even if consumers are totally uninformed 
because it requires also Imperfect information on the seller's side: Shapiro, “Aftermarkets and Consumer W elfare: Making 
Sense of Kodak’, Antitrust L  J. 483 (1995).
5™ See Van den Bergh and Camesasca, European Competition Law and Econom ics-A  Comparative Perspective (Antwerp, 
2001), p. 284.
“ 0 This point was m ade by Nalebuff in Bundling, Tying and Portfolio Effects (D TI paper, 2003), pp. 70-71. He argues that 
Kodak’s policy has two effects: price metering as a positive effect (pp. 68-70) and entry deterrence as a negative effect.
58’ Notably, those entry barriers increase the potential ability for a firm to unilaterally raise prices, but it may also facilitate a 
collusive outcome.
582 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, a t 486.
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5.3. Clarifying the law on bundling
The case law is nebulous and ripe for Review is suggested by the strong dissents in Jefferson
Parish and Kodak. In the latter case, Judge Scalia sharply criticised the p erse  approach. He noted that 
‘[pjer se rules of antitrust illegality are reserved for those situations where logic and experience show 
that the risk of injury to competition [...] is so pronounced that it is needless and wasteful to conduct the 
usual judicial inquiry into the balance between the behavior's procompetitive benefits and its 
anticompetitive costs/^w
If the rigid per se test is clearly indefensible and the per se legal test is too optimistic about possible 
efficiencies and too sceptical about the negative effects, what should the Supreme Court put in its place 
as an alternative to the current morass? For one, any new approach must be designed to deal with all 
markets, not just high-tech markets.s^s The Court has two options: (1) adapting the current modified per 
se test, or (2) applying the mie of reason test.
5.3.1. Adapting the modified perse test
W hen choosing between the unfavourable perse  test and the mie of reason test, commentators usually 
prefer the latter approach.“ ® Those commentators neglect the option of adapting the current Supreme 
Court test. Perhaps the major advantage of a  modified per se is that it provides for a clear m ie for 
businessmen and courts.“  ̂Jefferson Parish helps make the distinction between the per se and m ie of 
reason analyses.“ ® According to the Supreme Court, in the event that a  defendant has a great deal of 
leveraging power, the per se analysis is appropriate for the existence of forcing by the defendant is 
more than likely.^^ In the circumstances where the defendant is clearly in a dominant position to 
engage in “anticompetitive conduct," a court can avoid making a burdensome inquiry into actual market 
conditions.®^®
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., writing that *[aln injustice would be done by blindingly accepting the per se 
rule’ (at 56).
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Im age Technical Services, at 489-502.
See White, ‘Microsoft and Browsers: Are the Antitrust Problems Really New?", In: Eisenach and Lenard (eds.), op. cit., 
arguing that ‘ [tjhe antitrust issues at stake in Microsoft are not new and are not unique to computer software* (pp. 137-139). 
^  An interesting exception is Campeil. He suggests adopting the rule for reason test for non-dominant firms and the p erse  
test for dominant fimis. See Campeil, T it to Be Tied: How United States V. Microsoft Corp. Incorrectly Changed the 
Standard For Sherman Act Tying Violations Involving Software’ , Loy. L  A. E nt L  Rev. 583 (2002), pp. 602-603.
For a  similar recognition, see Bauer, op. d t., p. 286. 
s® Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, at 14-18.
5® Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, holding that “[ajs threshold matter there must be a substantial potential 
for impact on competition in order to justify per se condemnation* (at 15-16).
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, at 15.
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In contrast, the rule of reason test allows a court to examine the potential benefits of a certain bundle by 
investigating the m artlet, although at the expense of increased litigation inherent to a case-by-case 
inquiry 591 The p e rs e  test therefore simplifies judicial application. A  second advantage is that courts do 
not apply the p e rs e  test in a typical way. The p e rs e  test in other areas of competition law simply avoids 
inquiry into market structure altogether as the challenged behaviour has little chance of being beneficial 
and a great likelihood of being harmful.532 However, the current test incorporates some economic 
analysis.593 As seen in Fortner H and Jefferson Parish, courts must assess the market structure.®®  ̂The 
threshold for application of the test is substantial market power, which economists view as a necessary 
condition for anti-competitive bundling. Even so, once a plaintiff has established market domination and 
the p erse  test is in order, courts still allow the defendant to justify its business conduct.
In my view, the current modified per se test has deficiencies. As our next section on efficiencies 
demonstrates, US law only accepts business justifications under very limited circumstances. This is 
plainly contrary to the economic insights discussed in the first chapter. As for the separate-product 
question, courts apply a variety of tests that are all somewhat flawed. To a certain extent, both 
shortcomings could be solved by accepting bundling-related efficiency justifications and by applying the 
multi-factor test proposed. Although those modifications may surely increase the modified per se test’s 
attractiveness, the test is still flawed on two related levels.
On an analytical level, the test is based on the prior belief that it is more than likely that a defendant 
holding a  strong m arket position engages in anti-competitive bundling. If a plaintiff proves both 
significant market power and the existence o f a bundle, there is the assumption that the defendant is 
acting anti-competitively.595 The defendant must then demonstrate that its practice is justified. Splitting 
the ‘existence’ from the ‘liability’ issues would be a more sound antitrust approach. Once a bundle is 
found to exist, this should not conclusively establish liability, even if done so after some economic 
analysis within that standard. This would be consonant with mainstream economic thinking that 
leveraging may be //ke/y when the defendant has market power.
591 See Aniauf, op. c/f., pp. 508-509.
»2 See Campell, op. c i., p. 601.
“ 3 Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. Chrysler Motors Corp., finding that without anti-compettive conduct, a bundling 
arrangement in a competitive marketplace is not illegal in and of itself (at 495-496).
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, stressing that ‘ [tjhe per se doctrine in lying cases has thus always 
required an elaborate inquiry into the economic effects o f the tying arrangement" (at 34).
Moore v. J a ^  Matthews, 550 F. 2d 1207 (9®' Cir. 1977), making a similar point that bundling Is presumed illegal (at 1211).
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Moreover, the per se language suggests an ‘ideological’ position that is not required for bundling. For 
instance, price fixing is assessed under a per se test, as it is considered to be very pernicious at all 
times. Given its ambiguous effects, bundling is not always harmful. In order to avoid confusion, the per 
se language should be abandoned. On a practical level, the current test does not really save the 
judiciary and litigants any time or expense. The modified test also involves considerable factual 
investigation and proof.
5 .3 .2 . Applying the rule o f reason test
Contrasted to the per se test, a restriction analysed under the mle of reason test is condemned only 
after analysis of its purpose and effect on competition. A key component In this analysis is an 
examination of efficiencies. If a restriction is essential to achieve significant efficiencies in production, 
distribution, or development, a court applying a rule of reason analysis will balance these pro- 
competitive effects against the anti-competitive effects when establishing the legality of the restriction
The obvious argument in favour of the rule of reason test is the somewhat uncertain path of the antitrust 
doctrine with regards to bundling. As already observed, the Supreme Court decidedly adopted a perse  
analysis without ever actually applying it in its ‘true* nature. Recently, it clearly backed away from 
reflexive invalidation of bundling. It began to apply a modified perse  test that resulted in such restraints 
withstanding antitrust scrutiny.
The rule of reason test was resolutely praised in Jefferson Parish's vigorous dissent and implicitly hinted 
towards in Kodaks dissent. M/crosoff III can be seen as a major impetus for the adoption of the rule of 
reason tesl^s^ Another advantage of the rule of reason inquiry is that it accords more closely with 
economic theory than any perse  test, whether modified or not. From an economic perspective, bundling 
can have pn>competitive as well as anti-competitive effects. The Supreme Court appears to have 
accepted this position when it stated in Jeffersori Parish that “there is nothing inherently anticompetitive 
about packaged sales.’ŝ s
s *  Q iicago Board o f Trade v. US, 246 US 231 {1918), holding that courts must assess “whether the restrain imposed is such 
as may suppress or even destroy compefition. To determine tiiat question the court must ordinarily consider the facts 
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before an after the restraint was imposed; the nature of 
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable* {at 238).
59̂  Notably, Judge Scalia did not directly call for the elimination of the perse test in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 
Services, at 489-502, but he strongly criticised the effects of such a test 
5 * Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, at 25.
Some scholars stress that the rule of reason test for bundling suffers from many problems, including 
ambiguity, increased litigation costs, and unpredictability's^® The m ajor disadvantage of the test is that it 
is more costly for courts to administer.®®® This is why some advocate that courts must only apply the rule 
of reason test in situations where a lengthy inquiry into market structure and market conditions is 
warranted.
Harchuck focuses on the negative effects of fear of antitrust litigation on innovation.®®  ̂ Because the rule 
of reason test is less deferential to defendants than the per se test, the plaintiffs ability and likelihood of 
success (in combination with the resultant increase in potential to collect treble damages) increases the 
incentive to start bundling suits, particularly with regards to design decisions. Harchuck stressed that 
this would create *a fear of antitrust litigation and could potentially create disincentives for companies to 
pursue beneficial innovation for new products."®®  ̂To avoid this effect, he calls for antitrust immunity for 
technical bundling. The troublesome issue with Marchuk’s proposition is that it ignores the possible anti­
competitive effects of such decisions. This would open the door to increased anti-competitive behaviour 
by monopolists.®®®
Remarkably, the cost aspect is used by other commentators to opt for the per se test. Campell 
advances that Microsoft III only causes confusion and unnecessary litigation in cases that courts should 
swiftly resolve under the per se test.®®  ̂This proposal is ostensibly negative for business. It would be 
unwise to continue to apply a modified per se test to technological bundling given the shortcomings 
identified in the preceding section.
559 In particular, see Turner, T lie  Durability. Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy, Cal. L. Rev. 797 (1987), p. 
800.
See Hylton, op. cit., p. 130.
See Harchuck, op. cit., pp. 434-435.
See Harchuck, op. cit., p. 434.
See Weinstein, op. cit., p. 923.
See Campell, op. cit., p. 603.
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6. Bundling and efficiencies
6.1 Introductory remarks
Companies that are legally challenged for bundling have often tried to justify their practice.̂ os An 
efficiency justification was accepted for the first time in Pick Manufacturing.^ The defendant, the 
distributor of Chevrolet cars, insisted that its authorised dealers use only Chevrolet replacement parts in 
their repair operations, o f which it was the sole supplier. The lower court approved this requirement 
based on the theory that the use of potentially inferior non-Chevrolet parts could lead to consumer 
dissatisfaction with the cars itself. The bundle was thus justified so that General Motors could preserve 
good will towards its products. The general position under US law is that *a proper business reason 
must justify what might otherwise an unlawful tie-in.*“ ^
The Supreme Court allowed defendants in cases like IBM, intemationdl Sa/t and Jerroicf to assert limited 
affirmative business justifications. This apparent contradiction of a perse test with potential exceptions 
has caused some confusion in the lower courts.®̂ ® Although defendants have sought in many cases to 
rely on the justification argument, it “fails in the usual situation."®®®
6.2. Efficiency justifications in detail
6.2.1. The justification promotes competition
This type of justification accepts the bundling practice because it promotes the overall competitiveness 
of the markets involved.®'‘® The most Important case here is Jerrold. Finding a bundle of separate items, 
the Court held that the full-system sale was reasonable at inception because it was "instituted in the 
launching of a new business with a high uncertain future."®̂  ̂ It noted that poor quality performance
For overview, see Hovenkamp and Areeda, op. c l, pp. 857-888: and, Jansen, op. at., pp. 84-86.
Pick Manufacturing Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 at 643-44 Cir. 1935), afTd per curiam, 299 U.S. 3 
(1936).
Dehydrating Process Co. v. A O . Sm/f/i Corp., at 655-656.
M iller V. Granados, 529 F. 2d 393 (5“’ Cir. 1976), refusing to consider a goodwill defense because 'once a tying 
arrangement is found to exist in context of sufficient market power, its illegality is established without further inquiry into 
business excuses for its uses’ (at 396).
Standard Oil Co. of C alihm ia v. United States, at 305-306.
Scanlan v. Anheuser-Busch Ing., 388 F. 2d 918 (9th Cir. 1968), noting that '[a] course of conduct which this increases 
rather than diminishes competition benefiting rather than injuring the public is not condemned under the Shennan or Clayton 
Act"
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., at 556-557.
«;!
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could doom the industry that Jerrold was creating. During the development period of a new industry, 
bundling is justified as a device for assuring the effective functioning o f complex equipment. Cieariy, this 
justification is limited In time, although no indication of time was given.®^^
The temporal nature of the justification was firm ly stressed in Chicken Delight^^^ Chicken Delight is a 
franchise set up in 1952. The defendant required franchisees to purchase different paper products 
necessary for different types of sales. The Court rejected the defendant’s new business justification in 
1971. “To accept Chicken Delights argument would convert," the Court said, “the new business 
¡ustiñcation into a perpetual license to operate in restraint of trade.“®î  Quite properly, the Court attempts 
to balance the need for the bundle with its presumed anti-competitive effects.
There is some suggestion that a company seeking to enter a new market would be entitled to use 
bundling in order to stake out a m arket share. W hat counts for the introduction of a new product may 
likewise apply for a newcomer. This form o f bundling is sometimes called “performance survival tie- 
ins."®̂ ® In Brown Shoe, the newcomer argum ent is expressly mentioned when referring to Jerroki, 
although it was not relied upon in the final decision
6.22. The justification favours intent over possible negative effects
6 .2 .2 .I. G oodw ill protection
This type o f justification favours the tying party’s intent over the anti-competitive effects of the bundle. 
The Supreme Court has in principie endorsed the goodwill defense but never accepted it based on the 
facts. The justification was accepted for the first time by a lower court in Pick Manufacturing}^'^ The 
goodwill justification has been limited by the requirement that it is the least restrictive alternative 
available to the seller. If specifications of the individual items of a bundle could assure the same high 
level of quality, it is not available. Notably, courts do not itself consider the degree to which quality 
standards could be feasibly specified and enforced.®^®
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., a t 558 (emphasis added).
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc..
614 Siegel V. Chicken Delight, Inc., at 51 (emphasis added).
615 See Frey, op. cit., p. 155.
Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 US 294, at 323.
Pick Manufacturing Co, v. Genera/Motors Corp.
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, holding that a “finding as to why contractual quality specifications would 
not protect the hospital* is irrelevant (at 26, n 42).
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In IBM, the defendant claimed that bundling was necessary to guarantee the proper functioning of the 
tabulators, although it admitted that other manufacturers could make cards satisfying the correct 
specifications.®''^ The Supreme Court firmly rejected IBM’s justification. IBM could have employed the 
less restrictive alternative of warning consumers about the “necessary specifications’ or conditioning the 
lease on use of cards meeting the company’s specifications.®^
The goodwill justification was made again in International Salt. The defendant asserted that its salt was 
m ore pure than that of competitors, and it would therefore be less likely to harm its machines.®2i 
Considering that competitors could also produce pure salt, the Court emphasised that quality 
specifications could be easily specified and monitored. In a plainly sarcastic way, it rejected International 
S alt’s justification, considering that less restrictive alternatives were obviously available.®^^
In Jefferson Parish, the defendant claimed that it bundled so as to assure 24-coverage, flexible 
scheduling, professional standards, and equipment maintenance.®^  ̂ The Court did not reject these 
justifications as inadmissible under the per se test. Instead, it found no reason to overturn the lower 
court’s conclusion that less restrictive alternatives were available, such as imposing “standards for staff 
privileges that would ensure staff would comply with the demands of scheduling, maintenance, and 
professional standards."®24
In Kodak, the defendant contended that quality control was a legitimate business reason for its 
behaviour. Kodak declared that, by preventing customers from using ISOs, "it [could] best maintain high 
quality service for Its sophisticated equipmenf and avoiding being ’blamed for an equipment 
malfunction, even if the problem is the result of improper diagnosis, maintenance or repair by an 
1S 0.’625 pirst, the Supreme Court mled that the evidence of ISOs providing quality service at lower 
prices was sufficient to refute Kodak’s argument.®^® It stressed that Kodak adopted its parts policy only 
after an ISO won a contract and once Kodak allowed its own customers to service their machines. 
Kodak customers could distinguish breakdowns due to poor service from breakdowns due to inferior
Intem atbnai Business Machines Corp. v. United States, at 138*139.
620 In te m a ^ a l Bu^ness M at^ines Co/p. v. United States, at 139-140. IBM could have easily specified issues like the 
correct size and thickness of the cards. See Bowman, op. a t, noting that '[a] careful description of the specifications 
necessary for successful performance might overcome the objections of the manufócturer' (p. 28).
621 international Salt Co. v. United States.
622 in tem a^nai Salt Co, v. United States, stating that *il is not pleaded, nor it is argued, that the machine is allergic to salt of 
equal quality produced by anyone except Intemattonal* (at 397-398) (emphasis added).
623 Jefferson Parish Hospita! District No. 2 v. Hyde, at 25, fn. 42.
62< Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, at 25, fn. 42.
625 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, at 483.
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parts. Second, the Court raised the issue of Kodak making conflicting statements about customers’ 
informational sophistication.627 Kodak submitted that customers would be able to fully evaluate the life- 
cycle costs of buying and using its copiers. However, it maintained that the same customers were 
unable to distinguish which breakdowns are due to bad equipment and senrice.
The goodwill justification often appears in franchise licensing. For the franchisor and franchisees, it is 
important that franchisees offer goods of uniform quality. Dissatisfaction by a customer with one 
franchisee could affect other franchisees’ sales. The franchisor therefore has reason to insist on selling 
all supplies and equipment to its franchisees in order to guarantee uniform quality. For instance, the 
franchisor can respond by bundling the franchise rights to the franchisee’s promise to sell only Coca- 
Cola as its soft drink.®28 In Kentucky Fried Chicken, the Court found a  permissible bundle that produced 
nationwide uniformity in the franchise product sold by hundreds o f Independently owned franchisees 
outweighed the restrictive effects.®^^
Notably, the requirement of less restrictive alternative is not absolute. The Supreme Court recognised in 
Standard Station that “[t]he only situation, indeed, In which protection o f goodwill may necessitate the 
use of tying clauses is where specifications for a substitute would be so detailed that they could not 
practicably be supplied
In Tuolumne, the Court recently accepted a hospital’s defense that the need to assure itself of the 
quality of those delivering babies by Caesarean sections justified its bundling arrangement.®3i The 
plaintiff offered a less restrictive alternative of reference letters rather than tied physicians. As for such 
letters, the Court found:
[i]t is difficult to see how a hospital [...] can assure itself that a physician has the surgical competence 
represented by Broad certification or the supervised experience of a 36-month residency program. Such 
a substitute [...] can be made only by the hospital’s incurring substantial costs.^
Eastman Kodak Co. v. image Technical Services, at 483484 ,
628 Martino v. McDonald's Sys., 625 F. Supp. 356 (N .D, til 1985), holding the franchisor’s requirement that franchisees sell 
Coca-Cola as their cola beverage not unlawful because the defendant had interest in maintaining unifonnity of product 
across its franchise network (at 362-263).
629 Kentucky Fried Chicken v. Diversified Packaging, 549 F.2d 368 {5“* Cir. 1977), at 379-381.
686 ^andard  O // Co. o f Cal. v. United Sfafes, at 306.
631 County o f Tuolumne v. Sonora Community Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148 (8“» CIr, 2001).
632 County o f Tuolumne v. Sonora Community Hosp., at 1159-1160.
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6 .2 ^ 2 . Tradem ark protection
A  variant of the goodwill justification is trademark protection. The argument is often used as an 
additional justification for bundling.®33 Likewise, it is usually relied upon in a franchise co n tex t^  The 
leading case is Sinclair Refining, already decided in 1923.^  On the facts of the case, the Supreme 
Court refused to a find a ‘bundle,’ The Court refused to apply the Clayton Act § 3 prohibition to Sinclair’s 
contracts that bound its gas-pump lessees to pump Sinclair gas through the leased pumps. Although the 
contracts clearly bundled gasoline to gas pumps, the Court was impressed by the lessee’s freedom to 
purchase his own gas pumps or rent them from others and to purchase gasoline freely in the open 
market.636
Subsequent cases tended to interpret Sinclair in terms of a right for a trademark owner to protect its 
m ark.^^ That is, Sinclair put its trademark on the pumps and could require that only Sinclair gasoline be 
sold under its brand name. Sinclair’s insistence that a buyer who wished to use its trademark also took 
the product protected by the trademark was simply not a ‘bundle’ according to the court. Instead, it 
concerned one product: branded gasoline. A more recent example of the one-product approach is 
Baskin-Robbins.^  In this case, the franchisor was Baskin-Robbins, and its designee made the ice 
cream  that was resold by the franchisee. The Baskin-Robbins trademark indicated the origin of the ice 
cream  and therefore was not a product separate from the franchise license.
Unlike the determining of one product in Sinclair Refining, courts have also accepted the trademark 
protection argument as a justification for a bundle. For instance, in Baker v. S/mmons, the Court 
accepted the defendant’s bundle because there was a *legitimate business justification."“  ̂ Simmons 
offered a hotel fomnat under the name ‘Beauty rest.’ Hotel owners could use the name for their hotel on 
the condition that they also purchased Simmons’ mattresses that also displayed its name. The 
anangem ent was justified because if hotel guests were to sleep on bad mattresses, this would affect 
Simmons’ name, reputation and goodwill. “Where the clear impart of the sign program was to convey."
633 See Treece, Tradem ark Licensing and Vertical Restraints in Franchising Arrangements', U. Pa. L  Rev. 435 (1968).
63« See Klein, T h e  Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts', J. L  & Econ. 345 (1985).
635 FTC  V. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 US 463 (1923). To the contrary, Tirnlcert Roller Bearing Co. v. VS, 341 US 593, noting 
that ‘ [a] trademark cannot be legally used as a device for the Sherman Act violation' (at 599).
638 F7*Cv, Sinclair Refining Co., a'i.AlA.
637 Times-Picayune v. United States, at 607.
638 Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 644 F.2d 1348 (9* Cir. 1982)
639 Baker V. Simmons, 307 F. 2d 458 (1®» Cir. 1962), at 468.
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the Court noted, “the message that a Beauty rest awaited the traveller inside, the Simmons Co. has 
ample justification in seeking to in sure that the realization met this expectation."®^
US case law also makes it clear that the argument is not unconditionally accepted. In Jack Winter, the 
Court m ade explicit that a “tie-in" may only be justified in order to protect the defendant’s trade mark if 
this is advantageous for the public image of the mark.®^  ̂The Court rejected the defendant’s justification 
in Chicken Delight arguing that a “restraint of trade can be justified only in the absence of less restrictive 
altematives. ’*®^2 jh e  Court condemned Chicken Delight’s requirement to pack together the bundling and 
bundled product by holding that “one cannot immunize a tie-in from the antitmst laws by simply 
stamping a trade-m ark symbol on the tied product -  at least where the tied product is not itself the tied 
product represented by the mark."®^^
6.2.3. Some remaining justifications
Courts have discussed and sometimes accepted justifications which cannot be categorised under the 
first two headings.
6.2.3.1, Cost savings
The Supreme Court recognised cost savings as a legitimate purpose of bundling in Times-Picayune, It 
sustained the defendant’s policy of bundling morning and evening advertising as supported by 
“legitimate business aims" because it lowered production costs.®^
In Loew%  the Court likewise concluded that cost savings could justify a bundle.®^® Let us recall that the 
defendant only sold its films to television stations in block booking. This meant that television stations 
could not buy popular films without taking less popular films. The Court found Loew’s conduct to 
constitute bundling. However, it allowed package discounts up to the amount of “all legitimate cost
^  Baker v. Simmons, at 469. For similar conclusion, Susserv. Carvel Corp., 332 F. 2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert, der), 381 US 
125.
Jack W inter Inc. v. Koratron Co. Inc., 375 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Cal. 1974), a t 63.
«2 Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., at 51.
^  Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., at 52.
^  Times-Picayune v. United States, at 622-624.
Unäed States v. Loevir’s, Inc., at 44. See also Breaux Bothers Farms v. Teche Sugar Co,, 21 F. 3d 83 {S“* Cir. 1994), cert, 
denied., 513 U.S. 963 (1994), holding that bundling may enable a plant to guarantee its production during slack periods, thus 
reducing fixed costs (a t 89).
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justifications.’®̂® It is important to note that the Court rejected the government’s position that onty 
savings in distribution costs should be accepted. This means that sellers are allowed to offer products 
separately and at a package discount equal to the amount of the cost savings.
Occasionally, the Supreme Court has rejected the cost saving justificdtion with arguing that bundling 
was not necessary to achieve those savings. In Kodak, the defendant submitted that it needed to be the 
sole service provider so as to control its Inventory costs for replacement parts. The Court rejected 
Kodak’s inventory costs explanation because breakdown rates seem to be unrelated to who is servicing 
the copiers.®47 Kodak failed, the Court argued, to explain why it had to force replacement parts 
manufacturers and equipment owners not to sell to the ISOs, considering these requirements have no 
effect on Kodak’s inventory costs.
6.2.S.2. Free riding
This justification has been discussed in Kodak. The defendant claimed that bundling would prevent 
ISO s from free riding its capital Investment in equipment, parts and service.®^® The Court rejected the 
free riding argument Kodak did not dispute that respondents Invested substantially in the servicing 
m arket by training repair workers and investing in parts inventory. Instead, Kodak stressed that the ISOs 
w ere free-riding and had failed to enter the equipment and replacement parts market®^® The argument 
w as turned down. The Court concluded that “one of the evils proscribed by the antitrust laws is the 
creation of entry barriers to potential competitors by requiring them to enter two markets 
simultaneously.”®®®
^  United States v. Loew's, Inc., at 54-55.
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, at 484-485. See also J.L Thomson Mfg. v. FTC, 150 F. 2d 952 (1** Cir. 
1945).
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, in which Kodak stated that its bundling policies prevented ISOs from 
“exploiting the investment Kodak has made in product development, manufacturing and equipment sales in order to take 
away Kodak’s service revenues' (at 485).
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, at 486.









By tracing the legal development o f the bundling analysis, it becomes clear that US law has undergone 
significant changes over time. The US case law has in practice always been more flexible than what 
might appear at first sight. The Supreme Court has treated bundles both with hostility and considerable 
tolerance over the last decades. A t one point, it did not hesitate to take a strict approach vis-à-vis 
bundling. Not surprisingly, in the w ake of that utterance, a number o f decisions characterised bundling 
as illegal perse.
The Court has nonetheless never been willing to say of bundling, as it has of price fixing and other 
restrictions subject to the per se test, that it is always illegal, without proof of market power or anti­
competitive effects. Even under the per se test, the Supreme Court left the door open to a reasonable 
justification of bundling. The requirement in Jefferson Parish that a  detailed examination of the 
characteristics of the markets involved before prohibiting bundling has taken a great deal of substance 
from the per se test. This resulted in the modified per se test. Microsoft ill undoubtedly highlights, in 
particular when markets are dynamic, the flaw s o f the current Supreme Court test. It has led to the most 
recent and vigorous call for the rule of reason test for bundling.
For the EU, the examination of US law provides useful material for inspiration. The Community standard 
for bundling should apply a multi-factor approach in order to determine whether products are 
components of a single product or are in distinct markets. In addition, any European standard should 
follow the US approach of applying an effects-based test that essentially requires market power in the 
tied market. Finally, the US case law may be a guiding tool for pro-competitive explanations as it has 
recognised a number of bundling-related efficiency considerations.
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This work now turns to EC law. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the conditions and rationale that the 
Community Courts and the Commission have applied for findings o f anti-competitive bundling under 
European law.
My assessment covers Articles 81 and 82  EC. Although this thesis is principally about Article 82 EC, 
and attempts to suggest a modernised approach to bundling, it is essential to include Article 81 EC in 
this chapter for two reasons. First, there are common aspects o f analysis under both provisions. For 
instance, separability of products as a basic condition for leveraging, or the leveraging rationale for 
prohibiting a bundling arrangement is the same under both articles. Second, Article 81 EC has already 
been reformed, favouring an economics-based approach. It may therefore give useful insights for 
developing a modernised bundling approach under Article 82 EC.
The examination in this chapter is three-fold. First, I will discuss the separate-product tests applied by 
the European Courts and the Commission. After discussing the advantages and disadvantages of those 
singie-factor tests, 1 will propose to apply a multi-factor test in order to determine separability under EC 
law. The multi-factor test proposed is appraised by applying it to the facts of Microsoft, Second, as I 
likewise observed under US law, the discussion in this chapter reveals a gradual shift from an early and 
overly hostile approach to a more effect-based antitrust analysis. I will argue that EC law appears to 
apply a test resembling, to some extent, an unstructured rule o f reason. The EC approach is 
ideologically based on the leveraging theory. I will also make a legal-economic assessment of the 
Commission’s decisions in Hitti, Tetra P ak II and Microsoft. My examination suggests that the 
Commission could have reached different conclusions from those it did. Third, I will discuss the various 
bundling standards that have been proposed in the literature and case law. All these suggestions will be 
dismissed. I will propose to apply a structured m /e o f reason.
2. A dual system of ex post rules
Under the Treaty, Articles 81 and 82 EC are designed to tackle ex  post restrictions of competition.^si 
Article 81 EC is concerned with restrictions of competition that are the result of cooperation between two
Article 81 EC prohibits ‘all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices which may affect trade between member states and which have as ttieir object or effect the prevention, restriction 
or distortion of competition within the common martceL” Article 82 EC prohibits '[a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a 
dominant position within the common market [.„ ] in so far as it may affect trade between member states.”
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or more undertakings, whether horizontal or vertical.̂  ̂ Reading that provision quickly discloses its 
essentially bifurcated constitution. It consists of a broadly formulated prohibition of agreements that 
restrict competition, although an exemption may be granted from such a prohibition. The prohibition of 
Article 81(1) EC has direct effect. The recently adopted Regulation 1/2003 provides for the direct 
applicability of Article 81(3) agreement Is caught by Article 81(1) EC  if either its object or its
effec t is the restriction of competition.654 Where the object of the agreement is to restrict competition, 
th ere  is no need to look further and to prove that its effect lies in the restriction of competition
In effect cases, it is important to consider the agreement In its legal and economic context.®56 Out of this 
necessity developed the doctrine of the inherent restrictions and of ancillary restraints. Under the 
doctrine of inherent restrictions, restraints in an agreement do not ran afoul of Article 81(1) because they 
are  inherent to the activity pursued,®®? The jurisprudence also indicates that restrictions on the parties’ 
behaviour that Is ancillary to the operation of a pro<competitive agreement cannot be said to restrict 
competition.®®®
H ow ever, the CFI expressly rejected in Métropole that the approach of considering the agreement in the 
legal-econom ic context amounted to an acceptance of a rule of reason American style under Article 
81(1).®®9 Pro- and anti-competitive effects of an agreement must be balanced under Article 81(3) EC.®®° 
For the purpose of this thesis, this suggests that there is no unstructured rule of reason under Article 
8 1 (1 ) EC.
652 Cases 56 & 58/64, Consien & Gnindig v. Commission I1966) ECR 299, p. 313.
653 See Article 1 of Council Regulation 1/2003 on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 
and 82  of the Treaty. [2002] OJ 1/1.
654 Cases 56/65, Société La Technique Minière v. Mascbinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 234, p. 249; and. Cases T -3 7 4 ,375,384 & 
388 /94 , European Night Services v. Co/nm/ssron [1998] ECR 11-3141, at 136.
655 C ases 56 & 58/64, Consfen & Grundig v. Commissbn, p. 314.
656 C ase C-234/89, DeSmitis v. HenningerBrau [1991] ECR 1-935, at 13-27.
657 Case 258/78, Nungesser v. Commission [1982] ECR 2015, at 56-58; Case 161/84, Pronuptia [1986] ECR 353, at 16-22; 
Case 0 2 5 0 /9 2 , Gottrup-Klim v. DLG  [1994] ECR 1-5641, at 30-35; Cases C -115 ,117/97, Brentjes [1999] ECR 1-6025. at 56- 
61.
658 Case 42/84, Remia v. Commission [1985] ECR 2545, at 18-20; and, Case T-112/99, Métropole Télévision v. Commission 
[2001] ECR 11-2459, a t 104-117.
659 Case T-112/99, Métropole Télévision v. Commission, at 76. Earlier stated In Cases 56/65, Société La Technique Minière 
V. Maschinenbau Ulm.
660 Case T-112/99, Métropole Télévision v. Commission, at 77. The Court reiterated this approach to Article 81 EC in Case T - 
65/98, Van den Bergh Foods v. Commission, 23 October 2003, not yet reported, at 106-107.
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Article 82 EC is essentially concerned with the repercussions on competition of behaviour by one 
company In order for Article 82 to apply, the undertaking must hold a dominant position. That 
position does not exist in a vacuum. It involves an actual market that must be delineated as both a 
product market and a geographically identifiable area.®^ Market shares are a solid indicator of whether 
or not dominance may be said to exist. The ECJ has held that persistent market shares exceeding 50% 
normally confer a dominant position on an undertaking.®«^ W hether dominance exists for any other 
market share is a question that concerns several other factors.®®  ̂Among such factors are the market 
shares of direct competitors, intellectual property rights, potential competition, and the degree of vertical 
integration of the undertaking. The undertaking in question must abuse this dominant position. Unlike its 
counterpart § 2  Sherman Act, Article 82 EC proscribes abusive actions of a dominant firm, not 
monopolisation by means other than superior skill, foresight and industry. Holding a dominant position is 
thus not a  precondition under US law.
With regards to abuse, Article 82 EC contains an indicative list o f abusive behaviour. The concept of 
abuse is an objective one.®®® W hether or not the intention of the enterprise in question was to abuse its 
dominant position is irrelevant. The company In a dominant position should be aware of its position on 
the market and the accompanying special responsibility not to distort competition.®®®
In essence, two types of abuse exist.®®  ̂ Exploitative abuse relates to abuse that aims to exploit the 
dominant position, whereas exclusionary abuse lies in attempting to affect market structure. Exploitative 
conduct seeks to reap the monopoly rents by, for instance, charging excessive prices or pricing below 
cost. Abuse seeking to keep other enterprises from challenging the dominant position is exclusionary.
As for exclusionary abuse, the ECJ made it clear in Hoffman-La Roche that it concerns behaviour that 
“through recourse to methods different from those governing normal competition" has the “effect of
The wording of Article 82 EC {'one or more undertakings') lends to the view that the provision may be used to control also 
the abuses by oligolpolists that collectively hold a dominant position. For a review of the concept of collective dominance, 
see Stroux, EC Oligopoly Control (EDI Thesis, 2003).
662 See Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purpose of Community Competition Law, [1997] 
O JC372/5, at 53-55.
6« Case C-62/86, AKZO v. Commission [1991] E C R 1-3499, at 60.
^  Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commissbn [1978] ECR 207, at 66.
^  Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission [1979] ECR, at 91.
Case 322/81, Michelin v. Commission (Michelin I) [1983] ECR 3461, at 57.
See Jones and Sufrin, EC  CompeW/on Law (Oxford, 2004), using the terminology ‘exploitative" and ‘anti-competitive’  (pp. 
270-271); and, Bellamy and Child, European Community Law  o f Competition (London, 2001), p. 720. For a different 
categorisation, see Eilmansberger, ‘How to Distinguish Good from Bad Competition under Article 82 EC: in Search of 
Clearer and More Coherent Standards for Anti-Competitive Abuses", CMLRev. 129 (2005), p. 132; and, Goyder, EC  
Competition Law (Oxford, 2003), p. 283.
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hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that 
competition."®®^ According to the Commission, a  dominant firm is still entitled to compete on the 
merits.®®® Competing on the merits is when the enterprise’s behaviour is economically justified.®^®
Unlike Article 81(3) EC, Article 82 EC does not provide for an explicit legal basis for invoking 
justifications. Arguably, this is immaterial as the purpose of Article 82 EC cannot be to deprive dominant 
companies of the possibility to drive out their rivals by lawful objective means. As early as United Brands 
and Hoffm an-ia Roche, the ECJ has recognised the possibility of considering whether the conduct of a 
dominant company is “justified."®^^ If behaviour is justified, abuse simply does not exist because the 
alleged abusive behaviour is objectively justified.
3. The Treaty and bundling in general
A first reading of Articles 81 and 82 EC reveals that the drafters of the Treaty were already concerned 
with bundling and related issues.®^ Both provisions consider that there is a prohibited restriction of 
competition where the conclusion of contracts is made "subject to acceptance by other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection 
with the subject of such contracts."®^®
The terms 'supplementary obligations’ suggest that a main and a  second supplementary product are 
required,®^^ as is often the case. Guesthouses offer the service of renting a room with breakfast; copying 
machines are tied to the supply of paper; and, a  manufacturing process for meat sausages may be 
linked to the casings used in that process. Today the links deriving from technological developments in 
general and digitalisation in particular can blur this distinction. For instance, firms active in electronic 
communications offer bundled packages of lines, internet access, digital TV  or hardware. Identifying the 
main and secondary markets becomes more and more complex. In my view, it is therefore advisable not 
to focus on supplymentarity. Instead, it is important to identify two distinct markets. The main market Is 
generally equated with the product market being dominated by the undertaking under investigation.
6®® Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Ckmnission, at 91 See also Case 322/81, Michelin I, at 57.
«9 Case IV/30.698, ECS/AKZO  [1985] OJ L 374/1. at 81.
Case T-203/01, Micheltn v. Oimmission (Michelin If), dedsion of 30 September 2003, not yet reported, at 97.
671 Case 27/76 United Brands, at 184; and, Case 85/76 Hofhnann-La Roche, a t 90.
672 Notably, bundling can also be addressed under Artide 28 EC: Case C-17/92, Fidicine [1993] E C R 1-2239, regarding tying 
the license to American films with the distribution of Spanish films.
673 See Articles 81{1){e) and 82(d) EC.
674 See Jansen. Die Kopplungsverträge im R ed it der Wettbewertsbeschänkungen (Berlin. 1968), noting "[e]s wird also 
zwischen einer Hauptleistung, die den wesentlichen inhalt des Vetrages ausmacht und der zusätlichen Leistung zu 
unterscheiden sein* (p. 159).
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Both Articles 81 and 82 EC speak o f 'acceptance.' The term suggests that parties must have agreed to 
the bundle. However, this narrow-technical interpretation must be dismissed. Bundling is not limited to 
those cases of “rechtlicher Zwang," as the German Federal High Court recently noted in a national 
bundling case.675 Rather, the œ ercive nature to accept the bundle must be the focus of attenfon. As 
Faull and Nikpay write, this is a "crucial elem ent" of the abuse.^^e The rationale for this is simple. In the 
absence of a coercive element, a bundle cannot have an impact on competition. It is important to 
distinguish coercion to accept from coercion to use the tied product. Coercion to accept arises if an 
undertaking denies customers the realistic choice of buying the components of the bundle separately. 
The language of Article 82 EC would suggest that, in order to demonstrate ‘acceptance,’ it is not 
necessary to show that customers are forced to use the tied product. Whether customers are forced to 
use the tied product is relevant for assessing the actual impact of the tie on competition.
Coercion to accept can manifest itself in different forms. It typically consists of a contractual clause, but 
may also be the result of a refusal to supply or technical bundling. A good example of technical bundling 
is the bundle of Windows with Windows M edia Player (WMP).6T7 OEMs license Windows from Microsoft 
with W M P pre-installed. They may install alternative media players on Windows but only in add^ion to 
W MP. Moreover, there are no readily technical means for consumers to uninstall W MP. Financial 
coercion is all the more interesting. A manufacturer may be tempted to reduce or even refuse discounts 
on a particular product to customers who refuse to purchase a second product from It. It may also grant 
or increase discount for customers purchasing the bundle. As a result, the pricing behaviour may be 
deemed to be the functional equivalent o f an explicit bundle and might therefore attract the same odium 
as an outright tie.
The Court initially took the view in Hoffm ann-La Roche that a “strong incentive" to buy the bundle was 
sufficient to m ake a  bundling case.^^s A sim ilar reasoning was followed by the Commission in Michelin 
/.679 The Commission found that Michelin had abused its dominant position by granting an extra bonus 
on purchases of tyres for heavy vehicles. The bonus was offered on the condition that dealers would 
achieve a  minimum sales target o f tyres. In the Commission’s view, the extra bonus was Intended to
^  Translation: legal binding force. See AOL v. Deutsche Telekom, K Z R 1/03, judgment of 30 March 2004, p. 10.
See Fauli and Nikpay, The EC Law o f Competition (Oxford, 1999), p. 167.
677 Case CO M P/37.792, Microsoft, decision of 23 March 2004, not yet officially published, at 310,827-829,
678 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission [1979] ECR 461, at 111.
679 Case IV/29.491, Bandengroothandel Friescheburg/Nederiandsche Banden-lndustrie MicheSn (Michelin I) [1981] OJ L 
353/33.
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com pel dealers to make a special of heavy-vehicle tyres. It contended that this commercial practice was 
sim ilar to that covered by Article 82(d) EC.
O n appeal, the ECJ made it clear in Michelin I that an incentive is not adequate. It explained that 
discounts by dominant undertakings may be abusive where they ‘remove or restrict the buyer's freedom 
to  choose his sources of supply.’®®̂ In my view, the proper test should indeed examine whether 
custom ers are left a meaningful commercial choice of buying the products separately. Such a choice is 
d en ied  if the separate price for either the tying or tied product equals or exceeds the package price.
T h is  is also the legal position under US law. In Microsoñ III, the Court of Appeals noted that competition 
is restricted when either the products are sold only in a bundle or the tying product “though offered 
separate ly  is sold at a bundled price, so that the buyer pays the same price whether he takes the tied 
p ro d u cto r not."®®̂
T h e  Commission also appears to emphasise this lack of choice. It qualified the reduction of discounts in 
H ilti as illegal because they were found to ‘leave the customer with no choice over the sources of his 
n a ils ."®®2 A similar approach was discernable in Digital.^  The case arose from complaints lodged by 
th ird -party maintenance companies regarding Digital’s pricing practices for its computers. The 
Com m ission found that offering a package price for hardware and software support below the sum of 
th e  prices for the component services constituted illegal bundling.®®̂  As part of the settlement, Digital 
w ould refrain from charging prices that would make it uneconomical for customers to purchase 
com ponent services from rival companies.
A t the same time, the Commission recognised that efficiencies may be achieved. Digital was allowed to 
give  its customers a maximum discount of 10% in order to ‘allow cost savings or other benefits to be 
passed on to system users while ensuring the maintenance of effective competition in the supply of 
hardw are services."®®® That the Commission appears to concentrate on the lack of choice was expressly
®80 C ase 322/81, Miche/in I. at 73.
M l U S V. Microsoft, 235 F.3d 34 (D .C. Cir. 2001), at 87. See also US v. loew*s, 371 US 38 (1962), at 43 and Data General 
Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 490 F. Supp. 989 (N.D. Cal. 1980), at 1010-1011.
M2 C ase lV/30.787, Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti, at 75.
M3 S ee 27®' Report on Competition Policy (1997), p. 69 For more details, see Andrews, •Aftermaricet Power in the Computer 
Services Market: The Digital Undertaking', ECLR 176 (1998), p. 179; and. Dolmans and Pickering, T h e  1997 Digital 
Undertaking". ECLR 108 (1998), p. 110.
M4 See IP /97/868,8 October 1997.
MS See IP /97/868,8 October 1997.
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noticeable in Microsoft. In its decision, it noted the importance of assessing whether ‘customers are not 
given the choice of acquiring the tying product without the tied product."®86
There has been some discussion whether or not customers should pay extra for the supplementary 
obligation. For instance, Microsoft rejected the applicability of Article 82(d) EC as WMP is distributed 
with Windows for f r e e T h i s  view is arguably to be dismissed. In Article 82(d) EC, there is no 
reference to any elem ent of ‘paying’ for the acceptance of the supplemental obligation. In fact, 
customers can be coerced into accepting the tied product even if they have not paid for it. Whether 
customers have actually paid is relevant to the competition-impact analysis. Following Microsoft’s line of 
reasoning would conflate the element of ‘acceptance’ and the important assessment of bundle's impact 
on competition.
4. Critical-historical overview
4.1. The early cases on bundling
Until the mid 70s, EC law has hardly paid any attention to bundling arrangements. In the earliest cases, 
the Commission took a highly formalistic approach. Any restriction in an agreement was illegal without 
explaining why or assessing the actual effects of the opposed restriction.
In Glass Containers, for instance, it held that a  system whereby competitors agreed to apply uniform 
delivery prices to the exclusion of any other price system has the object of nullifying any competitive 
advantage that a producer of glass containers might gain from the proximity to his customers.®®« Such a 
system meant in fact that the seller imposed on the user the supplementary obligation to accept the 
delivery to his location - something not connected to the sale of goods. According to the Commission, 
this was an infringement of Article 81(1) EC, Another case concerned the European distribution network 
of Campari. Obliging licensed manufacturers to supply the original product rather than their own when 
supplying diplomats, ships victuallers and foreign armed forces “prevented] the licensees from 
supplying bitter which they have manufactured themselves to these consumers", and constituted 
therefore a restriction of competition under Article 81 (1).®®^
“ 6 Case COMP/37.792, Microsoff. a t 826.
Case COMP/37.792. Micmsoft, at 830.
“ 8 Case IV/400. Glass Containers [1974] OJ L 160/1. 
Case IV/28.173, Campari [1978] OJ L170/69, a t 34.
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Like under US law, the early cases often concerned licensing agreements. The leveraging theory 
appears to be crucial to the analysis under EC law. One important case in this context is 
Vaessen/Mons.^^ Mr Moris was a Belgian patent holder for a manufacturing device for meat sausages, 
in particular sauc/ssons de Boulogne. He was also the principal shareholder of ALMO, a company which 
manufacturers and sells synthetic casings for sausages. Moris' patent did not cover the casings. Mr 
Moris gave ALMO a licence to work his patent. ALMO sublicensed to Belgian sausage manufacturers, 
including Impérial and Lovendegem. These suWicensees were allowed to use Moris' patented process 
free of charge on the condition that they bought all their casings from ALMO. Vaessen, a Dutch 
competitor of ALMO, had difficulty entering the market for casings for saucissons de Boulogne, as 
sausage producers were committed to ALMO.
The Commission found that the bundling provision deprived "the sub-licensee of its business freedom to 
obtain supplies from other undertakings, perhaps on more favourable terms as in the case of its 
purchases from V a e s s e n I t  explained that "[t]he obligation on the part of Impérial to obtain supplies 
of casings exclusively from ALMO prevents Impérial from obtaining supplies from competitors in other 
Member States, such as Vaessen In the Nether1ands."692
As observed by Waelbroeck, it is interesting to note how the Commission applied the same criteria as 
the US Supreme Court in prohibiting the early cases.̂ ^s jh e  Commission took into account both the 
market power of the patent holder and the effect on the market of the clause. Like the US courts, the 
Commission’s application of these criteria was flawed for two reasons.
First, the Commission did not consider the possibility of a dominant position being held by ALMO  
explicitly. Yet, it referred to the size of the national market share for the relevant products it held. It was 
stressed that ALMO supplied at least two thirds of the market in casings for sauc/ssons de Boulogne. 
This fact, however, does not say much about the market power held by the patent holder. When 
evaluating the feasibility of leveraging, the possibility of ALMO enjoying dominance should have been 
taken into consideration.
6M Case IV/29.290, Vaessen/Moris [1979] OJ L19/32.
Case IV/29.290, Vaesse/i/Mo/fs, at 15.
692 Case IV/29.290, Vaessen/Moris, at 18.
693 See Waelbroeck, T h e  Compatibility of Tying Agreements with Antitrust Rules: A Comparative Study of American arxi 
European Rules*, Oxf. YEL 39 (1987), pp. 50-51.
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Second, one could point out the fact that ALMO could have linked the casings to its machines with the 
objective to m eter the use of these m achines. In my view, this observation is confirmed by the facts of 
the case. ALMO charged nothing for the use of the manufacturing device. It was presumably less costly 
for ALMO to tie the use of the device to the casings it produces, rather than fitting a metering gadget to 
its patented device.
One last aspect to be considered is the foreclosing effect of the bundling clause. It is true that ALMO’s 
bundle increased the difficulty for Vaessen to penetrate the market independently. However, the 
Commission appears to have considered an adverse effect on Vaessen as the presumptive equivalent 
of an adverse effect on competition. The Commission stressed that ALMO’s clause prevented Imperial 
and others from obtaining supplies from competitors in other Mem ber States. This argument reflects the 
leveraging theory in the long term. The Commission’s finding may well have been the case, but this 
must be demonstrated explicitly through some kind of empirical evidence. In its decision, the 
Commission limited the relevant market to only casings for saucissons de Boulogne exclusively. For that 
market, it stressed that ALMO supplied at least two thirds of that market, and that its customers 
comprised a number of large manufacturers.
The Commission took the same rigid position in Velcro/Aplix.^^ In this decision, the Commission 
objected to the requirement that the licensee of an exclusive technology was required in order to buy its 
machinery equipment from a particular supplier who had developed the technology. Assuming a 
restrictive effect on competition, it condemned the provision: “A t least with effect from 1977, when it may 
be considered that substitute products w ere on the m arket [...] such an obligation prevents the licensee 
from obtaining the equipment from other manufacturers in the Common market, possibly on more 
favourable term s.”®®̂
Without making a  factual-economical analysis, the Commission wrote: “Besides restricting the freedom 
of the licensee, this obligation also significantly affects the position of third parties, especially loom 
builders, who are thereby deprived of an important potential customer."®®
in Windsurfing, the Court upheld the harsh approach by the Commission towards bundling.®®  ̂
Windsurfing owned a German patent to sailboard rigs. Its licensees were allowed to manufacture and
6« Case IV/4204, Velcro/Apiix [1985] OJ L233/22.
Case lV/4204, V€iax>/ApHx, at 52.
696 Case IV/4204. Velcro/Z^lix, at 53-54 (emphasis added).
^  Case C-193/83, Windsurfing v. Comm/ssion, [1986] EC R611.
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distribute the rigs only for boards approved by Windsurfing, or as complete sailboards. Without 
engaging in a factual-economic analysis of the case, the Commission came to two conclusions.^ss The 
bundling clause restricted the licensees’ freedom to decide whether they wanted to act as suppliers of 
only sailboards of their production or also as suppliers of rigs separately from third parties.®®  ̂|n addition, 
suppliers of other sailboards were prevented from supplying such boards to licensees or from 
completing their own range with licensees’s rigs.
On appeal, the ECJ agreed with the Commission. It likewise took a highly formalistic approach and 
condemned the obligation to sell the rigs only in conjunction with the boards approved by the licensor 
was a restriction of competition.^oo Because the German patent only covered the rig, the clause was not 
indispensable to the exploitation of the patent. It concluded that the bundling provision was "of such a 
nature as to restrict competition.’^oi a s  one critical commentator put It, the judgment as whole is "based 
on the assumption that there is something inherently anti-competitive in the patent monopoly and that 
patent licenses [...], even when arguably vertical in nature, differ fundamentally from distribution 
arrangements and warrant stricter treatment.*702
The old block exemptions on licensing agreements were also strict for bundling so long as it was not 
required for a proper technical exploitation of the licensed technotogy.^o^ The old Regulation 2349/84 on 
Patent Licensing exempted under Article 81(3) the obligation to procure goods and services from his 
licensor or designee, insofar as they "are necessary for a technically satisfactory exploitation of the 
licensed invention."̂ o4 This form of bundling was generally considered not to fall within Article 81(1),™®
However, the Regulation blacklisted bundling on two important instances.̂ o® In the line of the licensing 
cases discussed, the following provisions were prohibited: "[where the] licensee Is charged royalties on
698 See Advocate General Lenz in Case C-193/83, Windsurfing v. Commission, noting that the Commission 'neglected to 
carry out a detailed market study" (p. 620).
Case lV/29.395, Windsurfing Intematìonal [1983] O J 19/32. 
roo C-193/83, Windsurfing v. Commission, at 56-57.
C-193/83, Windsurfing v. Commission, at 59 (emphasis added).
702 See Venit, “In the W ake of Windsurfing: Patent ücensing ir» the Common Market", Fordham Corp. L. Inst 517 (1986), pp. 
560-561.
™  For an older but similar view, see Commission Notices on Patent Licenses and Commercial Agents, [1962] OJ C2922/62, 
considering that Artide 81(1) EC did not apply to quality standards or obligations to procure supplies of certain products 
imposed on the licensee "in so far as they are indispensable for the technically perfect exploitation of the patent*
7M See Artide 2(1)(1) of Commission Regulation 2349/84 on the Application of Artide 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain 
Categories of Patent Licensing Agreements, [1984] OJ L219/15.
705 See Pickard, T h e  Commission’s Patent Licensing Regulation -  A History", E C LR 158 (1984), p. 161.
706 See Artide 3(3) of the Commission Regulation 556/89 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain 
Categories of Know-How Licensing Agreements, [1989] OJ L61/1. providing that the Regulation did not apply where the 
licensing agreement accepted “quality specifications or further licenses [...], unless such licenses, quality specifications,
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products which are not entirely or partially patented or manufactured by means of a patented 
process."707 Nor was the licensor allowed to impose ancillary obligations with respect to further licenses, 
“unless such patents, products or services are necessary for a technically satisfactory exploitation of the 
licensed invention."7®
Thus, early EC law prohibits the ow ner of an intellectual or industrial property right from taking 
advantage of the monopoly in order to extend it to products that do not desenre the legal protection of 
the intellectual or industrial property right itself. Leveraging was often assumed, even if sufficient market 
power might not have been achieved. Nor were the negative effects on competition in the tied market 
properly assessed.
4.2. The perse test of the 80s
In the 80s, the hostile treatment of the early cases appears to have been carried over into a general per 
se ban against bundling. Under EC law, market dominance necessary for a successful leverage was 
easily assumed, and assessing the foreclosure of rivals in the tied market was not essential. For Article 
81 EC, old Regulation 1984/83 on Exclusive Purchasing expressly blacklisted bundling clauses. This 
was regardless of whether the distributor was dominant in the markets involved
For Article 82 EC, the mere fact that a dominant company bundled two products, and that trade was 
affected, was apparently sufficient for the Commission to condemn an undertaking for the abuse of that 
position. In British Sugar, for instance, it was not essential to establish that British Sugar’s bundling 
practice had any significant effect on the tied market.^^o The case concerned British Sugar and Napier 
Brown. British Sugar was dominant in the UK sugar market for both retail and industrial sale, while 
Napier Brown was active in the UK sugar retail market. British Sugar refused to supply sugar to its 
customers unless they agreed to have it delivered by British Sugar Itself or by firms appointed by it. 
British Sugar’s refusal to give its customers the option of purchasing sugar on an ex-factory or delivered 
price basis was held abusive under Article 82 EC. as it resulted in tying the delivery o f sugar to the
goods or services are necessary for a technically safisfactory exploitation of the licensed technology or for ensuring that the 
production of the licensee conforms to the quality standards that are respected by the licensor and other licensees.*
^  See Article 3(4) of Regulation 2349/84.
See Article 3(9) of Regulafion 2349/84.
See 3(e) of Commission Regulation 1984/83 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Exclusive 
Purchasing Agreements, [1983] OJ L I 73/5.
710 Case IV/30.178, Napier Brown v. British Sugar [1988] OJ L 284/41.
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supply of sugar. The Commission found the mere fact that British Sugar had "[r]serv[ed] for itself the 
separate activity of delivering sugar^ sufficient grounds to claim anti-competitive effects.^i^
The same per $e prohibition was noticeable in London European/SabenaJ^^ In that case, Sabena was 
willing to grant access to its computerized reservation system only on the condition that London 
European Airways would sign a ground handling contract with it  Without making an analysis of the 
effects on competition, the Commission decided that Sabena had abused its dominant position on the 
market for computerised flight reservation in Belgium. Bundling access to the reservation system with 
signing a contract for ground handling was illegal because the contracts are "not connected" and the 
latter contract is “not related to the subject matter" of the first contract.7i3
The ECJ appears to have confirmed the per se approach in two instances. In Télémarketing, the ECJ 
was asked by a Luxembourg court to mle on bundling through the variant of refusal to supply the 
connected products on a standalone basis.̂ ^  ̂The conflict arose between national television monopolist 
CLT and CBEM that conducted telemarketing operations broadcasted on CLT’s channels. CLT refused 
to renew the television advertisement contract unless CBEM would use a CLT or one of its subsidiaries’ 
telephone numbers for its marketing operations. Essentially, CLT was attempting to bundle television 
advertisement services to telemarketing services.
In its judgment, delivered in 1985, the ECJ held that it was an abuse for CLT to insist that advertisers 
should channel their advertising through its advertising manager or agency appointed by it. Considering 
that the arrangement amounted to monopoly extension from one market into a neighbouring market, the 
Court appears to have relied on the leverage theory.^is Notably, the threshold for application was very 
low. As CLT’s practice “intended to reserve" any telemarketing operation “with the possibility of 
eliminating all competition” by its competitors, it amounted to an abuse prohibited under Article 82 
EC.716
711 Case IV/30.178, British Sugar, at 71.
712 Case IV/32.318, Lorrdon European-Sabena, O J11988] L 317/47.
713 Case IV/32.318, London European-Sabena, at 31.
7M Case 311/84, Centre Beige d ’Èudes de Marché Télémarketing v CLT(Télémarketing) [1985] ECR 3261.
Case 311/84, Télémarketing, noting that *an abuse within the meaning of Article [82] Is committed where, without 
objective necessity, an undertaking holding a dominant position on a particular market reserves to itself [...] an ancillary 
activity which might be carried out by another undertaking as part of its activities on a neighbouring but separate m arket with 
the possibility of eliminating all competition from such undertaking* (at 27).
716 Case 311/84, Télémarketing, at 26.
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The Court was even more explicit in AlsatelJ^^ In that case, it considered an after-sales bundle in 
reference to a French court. The case involved the dispute between the regional telecommunications 
provider Alsate! and the temporary employment agency Novasam , The parties disagreed over 
outstanding payments under contracts for rental and m aintenance of telephone installations. The 
contracts required Alsatel’s customers to deal exclusively with Alsatel for any changes, moves, 
extensions or modifications of the installation. The French court asked the ECJ whether Alsatel’s 
contracts were sufficient evidence of abuse of a dominant position in the sense of Article 82 EC, given 
Alsatel’s share in the regional market. The Court noted that:
[allthoug the obligation imposed on customers to deal exclusively with the installer as regards 
any modification of the installation may be justified by the fact that equipment remains the 
property of the installer, the fact that the price of the supplements to the contract [...] is 
unilaterally fixed by the installer and the automatic renewal of the contract for a 15 year term pf 
certain conditions are met] may constitute unfair trading conditions as abusive practices by 
Article [82] of the Treaty if all the conditions for the appiication of that provision are met.̂ ®̂
The ECJ went on to describe the necessary conditions to the p e rs e  approach adopted in other cases. 
For the Court, these requirements were (1) that trade between M em ber Slates must be affected and (2) 
that Alsatel must be found to be dominant in the relevant m arkelJi^ Importantly, no mention was made 
of any requirement to assess the effects o f Alsatel’s behaviour. Foreclosure was thus not essential for 
the Court. O f course, it was ultimately for the national court to determine whether those conditions were 
satisfied as a matter of fact.
In conclusion, EC law appears to have adopted in the 80s a per se  approach towards bundling, based 
on the leveraging rationale.72o
Case 247/86, Société alsacienne et torraine de télécommunications et d'électronique v. Novasam (Alsatel) [1988] ECR  
5987.
r«  Case 247/86. Alsatel [1988] ECR 5987, at 10.
7« Case 247 /86 .4 /sa fe /[1988] ECR 5987, at 11-12.
^  Others have stressed for instance the aM rarm ess  of bundling of two items. See Advocate General Tesauro in Case O  
320/87, Ottung v. Klee & Weilbach [1989] ECR 1185, noting that tying in licensing agreements is “one form of which consists 
precisely in artitrarily making the permission to exploit commercially a  patented product conditional upon a  commitment by 
the other party to enter into a licence agreement and to pay a royalty for an unpatented product whose use is unnecessary 
for the exploitation of the patented product“ (at 18) (emphasis added).
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4.3. The modified per se approach of the 90s
During the 90s, bundling has been investigated in a string of cases. Some minor but nevertheless 
significant cases have been informally settled. The only public information comes from the Commission 
press releases, which should be considered with due care.
For instance, Coca-Cola was accused of abusing its dominant position on the Italian market for colas by 
granting various rebates to large distribution chains. The Commission objected specifically to Coca- 
Cola’s range rebate for distributors that would buy additional drinks by Coca-Cola along with their 
purchases of the Coca-Cola drink. Coca-Cola omitted this rebate and other rebates from its agreements 
with distributors. The Commission believed that the removal would create “fuller opportunities of access 
to commercial outlets selling beverages“ for the competition.^!
In 1996, Nielsen was found to have abused its dominant position in the market for retail tracking 
services by applying discounts in exchange for commitments from customers to call upon its services in 
a wide range of countries. The Commission feared that Nielsen’s behaviour would prevent rivals from 
establishing “a competitive presence” in the relevant market.^22 |n 1 9 9 5 , the Commission worried about 
the requirement contracts used by Nordion. For the supply o f a base product for radiopharmaceuticals 
used in nuclear medicine, Nordion required its European customers to also purchase other materials 
from it. The contracts prevented rivals from "developing and ultimately even from maintaining its 
presence on the market" and discouraged “the entry of possible new competitors."̂ 23
In my view, the formal decisions and judgments in those days are difficult to comprehend. Like the 
ancient Roman visage of Janus, EC law was two-faced, with each one poised in opposite directions. For 
one, It confirmed by and large the per se test that was established in the 80s. On the other hand, it 
appears to have left the door ajar to modifications of that approach. For instance, dominance was 
assessed more economically and even justifications for bundling were considered.
The doubled-faced approach is based on four interrelated features. O f course, the first feature is the 
confirmation of the per se label tagged to bundling. Hilti and Tetra Pak II are important cases to consider 
here. Tetra Pak is even called the “poster child" for anti-competitive bundling.̂ 24 related to the
^  See lP /90/07,9 January 1990.
^  See 26®' Report on Competition Policy (1996), p. 64.
^  See 28®' Report on Competition Policy (1998), at 74.
72® See Nalebuff, Bundling, Tying and Portfolio Effects Part If (DTI paper, 2003), p. 16.
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temporal bundling of consumables.̂  ̂ |t concerned the supply o f nail guns and associated nails and 
cartridge strips that are specifically adapted to a particular brand of nail gun. Hilti was the largest 
manufacturer of nail guns in the EU. It had patent protection for its guns, cartridge strips and nails. 
Despite this, a  number of other companies supplied Hilti-compatible nails. Rivals complained to the 
Commission that Hilti was engaging in abusive behaviour that limited their ability to compete in the 
market for Hilti-compatible nails. The practices included making the sale of nails conditional upon the 
sale o f cartridge strips, refusal to honour guarantees if customers used nails supplied by third parties, 
the refusal to supply cartridge strips to customers who would resell them, and frustrating the grant of 
legitimate licenses of right available under its patents.
In its defence, Hilti claimed to supply powder-actuated fastening (PAF) guns instead of separate 
com ponents.^ Contrary to this claim, the Commission found that Hilti was dominant in three relevant 
product markets; nail guns, Hilti-compatible cartridge strips and Hilti-compatible nails. For this 
conclusion, it stressed the lack of functional interchangeability between the components of the bundle. 
The Commission concluded that tying the sale o f cartridge strips to the sale of nails and the general 
policy o f refusing to honour its guarantee was abusive under Article 82 EC. Basically confirming the per 
se test, the Commission noted that: T h e s e  policies leave the consumer with no choice over the source 
of his nails and as such abusively exploit him. In addition, these policies all have the object or effect of 
excluding independent nail makers who may threaten the dominant position Hilti holds."^^?
Although the Commission stated that Hilti had “severely" restricted the market penetration by 
independent suppliers of Hilti-compatible consumables, this was not based on an extensive analysis.̂ ŝ
The C FI agreed with the Commission that there w ere three separate products, not one integrated 
system.729 important to the Court was the presence of independent manufactunsrs of Hilti- 
consumables.^^ The findings of the C FI were upheld by the ECJ.^^i as  Advocate Genera! Jacobs 
noted, “[i]f Hilti is dominant in [the nail guns] market, it is clear that that can only serve to reinforce its 
position in the markets for components such as cartridges and nails.'*732
” 5 For more details on this case, see Farr, "Abuse of a Dominant Position -  The Hilti Case", E C LR 174 (1992). 
726 Case lV /30.787, Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti, at 57.
^  Case lV /30.787, Eurofix-Bauco v. Him, a t 75 (emphasis added).
728 Case IV /30.787, Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti, at 74.
729 Case T-30/89. Hilti AG v. Commission [1990] E C R IH 6 3 .
730 Case T-30/89, Hilti, at 66-67.
731 Case C -53/92P, Hilti AG v. Commission [1994] ECR 1-667.
732 See Advocate General Jacobs, in Case C -53/92P, Hilti, at 19 (emphasis added).
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The approach in Tetra Pak II was similar to the reasoning of The Commission found that Tetra 
Pak was dominant on the markets in aseptic machines and cartons intended for the packaging of liquid 
foods in the EU. Tetra Pak had argued to supply an integrated distribution system for liquid and semi­
liquid foods. The relevant market should include all ways of packaging all sorts of liquid food products, 
such as glass and plastics bottles and metal tins for milk, fruits juices or mineral waters. Focusing on the 
differences between the various packaging containers, the Commission rejected Tetra Pak’s plea 
because Its cartons, for instance, could not be used for fizzy drinks.^  It held that Tetra Pak had abused 
its position contrary to Article 82 EC both on the aseptic markets and on the markets in non-aseptic 
machines and cartons. Tetra Pak was fined for bundling the purchase of its carton packaging machines 
to the purchase of cartons, reserving itself the exclusive right to maintain and repair equipment and to 
supply spare parts, and withholding guarantees on equipment unless purchasers complied with all o f the 
preceding contractual obligations.
The Commission contended that Tetra Pak's behaviour was intended to bind customers to the Tetra 
Pak group and eliminate trade in the goods that had been supplied to them.735 sticking to the p e r se 
approach, it argued that Tetra Pak had imposed numerous obligations on its customers that had "no link 
with the purpose of the contracts."^^ The exclusivity requirement for Tetra Pak maintenance services, 
for instance, “close[d] the door to any competitor' and deprived customers of ‘any freedom to make his 
own choice” and of ‘any possibility of having maintenance and repair services provided by his own 
technical staff."^^? |p her typical style, Korah elegantly summarised the objection against this approach: 
‘ [ojfficials should not have discretion to dictate the sole purpose of agreements in the name of 
competition without analysing in what way competition is restricted. It is of the nature of contracts to 
restrain conduct that would otherwise be !egal."738
The Commission’s rejection of the integrated-product claim was upheld by the CFI.̂ ^s Suggesting a per 
se  test, the Court noted that, even if it is the customary practice in a particular market, a dominant 
company is not allowed to tie products together as ‘usage that is acceptable in a normal situation, on a 
competitive market, cannot be accepted in the case of a market where competition Is already
733 Case IV/31.043, Bopak/Tetra Pak (Tetra Pak II) [1992] OJ L72/1.
73* Case lV/31.043, Tetra Pak II. at 6-13.
735 Case IV/31.043, Tetra Pak II. at 105.
735 Case IV/31.043, Tetra Pak II, at 106.
737 Case IV/31.043, Tetra Pak II. at 108.
738 See Korah, T h e  Paucity of Economic Analysis in the EEC Decisions on Competition Tetra Pak IT. CLP 148 (1993), p. 
168.
739 For details on the appeal, see Levy, T e tra  Pak II: Stretching the limits of Article 86?’ , ECLR104 (1995).
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r e s t r ic t e d .B e fo r e  the ECJ, Tetra Pak claimed that the CFI e re d  in law by holding that Article 82(d) 
EC prohibited only where the supplementary obligations imposed had no connection with the subject of 
the contract by their nature or commercial usage.
The ECJ confirmed the CFI’s judgment. It held that the reasoning behind CFI finding no natural link 
between the components was correct.̂ ^^ It also held that, as Article 82  provides for an exhaustive list of 
examples, bundling may constitute an abuse even if there is a  natural link or the tied sales are in 
accordance with commercial usage.^^2 Advocate General Colom er was even more trenchant in his 
analysis. He noted that bundling by a dominant undertaking is abusive "as it deprives the purchaser of 
choice as to his possible sources of supply and limits access to the m arket by other producers. [...] [i]t is 
only in exceptional cases that tied sales by a dominant undertaking may be justified by the nature of the 
products or commercial usage."743
The second feature of the EC approach during the 90s relates to potential justifications for bundling. EC 
law appears to have in principle accepted the possibility of justifying bundling arrangements. For 
instance, Hilti advocated that its policies were motivated by concerns over quality and safety. It 
produced a number of technical reports alleging that the quality of the nails manufactured by the 
complainants was "substandard” and “dangerous."^^ By contrast, the Commission found that Hilti was 
attempting, to its own advantage, to impose its own allegedly justified safety requirements.^^^ It stressed 
that the national rules on safety and product liability guaranteed the quality of nails produced by 
independent manufacturers. More importantly, Hilti had not submitted evidence of any accidents with 
nails produced by independent manufacturers. Nor had it ever communicated its safety concerns to 
users, independent manufacturers or taken steps to alert the national authorities about safety problems 
with non-Hilti nails.
Recognising the importance of national law on product safety, the C FI rejected Hilti’s argument that the 
practices were justified by the dangerous nature of the independent nails.̂ ^® In the Court’s view, it is not 
for a dominant company to "take steps on its own initiative to eliminate products which, rightly or
^«C aseT-83/91, TetraPakv. Commission (Tetra Pak fl) [19941ECR 461, at 137.
™  Case C-333/94P, Tetra Pak Internationa SA v. Commission (Tetra Pak II) [1996] ECR 1-59521, noting that “[tjhat 
assessment, Hself based on commercial usage, rules out the existence of the natural link claimed by Treat Pak by stating 
that other manufacturers can produce cartons for use in Tetra Pak's machines’  (a t 36).
” 2 Case C-333/94P, Tetra Pak II, at 37.
2« See Advocate General Colomer in Case C-333/94P, Tetra Pak II, at 69 (emphasis added).
2^ Case IV/30.787, EuroUx^Bauco v. Hilti, at 87.
2« Case IV/30.787, EuroUx-Bauco v. Hilti, at 87-95.
2« Case T-30/89, Hilti, at 115-119.
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wrongly, it regards as dangerous or at least as inferior in quality to its own products."^^^ in support, it 
was pointed out that Hilti had never complained with the competent national authorities. The safety 
issue was not raised before the ECJ.
Neither the Community Courts in Tetra Pak II were convinced by Tetra Pak’s safety defence, but, 
arguably, accepted the possibility of such a claim in principle. The CFl stated that it is not for a dominant 
company to decide that, in order to protect safety, cartons and packaging machines constitute an 
inseparable integrated system.^^s safety concerns should be remedied by national law, and not by rules 
“adopted unilaterally by manufacturers, which would amount to prohibiting independent manufacturers 
from conducting the essential part of their business."^« Assuming legitimate safety issues existed, the 
CFl underlined that Tetra Pak could guarantee packaging reliability and hygiene by merely disclosing 
technical specifications to machine users. Emphasising the importance of the unhindered production of 
consumables, the ECJ agreed with the CFl. It noted that Tetra Pak should not “impose [...] measures on 
its own initiative on the basis of technical considerations or considerations relating to product liability, 
protection of public health and protection of its reputation."^^o
A third feature of the EC approach during the 90s is the tendency to give an economic explanation for 
bundling. In Sacem Toumier, for instance, the ECJ considered in a reference from a French court the 
refusal of the national copyright association Sacem to allow discotheques and clubs access to only one 
part of the protected repertoire.^si The owner of Whiskey a GoGo wanted to play only English music in 
his club. When he approached Sacem, it only gave him access to the foreign repertoire conditional upon 
his paying royalties corresponding to use of the entire repertoire, even though he would only be playing 
part of it. In my opinion, Sacem was basically offering only a bundled licence for foreign and national 
music, notwithstanding the apparent separate demand.^52
It is noteworthy that in its intervention before the ECJ, the Commission attempted to justify the bundled 
licence on the grounds of efficiency considerations.^sa it stressed that a fragmented supply o f the 
repertoire in the form of different marketable subdivisions would result in more extensive surveillance by 
Sacem. This would lead to higher costs, and, presumably, to a higher licencing fee. Highiighting the
7 ^ ? C a s e T -3 0 /8 9 ,« a t1 1 8 .
7«C aselV /31.043, T e tra P a k H .a m .
Case IV/31.043, Tetra Pak II, at 84 and 139.
750 Case C-333ra4P, Tetra Pak II, at 36-37
751 Case 395/87, Min/sfere Public v. Jean Louis Toumier (Sacem) [1989] ECR 2521.
752 For some authors this case deals with pricing issues, see Faull and Nikpay, op. cit., p. 620.
753 Case 395/87, Sacem, at 29.
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purpose of copyright societies, the Court accepted the bundle. Those societies “pursue a legitimate aim 
when they safeguard the rights and interest of their members ws-a-Ws the users of recorded music.’ 5̂4 
Therefore, the refusal does not restrict competition under Article 8 2  EC unless “the concerted practice 
exceeds the limits o f what is necessary for the attainm ent of that aim.̂ ^ss
The latter would indeed be the case if direct access to a subdivision of the repertoire "could fully 
safeguard the interests of authors, composers and publishers o f music without increasing the costs of 
managing contracts and nronitoring the use o f protected musical works.’̂ ê \[ \ q  t^e national 
court to assess whether or not these conditions were fulfilled.
A similar approach was noticeable for licensing agreem ents. The old Regulation 240/1996 on 
Technology Transfer Agreements expressly whitelisted bundling provided that it is necessary for a 
technically proper exploitation of the licensed technology or to ensure that the product meets accepted 
minimum specifications.^s^ Like under the earlier Regulation 2349/1984, this provision did not normally 
restrict competition but was exempted just in case. O ther bundling clauses could be exempted through 
the Regulation’s opposition procedure.̂ ŝ j^ is  procedure enabled undertakings whose bundling 
provision fell outside the terms of the block exemption to notify the agreement and to expect an 
exemption, unless the Commission opposed it within a specified period of lime.
A final feature is that, at least under Article 82  EC, the requirement of market power appears to be taken 
more seriously. Legally, the power component was easily satisfied. As dominance is a  pr&<x)ndition for 
any abuse under Article 82 EC, all defendant companies have been found, not surprisingly, dominant in 
the tying market.
The earlier cases appear to assume dominance quite easily. By contrast, the Commission made a  
genuine effort to demonstrate dominance in It has assessed Hilti’s market share for nail guns at 
55% with a sim ilar share for cartridge strips and nails. The dominance was supported by Hilti’s patent 
protection as well as by its well-organised distribution system. Tetra Pak surely held sufficient market
7M Case 395/87, Sacem, at 31.
Case 395/87, Sacem, at 31.
756 Case 395/87, Sacem, at 31.
757 See Article 2(1 ){5) o f Regulation 240/1996 on the Application o f Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of 
Technology Transfer Agreements, [1996] L31/2. In Case IV/31.206, Rich Products/Jus-Rol, [1988] OJ L69/21, for instance, 
the Commission cleared the licensee’s obligation to obtain a pre-mix only from the licensor. Accepting the parties' arguments 
that the pre-mix was necessary to a technically satisfactory exploitation of the licensed technology, the Commission did not 
require the licensor to disclose the secret recipe
758 See Article 4(2) o f Regulation 240/1996.
759 Case IV/30.787, Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti, at 66-73.
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power for leveraging. On the aseptic markets, it held a quasi-monopolistic position by flaunting 90-95%  
of sales. Its closest competitor held the remaining part of the sales. The existence of technological 
barriers and patents held by Tetra Pak hindered market entry. On the non-aseptic markets, the 
Commission did not find Tetra Pak to be dominant, though the company had a market share around 
50%.
In sum, EC law in the 90s closely resembles a modified per se test. Bundling analysis begins with a 
definition of whether a bundle does indeed exist. There must be two distinguishable products that could 
be supplied separately, yet consumers are forced to accept both in order to acquire one. If there is 
bundling, the bundle is illegal under Article 82 EC unless the firm is not dominant or there is a 
justification of some sort.
If there is bundling, the bundle does not constitute a restriction of competition under Article 81 if one of 
the rarely accepted economic reasons applies to the opposition procedure. In order for Article 81 EC to 
be applicable, however, market power does not appear to have been an essential element.
4.4. The effect-based analysis of the new century
With the turn of century, EC law seems to have adopted a test that comes close to a stnjctured rule of 
reason.760 Having said that, there have also been some intransigent moves back to the perse  ban. One 
of those instances was the Commission decision in De Post-La PosteJ^^ La Poste had a legal monopoly 
in the Belgian market for general post services. Business customers could get a discount for these 
deliveries if they also subscribed to business-to-business mail service offered by La Poste. Without any 
economic-factual analysis, the Commission condemned this behaviour under Article 82 EC. It found that 
La Poste had attempted to extend its monopoly in the letter market into the market for business-to- 
business mail services that was subject to competition La Poste wished to thwart.7®2
760 This observation is based on a string of formal decisions and regulations. Informally, the Commission accepted in Case 
COM P/39.116, Coca Cola, an important undertaking by Coca-Cola to change its commercial behaviour with regard to the 
take-home and on-premise channel and sponsorship. Among other things, Coca-Cola was forced to drop: (1) tying Cota or 
Orange soft drinks with one or more additional Coca-Cola beverages (p. 5); (2) range commitments or combined payments 
of rebates (pp. 5-6); and, (3) shelf space commitments not separating between shelves for Cola or Orange soft drinks and 
other Coca-Cola beverages (p, 6).
See www.euroDa.eu.int/com m /com petition/antitm stfcases/dedsions/39116/com m itm ents.Ddf. 22 June 2004.
761 Case COMP/37.859, De P o s ila  Poste [2002] OJ L 61/32.
762 Case COMP/37.859. De Post-La Poste, at 74.
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As for Article 81 EC, bundling has been subjected to an effect-based analysis, though with a flawed 
power requirement. This is discernable in Regulation 2790/19999 regarding verticals restrains.763 For 
one thing, bundling is not blacklisted under this Regulation. Thus, any bundling restriction in a vertical 
agreement will be automatically exempted if the supplier's market share is less than 30% . This makes 
perfect sense, as the supplier with that m arket share or less would surely lack the power to impose a 
leveraging practice. For market shares above the threshold, the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints 
concentrate on the foreclosure effects on the market for the tied product,̂ ®^ Foreclosure should be 
assessed based on the power of competitors and buyers and entry baniers. This implies, in my view, an 
effect-based approach instead of a perse  approach.
Conversely, where appreciable anti-competitive effects have been established, the question of a 
possible exemption under Article 81(3) EC arises as long as the company is not dominant^® 
Remarkably, this suggests that, in the eyes of the Commission, leveraging would be possible even if the 
company is not dominant. This approach is not to be applauded. While it takes the market power 
requirement more seriously, it becomes questionable whether a company with a  market share less than 
the dominance threshold may be in the position to leverage its m arket power to a related market. Even 
in the case of dominance, it depends on the actual effects of the bundle on competition in the tied 
market.
A similar deficient approach may be found under Regulation 772/2004.^®® Bundling arrangements are 
automatically exempted under Article 2, so long as they do not constitute “the primary object of such 
agreements, but are directly related to the application of the licensed technology"^®^ and the parties to 
the agreement do not fall outside the m arket share thresholds.̂ ®® In the case of competitors, the 
Regulation is not applicable if the parties’ market share exceeds 20% . For non-competing parties, the 
market share is set at 30%. Above the m arket share thresholds, it is necessary to “balance the anti­
competitive and pro-competitive effects of tying."^9 As for the negative effects, the Commission looks at 
foreclosure of competing suppliers in the tied market, whereby raising entry barriers is an important 
aspect of the analysis. The Commission also acknowledges that, in order to generate these effects, a
^  See Regulation 2790/1999 on the Application o f Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Categories o f Vertical Agreements and 
Concerted Practices, [1999] OJ L 336/21.
7M See Commission Notice. Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, [2000] OJ C 291/01, at 217,219-222.
755 See Commission Notice, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, at 222.
^  See Regulation 772/2004 on the Application o f Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Technology Transfer 
Agreements, [2004] OJ L 123/11.
6̂̂  See Recital 9 of Regulation 772/2004.
768 See Article 3 o f Regulation 772/2004.
769 See Commission Notice, Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Technology Transfer Agreements, 
[2004 ]O J C 101 /2 ,a t192 .
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‘significant degree of market power" in the bundling market is required.77o Likewise, it duly concedes 
that the bundle must cover a certain proportion of the market for the tied market in order for appreciable 
foreclosure effects to occur.
The Commission’s stmcture is so far so good, but arguably remains flawed. On the one hand, the 
Commission does not explain what degree of market power it considers necessary for anti-competitive 
leveraging. Like in the case of vertical restraints, the low thresholds suggest that marker power not 
constituting dominance would be sufficient to lead to anti-competitive foreclosure in the market for the 
bundled good.
On the other hand, the Commission expressly recognised for the first time that bundling can also give 
rise to efficiency gains.^^ As with earlier regulations, bundling is allowed if it is necessary for a  
technically satisfactory exploitation of the licensed technology. Bundling can be accepted if it is 
necessary to ensure that production under the licence conforms to quality standards. Bundling may also 
be necessary to protect a licensor’s trademark or brand name. A final efficiency reasons is that it could 
allow the licensee to exploit the licensed technology significantly and more efficiently.̂  ̂ ¡n these 
instances, bundling is normally not restrictive of competition, or at least covered by Article 81(3) EC 
even above the market share thresholds.
The recent decisions in Van den Bergh and Microsoft also reveal a tendency for effect-based analysis 
under Article 82 EC.^^ the former case, the Commission found that Van den Bergh had abusively tied 
ice cream retailers in Ireland to it through freezer exclusivity.^^ Van den Bergh supplied ice cream  
sellers with free freezer cabinets on the condition that only Van den Bergh ice would be sold from those 
cabinets. Although commonly categorised as a  case concerning exclusivity, one could consider the facts 
of Van den Bergh as constituting a de facto bundling arrangement.^^5 Essentially, the case involved the 
bundling of the wholesale market to the retail market for ice creams.
^  See Commission Notice, Guidelines on Technology Transfer Agreements, at 193, where it also noted that ‘ [ijn the 
absence of market power in the tying product the licensor cannot use his technology for the anti-competitive purpose of 
foreclosing suppliers of the tied product’
See Commission Notice, Guidelines on Technology Transfer Agreements, at 194.
^  See Commission Notice, Guidelines on Technology Transfer Agreements, at 195.
^  The decision in Van den Bergh Foods also involved an infringement of Article 81 EC. For our purpose, the analysis under 
Article 82 EC is of particular interest 
Case IV/34.395, Van den Bergh Foods Limited [19981OJ L 246/1.
At the least the facts of case resemble a bundling setting and allow for some analogies. For the common position, see 
Jones and Suftin, op. cit., pp. 462-463; Faull and Nikpay, op. cit., p. 163; and, Robertson and Williams, T h e  Law and 
Economics of Freezer Exclusivity", ECLR 7 (1995), pp. 7-8. Another instance of de facto bundling is Case Comp/34.493, 
DSD  [2001] OJ L 166/1 regarding tying the members of the DSD waste collection system (at 112-115).
165
Rather than applying the modified per se  test, the Commission made a profound market analysis and 
made a detailed assessment o f the foreclosure effects of Van den Bergh’s behaviour in the retail 
market. Despite the fact that the contracts left retailers free to place another freezer in their shop or to 
replace the cabinet supplied with any other, the Commission found it was unlikely that retailers would 
actually do this. Because of factual constraints such as the lack o f space and extra costs, they were tied 
to Van den Bergh.
The CFI upheld the Commission’s decision, even though Van den Bergh’s condition was standard 
business practice.^® In 1996, only 17% of outlets in Ireland had freezer cabinets belonging to the 
retailer and, consequently, were free to stock ice cream  from any supplier. Thus, 83% of retail shops 
had freezers supplied by a manufacturer subject to conditions o f exclusivity. More than 60% of those 
freezers supplied by exclusivity came from Van den Bergh. Due to its ovenwhelming position on the 
market for the supply of ice creams, the exclusivity clause was held to tie, even at the retailer’s request, 
40%.
The CFI held that this has the effect of preventing the retailers concerned from selling other brands of 
ice cream or of reducing the opportunity for them to do soP^  As there was demand for ice cream 
supplied by others. Van den Bergh's contracts prevented competing manufacturers from gaining access 
to the retail market. In that respect, it should be noted that Van den Bergh had an extremely large 
market share of 89%  in the ice cream wholesale m arket when the Commission decision was adopted. 
Its rivals. Mars and Nestlé, had well-known brands coupled with experience and financial capacity to 
enter new markets.
However, they had only very small m arket shares even though they are major players in the 
neighbouring markets for confectionery and chocolate and sell those products in the same outlets as 
those concerned in Van Den Bergh, In response to Van den Bergh’s plea that the decision 
disproportionately infringed the property rights in its freezer cabinets, the Court found that there was no 
undue limitation on the exercise o f these rights. The contested decision does not deprive Van den Bergh 
of its property rights or prevent It from exploiting those assets by renting them out on commercial 
terms.778 All it does, observed the CFI, is to provide that if Van den Bergh decides to exploit the freezers
Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v. Commission.
^  Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v. Commission, at 160. 
^  Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v. Commission, a t1 7 l.
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by making them available to retailers “without charge,“ it may not do so based on an exclusivity clause 
so long as it holds a dominant position on the relevant m a rk e t^  Thus, Van den Berg had abused its 
dominant position in the ice cream wholesale m arket by bundling it to the icre cream retail market
The Commission’s decision in Microsoft is undoubtedly the most prominent case on bundling/®'̂  With a 
great deal of drama, the decision was lauded as ‘the case of the century.' F o lM n g  a complaint lodged 
by Sun Microsystems, the in March 2004 the Commission found that Microsoft had violated Article 82(d) 
EC by including W MP in its Windows operating system.̂ ®! Before analysing the decision in greater 
detail, some general observations can be made.
First, the Commission expressly articulated a test for assessing technical bundling and contractual tying 
for the first time. For illegal bundling and tying, the following four-part test applies: (1) the tying and tied 
goods must be separate products; (2) the defendant must be dominant in the tying product market; (3) 
the defendant must not give customers the choice of obtaining the tying product without the tied product; 
(4) and, the tying arrangements must foreclose competition.̂ ®2 The Commission devoted most of its 
analysis to the first and fourth element of its test. The other elements were quite easily satisfied.
Second, the foreclosure requirement has not explicitly been part of bundling analysis under EC law. As 
observed, the Commission has gradually focused more on this important aspect of any competition 
analysis. Perhaps, the Commission felt obliged to emphasise this point because the case was not a 
“classical tying case," as consumers are free to use third-party media players with Windows.̂ ®®
Third, although not stated by the Commission as a part of its test, it discussed, only to then reject, the 
possibility that otherwise unlawful bundling could be saved by an objective justification.̂ ®^ Fourth, 
although some aspects o f the analysis employed by the Commission were reminiscent of Jefferson 
Parish, commentators accurately stress that its analysis resembles, to a certain extent, the rule of
^  Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v. Commission, a t 172.
^  The second limb of the Commission decision regarding compulsory licensing is not discussed in this thesis. For details, 
see Anderman, “Does the Microsoit Case Offer a New Paradigm for ttie ‘Exceptional Circumstances’ test and Compulsory 
Copyright Licenses under EC Competition Law?*, CompLRev 7 (2004).
For interesting reviews, see Ayres and Nalebuff, “Going Soft on Microsoft? The EU’s Antitrust Case and Remedy*, The 
Economists' Voice 1 (2005); Pardolesi and Renda, T h e  European Commission’s Case Against Microsoft: Kill Bill?’ , 
W.Comp. 513 (2004); Korber, “MachtmiSbrauch durch Multimedia - Der Fall Microsoft zwischen Produktinnovation und 
BehindeningsmiUbrauch*. R IW  568 (2004); Van Daalen and Geursen, ‘De Microsoft-Beschikking: Dwanglicenties en 
Opsplitsing van Geïntegreerde Producten*, M&M 246 (2004); Langer, 'D e Microsoft-Zaak en de Leverage-theorie*, AM 169 
(2004).
782 Case COMP/37.792, Microsoft, at 794.
783 Case COMP/37.792, Microsoft, at 841.
784 Case COMP/37.792. Microsoft, at 961.
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reason framework articulated in Microsoñ 1117  ̂ This is due to the prime focus of the analysis on the 
effects of the bundle in the tied market and the clear acceptance of the possibility o f justifying it. The 
Commission itself also has this view. Like the Court of Appeals, it purported to follow a “rule of reason 
approach in order to establish whether anti-competitive effects of tying WMP outweigh any possible pro- 
competitive benefits.“786
Given its m arket share of more than 90% . Microsoft was considered dominant in the market for the 
Windows operating systems.̂ ®^ As the case concerned technical bundling, consumers were clearly 
forced to accept the Windows-WMP bundle.^ss On the first element, the Commission did not focus on 
the technical integration of the software functions. It claimed that the “distinctiveness o f products for the 
purpose of an analysis under Article 82 [...] has to be assessed with a view to consumer dem and.™  
The Commission contended that there is “separate consumer demand for media players, 
distinguishable from the demand for client PC operating systems,” as evidenced by the fact that media 
players are provided separately in the market by independent suppliers.̂ ^^  ̂ It further stressed the fact 
that a  “non-insignificanl consumer demand” for separate media players existed “some four years after 
Microsoft started tying its streaming media player with Windows."^^! The Commission’s analysis was 
complemented with evidence o f Microsoft’s internal views on the Windows-WMP bundle and the 
functional differences between Windows and WMP.^^^
For the fourth elem ent of the claim, the legal-political stakes of the game are quite high. The media 
player market is not just about music. There is a battle about which operating system will appear on the 
next generation of mobile phones and televisions. W MP is already running on more than 90% of the 
computers working with Windows. As a result, most media and audio files are encoded In Windows 
media format and APIs. The troublesome issue is that when digital media is delivered to platforms other 
than computers, there will be no effective competition in the m arket for media piayers. The simple 
reason is that all content will be encoded in Microsoft’s proprietary W MP format. In its decision, the
78S See Ehlermann and Ratliff, 'Mario Monti’s Legacy for Competition Policy in Article 82", Comp. Pol'y Int’l. 79 (2005), p. 85; 
and, Dolmans and Graf, "Analysis of Tying Under Artide 82 EC: The European Commission’s Microsoft Dedsion in 
Perspective", W .Com p. 225 (20M ), p. 226.
7« See lP /04 /70 ,24 March 2004.
^  Case COM P/37.792. Microsoft, at 799.
788 Case CO M P/37.792, Microsoft, at 834.
789 Case CO M P/37.792, Microsoft, at 803. Compare United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d, using a  "character of 
the demand* test for determining whether two products are in reality a  single product (at 47-49).
790 Case CO M P/37.792, Microsoft, a t 8 0 4 ,806 ,808 .
791 Case COM P/37.792, Microsoft, at 808.
792 Case COM P/37.792. Microsoft, at 8 0 5 ,8 0 6 ,8 1 0 ,8 1 1 .
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Commission concluded that the “tying in this specific case has the potential to foredose competitjon.“̂  
In other words, the Commission did not retain the competition had actually been foreclosed. Rather, it 
stated that “tying W MP with the dominant Windows makes WMP the platform of choice for 
complementary content and applications which in turn risks foredosing competition in the market for 
media players.'̂ s^
The Commission applied an indirect network effects theory. It daimed that the indusion of WMP in the 
ubiquitous Windows system would result in content providers and software developers to rely upon 
Windows formats. That would again have the effect of increasing usage of W M P .^  As a consequence, 
it was argued that the use of media player software would over time “tip" to W M P .^  Furthennore, the 
Commission rejected the justifications put forward by Microsoft for the bundle. Although it recognised 
that an objective justification could serve to overcome bundling liability, the Commission advanced that 
such justification would not suffice unless the challenged bundling was “indispensable" to attaining the 
aforementioned efficiencies.^^^ In this regard, the Commission said that efficiencies that relate from 
Microsoft's deliberate design choices do not count.^^ Microsoft had argued that including media 
functionality in Windows improved various other aspects of the operating system. The Commission 
accorded no weight to such efficiencies, stating that “[t]he existence of such interdependencies would 
be the result of deliberate choice by Microsoft."̂ ^^
The Commission fined Microsoft more than 497 million euros. More seriously for Microsoft, the decision 
also ordered it to sell a  version of Windows v/ithout WMP built in.“ ° It should be recalled that Microsoft 
can continue to sell Windows bundled with WMP. For obvious reasons, Microsoft is not allowed to offer 
any technological, commercial or contractual term or inducement so as to make the bundled version 
more attractive than the unbundled version. Interestingly, the Commission states that if its remedy 
proves to be ineffective, it “reserves the right to review the present decision and impose an alternative 
remedy."8oi
«3CaseCO M P/37.792. 
«<CaseC O M P/37.792. 
7»CaseCO M P/37.792, 
7» Case COMP/37.792, 
^7CaseCO M P/37.792, 
™  Case COMP/37.792. 
™  Case COMP/37.792, 
8«  Case COMP/37.792, 
Case COMP/37.792.










Compared to US proceedings, the Commission imposed quite heavy obligations on the Redmond- 
based giant. In fact, I have written earlier that the US case was a victory for Microsoft because the 
American authorities dropped the bundling claim  and the settlem ent reached was quite w eak .“ 2
Contrary to what some commentators suggest, requiring a product change is not new under EC law.®“  
Indeed, the decision does not refer to applicable jurisprudence, but such a remedy, although informally, 
was already applied in the proceedings against IBM.®^ The Commission was concerned about IBM’s 
business practices with regard to its System /370 mainframe compuler.®05 it was alleged that IBM held a 
dominant position in the market for the supply of the central processing unit (CPU) and the operating 
system for the System/370. Due to this strong position, the Commission feared that IBM would control 
the market for all products compatible with System /370. Therefore, it objected to IBM’s integration of 
memory devices with the CPU and the bundling with basic software applications. A settlement was 
reached by 1984 when the Commission secured that IBM would supply its computers either without any 
memory capacity or with only enough memory capacity as testing strictly required.®^
Not surprisingly, Microsoft appealed the decision to the CFl, It also asked the CFI President Vesterdorf 
to suspend the remedy until its appeal is resolved. For the suspension of the unbundling remedy, 
Microsoft claimed that it would suffer serious and irreparable harm from immediate implementation in 
four ways.®®^
First, Microsoft argued that its reputation would be irreparably harmed by the mere existence of a 
Windows version without the W MP functionality. That argument is far-fetched and was rightly dismissed 
by the President. Microsoft’s reputation would not be harmed because OEMs will not sell Windows with 
a non-functional media player.so®
Second, as a consequence of unbundling, it would suffer development costs. The President stressed 
that these costs are financial, and therefore do not constitute irreparable damages.®“  |n the event that 
the decision should be annulled, Microsoft could even resume selling Windows with W M P functionality
See Langer, “De Microsoft-Zaak; de Schikking tussen het Amerikaanse Ministerie van Justitie en MicrosofT, AM 28 
(2003), p. 31.
For instance, see Art and McCurdy, “The European Commission’s Media Player Remedy in its Microsoft Dedsion: 
Compulsory Code Removal Despite the /U)sence o f Tying and Foreclosure”, ECLR 6^1 (2004), p. 698.
8"  Case COMP/37.792, Microsoft, at 1011.
8“  For more details, see Goyder, op. cit., pp. 301-304.
806 See IP /84C 91.2  August 1984.
807 por details on the appeal, see Langer, “Case T -201/04 R, Microsoft v. Commissiorf, AM 7 (2005).
808 Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft v. Commission, decision of 22 December 2004, not yet reported, at 442-475.
8® Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft v. Commission, at 413.
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and there would be no "obstacles capable of preventing Microsoft from regaining the position which it 
held on the market before the implementation of the remedy
Third, Microsoft claimed that allowing different versions of Windows would require web sites to make 
their media streams compatible with multiple m edia players rather than the de facto WMP standard. The 
President made it clear that costs to third parties are no legal justification for staying the remedy 
Finally, Miaosoft claimed that there would be little commercial demand for Windows without W M P. As 
the President duly noticed, Microsoft’s argument was inconsistent with its argument that imposing the 
remedy would lead to serious and irreparable harm.f^i^ An ineffective remedy is unlikely to cause such 
harm. Thus, there was no urgency to suspend the remedy and Microsoft must therefore sell a version of 
Windows without its media player. This means that OEMs who sell machines with this version will have 
the option of choosing to match it with alternative media players, such as Real Player.
It is intriguing that President Vesterdorf engaged in a fairly detailed assessment of whether Microsoft 
had demonstrated a prima facie case against the contested decision. The President made some 
comments that appear to be in the direction of Microsoft, whereas others are more encouraging for the 
Commission. He noticed that Microsoft’s arguments raised complex questions that cannot be regarded 
as prima facie unfounded in a proceeding requesting suspension. There was doubt over the 
Commission’s indirect network effects theory and the tipping effect.®^^ The Commission should have 
given greater weight to the potential positive effects of Windows as a de facto standard.®^^ It wrongly 
concluded that the Windows operating system and media players constitute distinct products.®^® Thus, 
the President appears to have accepted by and large the Issues pleaded by Microsoft.
However, the President also recognised that in order to find abuse, it is sufficient for the defendant’s 
behaviour to tend “to restrict competition or, in other words, that the conduct is capable of having or 
likely to have such an effect."®^® This would mean that proof actual anti-competitive effect is not 
required. To be sure, it is tempting to speculate over the outcome of the main case from the statements 
made by the President. Microsoft indeed appears to interpret the order as supporting its main action.®^^
^̂ 0 Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft v. Commission, at 430.
Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft v. Commission, at 415-416.
Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft v. Commission, at 42^441.
813 Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft v. Commission, at 395-400.
8̂  ̂Case T-201/04 R, M/croso/i v. Commission, at 401.
Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft v. Commission, at 403.
816 Case T-201/04 R, Af/croso/i v. Commission, at 400.
81̂  See wvw.microsoft.com/presspass/Dress/2004/dec04/12-22cfimlinQDr.msDx. 22 D ecem ber 2004.
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However, some words of caution are in order. It should be stressed that the threshold for finding of a 
prima facie case is fairly low. W here the President agreed with Microsoft’s pleas, he used wordings such 
as “Microsoft’s [...] arguments raise complex issues which it is for the Court of First Instance to resolve 
in the main action and that those arguments cannot be regarded in the interim measures proceedings 
as prima facie unfounded"®^® and “[l]t is fo r the Court of First Instance to mie, in the main action, on 
those factual questions and on the consequences, if any, to be drawn from them For the main 
case, the standard for annulment is higher. Undoubtedly, the President’s statement will be taken into 
account by the chamber deciding Microsoft’s appeal, although they are not binding on the chamber. A 
final point is that the President himself is not a member o f the chamber deciding the case.®20
4.5. Interim  conclusions on EC law
Bundling under EC law is largely controlled in the context of Article 82 EC, although it may also fall 
within the scope of Article 81 EC. From a comparative perspective, under US law, bundling has primarily 
been addressed under § 1 Sherman Act. Paradoxically, despite the fact that the US and EU use 
different policy instalments to control bundling, there still exists a close proximity between the two 
analytical frameworks. This is partly because the requirement of ‘sufficient market power* under US law 
matches more closely the standard of dominance under EC law.
The Commission's practice in 70s and 80s with regards to bundling can be called harsh. Similar to US 
law, the earliest cases typically involved the efforts of an intellectual property holder to tie Its license for 
the protected product to a second, mostly competitively supplied product. Following the observation that 
the Commission easily held any restriction of licensee’s freedom to constitute a restriction of 
competition, it condemned bundling clauses without making a proper analysis of market conditions. A 
form-based rule was adopted on assumptions about the harmfulness of leveraging, particularly with 
respect to exclusion. The Commission’s practice also suggests that the presence of market power was 
not a necessary requirement for successfully implementing bundling. The harsh policy was accepted by 
the Community Courts. Notably, this approach was adopted when the Community’s competition policy 
was in its infancy, and it was considered that reasonably clear rules were needed in order to address
818 Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft v. Commission, at 394.
818 Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft v. Commission, at 402.
820 Although there are press reports that President Vesterdorf has proposed to move the case from a five-judge panel 
headed by Judge Legal to the Courts Grand Chamber, headed by himself. See www.reuters.com/newsArtcle. 20 June 
2005.
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conduct that impeded competition. At the time, economic analysis was less developed and could not 
provide a clear view of the effects that practices were having on competition.
The field of economics has since then developed. This section has also revealed that Articles 81 and 82 
EC have seeked to follow this approach. EC law is paying indeed more ‘heed to economic evidence .“®̂  ̂
Although the legal approach was still form-based and perse, there were significant modifications in the 
90s. The market power requirement was taken more seriously and economics played a greater role in 
explaining and justifying bundling arrangements. This resulted in a two-faced approach that I described 
as a modified per se test. The recent decisions, with Microsoft as a leading example, tend to an effect- 
based approach. The Commission appears to have somewhat recast the analytical framework in 
comparison with previous cases. It can be said that the new approach comes dose to an unstructured 
rule of reason test. Under this framework, leveraging is no longer assessed in a vacuum. Antitnjst 
analysis focuses heavily on foreclosure in the tied market.
However, for Article 81 EC to apply, sufficient market power does not always appear to be essential. 
Strictly speaking, Article 81 EC does not require a finding of dominance, but such an approach does not 
make economic sense. In my view, it would be better to completely drop the Article 81-limb to regulate 
bundling.
5. The separate-product issue
The concept of bundling presupposes that different products are being bundled together. As Sufrin and 
Jones write, ‘ [i]f what is supplied consists of one product there cannot be a tie as one cannot tie 
something tied together."®22
As seen in Chapter 2, the relevance of this condition for leveraging was just recently conclusively 
confirmed in /M S  Heafth.^^^ In general, the examination of EC law reveals the same endemic problem 
that we observed under US law: what test should be applied so as to determine whether products are 
components of a single product or are in distinct markets? As Advocate General Jacobs justly noted in
See Korah, T e tra  Pak II -  Lack of Reasoning in Court’s Judgmenf, ECLR 98 (1997), p. 103.
822 See Sufrin and Jones, op. cit., p. 454.
823 Case C-418/01 IM S Health v. NDC Health, stating lhat “it is determinative that two different stages of production may be 
identified and that they are interconnected, inasmuch as the upstream product is indispensable for the supply of the 
downstream product* (at 45).
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Hilti, this is a “complex operation involving both findings of fact and evaluation of those facts in the light 
of economic principles and legal criteria."®^^
In European academ ic and legal circles, a range of tests to answer this question have been discussed. 
These tests fall into six major categories: (1) the simple-product test; (2) the interchangeability test: (3) 
the inherent-link test; (4) the consumer-demand test; (5) the historical-practices test; (6) and, the 
customary-practices test. Because these tests are in and of themselves flawed, I suggest applying a 
multi-factor test.
5.1. The simple-product test
Like in the US. the Courts and the Commission have often separated products based on intuition. With 
little or no analysis, they decided that separate products existed. For instance, the early cases on 
licensing agreements involved products that were intuitively separate; manufacturing process for meat 
sausages and casings used in that process®^® patented technology and general machinery 
equipment®26, and sail boards and rigs.®^^
The same approach was discernable in early leveraging but non-bundling cases. For instance, in 
Commercial Solvents, concerning a refusal to supply, the ECJ and Commission did not elaborate on 
why the raw m aterial market was distinguished from the ancillary market for the derivative product.®^« 
Likewise, later cases intuitively considered products as distinct: telemarketing services and television 
advertisement services®29, reservation system and ground handling®®®, computer systems and 
maintenance services for those systems®®^ and train engines and staff handling these machines.®®®
Like in the US, the separate-product issue was sometimes decided by simple logic. For instance, in 
Hugin, the question arose whether the market for spare parts o f a product might constitute a separate 
market.®®® This case concerned a refusal to supply by Hugin, a Swedish firm that produced and sold 
cash registers and their spare parts. It decided to no longer supply spare parts to Liptons, a small firm
See Advocate General Jacobs in C -53/92 P, Hilti, at 8.
*25 Case lV/29.290, Vaessen/Moris.
*»  Case IV/4204, Vetcro/Aplix.
^  Case C-193/83, Windsurfing v. Commission.
*28 Cases 6 & 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA v. Commission, at 25.
Case 311/84, Télémarketing.
Case IV/32.318, London European-Sabena.
831 See IP /97/868,8  October 1997.
832 S ee lP /01 /14 15 ,12 October 2001.
833 Case 22/78, Hugin Kassaregister AB and Hugin Cash Registers U d  v. Commission [1979] E C R 1869.
174
specialised in servicing and repairing Hugin machines. The ECJ held that the relevant marltet in this 
case was the market for spare parts needed by general repairers and servicers of the Hugin machines. 
Focusing on independent suppliers like Uptons, the Court stressed that these undertakings “require 
spare parts for their various activities" and that they need ‘such parts in order to provide senrices for 
cash register users" in the form of servicing.®^  ̂The troublesome issue, in my view, is that the Court did 
not discuss the existence of possible substitutes on the demand side for independent undertakings. This 
would have suggested that the general market for spare parts required by Hugin owners as the relevant 
market.®®®
Som e national courts and authorities have also endorsed the simple-product test. To be fair, their 
results make sense. In France, the Competition Council has ordered the Mannesman Company to 
rem ove a bundling clause from its general conditions of sale.®®® This clause enabled buyers of a 
chronotachygraph to profit from a contractual guarantee only if they exclusively used the recording 
tapes offered by Mannesman. Without giving an explanation, the Council made a distinction between a 
chronotachygraph and recording tapes used with it. More recently, in Germany, the Federal High Court 
distinguished the market for voice telephony services from the market for electricity supply in two 
cases.®®^ The Court did so without making an elaborate analysis. In both cases, Deutsche Telekom  
sued publicly owned local electricity supply enterprises and their telecommunications subsidiaries for 
alleged abusive bundling. Only the decision that the geographical market was confined to the local 
supplier’s network was discussed at length by the Federal High Court.
In my view, any simple-product test should be dismissed as genera/instrument to answer the separate- 
product question. It is irrelevant if some intuitive conclusions match the results of more directed 
analysis. The simple-product test is inherently flawed. Like the US test, the simple-product test may 
dispose of antitrust cases because widely-held customs are rarely challenged. It may also obscure the 
factual premises of the legal assessment. As seen in Hugin, more sophisticated analysis is required to 
answer the separate-product question.
^  Case 22/78, Hugin, at 7-8. The proposition that one brand of spare parts can constitute a separate product market has 
also been applied in Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng [1988] ECR 6211 and Case 53/87, C/CCRA v. Renault [1988] ECR 
6039.
**35 See Baden Fuller, 'Article 86: Economic Analysis of the Existence of a Dominant Position*, ELRev 423 (1979), pp. 426- 
427.
33® Decision 90-D-34, Mannesman Company, 20 October 1990, Bulletin DGCC, 31 October 1990, p. 396.
837 Judgment of November 4 ,2003, cases 16/02 and KZR 38/02, p. 11.
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5.2. The interchangeability test
In deciding the separate-product issue, the Commission has sometimes advanced partially or fully an 
interchangeability test.®^ Under this test, the components of the bundle are considered to be separate 
and distinct when they have different supply and demand characteristics. This is regardless of whether 
or not the bundled items are interrelated.®®^
In Hilti, the Commission rejected Hilti’s view that nail guns, cartridge strips and nails should be seen as 
forming one integrated powder actuated fastening system (“PAFS"). The commission focused on the 
lack of functional interchangeability between the various components. As for the supply side, the 
Commission stressed that, for instance, nails and cartridge strips are produced with “totally different 
technologies and often by different firms" than nail guns.®^ The very fact that there existed independent 
nail and cartridge strip makers not producing nail guns was another indication that supply conditions 
were different.®^' The Commission concluded that “nail guns, cartridge strips and nails, even if inter­
related, have different sets of supply and demand conditions and constitute separate product 
markets."®^®
In Tetra Pak //, the Commission likewise found that packaging machines and the cartons used with 
those machines are separate products because the individual items lacked functional 
interchangeability.®^ Although primarily relying on a consumer-demand test, the Commission also 
considered in Microsoft the differences in “functionality" and “industry structures," coming to the 
conclusion that operating systems and m edia players are in distinct markets.®^
Some national courts and antitnjst authorities have also adhered to the interchangeability test. In 
October 2004, the Dublin High Court gave its first Irish judgment since Regulation 1/2003 came into 
force. In ILCU, the High Court found that ILCU was dominant in the market for the provision of savings 
protection.®^® By bundling access to its savings protection scheme with the provision of its 
representation services, the High Court held that ILCU was abusing its dominant position by foreclosing
838 See Van Daalen en Geursen, op. cit., pp 249-250.
838 See Farr, op. cit., p. 175.
8« Case IV/30.787, Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti, at 55.
Case lV/30.787, Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti, at 56.
842 Case IV/30.787, Euroftx-Bauco v. Hilti, at 57 (emphasis added).
843 Case IV/31.043, Tetra Pak II, referring to Case IV/31.043, Tetra Pak 1 [1988] OJ L 27/46 (a t 93). In Tetra Pak I, the 
Commission extensively discussed the supply and demand differences between filling machines and cartons (at 29-39).
844 Case COM P/37.792, Microsoft, at 811-813.
845 High Court Judgment [2003 No 8608P]. TTie C om p^tion Authority v. The Irish League o f Credit Unions CUCUl, 22 
October 2004, pp. 132-137.
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the related market for credit union representation. The parties engaged in a lengthy debate on how the 
S S N iP  test could be used to establish whether credit union representation services and savings 
protection services were a single offering or a bundle. Because the parties lacked quantitative data, the 
Irish Court ultimately adopted an intuitive approach and subsequently concluded that the services ILCU 
offered its members were not interchangeable.®^^
Another recent example comes from the UK telecom authority Ofcom. In BT Analyst, Ofcom examined 
w hether BT Analyst, a software programme analysing telephone billing data, was part of BT’s retail 
telephony sen/ice.®^^ The issue rose between Designbyte and BT. Designbyte offers Magictelcom, an 
electronic telephone billing analysis service with integrated database management. Designbyte’s 
programme competed with BT Analysts. Because BT offered its customers BT Analyst free of charge as 
part o f its retail telephony service, it allegedly abused its dominant position by bundling a service that 
could be supplied separately and competitively. Relying on product interchangeability, Ofcom found It 
artificial to distinguish a basic bill for a service from the service itself.®^® "[T]he functionality of BT Analyst 
is simply," the UK authority wrote in its decision, “one of the benefits of providing data in electronic form 
rather than functionality that clearly distinguishes BT Analyst from basic bills provided as part o f the 
retail telephone package."®^^ It dismissed the bundling claim.
The m ajor advantages of the interchangeability test are its easy application and the clear guidance it 
gives to antitrust enforcers and business advisers. As in B T Analyst, the test might even result in the 
sam e conclusions, like more directed analysis. However, the results of the test can be quite harsh in 
som e respects. Critics concede that the test is “highly tenuous."®®®
First, the test conflicts with the conventional notion whereby the possible attributes of the bundle itself 
should also be taken into consideration. Under the test purported by the Commission, complementary 
products could never constitute an integrated product. By definition, the conditions of demand and 
supply are different for complementary goods.®®^
ILCU, preferring to ‘adopt the ‘intuitive’ or ‘innate characteristics’ test to find that there are two martiets at work in the 
instant case, being respectively a market for credit union representation services [...], and the savings protection m arker (pp. 
130-131).
Ofcom, Pricing o fB T  Analyst, 26 October 2004.
^  Ofcom, Pricing o f BT Analyst, at 3.15-3.22.
Ofcom, Pricing o fB T  Analyst, at 3.21.
5® See Price, ‘Abuse of a  Dominant Position -  the Tale of Nails, Milk cartons and TV Guides’ , ECLR 80 (1990), p. 82.
See Korah (1993), noting that “consumables are to be treated per se as in a different market from the equipment with 
which they are used as they are not substitutes on the demand or supply side* (p. 151).
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Second, on an analytical level, the fatal shortcoming is that the test assesses the incorrect relationship. 
In Hiiti, the defendant’s argument was that the products were integrated, not they were 
interchangeable.852 Antitrust analysis should not focus on the functional interchangeability between the 
various items of the bundle. It must assess whether, for instance, PAFS are functionally interchangeable 
with nail guns supplied without cartridge stnps and nails. The SSNIP test also could not be used for this 
purpose. This test is designed to study the closeness of competition between sub^itutesfi^ It says 
nothing about how to determine whether or not two components form a single product or a bundle of 
products.®®^
Thus, the interchangeability test should, in my view, be dismissed.
5.3. The consumer-demand test
Like US law, EC law has sometimes applied a consumer-demand test. The test attaches unique 
significance to a one-single factor whether there is sufficient demand for the bundled items on a 
standalone basis from a different source than the defendant undertaking. The test’s rationale is that if 
there is no demand for acquiring the components separately from different sellers, there is no 
competitive issue.
For instance. Larouche writes that “[i]t is only once customers begin to demand the two products 
separately [...] that they fall on distinct relevant markets."®®® Likewise, the Commission explains the test 
in its Guidelines on Vertical Restraints: “[t]wo products are distinct if, in the absence o f tying, from the 
buyers’ perspective, the products are purchased by them on two different markets."®®® It recently 
repeated this position in its Guidelines on Technology Transfer Agreements. Products and technologies 
are distinct if there is “distinct demand for each of the products and technologies forming part of the tie 
or bundle."®®^
8^ Case IV/30.787, EurofixSauco v. Hitti, stating that "[tlhe Commission does not accept the view put forward by Hiiti that 
nail guns, cartridge strips and nails must be seen as forming one integral system: powder actuated fostening systems' (at 
57).
See Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community Competition Law, explaining 
that the SSNIP test determines the “range of products which are viewed as substitutes by the consumer* (at 15).
^  This point is stressed by Ridyard. See Ridyard, “Tying and Bundling -  Cause for Complaint?", ECLR 316 (2005), p. 316. 
“ 5 See Larouche, Competition Law and Regulation in European Telecommunications (Oxford, 2000), p. 261. For similar 
view, see also Dolmans and Graf, op. cit., pp. 227-228.
888 See Commission Notice, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, at 216.
857 See Commission Notice, Guidelines on Technology Transfer Agreements, at 191.
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A strong indicator for the existence of demand to acquire the components from a different source is the 
presence of independent suppliers offering the bundled product on a standalone basis. In Microsoft, the 
Commission argued that a product is distinct when there is “independent demand" for the bundled or 
tied good.®“  (t rested principally on the observation that separate media players are available, and that 
there is clearly consumer demand for these players.®®  ̂ Its observation was reinforced by Microsoft’s 
own practice of developing separate media players for Apple and Sun and the release of individual 
upgrades by the software giant.®“  The Commission also stressed the fact that some users of Windows 
do not need or want a media player in the first place.®®^
By contrast, in Info-Lab/Ricoh, the Commission declined to accept that there was a separate market for 
em pty toner cartridges because there was no consumer demand for such product.®®^ This case 
concerned a complaint by Info-Lab against Ricoh for refusing to supply it with empty toner cartridges 
that w ere compatible with Ricoh photocopy machines. Info-Lab wanted to fill these cartridges with toner 
and then sell them to consumers. Info-Lab’s complaint was rejected because there was no supplier 
producing or selling empty cartridges and thus no demand for the product.
The Community Courts have supported the Commission’s focus on independent suppliers. In Hitti, the 
C FI found that the presence of independent manufacturers of Hilti-consumables “in itse lf constituted 
“sound evidence" of separate markets.®“  In Tetra Pak fl, it was emphasised that, for a considerable 
am ount of time, independent carton manufacturers were manufacturing non-aseptic cartons to be used 
Tetra Pak machines.®®^
The consumer-demand test appears to have become akin to a civil religion for determining the 
distinctiveness of products. Its principal prophet is the Commission. Generally, it has been saluted in the 
literature as a relatively simple and useful test to answer the single-product question.
Case COMP/37.792, Microsoft, noting that “plf (here is no independent demand for an allegedly tied ’ product, then the 
products at issue are not distinct and a tying charge will be to no avail’  (at 803).
8® Case COMPy37.792. Microsoft, at 804.
«0 Case COMP/37.792, Microsoft, at 80S^07.
Case COMP/37.792, Microsoft, stating that *a non insigniticant number of consumers choose to obtain media players 
separately from their operating system shows that Informed consumers recognize them as separate products” (at 806).
8® Case lV/36.431, Info-Lab/Ricoh, unpublished, summarised in 29®' Report on Competition Policy (1999), pp. 169-170.
8® Case T-30/89, Hiltì, at 66-67.
8« Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak It, at 60-78.
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However, the consumer-demand test is not “on the right track.”®®̂  As I already observed with regards to 
the US Supreme Court’s decision in Jefferson Parish, the test is deficient. The test proposed by the 
Commission is also vague and cursory. It provides no guidance about how to determine who the 
consumers of a product are or what kind of consumer opinions matter.®“
In order to understand the pernicious nature o f the consumer-demand test, one need only look at its 
application by Judge Jackson in Microsoft H i Applying the test to assess whether operating systems 
and IE are distinct or not, Judge Jackson found that the “resolution of product and market definitional 
problems must depend upon proof of commercial r e a l i t y F o r  Judge Jackson, however, this reality 
was clear-cut. He stated in only one sentence that *[c]onsumers today perceive operating systems and 
browsers as separate products" because there was separate demand.“ ®
Although the very detailed analysis by the Commission in Microsoft was certainly better than Judge 
Jackson’s application of the test, It was still flawed.®“  The Commission failed, for instance, to make a 
clear-cut distinction between consumer dem and at the tim e of the bundling and post-bundling demand. 
As it appears from the public record, it also neglected to assess the technological advance of the 
Windows-WMP bundle as a separate factor.
Another problem with the consumer demand test concerns the its limited, even sometimes misleading, 
application to technologically-dynamic m arkets. Market perceptions can change over time. Separate 
demand for two products may fade if bundling creates genuine benefits,®7^ This means that consumers 
may then not have any separate demand for individual components.
For instance, in IBM, the issue was the sale of central processing units, together with main memory.® î 
Today it is generally recognised that demand to acquire the two products separately has disappeared. 
With regard to Microsoft, for instance, Gastle and Boughs note that “operating systems must evolve and 
change such that the pattern of demand for functionality in the future might be radically different than the
See Evans and Padilla, 'Tying Under Article 82 and The Microsoft Dedsion: A  Comment on Dolmans and G raf, W.Comp. 
503(2005). p. 511.
See also Advocate General Jacobs, in Case C -53/92P, HOti, stressing the need to identify the “category of dients* that 
require a product (at 16).
United States v. Microsoft, 87 F.Supp. 2d 30, at 49.
868 United States v. Microsoft, 87 F.Supp. 2d 30, at 49.
869 Case COMP/37.792, Microsoft, at 800-825.
879 This shortcoming is noted by Fault and Nikpay. See Fault and Nikpay, op. cit., writing that “characterisation of products as 
independent from each other evolves over time* (p. 167).
871 See IP/84y291,2 August 1984.
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present"®72 The Commission approach also neglects Mariotti’s warning that “legal standards should not 
be based on advertising campaigns."®^®
In my view, the most notable shortcoming is that the consumer-demand test concerns a one-single 
factor analysis. Any dominant supplier of a product could be held to infringe Article 82 EC if it would be 
possible to compete in the supply of a sub-component of that product This would be bad antitnjst 
policy. Rather, it is advisable to also consider the technological advantages of the bundle and the 
manufacturers' point of view.
Evans and Padilla dismiss the consumer-demand test for a different reason. They claim that the 
fundamental problem with the Commission’s analysis in Microsoft is that it never Investigated whether 
there was any material demand for operating systems without media player at all.®^  ̂ Indeed, the 
Commission appears to concede that there may be no such demand.®^® The perspective of their 
analysis is incorrect, however. In my view, the main focus o f analysis should be whether there is 
demand for operating systems with a different media player and likewise, demand for media players 
separate from operating system.
As in Jefferson Parish, the fact that consumers would inevitably use the functionalities together is not 
the point to assess. In Jefferson Parish, there were hardly any patients getting surgery without 
anesthesia. As the Commission itself suggested, most computer users also use word processing 
programs, but no one has ever seriously claimed that word processing was part of the market for 
operating systems.®^® It is advisable to examine who chooses which anesthesiologist goes into the 
operating room, or which media player goes with Windows.®^ Do OEM s compete in bolting together 
Windows and WMP? Or, do consumers themselves bundle the various items? Is Microsoft in a position 
to discourage the inclusion of a second media player?®78 These are the right questions. To be sure, the 
hard part of any antitrust analysis is to find the answers. But, looking at the separate-product question 
like this switches the perspective of the analysis.
^  See also Gastle and Boughs, "Microsoft III and the Metes and Bounds of Software Design and Technological Tying 
Doctrine*, Va. J, L. & Tech. 1 (2001), p. 68.
8^ See Mariotti, 'Rettiinking Software Tying*, Yale J. on Reg. 367 (2000), p. 378.
See Evans and Padilla, op. ciL, pp. 511-512. For a sim ilar critique, see Van Daalen en Geursen, op. c it, p. 250.
875 Case COMP/37.792, Microsoft, noting that ‘OEMs are likely to follow consutner demand for a pre-installed media player” 
(at 809).
876 Case COMP/37.792. Microsoft, at 405.
877 Case COMP/37.792, Microsoft, refuting Microsoff argument that consumers’ preference for some media players 
necessitates inclusion of W MP by pointing out OEMs could just as easily pre-install a competing media player (at 809).
878 Case COMP/37.792. Microsoft, concluding that the demand for operating systems with media players is met by allowing 
Microsoft to force customers to accept ‘a* third party media player (at 959).
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In summary, the consumer-demand test is arguably deficient in many ways, but should not be dismissed 
simply on the basis of Evans and Padilla’s critique.
5.4. The inherenMink test
Articles 81 and 82 EC specifically refer to the supplementary obligations which ‘by their nature [...], have 
no connection with the subject o f such contracts.’ This wording suggests an inherent-link test.̂ ^^ Under 
this test, products are not distinct if there is an inherent link between the products involved.®®^
In Microsoft, the Commission acknowledged that dominant companies often contest that two products 
are distinct, particularly “when these are used in conjunction with each other."®®'' The argument is that if 
products are inherently linked, then the pricing of the individual components is irrelevant to the 
purchaser, as he is concerned only about the total price of the product. Let us consider Vaessen/Moris. 
Because the manufacturing process and the synthetic casings are used in conjunction with one another 
in order to produce saucissons de Boulogne, they should be thought off as an integrated product.®®  ̂
Like the American technological-integration test, the inherent-link lest concentrates on the attributes o f 
the bundle Itself.®®® While the US test is about the functionality of integration, the inherent-link test 
emphasises the inherent nature o f the relationship between the various components of a bundle.®®^
Some commentators suggest a very low threshold. For instance, Kiemel submits that two products are  
inherently linked if the tied product ‘relates’ to the functioning of the bundling arrangement.®®® The major 
disadvantage o f his proposal is that it reduces the antitnjst analysis, covering only bundling of non- 
connected items. This is contrary to the wisdom that bundling of complementary products may also lead 
to anti-competitive effects.®®®
879 See Mégret, Commenfaire -  fe Droit de la CE -  COncu/Tence (Brussels, 1997), pp. 621-622.
See Jones and Sufrin, op. cit., p. 454; and, Larouche, op. cit., p. 260.
Case COMP/37.792, Microsoft, a t 801.
See Zanon, T ie s  in Patent Licensing Agreements*. ELRev. 391 (1980), p. 393.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d, defining a genuine technoiogical integration as “any product that combines 
functionalities (...) In way that offers advantages unavailable If the functionalities are bought separately and combined by the 
purchaser" (at 948). See Chapter 3.
See Jansen, op. cit., noting that “D ie sachliche Beziehung zwischen Vetragsgegenstand und gekopplter Leistung kann 
sich aus deren Beschaffenheit oder Funcktion ergeben’  (p. 165).
See Kiemel, ‘Zur Anwendung von A rt 85 Abs. 1, Buästabe e), EWG-Vertrag auf Lizenzverträge", NJW 2333 (1964), p. 
2334.
686 For details, see Carlton and Waldman, T h e  Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving 
Industries", Rand J. Econ. 194 (2002).
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The Commission appears to advance a test which is not easily satisfied and applicable in limited 
circumstances. In its Guidelines on Technology Transfer Agreements, the Commission recently wrote 
that products and technologies are distinct unless they are “by necessity linked in such a way that the 
licensed technology cannot be exploited without the tied product or both parts of the bundle cannot be 
exploited without the other."®®  ̂ This seems to be In accordance with the strict view of the Court 
examining whether there is a “natural tie" between the components in question.®®® For Instance, in Van 
den Bergh, the CFI found that there was no “objective" link between the supply of freezer cabinets and 
the sale of ice creams.®®^
Like its US counterpart, the inherent-link test is a one-single factor analysis. Whereas the consumer- 
demand test neglects the nature of the relationships between the components of an alleged bundle, the 
inherent-link ignores useful information from both consumers and other producers. The case law seems 
to recognise this observation, at least in effect. For instance, Advocate General Colomer stressed in 
Tetra Pak II the importance potentially separating the components of the bundle rather than the links, 
thus suggesting an integrated product. In his view, “[s]ystems of tied sales of products which are by 
nature separable and can be marketed separately thus constitute abuses contrary to Article [82]."®®®
The Courts are more explicit. They suggest that the existence of a link between the bundled items does 
not exclude the possibility of defining distinct markets. It is recalled, in Hilti, whether the company’s tying 
of its nail gun cartridge strips with a complementary supply of compatible nails was abusive. It was clear 
that the purchase of cartridges was useless without compatible nails. However, what mattered in the 
eyes of the CFI was that there was demand to acquire nails from other sources. As the CFI noted: 
“Hilti's contention that guns, cartridge strips and nails should be regarded as fonning an indivisible 
whole [...] is in practice tantamount to permitting producers of nail guns to exclude the use of 
consumables other than their own branded products in their tools.’®®i
The ECJ confirmed the H//f/approach in Tefra PakIL Interpreting Article 82(d) EC Treaty as requiring an 
inherent-link test, Tetra Pak claimed that the machines and the cartons formed an integrated distribution
^  See Commission Notice, Guidelines on Technology Transfer Agreements, at 191 (emphasis added).
888 Case C-333/94P, Tefra Pak ¡1, at 37.
889 Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods Ud v. Commission, at 113.
8» See Advocate General Colomer In Case C-333f94P, Tefra Pak H, at 69. 
89iC aseT-30/89,H /H r,at68.
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system.®92 However, upholding the CFI’s decision, the ECJ held that "even [...] there is a natural tie 
between the two products in question, [tied] sales may still constitute abuse” under Article 82 EC.®^̂
In sum, links are an important factor to consider, but in my view, should not be the sole basis for the 
separate-product test.
5.5. The historical-practices test
Some commentators have proposed interpreting the separate-product test as a historical-practices test. 
They advocate that products can be viewed as separate if they have previously been supplied 
separately.®^
The first advantage is that in theory, this test provides clear guidelines for deciding whether products are 
distinct. If the defendant has supplied products in the past, these cannot be considered as an integrated 
bundle. The test emphasises obliging a dominant firm not to adopt a bundling policy that impedes 
competition that has already taken shape on the market. A  second, related advantage is that the test 
can quite easily be applied by competition authorities. They should only assess whether the items of the 
bundle have been prevbusly supplied separately. If applied to Microsoft, Windows and W MP, these 
would be in distinct markets because Microsoft supplied on a standalone basis from July 1998 till May 
1999WMP.895
However, I believe the test is flawed on two levels. As to its application, it is not a straightfonvard test 
especially because the product characteristics change over time. Determining whether a product has 
been supplied on a  standalone basis in the past is more complex than the test seems to presume. For 
instance, consumers may view a particular component as a new product rather than a product 
previously supplied separately and later improved. More importantly, on a doctrinal level, the test fails to 
recognise that innovation often results in bundling together two previously unbundled products.®^
B92 Case C-333/94P, Tetrd Pak II, at 35.
Case C-333/94P, Tetra Pak II, at 37 (emphasis added).
For instance, see "Microsoft the EC Abuse of Dominance Case", www.reckon.cQ.uk. 26 April 2005.
835 Case COM P/37.792, Microsoft, at 309.
See Woodrow De Vries. ‘ United States v. MicrosofT, Berkeley Tech. L  J. 303 (2005), p. 312. For a general discussion of 
innovation and bundling, see Rahnasto, Intellectual Property Rights, Extern^ Effects and A itf-Tm sf Law -Leveraging if^ s  
in the Communications Industry {Oidord, 2003), pp. 156-163.
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Under a strict application of the historical-practices test, any combination of products which have been 
supplied in the past on a standalone basis would involve the bundling of two distinct products. 
Commentators like Turner stress that “there must be some room for innovative combination of elements 
‘normally’ produced and sold separately, into new single products.’897 Applying the test in the software 
industry would be fatal. To begin with, software programmes providing discrete functions can easily be 
combined and offered to consumers as a single product. Combining software functions can enable the 
development o f entirely new capabilities, a  powerful form of innovation.®® The historical-practices test 
condemns a priori these fonns of innovation.
The latter flaw in particular suggests rejecting the test. The Commission appears, and rightly so. to 
dismiss the historical-practices test. It noted in Microsoft that the test focuses on historic consumer 
behaviour that is likely before bundling, and therefore risks ignoring efficiency benefits that derive from 
new product integration.®®
5.6. The customary-practices test
The customary-practices test is the Community variant of the universal-practices test purported by 
Areeda and Hovenkamp.s® The test is also rooted in the wording of Articles 81 and 82, which suggests 
that bundling may be permitted if the bundle is “commercial usage.“®oi Commercial usage is not defined. 
It is reasonable to assume that it depends on the business and territory concemed.®^
The test is an important derivation of Articles 81 and 82 EC, and should therefore be viewed as 
restrictive.®® As Art and McCurdy succinctly write:
Without it, a vast class of products would be condemned under the tying analysis. The classic 
example is the sale of shoes with laces. Without the commercial usage exception, such a sale 
would be tying, simply because there is a market for shoelaces separate and apart from the sale 
of shoes. Shoes v^out shoelaces are not very useful, but theoretically they could be sold
See Turner, T h e  Validity of Tying Arrangements Linder the Antitrust Laws’ , Harv. L  Rev. 50 (1958), p. 68.
See Heiner, ’Assessing Tying Claims in the Context of Software Integration: A Suggested Framework for Applying the 
Rule of Reason Analysis’ , U. Chi. L  Rev. 123 (2005), pp. 126-129.
8» Case COMP/37.792, Microsoft, at 808.
*0  See Hovenkamp and Areeda, Fundamenfate o f Antitrusi Law  (New York, 2002), suggesting to assess whether bundling is 
universal in the relevant market (pp. 835-646). See Chapter 3.
90’ See Jones and Sufrin, op. df„ referring to ‘customary link’  between the products (p. 454); and, Mégret, op. cit., pp. 621- 
622.
902 See Jansen, op. d t , *Ob Kopplungen handelsüblich sind, kann nicht allgemein gesagt warden, da dies branchenmäßig 
und gebietsweise unterschiedlich sein kann’  (p. 163).























separately. And, as the Commission recognises, to condemn the shoemaker who only sells 
shoes with laces would be the wrong outcome^
The Commission appears in principle to accept the test. In its Guidelines on Vertical Restrains, it 
explains that “since customers want shoes with laces and this has become commercial usage, the sale 
of shoes with laces is not a tying practice."905 However, the Guidelines also specify that the customary- 
practices test is not easily satisfied.^o® The test was dismissed in Microsoft. Defending its behaviour, 
Microsoft stressed that “[t]he process of integrating previously separate functionality, and the continued 
availability of such functionality in stand-alone products, is a pervasive feature of many technology 
industries.”®®̂  It submitted that “[t]he major competing OS vendors including Apple, Sun, Linux and IBM 
include media player functionality with their operating systems.”®®®
The Commission correctly rejected the test in Microsoft or other cases. The customary-practices test is 
arguably flawed. The first shortcoming is that many markets are not competitive markets, and thus the 
commercial usage in those markets m ay not say much.®®® The test also fails to recognise that 
undertakings with market power may engage in bundling for different reasons and with different effects 
than undertakings without market power. Another shortcoming is that the test is a one-single factor 
analysis. In my view, market practices by other undertakings are informative, and it is therefore 
important to assess them.
A final reason to dismiss the customary-practices test relates to the division of the burden of proof. 
Article 82 EC does not make it perfectly clear whether or not possible customary-practices should be 
considered in the context of the separate-product test, or whether those practices could justify a bundle. 
If customs should be considered at the stage of the separate-product issue, the Commission would 
have to show that no such usage exits. The Commission would then have to prove a negative fact. By 
contrast, if those customs are taken into account as a justification of bundling, the defendants have to 
bear the burden o f proof. As the defendant parties are better informed, it may be useful to place the 
burden on them, thus considering customary-practices as a justification. The same shift of burden would 
be achieved by taking customary practices into account under Article 81(3) EC.
See Art and McCurdy, op. cit., p. 698.
»5 See Commission Notice, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, op. cit., at 216.
»6 See Commission Notice, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, op. cit., at 216.
See Art and McCurdy, op. cit., p. 698.
See Art and McCurdy, op. cit., p. 698.
^  See Korah (1993), op. c it, noting that *[t]he Commission may be right [...) to ignore custom based solely on the practice 
of the dominant firm’ (p . 157).
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The Courts have discussed the notion of commercial usage in detail. In Tetra Pak If, the CFI turned 
down Tetra Pak's appeal that its system should be treated as customarily integrated. Setting a high 
threshold, the CFI ruled that bundling was not commercial usage as long as there were untied sales. It 
noted that untied sales of 12 percent were sufficient to conclude that bundling was not the ‘general rule” 
in the non-aseptic market.9^0 uk© yvith the inherent-link test, the CFI seems to recognise, at least in 
effect, the test’s shortcomings as a one-single factor analysis by finding that ‘[e]ven usage that is 
acceptable in a normal situation, on a competitive market, cannot be accepted in the case of a market 
where competition Is already restricted."9'‘  ̂ On appeal, CFl’s reading was affirmed by the ECJ.®''̂
In sum, the test should, in my view, be rejected.
5 .7. The m ulti-factor test
5 .7.1 . The outlines o f the new tes t
The tests discussed above are in and of themselves flawed. It is obvious that the simple-product test 
and the historical-practices test should be dismissed. Intuition is never a proper basis for antitrust 
intervention, while the historical-practices test would seriously discourage innovation. The 
interchangeability-test is likewise to be rejected because it examines the incorrect relationship between 
the bundle's components. The principal objection against the other tests is that they only offer a one- 
single factor analysis. The separate-product issue is complex, and no one-single factor test is sufficient 
to answer that question. These flaws show the need for a new test.®^^
In order to outline the new test, it is useful to look at the legal solutions advanced under the American 
case law.®^  ̂ I have observed earlier that both Jerrold and Dafa General posed the right questions.®̂  ̂in 
those cases, both courts turned to the sources that best knew those particular product markets: 
consumers and manufacturers. Both courts also examined the technological advantages of the bundle 
itself. Under EC competition law, the separate-product test should, in my view, rely on the following
910 Case T-83/91, re f/3  Raff II, at 82.
911 Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak II, at 137.
912 Case C-333/94P, Tetra Pak II, finding that 'even where tied sales of two products are in accordance with commercial 
usage (...) such sales may still constitute abuse within the meaning of Article 86 unless they are objectively justified* (at 37).
913 Y e t some commentators criticise the Community approach without suggesting another solution. See Evans and Padilla, 
op. cit., pp. 511-512: and, Van Daalen en Geursen, op. cH., p. 250.
9i< For details on the multi-factor test see Weinstein, “Bundies of Trouble: The Possibilities for a New Separate-Product Test 
in Technological Tying Cases’ , Cal. L. Rev. 903 (2002), pp. 918-935.
915 Ufi/ted States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960) and Re Data Genera/ Corp. Antitrust 
Litigation.
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three elements: (1) consumer perceptions (2) the view of manufacturers; and, (3) technological 
advance.
An evaluation o f the consumer’s views should take into account both demand at the time of bundling 
and demand once bundling has been in place for a period of tim e. With regards to the manufacturers’ 
point o f view, it is necessary to consider the actions of other manufacturers along with the defendant’s 
intent in bundling the involved components. The third element is included as a sort of sanity check. Even 
If elements one and two, on balance, point to separate products, it must be assessed whether 
considering the innovative character of the bundle would be the appropriate decision.
Generally, it w ill be difficult for Courts and the Commission to detemiine whether a particular bundle 
represents a genuine innovative step fonward. Parties would present experts giving diverging opinions. 
In the end, courts or the Commission vrould have to make a decision. This is not an easy undertaking.
However, I am not skeptical of the authorities’ or courts’ ability to make such an assessments^® They 
should first look at the consumer and manufacturer elements. These are very powerful sources of 
information. If both elements suggest a bundle of separate products, an integrated product should only 
be identified if there is clear and convincing evidence of technological progress. In doing so, genuine 
innovations would be protected in those rare instances that consumers and manufacturers fail to 
recognise the technological advance of the bundle.
5.7.2. Applying the new test to Microsoft
One useful way in to appraise the multi-factor test is to apply it to Microsoft. The Windows-WMP bundle 
is, using a term borrowed from Sidak, the "linchpin" of the case.s^^ Applying the customary-practices 
test, Microsoft claims that Windows and W MP form an integrated product.®^® Van Daalen en Geursen 
likewise stress that it is customary for operating system vendors to offer media players together with
316 For a similar positive view, see Brief of Lessig As Amicus Curiae, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 
(D.D.C. 2000) {No. 98-1232), p. 20.
31̂  See Sidak, An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration (Yale paper, 2001), p. 20.
318 Case COM P/37.792, Microsoft, at 821 -824. See also Art arid McCurdy, writing that ‘ the Commission paid little heed to the 
realities o f current commercial usage. The major competing [operating system] vendors including Apple, Sun, Linux and IBM 
include media player functionality with their operating systems. And there is little, if any, demand for a general purpose PC 
operating without media player functionality" (p. 698).
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their systems.®!® In the interim proceedings, the CFI President appeared to be impressed by Microsoft’s 
argument and accepted prima facie that Windows and WMP might not be distinct.®^®
Clearly, the Commission argues that Windows and WMP are distinct products.®^! Dolmans and Graf, 
who represent RealNetworks, most certainly believe that media players are distinct from Windows.®22 
Now the CFI must crack the hard nut of whether Windows and WMP are distinct products. Taking into 
account the limitations of the public record, the following analysis provides a quick look at how the CFI 
could utilise the multi-factortest.
5.7.2.I. Consumer demand at the time of bundling
The CFI should first determine whether there was separate demand for Windows and W M P on a 
standalone basis at the time of bundling. The court must therefore evaluate which consumers are 
concerned. Operating systems are typically purchased by OEMs. They load them on computers that are 
sold to end-users.®23 This is also generally true of media players, although some computer users will 
download them off the Internet themselves.®^^ The view of OEMs is certainly relevant because they are 
quite familiar the markets involved. For one, OEMs are probably more knowledgeable than computer 
users because they pay for the operating systems and media players separately. Another point to stress 
is that OEMs are more likely than computer users to comprehend the technotogical advantages of 
software bundling.
On the other hand, even if users have less technical knowledge, their opinions are, in my view, more 
essentia!. They actually use the programmes, and thus know which ones function best. The fact that 
they do not pay for the products separately is also important.®25 if a computer user chooses a different 
m edia player from W MP, the CFI knows that price has nothing to with it. Their choice is more likely to be
919 See Van Daalen en Geursen, op. cH., noting that '[djat Sun en aanbieders van Linux zich de moeite getroosten 
mediaplayers bij derden af te nemen onderstreept dat er 'integrated consumer demand’ bestaat en dat producenten daarop 
inspelen -  een handelsgebruik dus* ( p. 250, emphasis authors).
Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft v. Commission, finding that 'Microsoffs argument that ‘Windows and its media funcbonality* 
do not constitute two distinct products for the purpose of the application of Article 82 EC in regard to tying cannot, in the 
interim measures proceeding, be considered prima facie unfounded, regard being had in particular to the fact that for many 
years Microsoft and other manufacturers have integrated certain media functionalities in their client PC operating systems" 
(a t 403).
921 Case COMP/37.792, Microsoft, at 825.
922 See Dolmans and Graf, op. at., stressing in particular that a number of independent developers are active in media 
players and Microsoft’s own commercial conduct treats media players as a separate product (p. 239).
923 Case COMP/37.792, Microsoft, calling the OEMs the "purchasing agents’ for computer users (at 119).
924 Case COMP;37.792, Microsoft, a t 119.
925 Except for the earlier versions of QuickTime that were not for free and could be downloaded from the Internet. See Case 
COM P/37.792, Microsoft, at 135-137.
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influenced by design preferences than price or a special relationship with suppliers. To be sure, the fact 
that most users are ignorant o f the ins and outs o f software engineering could disqualiiy them for 
technical product evaluation. It is possible that som e consumers continue demanding a particular 
product even when a new integrated product is better or more useful. However, with regards to media 
players, this does not appear to be the case. Arguably, the average computer user is able to understand 
the basics of a media player.
Having decided to focus on consumers, the CFI should have a closer look at media players. Computer 
users want players that are able to play back and  stream audio/video files.̂ ^e j^ e  media players 
capable of this are: WMP, Apple’s QuickTime, RealNetwork’s RealPlayer. From the public record, it is 
clear that there was separate demand for operating systems and streaming media players at the time of 
bundling Windows 98 Second Edition and WMP.927 [p <1 9 9 5  ̂ RealNetworks started implementing 
streaming m edia functionality in RealPlayer. In April 1999, Apple introduced support for media 
streaming in QuickTime.
Until July 1998, WMP or its earlier versions did not allow  streaming over the Internet. In order to allow  
streaming, Microsoft started distributing Windows 95 together with RealPlayer in July 1997. Windows 98 
First Edition was also distributed with RealPlayer. The first W MP that allowed for streaming was 
released in July 1998 for download from the Internet. In July 1998, Microsoft released Windows 98 
Second Edition, which inciuded WMP as a non-removable component of Windows 98 Second Edition.
5 7 .2 .2 . Post-bundling consum er dem and
The second step concerns post-bundling consumer demand. Focusing on computer users, it is clear 
from the continued existence of third-party media players that some users still view operating systems 
and media players as distinct products. For instance, since 1995 RealNetworks has registered 245 
million unique installations of its media p layers.^^s A fter July 1998, some significant share of the market 
continues to ignore WMP on the desktop, and installs RealNetworks’ Realplayer or Apple’s Quicktime. 
Surveys show that each media player user in June 2002 employed media players from an average of 
1.7 vendors.929
926 Case C0M P/37.792, Microsoft, at 415.
927 Case COM P/37.792, Microsoft, at 302-315.
928 Case COMP/37.792, Microsoft, a t 806.
929 Case COM P/37.792, Microsoft, a t 860.
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Importantly, Microsoft itself has also recognised that there is non-insignificant consumer demand for 
alternative players after tying its streaming media player with W i n d o w s T h e  fact that some computer 
users do not want a streaming media player to be supplied with their operating system is also an 
indication that an important group of business users view the products as distinct^^i Thus, consumer 
demand for independent media players does not appear to have faded over the years.
57.2.3. Actions of other manufacturers
For the CFI, the third step would be to examine the actions of other manufacturers. Because 
manufacturers tend to have a very good understanding of the market, this type of information is very 
useful. Clearly, RealNetworks believed that Windows and media player are distinct, but its opinion as 
such should have little impact on the antitmst analysis.
For one, if other manufacturers continue to offer both standalones and integrations, this strongly 
indicates that they believe that the value of consumer choice outweighs the Increased efficiency of the 
bundle. The problem is that, at the time that Microsoft combined Windows and WMP, no rivals were in a 
position to offer both the standalones and a bundle. Rival operating system vendors like Sun and Linux 
did not distribute their own media players. Direct comparison between competitors is therefore 
impossible.
On the other hand, it is important to note that Sun and Linux do not link their operating system with a 
third party player in a way that makes it unremoveable. The fact that they do not irreversibly Integrate 
both items suggests, in my view, that consumer choice is preferred over fully integrating products.932
S.7.2.4. Analysis of Microsoft’s intent
Analysing Microsoft’s intent to bundle by integrating Windows and W M P should be the next Important 
step under this new test.s33 intent analysis should be concerned with the general aim of Microsoft’s 
behaviour and its view on WMP itself.
930 Case COMP/37.792. Microson, at 808, fn 938.
931 Case COMP/37.792, Microsoft, at 807.
932 Case COMP/37.792, Microsoft, at 823.
933 The approach suggested here accords with Bavasso, “The Role of Intent Under Artide 82 EC: From 'Flushing the 
Turkeys' to 'Spotting Lioness in Regent’s Park", ECLR 616 (2005), excluding intent from any substantive test under Artide 
82 EC, and only accepting intent analysis in relation to the standard of proof.
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First, there is evidence that Microsoft intended to use the integration of Windows and WMP so as to 
force RealNetworks and Apple out of the media players market, rather than for giving consumers a 
better product. This is clear from the fact that Microsoft first bundled Windows 95/98 with RealPlayer, 
then offered W MP for download from July 1998 through May 1999, before integrating Windows and 
W MP. Second, Microsoft itself views W M P as distinct from Windows. Most importantly, it has developed 
specific M edia Player versions for Apple and Other Indications are the release of distinct
upgrades for Windows and W M P and the marketing promotion specifically dedicated to WMP.s^ In 
addition, Microsoft describes W MP as a “sfand-a/one client executable program.*936 Legally, Microsoft 
applies different licensing agreements to Windows and media technologles.^^^
5.7.2.5. Innovative nature of the bundle
Finally, as a sanity check, the CFI should consider whether the bundle represents a genuine 
technological advance. The consumer and manufacturer elements of the test suggest a bundle of 
separate products. However, if the W indows-W MP bundle represents a technological breakthrough, It 
would be bad antitrust policy to prohibit it. Building a better mousetrap, as recognised under US law, 
must be promoted. In my view, there must be a clear and convincing argument that the bundle would 
change the software landscape.
It appears that this evidence is lacking. Surely, bundling Windows and media players Is important, but 
nowhere in the public record does Microsoft or any other party suggest that the Windows-WMP bundle 
is a  fundamental technological innovation. Nor was it seriously advocated that both items could not 
operate s e p ara te ly .^  Even assuming efficiencies, they are not described as significant. In other words, 
it appiears that the Windows-WMP bundle is not a truly genuine technological advance.
5.7.3. Conclusions on the multi-factor test
In sum, this brief application of the multi-factor test shows that Windows and WMP are distinct products. 
To be sure, this is the same conclusion that was reached by the Commission. The multi-factor test as 
suggested, however, provides a more detailed and profound analysis than the Commission test. It looks
934 Case COM P/37.792, Microsoft, a t 815.
935 Case COM P/37.792, Microsoft, at 810.
936 Case COM P/37.792, Microsoft, a t 805, fn 930.
937 Case CO M P/37.792, Microsoft, at 822.
938 Technically, separation is no problem: Case COM P/37.792, Microsoft, at 1028.
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particularly at the technological advance and makes a clear distinction between demand at the time of 
bundling and the post-bundling demand. By considering a spectrum of factors, the test reduces the risk 
of mistakenly finding two distinct products.
6. Legal-economic analysis of the Community bundling trilogy
The decisions in Hilti, Tetra Pak II, and Microsoft form the Community trilogy on bundling. The reason 
why the Commission decided that bundling constituted anti-competitive abuse in those cases appears to 
have been that such a policy is operated to extend power from one market to another. It is interesting to 
assess this intuitive antitrust concern from a legal-economic perspective.
Having access only to the public record, Section 6 takes the published analyses as its starting point and 
suggests, when possible, alternative conclusions to those reached by the Commission.
6 .1. Hilti
As Nalebuff noted, the antitrust effects in Hilti are a bit of a “puzzls.'̂ ^s | agree with his observation. In 
its decision, the Commission intimated that it accepted the leverage theory:
[t]he ability to carry out its illegal policies stems from its power on the markets for Hilti-compatible 
cartridge strips and nail guns (where its market position is strongest and the barriers to entry are 
highest) and aims at reinforcing its dominance on the Hilti-compatible nail market (where it is 
potentially more vulnerable to new competition).^
As for short-term leveraging, it does not appear that Hilti's behaviour would have led to immediate 
consumer harm. Notwithstanding Hilti’s market shares, the nail industry seems to have been reasonably 
competitive. Given its patents, Hilti was in the position to price its cartridges at the monopoly level, but 
leveraging was arguably doubtful. The purchaser of a nail gun is not just puxhasing the gun. He buys a 
complete package including the cartridge strips and nails. An attempt to charge monopoly prices with 
respect to the nails would increase the price of the package as a whole. This means that customers 
would cease to buy the bundle and would reduce the monopolist’s profits. According to Bork’s
8® See Nalebuff (2003), op. a t., p. 17.
8^ Case IV/30.787, Eurofìx-Bauco v. Hilti, at 74.
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interpretation, Hilti would not have had ability to gain additional profits by bundling the nails and the 
cartridge.9̂ ^
Some commentators believe that exclusionary leveraging would have been a likely strategy. For 
instance, Price argues that Hilti’s behaviour would exclude competitors from the tied market because 
they would be forced to maintain an artificially low production run that would, in turn, increase their 
cost. ^ 2  As a result, the cost increase would lead to productive inefficiency in the nail market. By 
contrast, in my view, foreclosing does not appear to have been feasible. The reason is simply that Hilti 
would not have been able to deny scale economies to other nail producers. Arguably, nail 
manufacturing does not seem to be an industry with significant economies of scale. Besides being used 
in Hilti guns, there are also many other uses for nails. This means that Hilti would not be able eliminate 
the competitive complements market in nails.
Having rejected the ieveraging strategy in the short and long term  term, the question arises whether Hilti 
had any benign reason justifying its conduct. Korah and Price claim that Hilti has bundled in order to 
monitor the use of the nail guns.®^ At first sight, their obsenration has merit. The case involved patented 
nail guns and consumables used with those guns. It appears that Hilti could not have directly metered 
high-intensity users by asking them a higher fee or by placing a counter on the nail gun. Price 
discrimination through bundling seems to therefore be a feasible explanation.
Nevertheless, their understanding of the case is somewhat flawed. First, Hilti was unable to m eter 
usage because the cartridges are supplied with a fixed number of nails.®^ Second, there appears to 
have been serious arbitrage undermining a policy of metering. This can be deduced from the 
documented efforts by Hilti to prevent parallel trade. The Commission stated that “the strategy of Hilti 
was aimed at the whole EEC in its attem pt both to stop new entrants into the market (who might start 
exporting) and to prevent otherwise profitable arbitrage."®^® Prices for Hilti guns, cartridge strips and 
nails differed quite substantially between Member States. By tying the sale of cartridges to nails and 
requiring its distributors to follow a policy of refusing to supply these cartridges to independent 
manufacturers of nails, Hilti attempted to prevent the threat of arbitrage.
See Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (Chicago, 1978), noting that “[t]he tying arrangement, whatever else it may accomplish, 
is obviously not a means of gaining two monopoly profits from a single monopoly" (p. 373).
See Price, op. cit., p. 87.
9« See Korah, EC  Competition Law and Practice (Oxford, 1997), p. 106; and. Price, op. cit., p. 87.
9** See Nalebuff (2003), op. cit., p. 17.
«9 Case IV/30.787, Euroiix-Bauco v. Hilti, at 74.
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It appears to me that Hilti had a motive other than increasing its profits when it bundled nails to 
cartridges. It could be seriously argued that the combination of safety and reputation were driving Hilti’s 
behaviour. In fact, Hilti claimed that independent nails had higher failure rates than its own. If consumers 
were to have blamed Hilti for this failure, this would have been a good reason to suspect an efficiency 
defence.
In Hilti, the Commission appears to have reached the wrong conclusion.
6.2. Tetra Pak II
Commentators likewise suggest that Tetra Pak used its market power to price discriminate among 
customers.®^® Tetra Pak’s contracts made it very difficult for customers to disguise their intensity of use. 
It required that customers would use only Tetra Pak cartons on its machines. The cartons could be used 
to monitor the usage of the machines. In order to avoid the usage of non-approved cartons. Tetra Pak 
was allowed to inspect the machines. In reality, in my view, price discrimination would not have 
succeeded. There were different valuations between consumers and countries-̂ ^  ̂As with Hilti, charging 
a single price for cartons cross Europe would have led to imperfect price discrimination.
More importantly, the public record suggests that Tetra Pak's behaviour could lead to exclusionary 
leveraging. That Tetra Pak was concerned over new entry was demonstrated by its reaction to the 
attempted entry by Elopak in Italy.®^ It is feasible that Tetra Pak’s strategy limited the size of the market 
that would be available to any new entrant The various contracts for the m xhines had different 
expiration dates. As a consequence, only a fraction of the users of aseptic packaging were available to 
a potential new entrant. This means that there was only competition for that fraction, and not in the 
whole market. This reduces entry, as the new entrant is less likely to profit considering he is not 
competing for the whole (or at least a substantial part] of the market. Interestingly, as Nalebuff noted, 
Tetra Pak reinforced this exclusionary effect by setting the price at which it may repurchase the 
machines sold or l e a s e d T h i s  would make it even more costly for a firm to switch to an alternative 
provider.
^  See Nalebuff (2003), op. cH., p. 12; and, Korah (ECLR, 1997), op. cif., p. 101.
Case lV/31.043, Tetra Pak II, annex V.
^  This reaction is documented in Case IV/31.043, Teira Pak II, at 76-83.
See Nalebuff (2003), op. d t., p. 13.
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In addition, there appears to have been another negative long-term effect. Tetra Pak’s arrangement also 
discouraged entry in the markets for repair and spare parts fo r its machines. This had the effect of 
preventing the creation of an industry that could service Tetra Pak machines. This means that any new 
entrant in the m arket for packaging machines would have to enter both markets, for customers expect 
them to do both.
In sum, the Commission appears to have reached the correct decision by finding an abuse by Tetra 
Pak, but did not, however, articulate the right reasons.
6.3. Microsoft
6.3.1. The effect on competition of the Windows-WMP bundle
Microsoft and the Commission seriously disagreed over how to assess economic foreclosure with 
respect to integrated software products. Appropriately, the Commission recognised that its media player 
case against Microsoft is not a “classic tying case* where foreclosure is more direct and apparent.s50 
The Commission applied a theory o f indirect networks. According to Microsoft, Commission has 
engaged in a “theoretical and speculative analysis" o f potential foreclosure and it "spins out a parade of 
contingent horribles.'̂ si Microsoft also stressed that its motivation for bundling is cost savings and 
standard-setting. Microsoft’s reproaches and claims are closely assessed in this section.
At the outset, it is important to have a closer look at the Commission’s requirement of foreclosing 
competition. In this regard, the decision in Microsoft is unique in two ways. For one, the Commission 
explicitly mentioned the need to foreclose competition in the tied market when assessing a bundling 
allegation for the first time. The second observation is that the Commission appears to have assumed in 
the cases of the 80s and 90s that competition was actually affected and therefore foreclosed. Now it 
says to focus on pofenf/af foreclosure.
Strictly in the legal sense, the Community case law seems to support the Commission’s position. As 
Gyselen succinctly explains, there are three foreclosure scenarios that may arise: (1) predatory intent; 
(2) actual foreclosure: and, (3) potential foreclosure.^^z
950 Case COM P/37.792. Microsoft, a t 841.
951 See Art and McCurdy, op. a t., p. 699.
952 See Gyselen, “Rebates; Competition on the Merits or Exclusionary Practice?’, 8*’ EU Compefition Law and Policy EDI 
Workshop. 2003, pp. 6-7.
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Of course, intent analysis is useful. For the separate-product issue, it plays an essential role in the multi­
factor test proposed earlier. However, evidence of exclusionary intent should never be sufficient cause 
to apply Article 82 EC. As Advocate General Jacobs notes in Glaxosmithkfine with regards to a  policy 
limiting parallel trade in Europe:
a dominant pharmaceutical undertaking which restricts the supply of Its products does not 
necessarily abuse its dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 EC merely because of its 
intention thereby to limit parallel trade. I consider it plausible [...] that an intention to limit parallel 
trade should be one of the circumstances which will ordinarily render abusive a refusal of supply 
on the part of a dominant undertaking.^
European antitrust law must therefore concentrate on the latter two scenarios of foreclosure. The usual 
description of the concept of exclusionary abuse is as follows:
the concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a 
dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of the market where, as result of the 
very presence of the undertaking In question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, 
through recourse to methods different from those which condition normal competition in products 
or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering 
the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that 
competition.95<
Obviously, if there is empirical evidence that the dominant firm’s behaviour has actually produced 
foreclosure effects, the company may run afoul of Article 82 EC. As a matter of fact, the Courts have 
never invalidated a Commission decision under Article 82 EC because it lacked evidence of actual 
foreclosure.®55 Notably, the ECJ found the mere fact of actually implementing a foreclosure practice to 
be sufficient ground for antitrust liability. For instance, in Compagnie Maritime Beige, the Court 
considered that "where one or more undertakings in a dominant position actually impiement a practice 
whose aim is to remove competitor, the fact that the result sought is not achieved is not enough to avoid 
the practice being characterized as an abuse.”̂
An elem ent of abuse is also that, in terms of competition, the prohibition covers potential impact. 
Arguments to the contrary fit more naturally with the US ideas on antitrust, and have generally not been 
favoured by the Community Courts or Commission. A policy always requiring a concrete effect would
See Advocate General Jacobs, in Case C -53/03, Syneiairismos Faramkopohn AHoIias & Akamanias and others v. 
Gtaxosrrùthkline AEVE, opinion of 28 October 2004, not yet reported, at 69-70.
^  Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods Ltd. v. Commission, at 157.
*5  See Gyselen, op. cit., p. 7 .
Cases T-24-26Ì93 and 28/93, Compagnie Maritime Beige and others v. Commission {1996] EC R 11-1201, at 149.
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seriously restrict the ability o f competition authorities to intervene until some detrimental impact has 
actually occurred, which may in fact to be too late to reverse. This is a problem particularly with network 
markets. Otherwise put, EC law covers “a degradation of market structure and dynamics -  behaviour 
exhibiting a tendency to exclude, rather than a likelihood of actual foreclosure to competitors.*957 The 
ECJ made this clear in Tetra Pak II by stating that “the aimed pursued [of competition law], which is to 
maintain undistorted competition, rules out waiting until such a[n abusive] strategy leads to the actual 
elimination o f competitors.'^^
Recently, an argument along the same lines as Microsoft has been discussed by the CFI. In British 
Airways, the applicants suggested that an actual effect must be demonstrated.®59 The Court noted that:
pjn the first place, for the purpose of establishing an infringement of Art. 82 EC, it is not 
necessary to demonstrate that the abuse in question had a concrete effect on the markets 
concerned. It is sufficient in that respect to demonstrate that the abusive conduct of the 
undertaking in a dominant position tends to restrict competition, or, in other words, that the 
conduct is capable of having, or likely to have, such an effect.®“
CFI President Vesterdorf in M/crosoft also appears to believe that proof of actual anti-competitive effects 
is essentially not required.®®  ̂ Thus, the essential requirement demonstrating concrete effects on the 
market in the form of reduced output or higher prices is ruled out as a m atter of law. Typically, any 
dominant company will try to challenge the finding o f potential foreclosure by arguing that the m arket 
circumstances make it unlikely or impossible. It is up to the Commission to rebut this argument. This 
means that the Commission must assess the alleged abuse in its market context and demonstrate that it 
is capable of producing appreciable foreclosure effects. In this sense, there is arguably no perse  test.®®^
As for the potential effects demonstrated by the Commission, it seems to be defendable that Microsoft 
pursued a long-term leveraging policy. Some commentators disagree with this finding. They believe that
95̂  See Sinclair, "Abuse of Dominance at a Crossroads -  Potential Effect, Object and Appreciability Under Article 82 E C , 
ECLR 491 (2004), p. 493 (emphasis author).
«8 Case C-333/94P, Tetra Pak II, at 300.
959 Case T-219/99, British /Uiways v. Commission, decision of 17 December 2003, not yet reported.
9“  Case T-219/99, British Airways v  Commission, a t 293 (emphasis author). See also Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar v. 
Commisston [1999] E C R 11-2969, noting that it is essential to assess whether the defendant’s conduct "tends* to strengthen 
the dominant position by distorting competition (at 114). This interpretation likewise echoes the Commission’s statement in 
Notice on the Application of foe Competition Rules to Access Agreements in foe Telecommunications Sector, [1998] OJ 
C265/2 that discrimination occurs if foe defendant's conduct is "sufficiently likely to restrict or distort actual or potential 
competition” (at 120) (emphasis added).
961 Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft v. Commission, at 400.
992 This is also recognised by Whish. See Wish, "Should there be per se abuses under Article 82 EC?*, WuW 919 (2001).
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Microsoft did not leverage.^  Conversely, other commentators like Picker believe that Microsoft's 
bundling strategy led to leveraging in the short term. I will carefully examine both positions.
As for the latter group, Picker argues that, in the shortterm, Microsoft profitably leveraged its power in 
the Windows market to the market for media players.^ In my view. It is doubtful whether Microsoft 
bundled in order to increase its current Windows and WMP profits. As Ayres and Nalebuff explain, a 
one-off Chicago game suggests that Microsoft would not gain from doing s o .^  For their argument, they 
assume that Microsoft has a monopoly in Windows and that Window's consumer value is €  100. The 
value of W MP is € 2, and the value of Real Player is € 3. RealNetworks will not exit the market until the 
price of Real Player is zero. With a zero price for Real Player, Microsoft could charge €  103 for 
Windows, as consumers value the package of Wndows plus a free Real Player at € 103. In contrast, 
the Windows-WMP bundle is only worth € 102.
If Microsoft was not concerned with the direct profits of WMP, why then did the software giant bundle its 
Windows programme with Media Player? I think that there are two feasible explanations, both relating to 
leveraging in the long term.
For one, the argument could be made that the Windows-WMP bundle will lead to defensive leveraging. 
Microsoft was concerned with the potential threat of WMP to its Windows monopoly. The media player 
market is a threat in that it could be used as an entry point into the Windows market. Analogous to the 
browser market and the US proceedings, Microsoft was afraid that other media players would use its 
platform to enter and compete against Windows. To eliminate this threat, rival media players should be 
driven out of the market. Of course, Microsoft asserts that the European case is different. Their 
argument is simple: a media player is much less likely to develop Into an operating system than a 
browser program. Commentators also believe that media players would only be a weak beachhead in a 
larger attack on Windows.̂ ®®
However, rival players have the potential to morph into broad-based platforms like Windows virtien 
seriously combined with other software such as Java. Indeed, Media players do expose their own APIs.
^  For a different view, see Furse, 'Abusive Dynamics’, ECLR199 (2004), p. 200.
^  See Picker, “Unbundling Scope-of-Permission Goods: When Should We Invest in Reducing Entry Barners?', U. Chi. L  
Rev. 189 (2005), p. 202.
*5  See Ayres and Nalebuff, op. c l,  p. 2.
See Picker (2005), op. c l ,  p. 202.
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Applications can be written on them , as AOL has done with RealNetwork’s media player.s^? To be sure, 
media players now seem to not be as threatening to Windows as other competing Internet browsers in 
the US case. However, they may become a potential threat in the future for part of the Windows 
functions. W ith defensive leveraging, a  company like Microsoft is ‘killing’ the innovative nature of the 
market for media players, and thereby excluding any threat whatsoever from that market.
Second, this case is not only about the PC version of Windows. Now operating systems may be found in 
mobile phones, TV  set-top boxes and handheld devices. When studying potential foreclosure on media 
markets, one must consider the two-sided character o f the market^es One is the market for the actual 
media players running on the consumers’ desk top. The other is software that is sold by Microsoft, 
RealNetworks or Apple to content providers allowing them to encode their content in a format delivering 
their programmes to media player users.
Competition in the market for encoding software for content providers is subject to strong network 
effects. The more PCs that have a decoder for a specific form at, the more attractive it becomes for 
content providers to encode in that format. As encoding in multiple formats is costly, they prefer using 
only one format. It is clear that bundling by Microsoft in the Windows market with its media format 
decoding software can completely tip the m arket for encoding software toward itself. In that case, the 
market for media players will tip to Microsoft’s proprietary standard. As Kühn, Stillman and Caffarra 
rightly observe, Microsoft is another example of how bundling today can completely change competition 
in the market in the future.^®
A possible motivation that could be brought forward by Microsoft is that software bundles can generate 
efficiencies by saving costs and enhancing functionality. These claims should be assessed very 
carefully. It is doubtful whether bundling is necessary to realise these possible efficiencies.^^^ For one, 
having one standard lowers costs for suppliers and consumers. It is accepted for competing formats 
fight over a de fado  standard, or for industry associations to set such standards. On the other hand, 
this observation does not imply that a monopolist must be allowed to lever its market in order to create a 
proprietary standard in another market. Such a policy could lead to serious costs, such as setting the
Case COMP/37.792, Microsoft, noting that ‘ [sjoftware programmes can be written to the Window Media Player APIs’  (at 
892), that ‘AOL 6.0 and 7.0 make API calls to RealPlayer*(at 966), and that “media Players -  Microsoft gives RealRayer as 
an example -  expose their APIs’  (a t 972).
See Kühn, StHman and Caffarra, “Economic Theories of Bundling and Their Policy Implications in Abuse Cases: An 
Assessment in the Light of the Microsoft Case’ , ECJ 85 (2005), pp. 1 0 M  02; and, Picker (2005), op. c/f., p. 203.
See Kühn, Stillman and Caffane, op. ciL, p. 101. 
s™ See Kühn, Stillman and Caffarra, op. cff., p. 105.
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wrong standard, reduced incentives for innovation, and all the inefficiencies resulting from establishing a 
second monopoly.
6.3.2. The remedy fails to address all competition concerns
The Commission ordered Microsoft to sell a version of Windows without WMP. Will this remedy, as the 
old saying goes, change the price of fish? In my view, it would not. By common perception, I argue that 
the remedy did not go far enough.
During the settlement talks, Microsoft offered some version o f “mandatory versioning” as an alternative 
to unbundling.371 W hen choosing between these two options, the Commission accurately picked the 
rem edy to unbundle Windows and W MP over the obligation to carry rival players. However, as Ayres 
and Nalebuff note, the Commission’s choice was correct, but there was no need to choose.372 Perhaps 
a better remedy would have been combining both approaches.
Microsoft first suggested including rival media players in a CD to be supplied when buying a 
computer.373 Because it would not have created a level-playing field in the market for players, this 
remedy was fundamentally flawed, and correctly, I think, dismissed. Arguably, less-informed consumers 
would simply ignore the CD. Moreover, it would be likely that even knowledgeable consumers would 
disregard this option, as they probably did not want to spend time on installation.
Later, Microsoft and the Commission discussed the option of pre-installing rival players in addition to 
W M P. Microsoft would be required to include three other media players in its Windov\fs with media 
functionality. The Commission would select two players and the OEM would have the choice of the third 
one.974 This remedy has two advantages. It can restore some of the level-playing field in the market 
because it helps increase the availability of rival media players. The other advantage is that it would 
directly mitigate the tipping threat towards the Windows media format. The disadvantage for Microsoft is 
that extra players would take up valuable space in the computer. It is doubtful whether this is a genuine 
problem. 1 believe the size of a media player is less than 10 megabytes. As there are hard drives of 60  
megabytes or more, this seems to be an irrelevant cost.
The term Is borrowed from Picker. See Picker, ‘Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft The Dedining Need for Centralised 
Coordination in a  Networked World", J. InsL & Theoretical Econ, 113 (2002), pp. 115-116.
3^ See Ayres and Nalebuff, op. cif., p. 6.
9^ See www.windowsitDro.com/Article/AfticlelD/42040/42040.html.15 March 2004.
»4 See www.2dnet.co.uk/Drint:?TYPE=storv&AT=3915Q622-39027001t-2100QQ14c. 20 March 2004.
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However, mandatory versioning has one fatal shortcoming. It would not solve the underlying problem 
that WMP is loaded on all new machines running on Windows. As a result, content providers would still 
have an incentive to encode in Windows format. To prevent the tipping threat, it is crucial that content 
providers believe that alternative formats are of superior quality or with a wider reach.^^s other media 
players should remain viable in the market. Some people must therefore not have WMP on their 
Windows. In order for this to happen, it is essential, in my view, to go beyond Microsoft’s must-carry 
plan.
Under the unbundling remedy, Microsoft is forced to negotiate with OEMs like Dell, HP, Lenovo and 
Fujitsu Siemens to have the full-fledged version of Windows installed on Windows. It would have to 
bargain to get W M P on the desktop, just as RealNetworks, Apple, and all other media players 
companies currently bargain for the distribution of their software. It should be stressed that the remedy 
is based on the assumption that OEMs would be interested in actually buying the unbundled version, 
now called Windows XP
However, I submit that it is likely that OEMs will snub the antitrust altered version of Windows for two 
interrelated reasons. For one, given that today Microsoft is giving away W MP, it can be expected that it 
will continue to give it away. That suggests that Windows XP N will be offered for the same price as the 
standard version of Windows XP. A second reason is that OEMs would not install Windows XP N on 
their computers, as users now expect to have a media player included. As a consequence, the lack of 
interest from OEM s for Windows XP N would undermine the effectiveness of the remedy. Press reports 
suggest that this doom scenario is actually happening.^^r
Arguably, a better remedy would have been to combine both approaches discussed. Unbundling is 
necessary in order to mitigate Microsoft’s unique ability to ensure that its W MP would be on all new 
machines. To ensure that OEMs m ay actually choose the version without W MP, Microsoft must be 
required to carry rival media players on the unbundled version of Windows. To avoid interoperability 
problems, rival players could license W M P decoders in order to play WMP files.
See Picker (2005), op. df., writing that 'Windows isn’t  just software: it is one of the best possible vehicles for distributing 
software" {p. 204).
9™ There has been dispute over the name of the new Windows version. Microsoft wanted to name it ‘Windows XP Reduced 
Media Edition.’ The Commission refused this label, saying that the name would discourage sales and mislead customers. 
See ’’Microsoft, EU Agree on Slimmer Version of Windows System”, Wall Street Journal, 29 March 2005.
9^ See www.zdnet.co.uk/software/windows/0.39020396.39203741.0Q.htm. 20 June 2005.
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After the decision in Microsoñ, US officials appear to be reacting with more emotion than diplomacy. 
They patronisingly lectured the EC, saying that sound antitrust policy must avoid chilling innovation and 
competition even by dominant undertakings.®^® Conversely, Microsoft is free to innovate in virtually 
every way under the EC decision. Microsoft should fight the media player battle through innovation, not 
by leveraging a possible inferior product onto reluctant consumers. It could be argued that the contested 
decision will give Microsoft more, not less, incentive to innovate. The interest of the Commission was 
opening affected markets to competition so that increasing innovation would benefit all consumers in the 
form of better choices and lower prices. It is ironic that the firms whose innovative efforts Microsoft anti- 
competitively suppressed were mostly American.
7. Choosing the legal standard for bundling
Which standard should be applied for bundling? Many tests have been applied or suggested. I 
discussed in Chapter 1, for instance, the absolute and modified perse  illegality tests. The advantage of 
these tests is arguably that they can lead to swift decisions in many cases. However, their application 
will be neither simple nor error-free, for two main reasons. Those tests are therefore to be immediately 
dismissed.
First, the tests will apply to only a few, if any, cases. Many cases of bundling will also raise efficiency 
justifications that are at least plausible. W here valid efficiency claims are made, it is necessary to 
balance the benefits against harms in order to reduce the likelihood of enor. Any absolute perse  test is 
therefore to be rejected immediately. The modified perse  test shouldn’t be seriously considered either, 
as it also downplays and sometimes neglects efficiencies. Second, the modified per se test wili not 
really involve much of a reduction in the needed amount of analysis.
The antitrust literature and case law advocates a number of other tests for bundling.®^® In Section 7 , 1 
will discuss: (1) the software-specific test; (2) the predation test; (3) the refusal to supply test; (4) the 
modified per se legal test; and, (5) the rule of reason test.
For instance, see www.usdoi.QOv/atr/Dublic/Dress releases/2004/202976.litnn. 24 March 2004.
Some commentators have proposed to challenge Microsoft’s monopoly in the operating systems market directly by 
changing copyright laws. For instance, see Brennan, Do Easy Cases Aiate Bad Law? Antitrust Innovatbns o r Missed 
Opportunities in United States v. Microsoft (AEI-Brookings paper, 2002), pp. 44-45. By contrast, I focus in this thesis on 
antitnist solutions. For a  detailed general argument that competition law should intervene to ensure that private parlies 
cannot extend their intellectual property protection beyond the limits allowed by law, see Ullrich, Expansionist Intellectual 
Property Protection and Reductionist Competition Rules: A TRIPS Perspective (Berkeley Center for Law and Technology, 
2005).
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7.1. The software-specific test
Considering Microsoft, some commentators suggest applying a software-specific test. Software is 
inherently different, and should therefore be subjected to a different legal regime. These commentators 
prefer a distinct legal test, although they are unclear over the bundling test in general.
Their software-specific test could be applied on two levels: the separate-product issue or the analysis of 
the effects on competition. Focusing on the former, Elhauge claims that software products that combine 
historically distinct products in a new and useful way should be considered one “integrated" product 
rather than two distinct products.̂ so For the latter approach, Rule argues that technological bundling in 
itself should not be attacked
There are two important reasons to reject the software-specific test. First, as White rightly observes with 
regards to the US proceedings, the test must be designed to deal with all markets, not just high-tech 
markets.8®2 i^oce importantly, the test must leave a lot of room for strategic bundling. As with Lessig’s 
version of the technological-integration test, it may create an incentive for software producers and 
developers to modify their code so as to make it fit within the terms of the test.̂ ^^ |p sum, the software- 
specific test must be dismissed.
7.2. The predation test
Another way to address the issue is to abandon the concept o f bundling. There has been suggestion to 
redefine bundling as predatory behaviour.s®^ As Tirole recently notes, “p]t is difficult to think of reasons 
that tying should be considered a separate offense. Competition policy should therefore analyze tying 
cases through the more general lens of a predation test."̂ ®®
A predation test looks at the willingness of the company under investigation to sacrifice short-term  
revenues or profits in exchange for larger revenues anticipated to materialise later once a monopoly has
9® See Elhauge, "Xiombination Lock: the DC Circuit Incorrectly Applied an Integrated-Product Test in Microsoft Case*, San 
Frandscx) Daily Journal, 14 July 14, at 4.
981 See Rule, T h e  EC Decision Against Microsoft: Windows on the World, Glass Houses, or Through the Looking Glass?*,
www.antitrust50urce.com. 30 June 2004.
982 See White, "Microsoft and Browsers: Are the Antitrust Problems Really New?’, in: Eisenach and Lenard (eds.), 
Competit'on, Innovation and the Microsoft Monopoly: Antitrust in the Digital Marketplace (Boston, 1999), writing that "pjhe 
antitrust issues at stake in Microsoft are not new and are not unique to computer software’  (p. 139).
983 See Lessig, op. cit., pp. 39-42.
98< See Tirole, T h e  Analysis of Tying Case: A Primer*, Comp. Pol’y. Infl. 1 (2005); and, Brennan, op. cit., pp. 42-43.
988 See Tirole, op. cit., p. 15.
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been created, or the dominant position has been strengthened.986 In other words, this test asks whether 
the conduct in question would make business sense for its tendency to eliminate or lessen 
competition.967 Although the test has some flaws968, it can surely be useful in unilateral refusal to deal 
and predatory pricing cases.
I have my doubts whether the test would work for bundling. In my view, there are at least two problems 
with a predation test.969 First, the test requires recoupment o f the short-term profits sacrificed. If there is 
no sacrifice of immediate profits, the price charged is considered efficient, and thus lawful. From the 
outset, bundling is likely to be profitable to the dominant company, surely in the short-term. Neither 
short-term sacrifice nor subsequent recoupment is necessary in order to make the practice profitable. 
This means that the conduct would not run afoul of competition rules. Second, the test does not account 
for the cost or likelihood of errors. Its application is independent of the nature of the behaviour, and prior 
evidence as to whether the practice is likely to be good or bad. In conclusion, a predation test is likely to 
yield unpredictable results with regards to bundling.
7.3. The refusal to supply test
Other commentators like Art and McCurdy assert that bundling should be assessed under the refusal to 
supply test of Bronner.^  Like with the predation test, Art and McCurdy prefer to abandon the concept of 
bundling. Essentially, they advocate that any bundling case could be re-interpreted as a refusal to 
supply case.
In order to understand and dismiss their argument, it is first useful to have a closer look at Bronner. 
Mediaprint, a publisher of two Austrian newspapers, refused to grant its rival Bronner access to its 
nationwide newspaper home-delivery network. Bronner claimed that a  dominant company is required to 
allow access to competitors in the downstream market unless refusal to supply can be objectively 
justified. It contended that the access requested was essential for its business as it was not 
economically feasible to establish its own distribution network due to the limited circulation of its
See Hovenkamp, “Exdusion and the Sherman Act", U. Chi. L  Rev. 147 (2005), pp. 155-158.
5®̂  See Vidiers, ‘Abuse of Market Power", Econ. J. 244 (2005), p. 257.
Tlieoretically, the test must specify the benchmark for assessing whether there has been sacrifice and that is very difficult 
In addition, it is unclear whether sacrifice is a necessary or sufficient condition for the application of Article 81 and 82 EC. 
See Vickers, op. c l,  pp. 250-256.
By contrast, Brennan seems to believe that bundling could be assessed under a predation test See Brennan, op. c l ,  p. 
42.
See Art and McCurdy, op. c l ,  pp. 703-707.
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newspaper. The ECJ rejected Brenner’s argument.®®^ For access, the facility must be truly 
indispensable and the refusal is likely to eliminate all competition in the market. The ECJ observed that 
other forms of distribution existed, and, whüe they were less favourable, did not lead to a finding that 
Mediaprint's service was essential.
Applying the Bronner scenario to Microsoft, the Commission should have examined whether Microsoft 
was dominant in a  market for the supply of distribution services for media players. It should have 
assessed, Art and McCurdy claim, w hether the software giant abused this dominant position through 
refusal to supply appropriate distribution services that were necessary to maintain competition in the 
media player market. In other words, they assert that Microsoft concerns access to the OEM distribution 
channel like Brenner’s access to Mediaprint’s distribution network.
Applying the refusal to supply test of Bronner, the authors claimed that the refusal to include third-party 
media player functionality in Windows would not constitute an abuse under Article 82 EC. Art and 
McCurdy stress four arguments why the principles o f Bronner should not apply. First, distribution in 
Windows is not indispensable, as Internet downloading is a  feasible but only le s s  advantageous” 
distribution ch an n e l.®®2 Second, there is no new product being prevented. By contrast, the essence of 
the Commission’s complaint is that Microsoft is offering precisely the same functionality as its 
competitors in the putative relevant market. This suggests that the hypothetical refusal to deal causes 
foreclosure primarily to directly competitive products in the same market, not a secondary market. Third, 
there is no foreclosure because the media player market appears to be far more vibrant than the 
newspaper m arket in Bronner.®®^ Finally, Microsoft has objective justification for its own integration, as 
the W indows-W MP bundle is innovative and beneficial for consumers.
Although Art and McCurdy’s proposition has merit at first glance, a closer examination reveals that their 
approach is flawed and to be dismissed. As for the test itself, there is surely room for discussion as to 
whether the criteria of Bronner apply or not. To make this point, I refer to an article written by Creuss 
and Agustinoy.®®^ Stressing that the Windows system is the main gate to the Internet, they succinctly
Case C-7/97, Bronner, at 36-47. For details on the essential facilities doctrine, see Doherty, “Just W hat Are Essential 
facilities?’ , CMLRev. 38 (2001); Bergman, ‘ Editorial: The Bronner Case -  A  Turning Point for the Essential Facilities 
Doctrine?", ECLR 59 (2000); Hancher, “Case Note on Oscar Bronner", CMLRev. 1289 (1999); and, Temple Lang, ‘Defining 
Legitimate Competition: Companies' Duties to Supply Competitors and Access to Essential Facilities’ , Fordham Int'l L. J. 437 
(1994).
992 Case COM P/37.792, Microsoft, at 119.
993 Case CO M P/37.792, Microsoft, at 919.
99* See Creuss and Agustinoy, "Tiie Operative System as an Essential Facility; An Open Door to Windows?", W.Comp. 57 
(2000), pp. 71-77.
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argue that Windows is an essential facility because it is impossible to create a parallel substitute or 
alternative compatible system for accessing the Internet. If they are right, then Microsoft behaviour 
constitutes an abuse.
A second observation is that Art and McCruby’s approach raises pressing questions in general. On an 
analytical level, Art and McCurdy fail to give any theoretical reason why we should apply a refusal to 
supply test. The authors only make it clear that if  the facts o f the case are seen as a refusai to supply 
scenario, a condemnation of Microsoft for bundling would create serious tension with the restrictive 
interpretation of the essential facilities doctrine in Bronner,^^ They note:
[i]f the Commission cannot satisfy the very high standard necessary to impose a 'must carry’ 
remedy, there is something fundamentally wrong with allowing the Commission to satisfy a much 
lower standard by misapplying a traditional tying analysis to product integration and forcing 
Microsoft to remove the integrated media player functionality from the many interdependent and 
complementary elements of its operating system.̂ ^®
In addition, they emphasise that antitrust liability under EC law would conflict with the US decisions in 
Trinko and Re Microsoft Corporation Antitrust Litigation.^^ In my view, none of these arguments explain 
why the refusal to supply test must be applied. I have three reasons for this contention.
First, concerning the potential divergence with US law, it should be stressed that EC competition law is 
distinctly ‘European.* The mere fact that Community legal system may conflict with the US approach is 
no argument to change the law. Second, the fact that the Commission gave extensive consideration to 
mandatory versioning indeed underscores the importance of the OEM distribution channel. However, It 
does not, as Art and McCurdy seem to suggest, signal that the core competitive harni stemmed from 
Microsoft’s privileged access to this channel.̂ ^®
Third, on a doctrinal level, Microsoft appears to assume that bundling and the essential facilities doctrine 
ate  mutually exclusive. For one, surely, there may be some overlap when it concerns bundling of 
‘essential’ components. One could think of the refusal to supply the essential component of a bundle in 
an un-tied form. However, many disputes are beyond the scope of essential facilities. This observation
*5  See Art and McCurdy, op. c/f., p. 703.
See Art and McCurdy, op. cit., p. 705.
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Ttinko LLP (Trinko) 540 US 682 (2004) and Re Microsoft Corporation Antitrust Litigation 
333 F.3d 517 (4 * Cir. 2003). Trinko significantiy limits the circumstances in which antitrust law forces a firm to assist its 
competitors by providing access to its infrastructure. The tatter case arose between Sun Microsystems and Microsoft In that 
case, the Court of Appeals overturned a lower court’s order requiring Microsoft top carry Sun’s Java middleware product on 
its Windows system.
See Art and McCurdy, op. cit., p. 700.
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already suggests that the concept o f bundling has its own scope of application. Moreover, as Temple 
Lang writes with regard to Article 82. “the types of infringement are r?of mutually exclusive.“99̂
That the sam e set of facts and circumstances may constitute distinct abuses seems to be a settled 
issue. The position was recently confirmed by the CFI. In Van den Bergh, it affirmed that the 
Commission has the power to determine what type of abuse a particular set constitutes. In reaction to 
Van den Bergh’s plea to apply Advocate General Jacobs’ opinion in Bronner to the case at hand, the 
Court stated that the reference is “irrelevant in the present case because [...], [the Commission] did not 
claim in the contested decision that [Van den Bergh’s] freezer cabinets were an 'essential fac ilit/, which 
is the issue examined in his opinion."looo
In the same case, the CFI also appears to identify a  second argument why it did not consider the 
cabinets an essential facility. It stressed that “it is not necessary for [Van den Bergh] to transfer an asset 
or to conclude contracts with persons which it has not selected in complying with the contested 
decision."iooi Applying these considerations to Microsoft, the same conclusion prevails. The transfer of 
an asset is not a t issue. Microsoft didn’t exclude third-party media players from Windows either, as 
consumers were free to install other players on their operating system.
In sum, the refusal to supply approach should, in my view, be dismissed. Rather, it could be argued that, 
given the shortcomings of the essential facilities doctrine, bundling is a fruitful alternative. For instance, 
very recently the French Competition Authority decided that Apple’s refusal to license its digital rights 
m anagement technology to a competitor in the downstream market for music downloads did not 
constitute an abuse because Apple’s technology was not an essential facility . ‘‘ °°2 Arguably, the dispute 
could have been characterised as a bundle between the upstream market for Apple’s digital rights 
m anagement and the downstream m arket for music downloads.
See Temple Lang, “Monopolisation and the Definition of ‘Abuse’ of a Dominant Position under Article 86 EEC Treaty", 
C M LRev345 (1979), p. 363.
1000 Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods Ltd. v. Commission, at 161.
Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods Ltd. v. Commission, at 161.
1002 Decision 04-D -54, VirginMega v. Apple Computer France, 9 November 2004, www.conseil- 
concurTence.fr/Ddf/avis/04d54 Ddf. For details, see Mazziotti, 'D id  Apple’s Refusal to License Proprietary Informartion 
enabling Interoperability with its iPod Music Player Constitute an Abuse under Article 82 of the EC Treaty?", W.Comp. 253 
(2005); and, Deneuter, ‘No Abuse of Market Dominance by Apple according to the French Competition Coundl", 
www.ulvs.com. 23 December 2004.
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7.4. The m odified p erse  legal test
Reœ nlly, some commentators have been advocating a laissez-faire approach to bundling.̂ oos Ahibom, 
Evans and Padilla suggest a modified per se  legal rule for bundling on the basis that the efficiency 
effects of bundling are ubiquitous, while the anti-competitive effects are highly unlikely.low in rare 
instances of antitrust intervention, they advance a delicate assessment of the parameters and 
assumptions o f (he relevant economic theories. Based on a decision theoretic argument, Hylton and 
Salinger come to the same conclusion and propose applying a  modified legal test.^“ ®
Under EC law, the exceptional circumstances test for compulsory licensing, as enunciated in the Magill 
and IM S  series of decisions, Is an example of this approach.‘'00® The starting point of the antitmst 
analysis in those cases is that property owners may refuse to license even if they are dominant. Being 
dominant, they may only be forced to license when all of the following conditions hold: (1) access is 
indispensable for providing a product to a  secondary market; (2) there Is demonstrable potential 
demand for the would-be product; (3) denial o f access would eliminate all competition in a secondary 
market: and (4) there are no objective justifications for the refusal to give access.'*“ ^
I believe that a modified per se legal test like in IMS is too lenient for bundling. First, its proponents 
wrongly make a blanket assertion of efficiencies due to bundling. Contrary to their claims, steady-fast 
tying of products that could be sold separately in competitive markets is no basis for the conclusion that 
bundling almost invariably produces consumer benefits.ioos Second, the literature discussed in Chapter 
1 also shows that bundling allegations merit careful investigation when employed by firms holding 
market power. Leveraging in the long term is a  particularly serious problem that must be considered.
There Is perhaps a third reason why there should be a higher threshold for compulsory licensing than 
bundling. The former directly concerns the essence of an IP right itself, whereas bundling relates to the
10C3 See also chapter 1.
1004 See Ahibom, Evans and Padilla, The Antitrust Bconomics of Tying -  A Farewell to P erse Illegality (AEI-Brookings paper, 
2003).
100s See Hylton and Salinger, “Tying Law and Policy: A  Decision Theoretic Approach", Antitnist L  J. 69 (2001).
For details, see Houdijk, 'Rechtspraak op het Snijvlak van Mededingingsrecht en Intellectuele Eigendomsrecht het 
Evenwicht tussen de Rechtsgebieden in het Anest IM S  Health’, SEW 23 (2005); Derdaye, “The IM S Health Decision: A 
Triple Victory", W.Comp. 397 (2004); Prete, “From Magill to IMS: Dominant Firms’ Duty to ücense Competitors*, E B LR 1071 
(2004); and, Hatzopoulos, “Case 0418 /01 , IM SHealth GmbHv. NDCHealth GmbH", CMLRev. 1613 (2004).
^  Geradin, ‘Limiting the scope of Article 82 EC: W hat Can the EU Learn from the U.S. Supreme Courts Judgment in 
Trinko in the Wake of MicrosofI, IMS, and Deufsche Telekom T, CMLRev. 1519 (2004), pp. 1525*1539.
1008 For such claims, see Evans and Salinger, “Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and 
Implications for Tying Law", Yale J. on Reg. 37 (2005).
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manner in which a product is m arketed or designed, in the case o f technical bundling. In fact, IP owners 
have the right to refuse to grant a licence, even if it is undertaking holding a dominant position.''“  ̂This 
Is the essential nature of the IP  right. An antitrust remedy to license would directly mitigate that right. It is 
therefore important to set a very high threshold. As Advocate G eneral Maduro succinctly writes in KPN:
a duty under Article 82 EC for a dominant undertaking to aid its competitors should not be 
assumed too f/ghffy and refusal to supply a competitor Is not automatically considered abusive 
just because the inputs in question are necessary to compete on a secondary market A balance 
should be kept between the interest in preserving or creating free competition in a particular 
market and the interest in not detem'ng investment and innovation by demanding that the fruits of 
commercial success be shared with competitors.̂ ’̂^̂’
The case concerned a reference from the Dutch Administrative Court for Trade and Industry on an issue 
related to the liberalisation o f the m arket for telecommunications services in the Netherlands. The 
dispute arose between the national provider of universal services and a small rival publisher of 
telephone directories. The liberalisation mles required KPN to supply essential subscriber information 
like name, address and telephone number to any third party requesting that information.''oii The rival 
publisher had also requested additional information regarding subscribers’ mobile phone numbers and 
profession.
The referring court asked whether KPN was obliged, under Article 82, to supply the rival with the 
requested additional data. The Advocate General believes it should. As a former monopolist KPN was 
previously shielded from competition, he stresses that potentially deterrent effect on investment and 
innovation due to compulsory licensing would be “m inim ar and “likely to be outweighed by the interest 
in promoting competition."io^2
^«9 Case C -418/01, IM S Health v. N D C  [2004] EC R I-5039, noting that •[ajccording to settled case-law, the exclusive right of 
reproduction forms part of the owner’s right, so that the refusal o f grant a licence, even if it is the act of an undertaking 
holding a dominant position, cannot in itself constitute an abuse o f a dominant position”(at 34),
1010 See Advocate General Maduro, in Case C -109/03, KPN Telecom BV v. OPTA, opinion of 14 July 2004, not yet reported, 
at 39 (emphasis added).
1011 See Article 6 (3 ) of Directive 98/10 on the Application of Open Network Provision to Telephony and on Universal Service 
for Telecommunications in a Competitive Environment [1998] O J 1988 L101/24.
1012 See Advocate General Maduro, in Case C -109/03, KPN Telecom BV v. OPTA, at 40.
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7.5. The rule of reason test
As I already observed, there are two types o f rules of reason tests: an unstructured and a structured 
one. The Commission appears to favour the unstructured test.
In Microsoft, it advanced a lest similar to the Court of Appeals’ test in Microsoft in the US case, 
the challenged practice must have the potential to harm competition, not merely competitors. This 
means that the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the monopolist’s conduct has the requisite anti­
competitive effect. The monopolist may offer a pro-competitive justification for its practice. If the 
monopolist’s justification stands un-rebutted, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the anti­
competitive harm of the practice outweighs the pro-competitive benefit. The Commission likewise 
assessed first the anti-competitive impact o f the Windows-Media Player bundle. After considering that 
examination, it rejected Microsoft’s efficiency claims, possibly off-setting the negative effects.
Contrary to Evans’ contention that “[t]he debate now is where the law should settle between the 
modified per se legality and unstructured rule of reason," the reliance on the unstructured test, is my 
view, to be rejected.''°^^ The test does not ultimately offer what the courts, authorities or business really 
need: operational and predictable rules. Commissioner Kroes recently stressed the Importance of this 
point: “As an economist, I want an economically sound framework. But as an enforcer, I need a 
workable and operational for making enforcement decisions."io^5
In my view, a case-by-case analysis directly weighing the positive and negative effects of a business 
practice does not give that guidance. By contrast, a structured rule examines the conduct under 
investigation through a series of screens that sort out the legal from illegaP'̂ ^s Perhaps there are two 
reasons why a structured test is superior. First, it gives an arguably good balance between the essential 
guidance and the preferred economically sound framework for a modernised Article 82 enforcement. 
Second, it makes sure that bundling analysis will not involve endless fact finding, as one might imagine 
from the exhaustive list of factors required under an unstructured test like under US law.''̂ ^^
1013 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), at 94.
1014 See Evans, *How Economists Can Help Courts Design Competition Rules: An EU and US Perspective’ , W.Comp. 93 
(2005), p. 98.
1015 See Kroes, Tackling Exclusionary Practices to Avoid Exploitatìon of market Power -  Some Preliminary Thoughts on the 
Policy Review of Article 82’ , speech 05/537,23 September 2005.
1016 Por the application of a structured rule of reason to loyalty rebates, see Spector, “Loyalty Rebates: An Assessment of 
Compet'tion Concerns and a Proposed Structured Rule of Reason’ , Comp. Pol'y Intern*! 89 (2005), pp. 108-114.
1017 Chicago Board o f Trade v. US, 246 US 231 (1918), holding that courts must assess “whether the restrain imposed is 
such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
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The structured inquiry is focused and structured around the specific theories of competitive harm and 
efficiency benefits that I discussed in Chapter 1. First, the m ie supports some type of safe harbour 
clause, under which some types of bundling would be per se legal. It can be cam'ed out in a now- 
proverbial “twinkling of an eye" if the defendant’s behaviour falls within the scope of the safe harbour 
rule.‘’°̂ 8 Jo begin with, there is no need for antitrust intervention if there is no market power. In the case 
of market power, intervention is not necessary if the bundle concerns substitute or complementary 
goods unless the bundle of complementary goods concerns markets with strong network effects, or if 
there is significant foreclosure in the tied market.
Behaviour not covered by this safe harbour is assessed under a second filter addressing its possible 
anti-competitive impact. The Courts or Commission must state a logically consistent and plausible claim 
of significant antitrust injury. Bundling should be attacked if leveraging in the short or long term is likely 
to occur and, ultimately, harm consumers. Third, they must then evaluate the magnitude of possible pro- 
competitive explanations. In the absence of positive effects, the practice would be considered illegal. If 
there are positive effects, it is necessary to balance the anti-competitive impact and the pro-competitive 
explanations.
In the concluding chapter, I will sketch in more detail this structured rule of reason framework for Article 
82 EC.
8. Conclusions
In this chapter, I assessed bundling under Articles 81 and 82 EC, Like in the US, there is a gradual 
erosion of the p e r se approach towards bundling. The Court’s and Commission’s practice in 70s and 
80s regarding bundling can be called harsh. A form-based rule was adopted on assumptions about the 
harmfulness of leveraging, particularly with respect to exclusion. The Commission’s practice also 
suggests that the presence of market power was not a necessary requirement for successfully 
implementing bundling.
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied, its condition before an after the restraint was imposed, the nature of 
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting 
the particular rem edy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intenton 
will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse, but because knowledge of intent may help the court to 
interpret facts and to predict consequences* (at 238).
’018 The term comes from: NCAAv. B oardof Regents o f the University o f Oklahoma, 468 US 85(1984), 110, fn. 39.
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Although the legal approach was still form-based and per se, there were significant modifications in the 
90s. The market power requirement was taken more seriously and economics played a greater role in 
explaining and justifying bundling arrangements. This resulted in a two-faced approach that I described 
as a modified per se test. The recent decisions, with Microsoft as a leading example, tend toward an 
effect-based approach. The Commission appears to have somewhat recast the analytical framework in 
comparison with its previous cases. It can be said that the new approach comes close to an 
unstructured rule of reason test.
Essentially, the following specific obsenrations can be made. First, after having discussed the 
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed single-factor tests, I suggest that the separability of 
products should be assessed under a multi-factor test. I appraised the multi-factor test by applying it to 
the facts of Microsoft,
Second, the forgoing proposed structured rule of reason remedies the flaws in the analysis applied thus 
fa r by the Community Courts and Commission. It is superior over the unstructured rule of reason test 
because of its increased guidance. In general, the structured test is better equipped to undertake full 
consideration of the harms and benefits to consumers which result from bundling. It would be a 
significant step forward to have this conclusion property codified in the application of EC law.
Third, I suggest dropping bundling analysis under Article 81 EC. Although the analysis of Article 81 EC 
is more effects-based than under Article 82 EC, it may also be applied in cases lacking the necessary 
m arket power to pursue a feasible leveraging practice.
Fourth, a legal-economic assessment of Hilti, Tetra Pak H and Microsoft reveals that different 
conclusions than those reached by the Commission are also possible. I explain that Hilti’s efforts are 
likely to have been pro-competitive. In my view, the Commission reached the right result in Tetra Pak II, 
but did not articulate the right reasons, namely leveraging in the long term. As for the decision in 
Microsoft, I believe that there are serious leveraging concerns in the long term on two markets. 
Microsoft has a clear interest in killing all innovation in the media player market in order to protect its 
position in the Windows market. By the Windows-WMP bundle, Microsoft also seeks to tip the market 
for encoding software to itseif. Conversely, 1 am critical about the chosen remedy. In my view, a 
combined unbundling and mandatory versioning remedy would have been more suitable, given the 
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The final part of this thesis concentrates on ex ante regulation of bundling. There is an increasing 
tendency to address bundling under the merger rules. Recently, the Commission has been concerned 
with the ability o f merged entities to bundle products in order to leverage market power from the main 
market to a related market. The Commission approach has been recognised by the Community Courts.
This chapter aims to examine if and how the European merger control system can address this issue. I 
make two claims. The first is that merger control in the EU can in principle address strategic bundling. I 
attempt to summarise and criticise this bundling theory. My second claim is that it is advisable to block a
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merger for bundling concerns only in very limited cases. My general suggestion is that Article 82 EC Is, 
in most cases, sufficient to address bundling.
2. An outline of the merger rules in the US and EU
2.1. The merger control law in the US
The US merger control regime originated in efforts at the turn of the 2 0 * century to use the Sherman Act 
to unwind combinations that had yielded dominant positions.'*oi9 An example of this approach is the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Northern Securities.^^^ The ruling, delivered in 1904, implied that mergers 
between rivals previously competing directly constituted a restraint of trade violating Sherman Act § 1, 
regardless of the purpose that motivated the merger.
After the Supreme Court declared in 1911 that the full-blown reasonableness inquiry applies to all 
questions under the Sherman Act, the reach of the Act with regards to mergers was seriously 
undermined.'*o2i Not surprisingly, business adapted their techniques of conducting business. As a result, 
the US saw its first great merger wave in the 1890’s, after and perhaps due to the Sherman Act.
Congress reacted soon. In 1914, it adopted the Clayton Act. The Act prohibited a number of specific 
business practices, including anti-competitive acquisitions. The merger provision, Clayton Act § 7, 
prohibited the acquisition of the "stock or other share capital of another corporation [...] where the effect 
of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is 
so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition." By using the words ‘may be,’ Congress 
appears to indicate that it wanted to stop even potentially anti-competitive transactions. Remarkably, the 
merger control provision of 1914 applied only to acquisitions of stock.io^s Undertakings soon realised 
that they could easily evade the prohibition o f § 7. Merging parties made sure that the more lenient 
Sherman Act applied to their transaction by acquiring another firm through the purchase of its assets.
1019 See Stigler, “Monopoly and Gigopoly by Merger", Am. Ec. Rev. 23 (1950), p. 27. For reference work, see Gifford and 
Kaplan, Federal Antitrust Law: Cases and Materials (Cincinnati, 2002), pp. 461-572.
1020 t^orthem Securities, 193 US 197 (1904).
1021 Standard Oil v. United States, 221 US 1 (1911).
1022 There were also serious procedural restrictions. In Thatcher Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 272 US 554 (1926), the Supreme Court 
held that the FTC could not restrict the transfer of assets following a stock acquisition when the transfer occurred before filing 
of the FTC’s complaint.
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Given that the Act only prohibited mergers on the verge of obtaining substantial monopoly power, the 
antitrust laws hardly arrested mergers as the 20s drew to a c!ose.‘'023
In 1950, Congress established the foundation for modem merger control by adopting the Celler- 
Kefauver Act. This new Act amended Clayton Act § 7 by closing the assets loophole. The 1950 
amendment did not specify what level of market concentration or other industry characteristics indicate 
that a transaction’s effect would substantially lessen competition. Nonetheless, the legislative debates 
preceding adoption of the measure made clear that Congress expected § 7 to be used to ban mergers 
where the parties’ post-acquisition market shares fell well below the thresholds identified under the 
Sherman Act by the case law.̂ oz^
2.2. The European merger control system
The EC Treaty contains no specific provisions concerning the control of mergers.^025 jh is  legislative gap 
was meant to promote European industry. In a memorandum published in 1965, the Commission noted 
that mergers would strengthen European companies that were considered to be too weak to compete in 
international markets.''025 The document also communicated the Commission's intention of controlling 
anti-competitive mergers by applying Article 82 EC rather than Article 81 EC.
Already in 1966, the Commission recognised that both provisions were a far from efficient tool to control 
merger operations.'io^r Yet, it was not until 1989 that the Council adopted a Community merger 
regulation.^o^a in the meantime, the Commission challenged a number of merger cases under Article 82 
EC. It interpreted that provision liberally, preventing, for instance, a dominant undertaking from acquiring 
of a direct competitor.''029 Of course, the use of Article 82 EC is limited by the fact that the acquiring 
undertaking must have a dominant position before the provision can apply. It does not apply where two
1023 tfrjjfed States v. United Steei Corp., 251 US 417 (1920), finding that the consolidation of most of the industry into one 
firm possessing 80 to 90 percent of the market did not violate the Sherman A ct
1024 Por details, see The Merger Movement: A Summary Report (R C , 1948).
Unlike Article 66 (7) of the ECSC Treaty. For details, see Communication from the Commission concerning Aspects of 
the Treatment of Competition Cases Resulting from the Expiry of the ECSC Treaty, [2002] OJ C 152/5. The ECSC Treaty 
expired on 23 July 2002.
1026 See 1956 Memorandum on the Concentration o f Enterprises in the Common Market.
See Memorandum on the Problem o f Mergers in the Common Market, Competition Series Study No. 3, [1966] 26 CMLR, 
pp. 2-3.
See Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, [1989] OJ L 395/1. For details, see 
Overbury, ‘Politics or Policy? The Demystification of EC Merger Control", Fordham Corp. L  Inst 561 (1992); and, Bechtold, 
‘Die Grundzüge der Neuen EWG-Fusionskontrolle*. RIW  253 (1990).
Case 6/72, Continental Can v. Commission [1973] ECR 215, noting that *[a]buse may therefore occur if an undertaking in 
a dominant position strengthens such a  position in such a way that the degree of dominance reached substantially fetters 
competition, i.e. that only undertakings remain in the market whose behaviour depends on the dominant one* (a t 26).
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œ mpanies merge in order to create a dom inant firm,io3o por does it apply where a dominant company is 
acquired by a non-dominant
If a merger operation constitutes a concentration and is of a Community dimension, the Commission will 
appraise it based on the Merger Regulation.'*032 The substantive part of the Regulation is provided in 
Article 2. Under the Regulation of 1989, that provision pivots on whether or not the merger creates or 
strengthens, therefore impeding effective competition in the common market^o^a The concept of 
dominance referred to here is identical to that within the meaning of Article 82 EC.‘'034
In 2004, the substantive test has been rewordedJ^^s the amended Regulation of 2004 applies the 
Significant Impediment of Effective Competition (“SIEC”) test when scrutinising a merger proposal. 
Under this test, the Commission can block a merger when it “significantly lmpede[s] effective 
competition in the common market.'̂ 036
3. The bundling analysis under US law
3.1. The early case law
In the early years, courts paid no attention to bundling. Conglomerate mergers that can typically raise 
bundling concerns were even excluded from  antitrust scrutiny.'*°37
In Winslow, the Supreme Court made it clear that the Sherman Act did not apply to conglomerate 
mergers.'*'>38 The case involved a m erger between various manufacturers of different types of shoe 
making machines into United Shoe M achinery Corporation. One of the merging parties made lasting
0̂30 Case T-102/96, GencorUd. v. Commission [1999] E C R 11-753, noting that “only the strengthening of dominant positions 
and not their creation can be controlled under A rt [82] o f the Treaty’ (at 155).
1031 See Cook and Kerse, EC M e/gerCon/ro/(London, 2000), p. 129.
1032 Por details on the terms ‘concentration’ and ‘Community dimension’ as well as procedural aspects, see Ritter et a!.. 
European Competition Law: A Practbner's Guide (The Hague, 2000), pp. 415-529.
‘'°33 See Artides 2(2) and 2(3) of Regulation 4064/89 .
1034 See Whish, Competition Law (London, 2003), p. 770.
1035 Por a review of the reform, see Schmidt, T h e  New  ECMR; Significant Impediment or Significant Improvemenf, CMLRev. 
1555 (2004); González Diaz, T h e  Reform of European Merger Control; Quid Novi Sub Sole?*, W.Comp. 177 (2004); and. 
Levy, “EU Merger Control: From Birth to Adolescence", W.Comp. 195 (2003).
See Regulation 139/2004 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, [2004] L 24/1.
1037 Conglomerate mergers can be divided into three categories; product extension mergers, in which a producer of one 
product acquires the producer of a closely related product; geographic or market extension mergers, in which a producer in 
one market acquires a similar company in an adjacent market and pure conglomerate mergers, in which there is neither 
relationship between the parlies. For details, see Burnley, “Who’s Afraid of Conglomerate Mergers? A Comparison of the US  
and EC Approaches?", W.Comp. 43 (2005), pp. 44-45.
1038 United States v. Sidney Winshw. 227 US 202 (1913).
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machines, another party produced welt-sewing machines and a third one made outsole-stitching 
machines. Notably, these products were complementary, not competing. Writing for the majority, Judge 
Holmes concluded therefore that no competition was eliminated among the merging firms. As he 
observed: “[i]t is as lawful for one corporation to make every part of a steam engine and to put the 
machine together as it would be for one to make boilers and another to make the wheels."io39
In contrast, strategic bundling appears to have been one of reasons for adopting the Clayton Act in 
1914. When passing the Act, Congress considered that bundling is “one of the greatest agencies and 
instrumentalists of monopoly ever devised by the brain of man. It completely shuts out competitors, not 
only from trade in which they are already engaged, but from the opportunities to build up trade in any 
community where these great and powerful combinations are operating under this system and 
practice." t̂̂ <^
Nonetheless, it did not play a role in merger control enforcement in those days. Before the amendment 
of Clayton Act § 7, it was generally assumed that the statute only covered horizontal mergers. As Judge 
Burton wrote in his dissent in Du Pont de Nemours, “[ajlthough the language of the Act is ambiguous, 
the relevant legislative history, administrative practice, and judicial interpretation support the conclusion 
that 7 does not apply to vertical acquisitions.'̂ o^'' The general argument was that the word ‘between’ in § 
7 only suggests a concern with horizontal mergers.’'ô 2
When Congress amended that provision in 1950, one of its main purposes was to make the law dearly 
applicable to ‘all types of mergers and acquisitions, vertical and conglomerate as well as horizontal, 
which have the specified effects of substantially lessening competition."^°^3 jh e  inclusion of 
conglomerate mergers thus opened the way for antitmst analysis of strategic bundling under the merger 
rules.
1039 United States v. Sidney Winsfow, at 217-218.
1M0 See H.R. Rep. No. 6 2 7 .63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914), pp. 12-13.
1W1 United States v. E l  du Pont de Nemours, 353 US 586 (1957), at 613 (emphasis added).
10̂ 2 See Turner, ‘Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of The Clayton Act", Harv. L  Rev. 1313 (1965), p. 1314. For a 
different view, see Brodley, “Potential Competition Mergers: a Structural Synthesis", Yale L  J. 1 (1977), pp, 43-44.
1M3 SeeH .R . Rep. No. 1191,81®* Cong., IfS e s s . 11 (1949), p.11 (emphasis added).
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3.2. The entrenchm ent theory o f th e  70s
The first years after the adoption of the 1950 amendment were the heyday of the traditional approach to 
antitrust law /044  Essentially, merger enforcement was supposed to focus on preventing the creation of 
an industry structure conducive to anti-competitive effects. Scholars took the view that high market 
concentration as such would cause economic harm. They argued that it was therefore necessary to 
block such concentration in its incipiency.'’^«
The amended §  7 was accordingly interpreted in Brown Shoe^^^ The case involved the horizontal 
acquisition of Kenney by Brown Shoe and Kinney. At the time of the merger, the manufacturing and 
retail shoe markets were not concentrated. In fact, Brown Shoe was the fourth largest US manufacturer 
of shoes with a  market share of 4 percent, while Kinney was the largest retailer in the market for 
shoe distribution. Judge W arren's majority opinbn stressed the important role Clayton Act § 7 played in 
stopping a trend toward concentration in its indpiency.^^'^
The ruling expressed serious concern over the merger trend in the shoe-manufacturing and retailing 
industries. Judge Warren noted that Congress “feared accelerated concentration of economic power on 
economic grounds, but also for the threat to other values a trend toward concentration was though to 
pose.” 104® He stressed that “[i]f a m erger achieving 5  % control would now be approved, we might be 
required to approve future merger efforts by Brown’s competitors seeking similar market shares. The  
oligopoly Congress sought to avoid would then be furthered and it would be difficult to absolve the 
combinations previously approved.’ i^ s  Ultimately, the Supreme Court prohibited the merger.
Under this Structuralist influence, bundling concerns began to play a theoretical role in the mid 60s and 
70s with regards to conglomerate mergers. From 1965 to 1975, the US experienced a wave of such 
mergers. W hen this wave arose, antitrust enforcers and scholars were uncertain about the likely 
competitive effects of these mergers.i®®® There was considerable political concern about a “rising tide of
Antitrust economics may be divided into roughly three development periods: 'Classical’, 'Chicago School', ’post-Chicago.’ 
See Baker, “A Preface to Post-Chicago A ntitrusf, in: Cucinotta and Pardolesi et al. (eds.), Post-Chicago Developments in 
Antitrust Law (Chettenham, 2002), p. 60.
IMS Por extensive discussion, see Van den Bergh and Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics -  A 
Comparative Perspective (Antwerp, 2001), pp. 23-32.
IMS ^ w n  V. United States 370 US 294 (1962). For similar approach, see United States v. Riiladelphia National Bank, 374  
US 321 (1963): and, Von's Grocery v. United States 384 US 270 (1966)
Brown v. United States, at 332,343-346.
Brown v. United States, at 317.
1M9 Brown v. United States, at 345.
1050 See Bok, "Section 7  of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics’ , Harv. L  Rev. 307 (1960), pp. 310-313.
220
concentration" resulting from them.io^i |n response, antitrust agencies challenged a number of 
conglomerate mergers under a variety of theories.
The most prominent theory was the entrenchment theory embraced by the Supreme Court in Procter & 
Gamble^^^^ Under this theory, mergers could be condemned if they strengthened an already dominant 
undertaking through greater efficiencies, or gave it access to a broader Ime of products or greater 
financial resources, thereby making life harder for smaller rivals.‘'053 Bundling was one of the concerns 
attacked under this theory. Having a broad product line can supposedly provide increased opportunity 
for strategic bundling.
Procter & Gamble involved the leading manufacturer of household products like soaps and detergents. 
Proctor and Gamble (“P&G”) wanted to acquire Clorox, which manufactured liquid bleach, a product that 
P&G did not hold. The Supreme Court held that the size, advertising budget and distribution network of 
P&G would intimidate existing market rivals and discourage further market entry. In other words, the 
leading position of Clorox would become entrenched after the merger. The Court agreed with the FTC’s 
analysis that the acquisition might substantially lessen competition in part because “the substitution of 
the powerful acquiring firm for the smaller, but already dominant, firm may substantially reduce the 
competitive structure of the industry by raising entry barriers and by dissuading the smaller firms from 
aggressively competing."^054 this regard, the Court focused on the importance of advertising as “the 
major competitive weapon" in the bleach market.‘*05s it stressed that that P&G had a larger budget than 
Clorox and could use it to defeat “the short term threat of a new entrant'̂ o^s
The ruling In Procter & Gamble led to a number of other cases invoking the entrenchment theory. 
However, bundling concerns do not seem to have been a major objection in those cases. In General 
Foods, for instance, the Court of Appeals upheld unlawful General Food’s acquisition of SOS, one of the
1051 See OECD, Portfolio Effects in Conglomerate Mergers, 24 January 2002, www.oecd.orQ/dataoecd/39/3/1818237.pdf. p. 
215.
1052 F jc  V, Procter & Gamble, 386 US 568 (1967). Other theories that do not relate to bundling are not discussed. It 
concerns the potential competition theory and the reciprocity theory. For more on this categorisation, see Bauer, 
"Government Enforcement Policy of Section 7 o f the Clayton Act Carte Blanche for Conglomerate Mergers?", Cal. L  Rev. 
348 (1983), pp. 353-354. For details on these theories, see Hylton, Antirust Law -  Economic Theory and Common Law 
Evdution (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 244-251.
1053 On this theory, see Sullivan and Grimes, The Law o f Antitnjst: An Integrated handbook (SL Paul, 2000), p. 624; and, 
Heilman, “Entrenchment Under Section 7 of the Clayton A ct An Approach for Analyzing Conglomerate Mergers’, l-oy. U. 
Chi. L J . 225 (1982).
i«4 p jQ  Procter & Gamble, at 578.
1055 p jQ  V, Procter & Gamble, at 579.




two leading makers of steel wool soap pads.iosr |t held that the merger “has raised to virtually 
insurmountable heights entry barriers which were already high, changed the steel wood pad market 
[from] two substantially equal-sized companies and several sm aller firms to one in which SOS is now 
dominant, and that the substitution of G eneral Foods for SOS will paralyse any incentive to compete 
which might otherwise have existed.'io^a
In Wilson Sporting Goods, Wilson, the leading seller o f sporting goods, sought to acquire Nissan, the 
leading seller of gymnastic equipment-^os^ Unlike Proctor & Gamble, mass advertising played no 
significant role in the sale of gymnastic equipment. Nonetheless, the lower court was concerned that 
Nissan might obtain significant marketing advantages because of Wilson's influence over a large 
number of dealers who depended upon it for credit and other forms of cooperation and assistance.
In 1968, the DoJ introduced the Merger Guidelines.‘>o®o The Guidelines were unequivocal in their focus 
on controlling market structure.**®®  ̂ The Guidelines pointed out that the possible entrenchment of a fimn 
in an already concentrated m arket might raise antitmst concems-ios^ yvhile the DoJ admitted its lack of 
experience with the entrenchment theory and stated its unwillingness to specify the kinds of mergers 
that might trigger a veto, It demonstrated its concern for this potential anti-competitive effect
The Guidelines provided three examples: (1) a  merger which produces a very large disparity in absolute 
size between the merged firm and the largest remaining firms in the relevant markets; (2) a merger o f 
firms producing related products which may induce purchasers, concerned about the merged firm ’s 
possible use of leverage, to buy products of the merged firm rather than those of competitors; and (3 ) a  
merger, which may enhance the ability of the merged firm to increase product differentiation in the 
relevant m arkets .''^  The second example relates to bundling, but was not specified.
General Foods v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967).
General Foods v. FTC, at 943-946.
1059 United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F  Supp 543 (N .D . ILL. 1968).
1060 See US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Merger Guidelines, 33 Fed. Reg. 23442 (1968). For 
details on the history of these guidelines, see Gifford and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 553-572.
«K1 See 1968 Merger Guidelines, stating that The purpose of the E)epaitnent's enforcement activity regarding conglomerate 
mergers is to prevent changes in market structure that appear likely over the course of time to cause a substantial lessening 
of the competition that would otherwise exist or to a e a te  a tendency toward monopoly” (at 17).
1062 See 1968 M erger Guidelines, at 20.
1063 See 1968 Merger Guidelines, a t 20.
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The Guidelines proved to be far less effective than one might have been hoped. Very few courts cited 
them, much (ess adopted them-io®^ Although the entrenchment doctrine was frequently applied, 
bundling concerns do not appear to have been considered. For instance, in Kennecott Copper, the 
Court upheld R C ’s conclusion that the acquisition of Peabody Coal by Kennecott would violate Clayton 
Act § 7 in part because “Kennecott's deep pocket operating on a market which, though a loose 
oligopoly, is growing more concentrated” created a "likelihood of diminishing competition.’ “̂^
In sum, bundling concerns were, at least in theory, accepted reasons to prohibit a merger
3.3. The decline of the bundling analysis in the 80s
The enforcement approach of the 70s stimulated a critical examination of the entrenchment theory by 
legal and economic scholars.
For instance, Bork notes that none of the theories applied bear analysis.**“ ® He observes that the effects 
of a conglomerate merger are generally “manifestations of efficiency, and hence reasons to welcome 
the merger rather than condemn it."^“  ̂ Comperably critical, Areeda and Turner focus on the alleged 
strategic effect of having a wider product line. They argue that “apart from the leverage possibility, there 
is unlikely to be any prejudice to rivals at all, for they too can usually arrange packages or one-stop 
service when buyers demand them. And if they cannot, then the merged firm’s provision of those new 
services valued by customers is not a social evil but a contribution to their welfare.’ *“ ® With respect to 
leveraging, they express “serious doubt that very substantial foreclosure would often come about via 
tying that is too vague to catch the eye or to be proved.’ *“ ® Ultimately, the Chicago influence thoroughly 
discredited the entrenchment theory in academic circles in the 80s.
The courts and government agencies soon shared that view. Although the Supreme Court has never 
had the occasion to revisit Proctor & Gamble, in the late 70s lower courts began rejecting entrenchment
1064 Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979), noting that “[t]he guidelines do not establish the illegality of a 
merger which does flt the viteria used by the Justice Department [...] The Guidelines, therefore, simply reflect the 
considered view of the Justice Department as to which mergers are most likely to create a  reasonable probability of 
substantially lessening competition and which may therefore warrant the institution o f legal action [...] the Commission still 
bears the burden of showing the likelihood that the future effect of [the merger] may be substantially to lessen competition’ 
(at 353-354).
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), at 70.
1066 See Bork, The Antitrust Paradox {U e^Y or\i, 1978), pp. 252-257.
See Bork, op. cif., p. 255.
1068 See Areeda and Turner, AnW/usf Law  (Boston, 1980), 1109d, at 36 (emphasis added).




claims on the grounds that the plaintiff had not proven that entrenchment was likely.̂ o^o In 1982, the DoJ 
eliminated entrenchment on the basis for challenging mergers wfhen the new merger guidelines were 
issued.'io^i The main reason for its change was that it recognised that efficiency and aggressive 
competition benefit consumers even if rivals failing to offer an equally good deal suffer losses or market 
share. The DoJ eliminated conglomerate mergers as a separate category of analysis. Instead, it 
considered “horizontal effect from non-horizontal mergers."i072
Under the 1982 Guidelines, non-horizontal mergers are mergers between firms that do not operate in 
the same market and producing no Immediate change in the level of concentration in any relevant 
market. This embraces both vertical and conglomerate mergers. With regards to conglomerate mergers, 
the Guidelines were only concerned with the elimination of specific potential entrants: “in some 
circumstances, the non-horizontal m erger of a firm already in a market [...] with a potential entrant to 
that market [...] may adversely affect competition in the market/^o^s under the 1982 Guidelines and, 
later the 1984 Guidelines''̂ ^^ and the 1992 Guidelines^o^^ conglomerate mergers were therefore no 
longer isolated as a specific type of m erger with a specific kind of effect on c o m p e t i t i o n A l l  non­
horizontal mergers, whether conglomerate or vertical, were to be assessed in the same way.
For our purpose, such assessment no longer incorporated the entrenchment theory previously endorsed 
by the DoJ. Instead, it involves considering whether a  merger raises competition concerns if it involves 
the acquisition o f a  firm with a strong market position by a potential entrant to the market.
Today, conglomerate mergers in the US are not generally regarded as the competitive threat perceived 
in the 70s.'<o^ Clayton Act § 7 forbids only those mergers that are “likely to hurt consumers."io^8 Rather 
than being a reason for condemning a merger, significant efficiencies benefiting consumers are relevant 
to “the acquisition’s overai! effect on competition" because they may justify an otherwise anti-competitive
’0̂ 0 The entrenchment theory was rejected for that reason in: Emhart Corp. v. USM Corp., 527 F.2d 177 (1** Cir. 1975); 
Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. CargiU. Inc., 498  F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1974); Heublein, Inc., 96 FTC. 385 (1980); and, Beatrice 
Foods. 101 FTC. 733 (1983).
See US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28493 (1982).
1072 See 1982 Guidelines, p. 20.
1073 See 1982 Guidelines, p. 21,
1074 See US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Merger Guidelines, 14 June 1984.
1075 See US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Merger Guidelines, 4 Fed. Reg. 13104 (1992).
1076 Recently, US agencies have begun to classify mergers o f potential competitors likewise as horizontal mergers and 
accordingly scrutinise them under the horizontal merger guidelines. See United States v. SBC Communications, 99-0715 
(TPJ) (D .D .C ., 23 March 1999), www.usdoi,Qov/atr/cases/f2500/2572.htm.
The high point of the conglomeracy wave was 1975, but since that time large fimis have shown a  general tendency to 
strip themselves o f truly unrelated product lines focusing on their core business. See Scherer and Ross, Industrial Market 
Structure and Economic Performance (Boston, 1999), pp. 90-91.
1078 United States v. Rockhrd, Inc., 898 F.2d 1278 (7**’ Cir. 1990), at 1282.
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merger.‘'07® In other words, a merger that would not hurt rivals but otherwise benefit consumers vrill not 
violate § 7.
3.4. Interim conclusions
Bundling concerns have not been given much credence under US merger law. In the early years, 
conglomerate mergers were not even scrutinised, as they were excluded from the ambit of the merger 
rules. After a short period of attention for bundling under the entrenchment theory in the 70s, 
entrenchment was dropped by the US antitrust authorities in 1982. Today, bundling is not really a 
concern under US m erger law.
4. The evolution of the bundling theory under EC law
4.1. The early statements and cases on bundling
When the Merger Regulation was freshly adopted in 1989, the Commission communicated not to worry 
about bundling or tying under the merger rules. Having commissioned a study evaluating the effect of 
conglomerate mergers on competition, it pointed out that those mergers could lead to decisive 
advantages for the new entity due to its deep pockets and the reduction of potential competition. It 
observed the following:
[cjonglomerates can, more readily than other enterprises, adopt predatory strategies by using 
their financial reserves to eliminate competitors from some of their sectors of activity. Even if a 
firm does not utilize such a strategy, the fact that it has the necessary means can be enough to 
discipline smaller competitors. More important, however, is the anti-competitive effect arising 
from mutual forbearance: when conglomerate firms have an overlapping presence in a range of 
markets, they may be reluctant to compete against each other.̂ o®
Continuing to stress the financial strength involved in conglomeracy, two years later, the Commission 
identified bundling as a  separate concern for the first time. In 1991, it articulated:
the concern in conglomerate mergers is the possible strengthening of an already strong or 
dominant position by a combination of financial resources and other capacities or by the creation 
of a system-selling approach for complementary products [...] this concern does not exist if there 
are other financially strong competitors on the market or if the system-selling approach is not 
practicable because the market position of the company concerned is not strong enough
1079 f=TQ ^ /yeaffft, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11«* Cir. 1991), at 1222. 




U I J ^
(customers can turn to alternative suppliers) or because combined sales are only an insignificant 
part of the marketJ^^
The Commission appears, among other things, to focus on so-called system-selling effects. If the new 
undertaking bundles complementary products, this might result in an anti-competitive outcome. 
Unfortunately, the Commission did not explain how that possible anti-competitive effect was achieved. 
In its subsequent practice, the bundling theory was elucidated.
The first merger decision to consider bundling was ATR/Havil!and.^^^ This case of 1991 involved the 
merger between ATR and De Havilland. ATR was jointly owned by the leading manufacturers of 
regional aircrafts in the world, Aerospatiale and Alenia. As a  result of the merger, Aerospatiale and 
Alenia would acquire the number two manufacturer of regional aircrafts.
The Commission’s decision identified three separate but related segments in the market for commuter 
aircrafts; small commuters with 20-39 seats, medium-size commuters with 40-59 seats, and large 
commuters with more than 60 but less than 70 seats. As for bundling, the Commission stressed that the 
merged entity would have obtained “coverage of the whole range of commuter aircraft."‘‘o®3 Essentially, 
it worried about mixed bundling. The Commission w as convinced that the new company would take  
advantage of its market power in the market for large commuter aircraft to sell its aircrafts in the slightly 
more competitive market for medium-size commuter aircraft. It was feared that the new group would 
“give rise to the ability [...] of offering favourable conditions for a specific type of aircraft in mixed
deals."‘«o84
By concluding that the new company would enjoy a  “significant advantage” that could lead to 
foreclosure of its actual and potential competitors, the Commission considered two characteristics in 
particular.''085 First, it observed that the merged entity would have been the only manufacturer of 
commuter aircrafts that would be active in all market segments identified.
Second, the decision emphasised that purchasing an aircraft involves fixed costs like training personnel, 
the problem of dealing with different aircraft manufacturers, and necessity of different in-house
See Commission, 21*» Report on Competition Policy (1991), p. 369 (emphasis added). 
Case IV/M.53, ATR/Havitland [1991] OJ C 334/7.
»OM Case 1V/M.53, ATR/HaviHand, at 27.
Case 1V/M.53. ATR/Havilland, at 30.
Case IV/M.53, ATR/HaviHand, a t 32.
226
inventories for spare parts. Customers would therefore be inclined to purchase their aircrafts from the 
same manufacturer. As the Commission noted:
Thus, a significant regional carrier vi/hose aircraft needs may call for a full complement of aircraft 
capacities to meet the route needs of that carrier might be dissuaded from purchasing smaller 
aircraft from a single manufacturer if the needs of the carrier for a larger aircraft could also be 
met from the same aircraft manufacturer.’®̂
In my view, the Commission correctly focused on the foreclosure effects. Even where the merged entity 
can be expected to succeed in forcing the market exit of a sufficient number of rivals, foreclosure 
analysis cannot stop at this point. As the Commission itself recognised in ATR/Havilland, the 
substantive test of Article 2(3) provides that a transactions can be blocked only if a certain stability of the 
dominant position over time will be achieved.''®^
This requires an assessment of the improbability of re-entry.’oss in its decision, the Commission did not 
scrutinise this aspect of the merger. Although the Commission stressed the possible consumption-side 
efficiencies, they were not considered as such. To the contrary, these efficiencies appear to be an issue 
of concern.
In the same year, the Commission focused In Tetra Pak/Alfa-Laval on concerns besides bundling, 
notwithstanding its close resemblance with the facts of ATR/Havilland.'^^ The case involved the merger 
between two suppliers of complementary goods. Alfa-Laval produces cartons used for processing milk 
and juice, whereas Tetra Pak supplies the machines used to package the liquids. Like in ATR/Havllland, 
the Commission stressed that the new group would be able to “offer a fuller product range [...] covering 
all machines used by dairy/juice producers."’ô o
It went on to investigate whether the integration of a carton supplier could confer upon Tetra Pak 
“certain marketing or other advantages over non-integrated aseptic carton packaging machine suppliers 
that would be likely to limit growth by existing competitors or raise barriers to entry for potential 
competitors."’®̂ ’ Notably, the machines were distinct in both technical and commercial terms.
Case IV/M.53. ATR/Havilland, at 32.
0̂8̂  Case IV/M.53, ATR/Havilland, at 35.
1088 See Volcker, "Leveraging as a Theory of Competitive Harm in EU Merger Control", CMLRev. 581 (2003), p. 605. 
i«»C aselV /M .68, Tetra P a k / A l f a - L a v a l 1 290135 
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The Commission also stressed that less than 5 percent of packaging machine purchases occurred 
simultaneously with processing machine purchases over the preceding three years. This would reduce 
‘ to almost insignificance any potential advantage available to Tetra Pak as a result of the 
concentralion."̂ '̂  ̂ Moreover, customers seem to have ranked the ability of a supplier to offer both 
packaging and processing machines as not important. In combination with the presence of strong 
competitors on the markets for processing machines, the Commission considered this sufficient to 
conclude that Tetra Pak would not gain any anti-competitive advantage.
4.2. The incoherent approach of the 90s
Merger investigations in the 90s have frequently (and sometimes expressly) focused on bundling, 
although not in a coherent way.i093 jh e  Commission has investigated strategic bundling with regards to 
vertical mergers in the media and telecommunications sector and with regards to conglomerate mergers 
in the retailing sector. These categories o f cases therefore feature a number of blocked mergers.
As for vertical mergers, the risk of post-merger bundling was considered in MSG Media Service,^^ The 
case concerned the proposed joint venture between Bertelsmann, Kirch and Deutsche Telekom. The  
parties wanted to set up an alliance under the name MSG for the provision of technical infrastructure for 
pay-TV. Bertelsmann was the leading media group and book and music publisher in Germany. Kirch’s 
activities included the supply of TV  programmes and feature films. Deutsche Telekom was the 
incumbent telecom operator in Germany and supplied the essential technical infrastructure for the 
operation.
The decision identified four markets: the market for analogue pay-TV. the market for digital pay-TV. the 
market for cable TV  networks, and the future market for digital infrastructure for pay-TV. One of the 
concerns brought forward was that the parent companies would leverage their market power in the  
analogue pay-TV market by programme packages into the market for digital pay-TV. The Commission 
stressed M SG ’s power to “offer program suppliers a comprehensive service covering all the technical 
prerequisites for pay-TV," given the parents' combined resources.'’095 Bertelsmann and Kirch could
1092 Case IV/M .68, Tetra Pak/Alfa-Laved, at B4.
1993 For the same recognition in the literature, see Lindsay, E C  Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues (London, 2002), p. 
391-392; and, Evans and Padilla, “Demand-side Efficiencies in Merger Controf, W.Comp. 167 (2003), p. 185.
19M Case ÍV/M .469, M SG Media Service [19941OJ L 364/1.
1095 Case IV/M .469, MSG Media Service, at 70.
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“allow different programme packages to be put together that are tailored to the requirements of specific 
target groups and can be offered at an attractive subscription price" that rivals could not match.“'*^
Essentially, the likelihood of leveraging was assessed by the following factors. Firstly, the Commission 
stressed that Bertelsmann and Kirch already had a subscriber base that they could use in the future 
digital pay-TV-tos^ This base significantly reduced their risk of investing in digital TV. A second factor 
was the parties’ preferential access to potential distribution channels. Bertelsmann is the leading book 
operator in Germany. At the time of the merger, it had 6 million book-club members and was 
experienced in the customer management of 22 million members worldwide.'’ ^98 This potential 
distribution channel would add to the security of the customer base of MSG. A final factor relates to 
parties' preferential access to programme content. Notably, Kirch was the leading German supplier of 
feature films and entertainment programmes for It also jointly controlled a leading agency for 
sports broadcast rights and had access to attractive sports rights and film production activities.
The ability to leverage would be enhanced by the digitisation of pay-TV infrastnicture:
Experience in other countries where pay-TV is at a more advanced stage reveals that bringing 
together of individuai programmes to forni programme packages is a key factor in achieving 
success on the pay-TV market. Pay-TV suppliers occupying a less important position on the 
market may be forced to include their programmes in the leading pay-TV supplier’s packages, 
thus giving it control over its competitors.
Remarkably, the Commission did not consider the potential efficiencies that the joint venture might 
produce by integrating programme packages. It was stressed that efficiency considerations were only 
valid if “no obstacle is formed to competition."’ In any event, it was “extremely doubtful" whether 
efficiencies would materialise because of MSG’s ability to deter entry from suppliers of pay-TV.'*’ 92
In RTUVeronica/Endemol, the Commission was troubled by the establishment of Holland Media Groep 
(HMG), a company supplying TV  programmes in the Netheriands.'’’ ^̂  h MG was set up by a leading 
Dutch TV  Broadcaster (RTL), a former Dutch public broadcasting association (Veronica), and a major 
Independent programme maker (Endemol). Bundling concerns seem to have played a two-levelled role.
In c a s e  IV/M.469, 
i«7CaselV/r\^.469, 
io »C ase lV M 469 . 
10» Case IV/M.469, 
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niminfmnr
For one, it was one of the indications of HMG’s “very strong position” in the market for TV
broadcasting.'iiw
In order to demonstrate that position, the Commission stressed the following factors: RTL was the only 
Dutch commercial operator offering a full programme service at the time of the merged‘•os- h m G would 
have access to the large resources of RTL’s mother company that operates strong and successful 
television channels in other European countries‘'̂ os; HM G would be staicturally linked to Endemorî o^; 
and, not allowing public broadcasters to coordinate programming on the public channels in such a way 
to provide complementary programme schedules.'''•os In addition, it emphasised HMG’s ability to bundle 
advertising space of popular programmes with the space o f less successful programmes.'''^ It is 
evident that the Commission can rely on HM G ’s bundling capacity as one of the factors establishing its 
strong position. It is generally accepted that conduct showing a firm can act largely in disregard of rivals 
on the market may confirm that it is in a dominant position.‘"'o  For instance, in United Brands, the firm’s 
ability to adapt its prices to competitive conditions in the various national markets was evidence of its 
dominant position.'""
At a second level, the Commission seems to have been concerned with strategic bundling between the 
market for TV  broadcasting and the market for TV advertising, although leveraging is not expressly 
mentioned. In fact, the Commission believed that HMG would be able to coordinate its programmes in 
such a way that bundling of advertising space, in combination with the grant of rebates would become a  
realistic s c e n a r io ." '2 As the Commission observed:
HMG can maximise the possibility to offer suitable slots to the advertising industry, for example, 
by offering slots for specific target groups across the three channels in a complementary manner. 
More generally, HMG can offer packag e deals  to advertisers which go beyond the normal 
practice of granting rebates on the basis of the total value of advertising time purchased. HMG 
can. in commercial terms, link advertising on one channel with advertising on one or more of its
other channels.'"^
Case IV/M .553, RTUVeronica/Endemol, a t 64.
1105 Case (V/M .553, R TU V em ica/E ndem l, a t 41.
1106 Case IV/M .553, RTUVeronica/Endemol, at 41.
1107 Case IV/M .553. RTUVeronica/Endemol, a t 45.
1108 Case IV/M .553, RTUVeronica/Endemol, at 47.
1109 Case IV/M .553, RTUVeronica/Endemo!, a t 43.
1110 See Ritter et a i, op. cit., p. 344.
1111 Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, a t 204-234.
1112 Case IV/M .553, RTUVeronica/Endemol, at 4 3 ,7 8  and 86.
1113 Case IV/M .553, RTUVeronica/Endemol, a t 77-78 (emphasis added).
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Once again, efficiencies were not considered, and subsequently, the Commission blocked the proposed 
transaction. Considering HMG’s broadcasting rights of important sporting events '̂*^^ and its sponsoring 
abilities^^^^ the Commission expected HMG to hold a market share of 60 percent in the market for TV  
advertising.1116
It could be argued that the Commission focused upon the long<term effects of coordinating TV  
programmes. This practice would foreclose other broadcasters from the advertising market for two 
interrelated reasons. The first one considers the fact that the Dutch market for advertising will not leave 
significant room for entrants, as the largest part of the growth of the market would be captured by 
The second reason is that HMG would also deprive rivals of their opportunities to compete in 
the advertising market because it would be difficult for a newcomer to build a programme schedule for 
the Dutch market which would be attractive to advertisers.''
Other manifestations of the bundling theory were discemable in a  string of conglomerate cases in the 
retailing sector. In the 90s, the Commission began assessing the range or portfolio eflfecfs of a  notified 
transaction under the European merger r u l e s . " * A s  the Commission explained in GuinnessfGrand 
Metropolitan, a merged entity holding a wide portfolio of products has:
greater flexibility to structure fits] prices, promotions and discounts, fit] will have greater potential 
for tying, and fit] will be able to realise economies of scale and scope in [its] sales and marketing 
activities. Finally, the implicit (or explicit) threat of refusal to supply is more potent**^
There has been much debate over the underlying notion of this statement.**21 The Commission can 
surely be criticised for unnecessarily Introducing a new concept into merger control.* *22 It seems to view 
portfolio effects as a collection of leveraging and other theories of competitive harm, some or all of 
which may be applicable to the same transaction. I submit that the theory makes only economic sense
li
Case IV/M.553, RTUVeronica/Endemol, at 76.
11«  Case IV/M.553, RTUVeronica/Endemol, at 79-80.
1116 Case IV/M.553, RTUVeronica/Endemol, at 64.
1117 Case IV/M.553, RTUVeronica/Endemol, at 85.
1118 Case IV/M.553, RTUVeronica/Endemol, at 85.
1113 For details, see OECD, op. c/f., pp. 239-244; and, Baker and Ridyard, *Portfolio Power A Rum Deal?*, E C LR 181 (1999). 
112“ Case IV/M.938, Guinness/Grand Metropolitan [1998] OJ L 288/24, at 40. For critique on the vacuous nature of the 
definition, see Burnley, op. c'rt., p. 53.
1121 See Lindsay, op. c/f., pp. 410-414.
112 See Bishop and Walker, in an older version of TTre Economics o f EC Competition Law (London, 1999), noting that ‘ [tjhe 
introduction of a new enforcement 'buzzword' does little to advance the quality of analysis and could act as an excuse for 
excessive and unwarranted intervention* (p. 160). Likewise criticat, see Lofaro and Ridyard, 'Beyond Bork: New Economic 
Theories of Exclusion in Merger Cases’ , ECLR 151 (2002), p. 153. .
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in its “narrow form ."ii23 Essentially, it assesses whether the merged group can profitably leverage 
market power in one brand into a m arket where it holds a weaker brand by offering the products in a 
bundie. The Commission has investigated in particular whether the merged group would have the ability 
to bundle its position in a must stock m arket with other products held in its portfolio.
For instance, in Coca-Cola/Amalgamated Beverages, Coca-Cola was attempting to acquire its UK 
bottler. With regards to the merger, the Commission examined whether a beverage portfolio of 
carbonated soft drinks would give Coca-Cola the possibility to leverage its strong position in the market 
for cola drinks into other soft drink marketsJ^24 |t was worried that Coca-Cola would be able to exploit its 
portfolio by linking discounts for Coca-Cola to increased sales of its other products.1^25 xhe Commission 
ultimately found that the acquired bottler already had advantages arising from its wide portfolio, and the 
merger would not strengthen this position.
However, in Coca-Cola Company/Carfsberg, the Commission held that a beverage portfolio of 
carbonated soft drinks, packaged w ater and beer was problematic. “' ^26 observed that; “the inclusion of 
strong beer and packaged water brands, such as those of Carlsberg, in the beverage portfolio gives 
each of the brands in the portfolio greater market power than if they were sold on a stand alone
basis."ii27
In order to obtain clearance for the acquisition, it required the parties to divest an interest in a  
carbonated soft drink bottling company as well as in the third largest cola brand in Denmark. The 
Commission also emphasised that economies of scale and scope were “key competitive factors" in the 
carbonated soft drink market and that the merged entity would take advantage of these efficiencies.'*i28 
It was found that the portfolio of the merged entity would strengthen the existing dominant position in the 
tying market.
In Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, the analysis also focused on the competition effects resulting form the 
formation of a wide portfolio of product brands across various categories of spirits.“' 129 case involved
the proposed m erger of the spirits arms o f Guinness and Grand Metropolitan. The firms’ product ranges
1123 See Lindsay, op. cit., pp. 410-411. In its intermediate form, portfolio effects are a collection of leveraging theories and 
other theories, whereas in its broadest form, they are a separate theory as such.
'̂ 24 Case COMPA4.794, Coca-Cola Company/Amalgamated Beverages GB [1997] OJ L 218/15.
1125 Case COM P/M .794, Coca-Cola Company/Amalgamaled Beverages GB, at 110.
Case COM P/M .833, Coca-Cola Company/Carisberg A /S  [1998] OJ L 288/24.
1122 Case C O M P/M .833, Coca-Co/a Company/Carisberg A/S, at 67.
1128 Case CO M P/M .833, Coca-Cola Company/Carisberg A/S, at 66-68.
1129 Case IV/M .938, Guinness/Grand Metropolitan [1998] OJ L 288/24.
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were largely complementary. The merger was found to create problematic overlaps in Spain (Scotch 
whiskey). Greece (whiskey) and Belgium (whiskey, gin and vodka). These concerns were remedied by 
requiring the merged group to sell two whiskey brands, end its distribution agreement for one type of 
vodka brand and appoint a third-party distributor for gin in Belgium and Luxembourg. Despite the fact 
that there was no overlap in the supply of rum in Greece, the Commission also required the new entity 
to terminate its distribution agreement in that country. The rationale for these commitments was that the 
new undertaking would be in a position to exercise portfolio power.
The Commission’s decision identified a number of factors in order to examine whether the increased 
portfolio would result in strategic bundling:
[t]he strength of [portfolio power], and their potential effect on the competitive structure of the 
market, depends on a number of factors, including [...] the market shares of the various brands, 
particularly in relation to the shares of competitors; the relative importance of the individual 
markets in which the parties have significant shares and brands across the range of product 
markets in which the portfolio is held; and/or the number of markets in which the portfolio holder 
has a brand leader or the leading brand. In addition the strength of a portfolio effect has to be 
considered in the context of the relative strength of competitors’ brands and their portfolios.'̂ ^
Basically, here the Commission requires conducting an extensive m arket analysis in order to determine
whether the new group would have the ability to profitably engage in bundling.‘'̂ 3i
Repeatedly, the Commission stated that portfolio effects occur if at least one of the products involved is 
a must stock brand. In Newell/Rubbermaid, the theory was rejected as none of the merging parties had 
“any significant market power' with regards to any of their products Involved.“* 122 |p coca- 
Cola/Nestle/JV, the theory was dismissed because:“[n]o portfolio effects [...] would arise from the 
concentration as iced tea is far from being a ‘must stock’ product in Spain, being still a novel product in 
that country with volumes very small compared to other soft drinks and other countries."'*i33
Another important feature to consider in leveraging seems to be whether the portfolio goods are typically 
purchased together or the supplier could ensure that they are purchased together. In Akzo 





11» Case IV/M.938, Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, a t 41-42. See also Case Comp/M.2268, Pernod Ricard/Diageo/Seagrem  
Sp/rffs [2002] C 16/13.
1131 For details, see OECD, op. cit., pp. 239-244.
1132 Case 1V/M.1355, Newell/Rubbermaid [1999] OJ C 109/3, at 19. See also Case COMP/M.1681, Akzo Nobel/Hoechst 
Roussel Vet [2000] OJ C 11/5, at 40-41; and Case IV/M .938, Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, at 41
1133 Case COMP/M.2276. Coca-Cota/Nestle/JV[2!0O^] OJ C 308/13, at 37.
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involved could be used in combination for certain indications.“'^̂ 4 jh e  concerns were ultimately ruled out 
because the parties’ products were sold to different customer groups.“'i35
Likewise, in INA/FAG, the Commission partially ruled out bundling concerns with regards to a full-range 
supplier of bearings because customers bought bearings separately from different suppliers.'̂ ^e in order 
to determine whether a supplier can ensure that products are purchased together, the Commission also 
takes into consideration the cost of doing so. For instance, it cleared the proposed merger in 
UIAG/Carlye/Andritz because there would have been substantial costs in adapting the products involved 
so as to make them compatible with one another.“'̂ 37
When blocking a portfolio merger, the Commission has also emphasised whether competitors can 
readily match the merged e n tit/s  product range or not. The Commission attempts to look at foreclosure 
here. It appears to consider whether the merger would create a market structure that significantly pre­
empts rivals' opportunities. In Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, it stressed that competitors of the merged 
group would have “weaker portfolios and fewer strong brands.”î 38 By contrast, in Akzo Nobel/Hoedist 
Roussel Vet and in INA/FAG, it ruled out portfolio effects because rival suppliers had similar attractive 
portfolios.“"39 In Coca-Cola/Carlsberg, in accepting the proposed undertakings, one of the factors 
considered was that the joint venture’s main rival would have “sufficiently broad range of products in its
portfolio.”' 140
Potential competition was also considered. The Commission appears to regard the portfolio range in 
itself as a  barrier to entry as it reduces potential competition due to the economies of scale or scope. In 
Cocd’ Cola/Amalgamated Beverages, it emphasised that the must stock character of Coca-Cola meant 
that potential competitors had difficulty obtaining access to lop shelf space."4i The same approach was 
noticeable in Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, where it was stated that “as a result of the creation of [the 
merged group] entry of new products is likely to become more difficult.""42
1134 Case CO M P/M .1681, Akzo Nobel/Hoechst Roussel Vet, at 40-41.
1135 Case COM P/M .1681, Akzo Nobel/Hoechst Roussel Vet, at 32-102.
1136 Case COM P/M .2608, INA/FAG  [2001] OJ C  272/3, at 34. See also Case IV/M.1355, NeweHRubbenvaid, excluding 
range effects because th e  product markets in which the portfolio is held, widely diverge from each other thus making tying 
sales and predatory pricing unprofitable" (at 19),
1137 Case COM P/M .1736, UIAG/Carfye/Andritz [2000] OJ C 14/7, at 13.
1133 Case 1V/M.938, Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, at 103.
1139 Case COM P/M .1681, Akzo Nobel/Hoechst Roussel Vet, at 98 and 103; and. Case COMP/M.26Q8, INA/FAG, at 34.
11® Case COM P/M .833, Coca-Cola Company/Carisberg A/S, at 113.
1141 Case COM P/M .794, Coca-Cola Company/Amafgamated Beverages GB, at 190.
1142 Case IV/M .938, Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, at 113.
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As a final point, it can be stressed that the Commission looks at consumer power. In Allied 
Signal/Honeywell, it ruled out the risk of pure bundling, in part because customers were knowledgeable, 
and would allow bundling only if it was in their advantage.''^^ More importantly, it found that customers 
could retaliate against any unwanted bundle, for they could obtain the various products of the bundle 
from other s u p p l i e r s . B y  contrast in Dana/Glacier Vandervell, customers’ reaction was seen as a 
reason to justify the post-merger bundling practice.''in this case, the Commission rejected the 
portfolio concerns with the argument that customers were increasingly moving towards demanding 
product packages.
In Danish CrownA/estjyske Slagterier, the Commission Investigated the proposed merger of two leading 
slaughterhouses in Denmark.'*''̂ ® Approving the proposed merger after undertakings were offered, the 
Commission was afraid that the transaction would result in bundled sale of beef and pork through 
"discounting s c h e m e s A s  a result, the merger would have enabled the parties to “push the sale of 
pork using beef as a lever and vice v e r s a . " ' T h e  Commission stressed that the combined group would 
be in a position to offer a more complete product range than its competitors: “the concentration vrill 
achieve volumes which will make it possible to move from present/indirect/narrow-assortment sales to 
the retail sector to a full-assortment, direct supplier status for retailers in some of the major European 
markets.""^®
The Commission apparently feared that the transaction could have led to the exit of competitors from 
the relevant markets in the long run. While parties claimed that the fuller product line would benefit their 
consumers, it considered that the merger formed an obstacle to competition. As for the claimed 
efficiencies, it noted that: “the majority of the cost savings listed by the parties would seem to be at least 
partially achievable without the merger.’ "®®
In sum, the Commission began developing a bundling theory. The rudimentary framework of analysis 
was promising. Market power was required in the main market, while the Commission also suggested 
worrying about foreclosure in the second market. However, possible efficiency gains were not
1’«  Case COMP/M.1601, Allied Signai/HoneyweH [2001J OJ L 152/1, at 113. See also Case IV/M.938, Guinness/Grand 
Metropolitan, at104-112.
Case COMP/M.1601, Allied Signal/Honeywell, at 120.
Case IV /1335, Dana/Glacier Vandervell [1999] OJ C 25/18, at 15.
11« Case IV/M.1313, D anis/j Crown/Vestjyske S/agferier [2000] OJ L 20/1.
Case IV/M.1313, Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier, at 196.
11« Case IV/M.1313, Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier, at 196.
11« Case IV/M.1313, Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier, at 198.
115° Case IV/M.1313, Dan/s/i Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier, at 198.
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considered as a positive feature, but rather, as a reason to oppose the m e r g e r . ' * Moreover, the 
Commission seems to have considered the must stock character of a particular brand sufficient grounds 
to assume market power and even foreclosure in other markets.
4.3. The bundling theory of the new century
With the turn of the century, EC m erger control began applying a  somewhat mature bundling analysis, 
although significant misapplications still occurred. W hile early on the Commission played a major role in 
developing the theory, now the Community Courts became involved. They have without doubt clarified 
the scope and application of the bundling theory.
For the first time, bundling concerns were explicitly addressed in most cases. For instance, Commission 
decisions were using headings like ‘bundling,’ ‘tying,’ or ‘technical bundling’ when assessing the effects 
on competition. Unlike the 90s, where there was a focus on specific sectors, the Commission applied 
the bundling theory particularly to conglomerate mergers. The Commission has now blocked some 
major conglomerate mergers for strategic bundling reasons, causing a clear divergence with US merger 
law.
An interesting case in 2000 leading in part to a bundling problem was AOUFfme Wamer.^^^^ This case 
concerned the first significant merger involving the Internet. The proposed transaction combined A O L’s 
Internet access services and know-how with Time W arner’s m edia and entertainment content. Basically, 
the merger partially affected the markets for online music delivery media players and Internet access. In 
addition to the traditional objections against vertical integration, the Commission appears to have been 
troubled by the ability of the new group to bundle online music distribution with both the media player 
m arket and Internet access.
Considering that Time W arner has the largest music library in Europe '̂̂ ss ¡t found the new entity 
dominant on the market for online music delivery.'•154 Observing that position, the Commission noted 
that:
Ukewise critical, see Burnley, op. of., pp. 58-59; and, Baker and Ridyard, op. c/i., pp. 182-184. 
"52 Case COMP/M.1845, A O U fim e  W am er[2001] OJ L 268/28.
"53 Case COMP/M.1845, AOUTtme Warner, at 46.
"54 Case COMP/M.1845, AOl/Tirrie Warner, at 59.
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[o]ne entity controlling such a sizeable music catalogue could exercise substantial market power, 
by refusing to license its rights, or threatening not to licence them or imposing high or 
discriminatory prices and other unfair commercial conditions on its customers whishing to acquire 
such rights (such as internet retailers offerings music downloads and streaming).” 5s
Bundling practices seem to have been one type of the unfair commercial conditions that the new group 
could impose. First, the Commission feared technical bundling of Time W arner’s online music with 
AOL’s media player Winamp. Media players are software devices incorporated in a computer that 
enable computer users to play audio files. The new group could decide to “format Tim e W arner music to 
make It compatible only with Winamp,” so that it would become the only music player capable of playing 
Time W arner’s online music.‘>i56
Second, the Commission expected the merged entity to leverage its strong position In the online music 
market to the market for Internet access. The new entity could indeed bundle music and access in 
attractive packages, like offering subscriptions for AOL with free Time W arner music. It could also 
bundle both markets by adapting music CDs to carry AOL’s software, encouraging music fans to 
register with AOL. As a result, the Commission predicted that the new group would obtain a dominant 
position in the UK where AOL already had a strong market position.
In Boeing/Hughes, the Commission investigated the merger between Hughes, a supplier of satellites, 
and Boeing, a supplier of satellite launch s e rv ic e s .''The merger resulted in the integration of Hughes’ 
commercial satellite operations with Boeing’s services to deliver satellites to space orbit. Although the 
transaction was ultimately approved, the Commission was seriously concerned about the ability of the 
meriged entity to technically tie together the satellites and launchers by making the satellite interfaces 
incompatible with launchers other than Boeing.
The Commission seems to have worried about the ability of the new group to leverage its strong 
position in the satellite market into the market for satellite launchers. It ultimately rejected this possibility 
based on the single monopoly profit-theorem. As it stressed:
[i]t appears that, although the behaviour [...] might theoretically lead customers to favour 
Boeing’s launch services, it could also undermine competitiveness on the satellite market [...] In 
that context, it is necessary to examine whether the merged entity would gain more through
1155 Case COMP/M.1845, AOLiftme Warner, at 47.
1156 Case COMP/M.1845. AOUTime Warner, at 60.
115? Case COMP/M.1879. BoeingAiughes 12004] OJ L 63/53.
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additional launch services contracts than it would lose through lost satellite contracts, if it were to 
engage in such behaviour."’
Based on the facts, the Commission found that there was no risk of strategic bundling.’ ’sa First, the 
merging parties lacked sufficient market power in the market for satellites. As the Commission stated, 
“even launch service competitors who expressed concerns admit that, in the absence of substantial 
m arket power on the satellite market, the leveraging could not profitable take place.”” ®° Second, strong 
consumer preferences for other launchers would also prevent the merged entity from indulging in tying. 
It was stressed that “consumers will not accept having the choice of launcher imposed on them, and that 
any attempt by [new entity] to design satellites compatible with only [Boeing’s] launch would meet 
resistance from consumers."” ®’
Perhaps the best-known and most controversial instance of the bundling theory is GE/HoneywelL^^^^ 
The product offerings of the two companies were to a large extent complementary. GE was one of 
largest manufacturer of aircraft engines. Honeywell also made engines and was the leading supplier of 
avionics, components used in aircraft engines. GE was considered dominant in the market for large 
commercial aircraft je t engines.” ®® One of the concerns brought forward by the Commission hinges on 
the new group bundling GE and Honeywell products:
[t]he complementary nature of the GE and Honeywell product offerings coupled with their 
respective existing market positions will give the merged entity the ability and the economically 
rational incentive to engage in bundled offers or cross-subsidisation across product sales to both 
categories of customers.” ®̂
The Commission’s decision stressed the extent of the new entity’s product range, the fact that 
customers w ere price-sensitive and attracted by bundled offers as shown by the current and past
” 58 Case COM P/M .1879, Boeing/Hughes [2004] OJ L 63/53, at 83.
1159 For a positive review, see Lofaro and Ridyard, op. a t ,  pp. 152-153.
1180 033e COM P/M .1879, Boeing/Hughes, at 93. That leveraging is not profitable in the absence of a dominant position in the 
main market was affirmed in Case COMP/JV.15, BT/AT&T. In that case, the Commission dismissed bundling concerns 
because *the joint venture w ll not hold a dominant position on any of the markets in which it will be active, so any tying of 
B Ts services to those offered by the joint venture could not lead to any increase in market power, since any advantage that 
BT could obtain from the creation of the joint venture could be matched by other UK operators either on their own or in 
conjunction with the joint venture’s competitors’  (at 163).
1161 Case COM P/M .1879, Boeing/Hughes, at 87. See also Case COMP M.2397, BC Funds/Sanitec, [2001] OJ C 207/9, 
where the Commission found that the new entity would not have an Incentive to engage in pure bundling *in case 
wholesalers were not prepared to take the whole range" (at 17).
” 52 Case COM P/M .2220, GE/Honeyweii [2004] OJ L 48/1. For critical reviews, see Motta, Competition Poficy -  Theory and 
Practice (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 379-391; and, Evans and Salinger, "Competition Thinking at the European Commission: 
Lessons from the Aborted GE/Honeyweli Merger", Geo. Mason L. Rev. 489  (2002). For a more positive review, see Briggs 
and Rosenblatt, “6 E/Honeywell -  Live and Let Die; A Response to Kolasky & Greenfield", Geo. Mason L. Rev. 459 (2002). 
” 53 Case COM P/M .2220, GBWoneywe/f, a t 38 ,108-116,125-133.
” 54 Case COM P/M .2220. GE/Honeyweii, at 349.
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success of bundles in the markets concerned, and the fact that rivals were unable to provide customers 
with the same type of bundles. The Commission found that the merged group would engage in mixed, 
pure and technical bundling with adverse effects on competitors.''
The main focus of its decision was the possibility that the merged entity would engage in mixed bundling 
by offering packages of GE engines and Honeywell avionics and non-avionic systems at discounted 
prices. This would “lead to a re-allocation and therefore to a shift of market share in favour of the 
merged entity* to such an extent that G E’s rivals would be unable to cover their fixed costs and 
therefore exit the engine m arket.According to the Commission, it vrould shift demand away from 
rival suppliers that have neither the product range norths financial strength to compete. As a result, rival 
suppliers would cease to act as an effective competitive constraint on the new group.''
The merging parties submitted that the products involved were not typically purchased together. The 
Commission did not only dispute this fact, but also argued that even if there were different time lines for 
the selection of je t engines and avionics, “contractual arrangement can always make bundling 
possible."''̂ ®^ It referred to the possibility of retroactive discounts that would grow proportionally to the 
number of products ultimately sourced by customers.
The parties also stressed that their ability to profitably engage in bundling would be constrained by the 
ability of rivals to offer competing bundles, in particular through contractual teaming agreements virith 
one another. The Commission rejected this argument. It noted that:
even if com peting bundles through team ing w ere to be regarded by customers as attractive as  
those o f the m erged entity, custom ers will then make purchasing decisions on the basis o f th e  
respective prices o f these bundles [ ...]  In the absence o f economic integration among competing 
suppliers, the prices of their bundles cannot be expected to be k iw er than those o f the m erged 
entity.""®®
Essentially, the Commission deprives consumers of gains in terms of lower prices, at least in the short­
term, for the sake of long-term competition. Any conclusion that the merger is likely to result in the 
exclusion of rivals must be supported by highly particularised evidence and reasoning to avoid any
"65 Case COMP/M.2220, GE/Honeywell, at 360.
" «  Case COMP/M.2220, GE/Honeywell, at 350-355,398. 
"67 Case COMP/M.2220, GE/Honeywell, at 3 9 8 4 0 Z  
"68 Case COMP/M.2220. GE/Honeywell, at373.
"69 Case COMP/M.2220. GE/Honeywell, at 378.
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suspicion that the analysis is premised on self-serving statements by rival suppliers suffering 
competitive disadvantage due to reduced prices.
W hether the Commission succeeded in making this inherently difficult analysis is doubtful, in my view. 
For one, its reasoning appears to be supported merely by the theoretical argument that a firm might use 
bundling so as to exclude a rival from the market. Second, there was no evidence that bundling was 
already observed in the industry. Both arguments were disputed by the merging parties.
As for the first point, the Commission based its decision on an economic model developed by Nalebuff. 
However, it failed to demonstrate that his assumptions were consistent with the characteristics and 
nature of the markets under investigation. As for the latter, it seems that the empirical evidence w as  
w eak, considering the fact that package discounts were not common in aerospace markets. This 
observation was confirmed by competitors at the oral hearing.‘*̂ °̂ It must be stressed that Honeywell 
was already in a position to offer bundles, but there was no evidence that it had engaged in mixed 
bundling in relation to jet engines and avionics.
There are some issues in GE/Honeywell that remain open. The first question concerns the likelihood of 
G E rivals actually exiting the market. The Commission seems to underestimate the strong presence of 
some rivals, and does not properly discuss the possibility that they would ally with other companies in 
order to acquire smaller companies to fight M ore fundamentally, did not determine when the exit 
of rivals was supposed to take place. This is very unfortunate considering that the operating life o f an 
aircraft is long, and thus, it would take a long time to ensure a rival's exit. As a consequence, this 
implies that the Commission has not made a trade-off between the lower prices immediately after the 
merger and the possible post-merger price increases after rivals have exited over some time.
Similarly unfortunate is the fact that the Commission’s decision never mentioned the efficiency gains. In 
theory, it is possibie that the efficiency gains might eventually outweigh any negative effect on 
consumers. However, this was not assessed. Ultimately, I wonder why the Commission did not approve 
the merger with an undertaking that the new entity would refrain from mixed b u n d lin g .‘‘ ''72 The 
Commission’s argument that it did not want to continuously monitor the industry was arguably weak. It 
would not have been difficult to implement this commitment. Any cost could have fallen upon the
1170 See Pfianz and Caffarra, T h e  Economics of GE/Honeywell", EC LR 115 (2002), p. 116. 
11?’ COM P/M .2220, GE/Honeywell, a t 377-386.
1172 COMP/M.2220, GE/Honeywell, at 53.
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merging parties. Given my comments on remedies and bundling in Chapter 1, a behavioural 
commitment not to bundle would have recognised the possible efficiencies due to the merger. Potential 
anti-competitive effects could have been addressed under Article 82 EC.
Another important and explicit application o f the bundling theory is Tetra Laval.^^^ The case involved 
the liquid food packaging industry. Packaging involves the use of machinery that transforms cardboard 
or plastic consumables into containers. In the case of PET bottles, stretch blow moulding ("SBM”) 
machines are used for this purpose. The filling process is either aseptic (typically used for long-life dairy 
products and juices) or non-aseptic, used for fresh milk or soft drinks. Cartons are normally used for 
packaging sensitive products that must be shielded from light and oxygen.
Conversely, PET bottles are used for carbonated drinks. Recent innovations to PET bottles make it 
increasingly suitable for packaging sensitive products. It is expected that PET use will increase in the 
future and that the carton and PET markets would accordingly converge. In May 2001, Tetra Laval 
notified the Commission of its intention to acquire Sidel. Most relevant to the antitrust assessment were 
the markets for cartons and plastic packaging and the respective equipment markets. Those markets 
were further divided into aseptic and non-aseptic markets. Tetra held a  dominant position in the aseptic 
carton markets and a leading position in the non-aseptic carton markets. Side! held leading positions in 
the markets for SBM machines and a strong position in related markets for PET packaging.
One of the reasons that the Commission considered to veto the proposed transaction concerned 
strategic bundling. The Commission’s decision analysed the effects of the merger under the heading 
'Ability and incentive to leverage.’ According the Commission, there was a “need for particular vigilance" 
of the merger.^‘'74 \{ believed that the combination of Tetra Laval’s dominant position in cartons and 
Sidel’s leading position in PET packaging equipment would provide the new entity with the ability to 
leverage its power in cartons into the PET markets.‘'̂ 5̂ it noted, “nothing would stop the combined 
entity from inducing customers to source their equipment a t the same time and form a single source, 
changing the nature of bus iness." ' ' i t  stressed that Tetra Laval had a “particularly strong dominant
1173 Case COMP/M.2416, Tetra Laval/Sidel, [20041OJ L 43/13. For details, see Howarth, Tetra Laval/Sidel: Microeconomics 
or Microlaw', ECLR 369 (2005); and, 'Editorial Comments', CMLRev. 1 (2003).
Case COMP/M.2416, Tetra Laval/Sidel, at 359.
11̂ 5 Case COMP/M.2416. Tetra Laval/Sidel, at 392-400.
Case COMP/M.2416. Tetra Laval/Sidel, at 345.
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position" in the carton market, given its m arket share o f 80-90% , while Sidei held a market share of 60- 
70% In the PE T market.''
It also observed that the new entity would have an "added incentive* to leverage. Not only could it obtain 
dominance In the second market, but comperably also defended its position in the main market: "when a 
customer switches to PET he/she is a  lost customer on the carton side of the business either because 
he/she partially switched from carton or because he/she did not switch some of the production to carton 
from other packaging materials."'"78
It was further emphasised that the merged group’s rivals would be much smaller, with the largest 
competitor having less than 20%  of the market. Another factor that was considered was the fact the 
merged entity had a close and long-term relationship with most juice and dairy packagers.'"^9 Tetra 
Laval would know when a carton packager would like to switch to PET packaging, and, knowing its 
customers' needs, the merged entity could timely approach and discuss such a move with its 
customers. W ithout making any analysis, the Commission turned down Tetra Laval’s proposition to 
refrain from bundling for 10 years after closure of the merger. The Commission only wanted to consider 
structural remedies.
In July 2002, the bundling theory was also expressly applied in Telia/Sonera.^^^ In that case, the 
Commission reviewed the integration of Sweden and Finland’s dominant telecommunication networks. 
Telia is one o f the largest telecommunications and T V  cable operators in the Nordic countries. Sonera is 
particularly active in Finland, where it is the largest mobile phone operator and largest provider of long­
distance network services.
One of the antitrust concerns that surfaced during the investigation was the risk of strategic bundling of 
the market for fixed telephony services, along with the market for retail mobile and wireless 
communication services:
[t]he proposed transaction will increase the merged entity's ability to leverage its strong positions 
in the mobile communications services market in Finland, data communications services in 
Finland and Sweden and (international) fixed voice services in Finland through bundling Into
Case COM P/M .2416, Tetra Laval/Sidel, at 359.
1178 Case COM P/M .2416. Tetra Laval/Sidel, at 359 (emphasis added).
1179 Case COM P/M .2416. Tetra Lavat/Sidel, at 361-363.
1180 Case COM P/M .2803, Telia/Sonera, (2002] OJ C 201/19.
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p e
broader markets such as the market for customised corporate communications services in 
Finland and Sweden."'
The Commission’s decision stressed that bundling would take place through assembling 'packages’ of 
integrated communication solutions comprising both voice and data communications."'gy doing so, 
the new entity would raise its rivals’ costs and likely foreclose competitors from the retail markets:
p]n the provision of bundled service offerings there is generally risk that providers of essential 
parts of the package (such as call termination, access to local and national infrastructure, and 
wholesale international roaming) can foreclose providers of other parts by either through direct 
bundling or by offering prices structures that can only make it attractive to buy its solution."^
Possible efficiency gains due to the transaction were not considered, despite the fact the Commission 
noted that “there is a growing trend among corporate customers to demand integrated communication 
solutions.”i i^  The proposed merger was finally approved after the parties offered various behavioural 
and structural commitments, including the divesture of Telia’s mobile business in Rnland.
The appeal in Tetra Laval gave the CFl the opportunity to review the legitimacy of the bundling theory 
for the first time."'̂ 85 At the outset, the CFl made it clear in October 2002 that a merger can be blocked 
when “means and capacities brought together by the transaction may immediately create conditions 
allowing the merged entity to leverage its way so as to acquire, in the relatively near future, a  dominant 
position on the other market.’ ^ I n  other words, strategic bundling can in principle be addressed under 
the merger r u le s ." * In  its ruling, the Court focused solely on whether the transaction would create or 
strengthen a dominant position on a market outside the main market. Remarkably, the Court likewise 
seems to accept strategic bundling in cases of substitutes, as it stressed that "leveraging may be carried 
out when the products In question are ones which the customer finds suitable for the same end use.’ ^̂®®
On the leverage claim itself, the Court first observed that conglomerate mergers often have neutral or 
beneficial effects and do not immediately change the structure of competition. Any anti-competitive 
effect that might arise would rely on the new entity engaging in conduct that would be likely to infringe
1181 Case COMP/M.2803, Telia/Sonera, at 108 (emphasis added).
1182 Case COMP/r-t.2803, Telia/Sonera. at 109.
1183 Case COMP/TjI.2803. Telia/Sonera. at 110,
118̂  Case COMP/M.2803, Telia/Sonera, at 108.
1185 Cases T-5/02 & T-80/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Commission [2002] E C R 11-4381. For details, Hettema, Tetra/Sidel’, NTER 
55 (2003): and, O’Keeffe, “Gerecht Laatdunkend over Concentratieanalyse Commissie", SEW 212 (2003).
1186 Cases T-5/02 & T-80/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Commission, at 151.
1187 For similar recognition, see Volcker, op. cit., p. 588; and, Lindsay, op. d ,  pp. 292-293.
1188 Cases T-5/02 & T-80/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Commission, at 196..
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Artide 82 EC. Accordingly, the CFI held that the Commission must undertake “a precise examination, 
supported by convincing evidence, o f the circumstances’ ii89 that "in all likelihood”ii9i> would create or 
strengthen dominance “In the relatively near future" in a market other than the main market.‘'i9i
As for the feasibility of leveraging, the intensity of competition in the second market is "fundamental."^^^  ̂
The CFI agreed that the antitrust sins (like bundling) enumerated by the Commission might be 
committed. According to the Court, the incentive to do so “cannot be excluded."!^^^ However, the 
Commission could not assume that the new group would infringe Article 82 EC. The Court seems to 
accept that the availability of ex post remedies under Article 82 EC is a relevant factor. The Commission 
must thus analyse the “actual likelihood” of such behaviour, taking into account that the incentives to 
engage in illegal conduct are reduced or even eliminated by the likelihood of detection, remedial action 
by the Commission and national authorities, and the imposition of fines and other remedies.“' 
Moreover, the commitment by the merging firms to refrain from such conduct should have been 
considered. A blanket refusal to assess the impact of a behavioural undertaking is not justified."'iss
As for facts underlying the Commission’s decision, the CFI held that the Commission inflated grovrth 
projections for the PET markets.“' I t  also found that the Commission had underestimated the strength 
of rivals in the PET market.“' U l t i m a t e l y ,  the CFI overturned the merger prohibition, as its analysis was 
based on insufficient evidence and a “manifest error of assessment.’ ^̂ ®̂
The Commission seems to have paid attention to the C Fl’s arguments in Tetra Laval, and became very 
careful. In 2004, for instance, it decided to clear the proposed acquisition by GE of the UK diagnostic 
pharmaceuticals and biosciences company Amersham.“'!®  ̂ in the absence o f overlaps between the 
companies’ activities, the investigation focused on whether GE would be able to foreclose its 
competitors, namely through bundling its products with those of Amersham. Amersham produces mainly
1189 Cases T-5/02 & T-80/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Commission, at 155.
1190 Cases T-5/02 & T-80/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Commission, at 148 and 153.
1191 Cases T-5/02 & T-80/02, Tefra Laval BV v. Commission, at 2 4 1 ,2 5 2 ,2 7 5 .
11® Cases T-5/02 & T-80/02, Tetra Lavai B V  v. Commission, at 245. The competition in the second market rendered a 
leveraging strategy impracticable: “it has not been shown that the number of sales could reach a level which could threaten 
the strong competition prevailing on the market” (at 245).
1193 Cases T-5/02 & T-80/02, Tefra Laval BV v. Commission, at 216.
11« Cases T-5/02 & T-80/02, Tetra la v a i BV v. Commission, at 217-224.
1195 Cases T-5/02 & T-80/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Commisston, at 219.
1196 Cases T -5/02 & T-80/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Commission, at 192-216.
1197 Cases T -5/02 & T-80/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Commission, at 240-250.
1198 Cases T-5/02 & T-80/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Commission, at 308.
1199 Case COMP/M.3304, GE/Amersham, not yet published, 21 January 2004, 
httD://europa.eu.int/comm/comDetition/merQers/cases/decisions/m3304 en.odf
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diagnostic pharmaceuticals that are used to enable diagnostic equipment to image the body's health 
status, whereas GE Medical Systems specialises in medical diagnostic imaging technology. As the 
products of GE and Amersham are complementary, and considering that some imaging applications 
hospitals need to purchase both the hardware and the pharmaceuticals, the Commission was 
concerned, In particular, that GE could had incentive to offer mixed bundles, to force pure bundling, or to 
design its products in such a way that Amersham's products would work better with GE than with rival 
equipment. These concerns were explicitly assessed under three separate headings in the decision. 
However, the Commission’s market investigation has shown that all three scenarios were unlikely.
As for mixed bundling, this was because neither GE nor Amersham held dominant positions in their 
respective products in Europe.̂ ^oo Furthermore, both customers and a number of competitors agreed 
that the markets concerned enjoyed strong competition with viable equipment manufacturers such as 
Philips, Siemens and Toshiba, and strong producers of pharmaceuticals, such as Schering, Bristol 
Myers Squibb, Tyco/Mallinckrodt and Bracco. Combined offerings w ere therefore "generally uncommon 
in this industry."i20i Rivals would be in the position to respond to the new entity’s practices through 
various counter-strategies like price reductions and similar bundles.''202 The Commission therefore 
concluded that these players were unlikely to be foreclosed from the m arket or to become marginalised. 
The likelihood of pure bundling by the new entity was dismissed based on the one-monopoly profit 
theorem;
[t]he investigation suggested that the merged entity would lack economic incentive to engage in 
such a practice. Indeed, tying GE’s D1 pagnostic Imaging] equipment with Amersham’s DPs 
piagnostic Pharmaceuticals] would deny the merged entity significant sales of DPs to the 
current users of non-GE equipment. MutaSs mutandis, GE would need to forego sales for Dl 
equipment to users that would prefer to continue using non-Amersham DPs, were It to deny 
customers the sales of stand-alone GE Dl equipment. Therefore, forced bundling of Dl 
equipment and DPs seems unlikely to occur as a result of the proposed transaction.̂ 203
The technical tying fears were also dismissed when the Commission ascertained that there was perfect 
interoperability between the different existing equipment and pharmaceutical products.^204 |t also 
believed that such interoperability was unlikely to be reduced when new products hit to the market.
1200 Case COMP/M.3304, G£/Amersham, at 38.
1201 Case COMP/M.3304, GE/Amersham, at 35.
1202 Case COMP/M.3304, GBAmersham, at 39.
1203 Case COMP/M.3304. GE/Amers/jam. at 43.
1204 Case COMP/M.3304, GBAmersham, at 49.
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Recently, in February 2005, the bundling question was presented to ECJ.1205 After the CFI's annulment 
of the Commission veto In Tetra Laval, the Commission re-decided the matter, withdrawing its 
opposition to the merger but simultaneously appealing the C FI decision to the ECJ. One of the main 
reproaches in Its appeal was the requirement to make a detailed assessment of the impact of ex post 
remedies under Article 82 EC. Like the CFI, the ECJ noted that conglomerate mergers often have 
beneficial effects and do not change the structure of competition. As Advocate General Tizzano 
succinctly noted, “the [Commission] decision does not say that the merged entity would immediately and  
automatically acquire a dominant position on the PET packaging equipment markets, but predicts that 
that would happen only subsequently, by means of abuse of the dominant position already held by Tetra  
in carton.“i206
When predicting future conduct, the ECJ found that an assessment of incentives to infringe or not 
infringe Article 82 EC, taking into account enforcement actions by antitmst agencies and the deterring 
effect of possible fines, would be too speculative.‘'207 By contrast, the Advocate General believed that 
such an assessment would not constitute “insurmountable legal and practical obstacles.’ ^̂ os He argued 
that the CFI did not, in fact, expect the Commission to establish “with certainty" that the unlawful 
conduct would take p\ace.^^  Nor did he think that the Commission must demonstrate that the  
incentives identified would “definitively drive Tetra to engage in that conduct."i2io jh e  Commission w as  
simply asked to take account of all relevant factors. Although the Commission scored on this point of the  
appeal, the ECJ still upheld the ruling o f the CFI. The Commission was namely required, but had failed, 
to consider Tetra’s commitment not to engage in conduct prohibited by Article 82 ECJ211
1205 Case 12/13 P, Commission v. Tetra Lavai, decision of 15 February 2005, not yet reported. For details, Van Daalen, ‘De 
Rechterlijke Toetsing van Concentratiebesluiten: de zaak Tetra Laval", AM 56 (2005) en Howartìi, op. cH..
1206 See Advocate General Tizzano, in Case 12/13 P, Commission v. Tetra Laval, at 120 (emphasis added).
1207 Case 12/13 P, C o m m is i v. Tetra Laval, a t 77.
1208 See Advocate General Tizzano, in Case 12/13 P, Commission v. Tetra Laval, at 125.
1209 See Advocate General Tizzano, in Case 12/13 P, Commissbn v. Tetra Laval, at 125.
1210 See Advocate General Tizzano, In Case 12/13 P, Commissbn v. Tetra Laval, at 125.
1211 Case 12/13 P, Commissbn v. Tetra Laval, a t 89.
246
As for the standard of proof, the Commission pleaded that the CFl erred in applying the convincing 
evidence standard and had exceeded the scope of its review jurisdiction by overturning assessment on 
matters of discretion. On the issue of discretion, the ECJ observed: “[wjhilst the Court recognises that 
the Commission has a margin of discretion with regard to economic matters, that does not mean that 
the Community Courts must refrain from reviewing the Commission's interpretation of information of an 
economic nature."‘'2i 2
The Court noted further that the prospective analysis of merger control must be earned out ‘with great 
care," as it does not entail the examination of past or current events-'’^̂  ̂Rather, it concerns a prediction 
of events that are more or less likely to occur in the future. With regards to conglomerate mergers (and 
therefore, strategic bundling), the ECJ held that, because the effects of post-merger conduct are ’‘dimly 
discemable, uncertain and difficult to establish,, the quality of evidence required is “particularfy 
/mporianf.”''2i4 Ultimately, the appeal was turned down.
The most recent application of the bundling theory is Symantec.'*^^^ The case involved two American 
companies. Symantec develops security software and wanted to acquire Veritas, a storage software 
company. The m erger between these two companies is complementary in nature, as both security 
software and storage software largely function independently of each other. In its review, the 
Commission expressly examined possible bundling between storage and security under the heading 
‘ Bundling/tying."''2i 6 jh e  Commission concluded that the merger would not give rise to competition 
concerns as such. For one, both types o f software can properly function independently of one another 
and hence no technical bundling is necessary. Second, vendors continue to market these software 
products separately since no particular added value could be achieved from bundling. Finally, 
customers tend to purchase both products separately.
1212 Case 12/13 P, Comm/ss/on v. Tefra Laval, at 39.
1212 Case 12/13 P, Commission v. Tetra Laval, at 42. 
i2i< Case 12/13 P, Commission v. Tetra Laval, at 44.
1215 Case COMP/M.3697, Syman/ecA/erifas, not yet pubfished, 15 
vww.euroDa.eu.int/comm/comDetition/merQers/cases/decisions/m3697 20050315 20310 en.odf.
1216 Case COMP/M.3697, Symantec/Veritas, at 28-30.
March 2005,
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4.4. In terim  conclusions
A common antitrust concern that arises, particularly in conglomerate mergers, is the ability of the new 
entity to leverage a dominant position in one market to a  second market in order to have a decisive 
competitive advantage in that last market. Considering the economic insights of Chapter 1, it is in my 
view incorrect to dismiss a priori these antitrust worries as having no economic foundation. A merger 
may surely give the new undertaking the ability to bundle its products in a manner that could foreclose 
competitors and, in the end, reduce competition. However, it is important for such claims to be treated 
with the utmost care. The Commission appears to have unduly objected to any extension of a firm’s 
product range by applying concepts like must have products. That concept may say something about 
the possible power of that specific product, but bundling is, in my view, only an issue if there is the 
potential for a significant foreclosure effect.
The bundling theory is in application, without doubt, quite problematic. It should be noted that most 
cases involve mixed bundling. The competitive harm of mixed bundles may arise from the reduction in 
the price o f the complementary products supplied by the merged entity. The Commission's theory 
predicts that the new undertaking’s prices for the bundled product will, at least in the short term, 
decrease post-merger. As a consequence, significant competitive harm occurs if rivals are so 
competitively disadvantaged that they are forced to exit from the market. After their exit, the 
Commission claims, there will be anti-competitive effects on competition. The problem is that these 
effects m ay not take place for several years, if at all. It is arguably a difficult and highly uncertain 
evaluation to ascertain when and in which magnitude these effects will occur. In many cases, the 
Commission appears to have assumed that the merged firm will obtain a decisive advantage simply due 
to its size. W hile size may surely be an advantage in some circumstances, this does not necessarily 
equate to an undertaking being competitively more powerful, or even result in strategic bundling.
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5. Evaluation of the bundling theory
5.1. The theory in detail
Under the merger rules, the bundling theory clearly focuses on exclusionary leveraging, not short-term 
leveraging. In GE/Am er^am , the Commission sucdnctly described its theory vrlth relation to mixed 
bundling as follows:
[i]n assessing com m ercial bundling, th e  Commission examined w hether o r not each one o f the  
various conditions that would render it anti-com petitive are m et in the present case. Indeed, fo r 
com m ercial bundling to result in foreclosure o f competition, it is necessary that the merged entity  
is able to leverage its pre-m erger dom inance in one product to another complementary product 
In addition, fo r such strategy to be profitable, there must be a reasonable expectation that rivals 
w ill not be ab le  to propose a  com petitive response, and that their resulting marginalisation w ill 
force them  to  exit the m arket Finally, once rivals have exited the m arket the m erged firm m ust 
be able to im plem ent unilateral price increases and such increases need to be sustainable in the  
long term, w ithout being challenged by the likelihood of new  rivals entering the m arket or 
previously m arginalised ones re-entering the market^^i?
Essentially, the Commission examines the ability of the merged entity to engage in strategic bundling 
based on the following factors.‘'2̂ 8 First, the Commission defines the product markets involved and 
evaluates their relationship with each other. An important factor for successful leveraging is that the 
relevant markets shares concern, to a large extent, the same customers. If there are very few customers 
interested in buying both products, a leveraging strategy is difficult to implement, even apart from its 
inability to foreclose rivals. An overlap of customers is likely when the merger involves complementary 
products. The CFI’s suggestion in Tetra Lava/that bundling of substitutes could also result in leveraging 
should, in my view, be dismissed as economically unsound .1219
A second issue to consider is the presence of market power or dominance in at least one of the 
complementary product markets before the merger. Volcker dubs this one of the "^reshold 
questions."''22o W ithout market power, it is obvious that there is no concern for leveraging. In fact, the 
Commission appears to recognise this requirement in its public statements^22i and within its practice.‘*222 
The clearest recognition of this essential condition can be found in GE/Amersharri, where the
1217 Case COMP;M.3304. GE/Amersham, at 37.
1218 See also OECD, op. d t , pp. 239-244.
1219 Cases T-5/02 & T-8Q/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Commission, at 196.
1220 See Volcker, op. cit., p. 595.
1221 See Giotakos, ‘GE/Honeywell: A Theoretic Bundle Assessing Conglomerate Mergers Across the Atlantic’ , U. Pa. J. Inf) 
Econ. L. 469 (2002), writing that *p]ndeed, it can reasonably be argued that a firm that lacks market power in the tying market 
may not have the ability to leverage such market power to the ted market* (p. 482).
1222 Case COMP/M .2220, GE/Honeywell. at 357-358 and 369; and, Case IV/M.1355, Newell/Rubbennaki, at 19.
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Commission stressed that “pre-merger dominance in one producf was necessary for successful
leveraging.^223
Third, if the new undertaking has market power in one or more of the complementary products, it may 
be able to leverage that position Into other products o f the range. This can be, for instance, by mixed 
bundling or technical bundling. W hether such an arrangement is realistic must be assessed with regards 
to the products involved. For instance, in Symantec, the Commission did not fear any technical 
bundling, as the products could function properly independently.'*224 Fourth, it is essential to examine the 
specific characteristics of the relevant markets. The merged entity must have the incentive to leverage 
Its position. A combined offering in the form of bundling may not be a commercially viable option if the 
products are not typically bought together. For instance, the products may not be commercially related, 
or customers tend to make the purchases at different times.''225 Another reason could be that 
purchasing decisions are not principally driven by price considerations.
The Commission appears to accept quite easily, and arguably unduly, that there are no commercial 
restraints of this kind. In GE/HoneyweH, it argued that “contractual arrangements can always make 
bundling possible,* even if there are different times lines for purchasing the products.‘*226 |n Tetra Laval, 
the Commission even suggested that the merged entity could change the “nature of the business," 
forcing customers to "source their equipment at the same tim e and from a single source.'̂ ^zr At this 
point of the analysis, the Commission must also assess the impact of ex post remedies under Article 82 
EC. As Advocate General Tizzano stressed in Tetra Laval, certainty that illegal behaviour will happen is 
not necessary.i^ss Rather, the Commission must generally focus on how the company’s incentives to 
engage in illegal behaviour are effected by ex posi remedies.
Finally, the last important aspect of the analysis lies in the foreseeable foreclosure effects. In Tetra 
Laval, for instance, the Community Courts adequately devoted the most substantial part of their ruling to 
this question. The core of the examination is the prediction that as a result of the bundling strategy, a 
sufficient number of rivals will exit the market. This assessment must include the effectiveness of 
strategic bundling, possible counter actions by rivals as well as their ability to endure the merged entity’s
12»  Case COMP/M.3304, G&Amersham, at 37.
1224 Case COMP/M.3697, Symantec/Ventas, at 28. See also Case COMP/M.3304, GE/Amersham, at 44-45.
1225 Case COMP/M.3304, GE/Amersham, a t 35.
1226 COM P/M.2220, GE/Honeywell, at 378 (emphasis added).
1227 Case COMP/M.2416, Tetra Laval/Sidel, at 345.
1228 See Advocate General lizzan o , in Case 12/13 P, Commission v. Tetra Lavai, at 125.
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practices. After the exit of rivals is predicted, the prospective analysis must consider vvhether market 
entry is likely once the combined attempts to raise prices or reduce output.
The final part of this analysis will raise serious evidentiary problems.'*229 As the ECJ has made it clear in 
Tetra Laval, it is therefore particularly important to focus on the quality of evidence and the procedural 
care required when prohibiting a merger for strategic bundling.'*23° W hether the Court has hereby 
changed the standard of proof is open for discussion.'•231 While better evidence is always desirable, the 
Court failed to fully recognise an important aspect of antitrust analysis in general and particular merger 
control: uncertainty. As Howarth observes, “the results of a merger are not susceptible to proof one way 
or the other."''232 a  more economic approach would recognise that there is uncertainty In real markets. 
Any merger veto should therefore, in my view, focus on the probability that certain effects will occur.‘‘233
Arguably, this approach is a better reflection of what happens in practice.“*234 At least the CFl appears to 
have recognised this point. In Tetra Laval, it referred somewhat to probability thresholds: “in all 
likelihood"i235^ “particularly plausible"''236^ and “the certainty required to justify the prohibition of a 
merger.’’i237 jo  be sure, those thresholds were not actually applied or explained further. Recently, the 
Commission appears to have recognised this point, thus deserving recognition. Discussing the Tetra 
¿.ava/judgment, Drauz, a high-ranking Commission official, said:
essentially, the Commission considered that, as in other EU jurisdictions, the standard of proof 
for prohibiting but also for allowing mergers should be one of the 'balance of probabilities'. In 
other words, for reaching a final decision (whether positive or negative), it should be required 
from the Commission to assess, on the basis of the various elements at its disposal, which 
effects are the most likely.^^
1229 See Voicker, op. cit., pp. 607-608.
1230 Case 12/13 P, Commission v. Tetra Laval, at 44.
1231 The CFl President Vesterdorf argues that it did no t See Vesterdorf, “Standard of Proof in Meiger Cases: Reflections in 
the Light of Recent Case Law of the Community Courts”, ECJ 3 (2005). For a different view, see Bailey, “Standard of Proof In 
EC Merger Proceedings: A Common Law Perspective’ , CMLRev. 845 (2003).
1232 See Howarth, op. cit., p. 371.
1233 For a succinct review, see Heyer, “A World of Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization of AntitrusT, Antitrust L  J. 
375(2005). pp. 382-386.
1234 See Howarth, op. cit., noting that ‘ [t]he competitive effect of a merger Is determined partly by what actually happens 
tomorrow, but also by what firms do today in expectation of what will happen tomorrow. This e x p ^ tio n  is usually based on 
rough probabilities adjusted in the light what happened yesterday” (p. 371).
1235 Cases T-5/02 & T-80/02, Tetra Laval B V v. Commission, at 148 and 153.
1236 Cases T-5/02 & T-80/02, Tetra Laval B V v. Commission, at 162.
1232 Cases T-5/02 & T-80/02, Tetra Laval B V v. Commission, at 234.
1238 See Drauz, “Conglomerate and Vertical Mergers in the Light of the Tetra Judgement", Competitton Poftcy Newsletter No. 
2 Summer 2005, p. 35.
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In the case that the merger results in leveraging, the Commission must not always prefer structural 
remedies. A structural remedy in such a case is designed to reduce the merged entity’s market position 
in the main m arket or other markets. As Tetra Lava/shows, divesture is not always an option to achieve 
this.“*239 Behavioural commitments are more targeted remedies that can effectively take away any 
bundling concern. In both GE/Honeywell and Tetra Laval, the merging parties promised not to engage in 
pure or mixed bundling or tying. It is unfortunate that the Commission rejected these undertakings 
without analysing their impact with the argument that it favours structural remedies and that the 
proposed commitments required monitoring.'•240
5.2. US criticism
The EC theory on bundling stirred fierce criticism from the other side of the Atlantic. U.S. scholars and 
officials mainly criticise the prohibition in GE/HoneyweV^^^ The proposed merger was also notified with 
the American authorities. The DoJ concluded that there was no evidence supporting a challenge of the 
merger on the basis of bundling concerns.
First, it is important to note that the US clearance w as based upon different factual assumptions.^242 
Despite GE’s large market shares in the m arket for large aircraft engines, the DoJ did not consider it to 
bedominant. It found that that market share was almost entirely dependent on a single contract with 
Boeing. Excluding those sales, GE only had a market share of 44% , while Its rivals PW and Rolls Royce 
held 23% and 27%  respectively. Moreover, DoJ characterised the market for large aircraft engines as a 
bid market. Generally, the DoJ stressed, in such a market, historic market shares are weakly indicative 
of future success. Second, given the US approach towards bundling, the criticism is hardly surprising. It 
must be borne in mind that US law solely worries about harm to efficiency as represented by artificial 
limitation of output or price increases. The US agencies examine mergers between potential competitors 
under the horizontal merger guidelines for their effect on competition, while they generally avoid 
interfering with non-horizontal mergers.
According to US critics, the EC approach derives from a misplaced tendency to emphasise the 
protection of competitors rather than competition. This leads to the finding that economies of scale and 
efficiency defences are less important than the potential for exclusionary practices. In response, the
1239 Case C O M P M 2416, Tetra Laval/Sidel. at 421-42 2 ,433451 .
12«  Case COM P/M.2416, Tetra Laval/Sidel, at 431; and, COMP/M.2220, GE/Honeywell, at 53.
1241 See OECD, op. cit., pp. 225-227.
1242 See OECD, op .c/f„ p .225.
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Commission observed that the exit of rivals may result in an adverse effect on competition in the long 
term. Focusing on the competitive process, it noted;
m isleading to  accept unconditionally such overly simplistic positions that com petitors should 
never be the focus of antitaist worries and that if inefficient com petitors were driven out of the  
m arket, even then consumers would b e better off overall [...] subject to exceptional cases such 
as natural m onopolies, there can be no effective competition w ithout competitors [...] it might be  
pnident for antitrust authorities not to  adopt unconditionally such a  Darwinian theory on the  
evolution o f species, whereby com petitors that are unable o r unwilling to m eet the new  
com petitive environm ent created through a  conglomerate m erger should just leave the
marketJ243
The Commission’s response is cogent. It apparently says that protection of the competitive structure of 
an industry must not be confused with protection of inefficient competitors. The underlying idea appears 
to entail that market exit by an inefficient competitor may not be followed by market entry by a more 
efficient competitor. These rivals may not enter because of high entry barriers and long industrial cycles. 
In other words, each relevant market must, the Commission suggests, be carefully assessed on a  case- 
by-case basis.
While the Commission recognises that EC law must protect consumers and not competitors, it Is not 
absolute on this point. In my view, the Commission does well not to consider it like that. EC competition 
law is distinctly ‘European.’ After all, the legal substantive test o f the Merger Regulation differs 
significantly from the test applied under the Clayton Act. More importantly, the application of EC law 
incorporates policy aims that are more unique to Europe.''̂ ^^ Further, according to Article 82 EC, 
dominant companies have a special responsibility with regards to smaller and weaker competitors. 
Conduct that might be regarded as healthy competition in the US is severely restricted under EC law.
5.3. Discussion o f the necessity of e x  ante  control
The Commission believes that there is room for ex ante control of bundling under the merger rules. In 
their view, the very reason for applying the merger regulation is that an ex-posf control under Article 82 
EC is not considered sufficient for the prevention of leveraging. The Commission is convinced that 
merger control is important: “As is the case with all mergers, efficient application of Article 82 is an 
inadequate substitute for proper use of ex-ante merger control policy."^245
12̂ 3 See Drauz, ‘ Unbundling GEHoneywell; The Assessment of Conglomerate Mergers under EC Competition Law", in: 
Hawk (ed.), Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporafe Law Institute (New York, 2002), p.197.
’3« See Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Cenfu/y Europe (Oxford, 1998), pp. 12-13.
12« See OECD, op. c /f..p . 243.
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In a recent comment, Drauz repeated this point, saying that the very reason for the merger controi was 
that “an en ex-post controi under Article 82 was not considered sufficient for the prevention of such
abuses." 1245
To the contrary, there are, in my view, practical and legal arguments that argue in favour of a cautious 
approach towards the use o f merger control in this context.12471 have three interrelated arguments: (1) 
problematic predictions and evaluations of behaviour in the future; (2) blurring distinction of stmctural 
and behavioural instruments: and, (3) the role of Article 82 EC.
5.3.1. Problematic predictions and evaluations of behaviour In the future
The first argument relates to the nature o f merger control and to the specifics o f bundling concerns. This 
objection is two-fold. First, merger control is about conducting a prospective analysis. It involves an 
appraisal of how the market will operate in the future. As Ritter writes, it is a “complex evaluation" of the 
post-merger effects.i248 By definition, merger control therefore requires a delicate and inherently difficult 
prospective examination of business effects. With regards to bundling, this kind of analysis is particularly 
complex and sensitive to small changes in the characteristics of the markets and products. As Pflanz 
and Caffara succinctly obsen/e:
(t]he prediction of exit Is a much more hazardous prediction of short run post-merger price 
increases as in a horizontal merger -  not least because of the extended time-scale involved, and 
the reliance on assumptions about general economic conditions, the success of future products, 
etc.1249
In this context, an ex post approach would be more appealing, as it allows the Commission to see 
whether or not anti-competitive bundling actually occurs. A m erger policy for bundling should at least 
answer affirmatively two questions: (1 ) would the merged entity engage in bundling; and, if so. (2) would 
the bundling strategy harm consumers?
It Is very difficult, if not impossible, to ex ante answer these questions. Waiting would yield important 
advantages in analysing these issues. The first question would already be resolved at that point, and
«46 See Drauz (2005), op. cit., p. 38.
«47 por similar recognition, see Vesterdorf, op. cit., suggesting that Article 82 EC is ‘particularly apt" for this control (p. 29). 
See Ritter, op. erf., p. 408.
1249 See Pflanz and Caffara, TTie Economics of G.EJHoneyweH", EC LR 115 (2002), p. 117.
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more evidence on the second question would be available, even if it is not definite. This was also the 
approach taken by the Commission in Coca-Coia/Amalgamated Beverages, where clearance for the 
merger was accompanied by a reminder of the bottler’s obligations under Article 82
Second, the Commission does not only seek to predict particular events in the future, but also attempts 
to give a value judgment about the competitive consequences of these events. In the short term, the 
bundling practice predicted may lead to price reductions. The Commission emphasises that such price 
reductions or output expansions directly following the merger are of a merely strategic nature. These 
reductions are of short duration. Consumer welfare will ultimately suffer as competitors are eliminated in 
the second market. This elimination will then lead to price increases. This means that the Commission 
must estimate the price decrease its duration, and, after the exit of rivals, the price increase and 
subsequent negative effects on consumers.‘*2si
5.3.2. Blurring distinction between structural and behavioural instruments
From a dogmatic point of view, the introduction of the bundling theory under merger control blurs the 
distinction between the control of market stmcture and control of firms’ behaviour. As for strategic 
bundling, it is not the structure resulting from the merger itself that creates an anti-competitive outcome, 
rather future conduct. Leveraging will occur only after a certain amount of time, and will result from the 
practices engaged by the new undertaking.
5.3.3. The role of Article 82 EC
W hat is the role of Article 82 EC when assessing mergers? If the theory of merger harm is based on the 
leveraging theory, then potentially leveraging is also subject to control under Article 82 EC. The relevant 
practices may qualify as unlawful under this provision. Typically, this applies to the practices addressed, 
for instance, in Tetra Laval, namely bundling and predatory pricing. This suggest, in my view, a  cautious 
approach when applying
To better explain my argument, an analogy should be made with the oligopoly problem under 
competition law. The legal possibilities to control ex post oligopoly are limited.''252 a s  a consequence, it
1250 Case COMP/M.794. Coca-Cola Company/Amalgamated Beverages GB.
1251 See de Commission’s definition of the bundling concern in Case COMP/M.3304, GE/Amersham, a t 37.
1252 See Stroux, EC Oligopoly Control { EUI thesis, 2003).
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is essential, to prevent oligopolistic m arket structures from coming into existence. However, Article 82 
EC leaves little room for bundling: there is no “remediless tying."i253
The Community Courts seem to confirm this idea. In Tetra Lava/, the CFl held that the availability of ex 
post remedies under Article 82 is a  relevant factor. W ith regards to practices caught by Article 82 EC, 
the CFl in Tetra Laval took the view that when assessing the incentives to engage in the leveraging 
practice:
the Com m ission m ust also co n s id er th e  extent to  w hich those Incentives would be reduced or 
even elim inated owing to  the illeg a lity  o f the conduct, the likelihood o f its detection, action taken 
by com petent authorities both a t Com m unity and national level, and th e  final penalties which 
could ensue.‘‘2«
Although the Court apparently did not view  the possibility of enforcement actions under Article 82 EC as 
sufficient reason to hold the merger rules inapplicable, it found that the Commission could not base its 
prohibition on behaviour that would predictably infringe Article 82 EC. Arguably, it did not embrace a 
presumption that companies will act legally. Rather, it believed that the Commission cannot simply 
presume the contrary. In other words, the Court held that the Commission is required to analyse 
whether, in the specific circumstances of the case, the incentives of the combined entity to engage in 
illegal bundling.
6. Conclusions
Merger control in the ELI can in principle address strategic bundling. Unlike US law, EC law has 
developed a coherent bundling theory, whereby the main focus is possible exclusionary bundling. 
However, my claim is that it is advisable to block a m erger for those concerns only in very limited cases. 
The general suggestion is that Article 82 is, in most cases, sufficient to address the bundling issue. 
Under merger control, the bundling theory faces inherently difficult evaluations that may result in 
erroneous merger decisions. Considering the power of Article 82, it is thus doubtful whether merger 
control is necessary in this area.
1253 See Areeda and Turner, op. cH., p. 206.
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In this concluding chapter, I attempt to weave together the various threads that can be found throughout 
the thesis. My research concerns bundling and leveraging under EC antitrust law. The central focus was 
to analyse when and how bundling results in anti-competitive leveraging under EC competition law, in 
particular Article 82 EC and the Community Merger Regulation, in light of recent economic theory.
In order to answer this question, I reviewed in Chapter 4  and 5 the relevant legal doctrines, laws, their 
interpretations and applications by the European Courts and the Commission. The main observation is 
that EC law has been overly restrictive toward bundling under Article 82 EC by applying a form-based 
approach. The Commission failed to take account of the developments in economic thought over the 
last 20 years or so. Generally, this criticism relates to Article 82 EC, but most certainly to bundling 
abuses. In recent years, however, the law has moved to a more-effects based approach. As for merger 
control, bundling can in principle be assessed under the Merger Regulation. In a string of merger cases, 
the Commission has addressed bundling concerns, but has often and quite easily assumed negative 
effects.
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2. There are convergences and divergences between the EC and US
In this thesis, I also made a comparison with US law, its interpretation and its application, as this legal 
system has a long-standing enforcement history with bundling. As for the similarities and differences 
between EC and US, two arguably opposing observations can be made.
On the one hand, both jurisdictions are converging, whereby Community law in particular moves into the 
direction of US law. There is a clear tendency in Europe to consider legal and economic solutions and 
ideas from the other side of the Atlantic. In Microsoft, for instance, the Commission explicitly refers to 
the US proceedings and settlement. This is a laudable fact, considering the examination of the analysis 
of bundling shows a similar historical development in both regions. Both jurisdictions know a gradual 
erosion of the traditional and intuitive per se treatment of bundling practices. For European lawyers, 
there is a lot to be learned from the effects-based analysis that has been applied for many years in the  
US. I argued that, for instance, the multi-factor test that has been praised in US academic and legal 
circles should be considered under EC  law.
On the other hand, there is unsurprising divergence. For instance, GE/Honeywell was approved in the  
US but vetoed in the EC. In my view , this is an understandable position, as EC competition law  is 
distinctly 'European.' The initial inclusion of competition policy under the ECSC Treaty clearly senred the  
political objective of reining the heart of the German war machine: the coal and steel cartels.‘‘255 Under 
the EEC Treaty, and later the EC Treaty, competition law has developed under the influence of the  
German Ordoliberal school of thought, according to which the actual goal o f competition policy is the 
“protection of individual economic freedom of action as a value in itself, or vice versa, in the restrain of 
undue economic power."i256 Another principal objective that is typical for the European context was
market integration.'*257
1255 See Monnet, Mémoires (París, 1976), noting that *p]e problème était de briser les conœntrat'ons excessives dans la 
sidérurgie et les charbonnages de la Ruhr^ (p. 411).
1256 See Möschei, "Competition Policy from an Ordo Point of View", in: Peacock and Willgerodt (Eds.), German Neo-Uberals 
and the Social Market Economy (London, 1989), p. 146. For a concise summary of Ordoliberal thinking, see Joerges, ‘Die 
Europaisierung des Rechts und die rechtliche Kontrolle von Risiken’ , Krñische Vierteijahresschriñ fur Gesetzgebung und 
Rechtswissenschañ 416 (1991 ).
1257 See Slot, ‘A Vievir from the Mountain: 40 Years of Developments jn EC Competition Law”, CMLRev. 443 (2004), p. 445.
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The promotion of efficiency has subsequently come to the foreground in the E O .^^  The importance of 
this objective was stressed by Advocate General Jacobs when he reminded the Court that “the primary 
purpose of Article [82] is to prevent distortion of competition -  and in particular to safeguard the interests 
of consumers -  rather than to protect the position of particular competitors.'̂ ^ss |p 2001, former 
Commissioner Monti described the raison d'etre of European competition law as ensuring “effective 
competition between enterprises, by conducting a competition policy which is based on sound 
economics and which has the protection of consumer interest as its primary concem.’ ^̂ so
However, the European understanding of competition law is not based on “an attitude of unconditional 
faith with respect to the operation of market mechanisms", but rather, requires “serious commitment [„.] 
by public powers, aimed at preserving those mechanisms."̂ 26i jh e  primary objective of competition law 
is economic efficiency focusing upon the consumer surplus maximised over the long run as measured 
by price and quality. Notably, welfare in the Community context is not equated with consumer welfare in 
the Chicago tradition of the "total wealth welfare of the nation."^262 redistribution of income between 
producers and consumers is taken into account, as the EC requires that the overall result of the 
transaction is to the benefit of consumers. Importantly, this view is distinct from the notion o f welfare, 
understood under Ordoliberal ideology as being a corollary of economic freedom of market operators.
3. Economics as a useful tool for the analysis of bundling
Given its interdisciplinary character, this thesis sought to apply economic principles to legal concepts. 
Economic theory on bundling has changed over the last 20 years or so. The principal economic insights 
of Chapter 1 can be summarised based on two ‘false friends,’ frequently articulated in the antitrust 
literature.
3.1. “Leverage is never possible with complementary products”
This false friend is especially articulated by economists. The old and persistent fear (particularly that of 
lawyers) is that bundling can result in leveraging of market power. The antitrust concern is that bundling
2̂58 This is well explained in Townley, Artide 81: Putting Public Policy in its Place (EUI Thesis, 2004).
1258 $ee Advocate General Jacobs, in Case C-7/97, Oscar B/onner GmbH & Co KG v. Mediaprint [1998] ECR 1*7791, at 58. 
1260 See Monti, ‘Antitrust in the US and Europe: a History of Convergence’ , speech to the American Bar Association, 
Washington, 14 November 2001.
See Monti, ‘European Competition Policy for the 21** Century", speech to 28’*' Annual Conference on International 
Antitrust Law and Policy. Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 2001.
1282 See Bork, op. cit., pp. 90-91.
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enables a dominant undertaking to transfer its market position in the main market A into a second 
market B with the aim to extent it into B or to protect its original position.
Historically, however, liberal scholars like Bork and Posner claimed that bundling could hardly have any 
kind of anti-competitive effects. Bundling is typically beneficial, or associated with price discrimination. 
This thinking is based on the one-monopoly profit theorem. According to this theory, there Is only one 
monopoly profit. The theorem holds that, when consumers are homogenous, a monopoly supplier of 
one complement can extract all the monopoly rents through the price of this product. In other words, 
there is no need to monopolise competitively supplied complements by bundling.
In general, the problem of the one>monopoly profit theorem is that the model does not hold if 
assumptions are changed. Recent economic research made It clear that the Chicago predictions are 
based on strict and static assumptions. According to Nalebuff, for instance, leveraging might also be 
profitable if the assumption that goods are consumed in fixed proportions is relaxed. Today, economics 
offers a thorough picture of possible incentives and effects o f bundling. In particular, economic theory 
has a more long-term perspective. Possible antl-competitive effects of bundling can be the creation of 
entry barriers and foreclosure effects.
3.2. “All bundling is anti-competitive”
In legal circles, this false friend has been very popular. It Is now well understood that bundling can serve 
many purposes, both pro- and anti-competitive. One of the major contributions of the economic literature 
is arguably the increased awareness that bundling m ay result in efficiencies. There are many possible 
efficiency-enhancing effects, including cost savings and improvement of quality. Bundling is also often 
used as a price discrimination device. As cases like Hifti and Tetra Pak II show, EC law has neglected 
these pro-competitive explanations for too long. Bundling should, in my view, be assessed with the prior 
belief that it wiii be pro-competitive, whereas sometimes it may result in exclusionary leveraging.
4. The structured rule of reason
In order to balance the possible pro and anti-competitive effects, bundling should be examined under a 
rule of reason test. This observation was also recently stressed in a report written by a group of
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academies on behave of the Commission.''2631 fuHy welcome this position. Although the report did not 
make an explicit distinction between structured and unstructured test, it seems to suggest an 
unstructured rule of reason.'>264 However, an unstructured Inquiry should be dismissed, for it requires a 
direct weighing of the pro and anti-competitive effects. While the test theoretically has merit, it does not 
offer in the end what the courts, antitrust authorities or business really need: “workable and operational" 
tools as Commissioner Kroes recently stressed.''265 By contrast, the structured test offers in my view a 
functional and predictable legal standard for all parties involved.
It is first necessary to create safe harbour rules that can quickly filter out obviously innocent cases of 
bundling.‘*265 This saves enforcement costs. While non-dominant undertakings should certainly be 
covered by the safe harbour, dominant undertakings will not be protected under the safe harbour 
njle.i267 After a firm is not protected under the safe harbour rules, it is necessary to produce criteria that 
make it possible to decide whether bundling is sufficiently likely to have anti-competitive effects. The 
plausibility of leveraging effects at play should be carefully verified in each specific case. A dominant 
undertaking does not necessarily have the market power required to affect competition. The key 
requirement of the investigation is to either identify that there are monopoly profits in the short term or 
that there are entry-deterrent effects in the long term.
To be sure, efficiency benefits could off-set the competition analysis. It is important to assess whether 
ex ante efficiencies were intended to be achieved. The defendant’s argument that unbundling would be 
costly or impractical must be in principle rejected. Efficiency claims must be assessed carefully because 
they can often be achieved without bundling. As the bundling firm is better informed, competition 
authorities should only consider those efficiencies that are explicitly submitted by the bundling firm. 
Likewise, because the defendant company has better information about how it achieves these
“̂ 3 See EAGCP Report, An Bconomic Approach to Article 82 (Commission, July 2(X)5), p. 3.
See EAGCP Report, p. 23-29.
2̂65 See Kroes, Tackling Exclusionary Practices to Avoid Exploitation of market Power -  Some Preliminary Thoughts on the 
Policy Review of Article 82*. speech 05/537,23 September 2005.
For similar approach, see Regulation 772/2004 on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of 
Technology Transfer Agreements, [2004] OJ L 123/11, imposing safe hartxrurs on the basis of market share ttiresholds.
1267 pQ|- a different view, see Rousseva, “Modernizing by Eradicating: How the Commission’s New Approach to Article 81 EC 
Dispenses with the Need to Apply Article 82 EC to Vertical Restraints’ , CMLRev. 687 (2005), pp. 637-638. Rousseva's paper 
is an excellent attempt to rethink the approach towards contractual abuses under EC competition law. As contractual 
practices (Ike bundling and rebates are dealt with under both Article 81 EC and Artide 82 EC, and Artide 81 EC employs an 
economics-based approach considering also market power issues, she suggests releasing Artide 82 EC from vertical 
restraints. However, she has a very narrow view on what are contractual abuses as she fails to recognise the overlap, for 
instance, between bundling and re^sal to deal cases. She also fails to recognise that anti-competitive bundling like typical 
unilateral abuses requires market power amounting to dominance as a pre-condition for conduct to raise anti-competitive 
concerns.
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efficiencies, the burden of proof should be placed on the defendant. The following figure summarises 
this approach:
Y e s  i  Likelihood of 
Anticompetitive 
Effects?
1. No market power
2. Substitute goods
3. Complementary 
goods, unless market 
with network effects or 
significant foreclosure 
in the tied market
No No




2. Strong commitment 
to bundle
3. R iva l's inability to 
match the bundle
4. Likelihood o f en t 
of rivals
5. Entry barriers
6. Absence of buyer 
power
7. Presence o f strong 
network effects
8. Bundled goods are 
R& D  intensive or 
branded products
9. Potential of future 
competition between 
complementary 











5. A preference for ex post control
The Commission has a steadfast belief that bundling can and should be assessed under the m erger 
rules. In fact, as Chapter 5 shows, the merger rules can in principle address bundling concerns. Given 
the objections I have to this approach, this should, however, be done only in very limited cases. From a 
dogmatic point of view, the Commission approach blurs the distinction between structural and 
behavioural instruments. Considering the role of Article 82 EC, I doubt the necessity of merger control to 
address bundling. More importantly, the bundling theory applied by the Commission faces inherently 
difficult predictions and evaluations that may result in erroneous merger decisions. I made two 
interrelated obsenrations in this regard:
First, predicting posf-merger outcomes is generally difficult, but prospective analysis of leveraging 
practices is extremely difficult. It is not the structure resulting from the merger itself that creates anti­
competitive leveraging, rather future conduct Leveraging will occur only after a certain amount of time 
and will result from practices like bundling engaged in by the new undertaking. Consequently, as the
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Commission explained in GE/Amersham, "there must be a reasonable expectation that rivals will not be 
able to propose a competitive response, and that their resulting marginalisation will force them to exit 
the market.” ^268
Second, the bundling practice predicted does not normally involve immediate price increases to 
consumers. To the contrary, it often implies price reductions. Bundling potentially affects rivals through 
diverting demand to the combined entity, thus lowering their profits. Of course, where leveraging 
concerns are raised, the Commission emphasises that any price reduction or output expansion directly 
following the merger is of a merely strategic nature. ‘Once rivals have exited the market, the merged 
firm must be able," the Commission stressed, to  implement unilateral price increases and such 
increases need to be sustainable in the long term, without being challenged by the likelihood of new 
rivals entering the market or previously marginalised ones re-entering the market-’ ^̂ es jh e  reductions 
are thus of short duration, and consumer welfare will ultimately suffer as competitors are ultimately 
eliminated in the second market. The general stand of this thesis is to be very cautious about identifying 
imminent apocalyptic bundling by the new undertaking.
6. Critical examination of the bundling trilogy
A legal-economic assessment of Hilti, Tetra Pak II and Microsoft in Chapter 4  reveals that different 
conclusions from those reached by the Commission would have been possible. I explained that Hilti’s 
efforts to bundle its nail guns with its own nails are likely to have been pro-competitive. It can be argued 
that the combination of safety and reputation were driving Hilti as consumers were to blame Hilti for 
bundle’s failure when used with independent goods. The Commission reached, in my view, the right 
result in Tetra Pak II, but did not articulate the right reasons, namely leveraging in the long term.
As for the decision in Microsoft, I believe that there are serious leveraging concerns in the long term on 
two markets. Microsoft has a clear interest in killing all innovation in the media player market in order to 
protect its position in the Windows market. By the Windows-WMP bundle, Microsoft also seeks to tip the 
market for encoding software to itself. Conversely, I am critical about the chosen remedy. In my view, a 
combined unbundling and mandatory versioning remedy would have been better equipped given the 
characteristics of the market.
1268 Case COM P/M .3304, GE/Amersham, at 37.
1269 Case COMPAfl.3304, GE/Amersham, at 37.
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7. The need for guidelines
7.1. Introductory rem arks
The Commission has recently announced its intent to reconsider its policy under the “last of the steam- 
powered trains", as one commentator refers to Article 82 EC.''27o The Commission’s aim is to make it 
compatible with mainstream economics, and to render Article 82  EC an instrument to ensure the pursuit 
of consumer welfare. In this context, it is more than advisable for the Commission to publish guidelines 
on Article 82 EC in general and in particular on bundling. There is also a pressing need to do so, given 
the fact that the national competition authorities in Europe became, on 1 may 2004, the principal 
enforcers of EC competition law.i27i The Commission has announced the publication of drafts in the first
part of 2006.1272
While the outcome may be expected to align the Commission’s position with recent economic theory as 
well as antitrust thinking in the US on some aspects, significant differences will certainly remain. It 
suffices mention three factors in this context. First, all comers o f Article 82 must be fully respected. 
Simply put, the Commission cannot change the text of the EC  Treaty. The terms o f Article 82 EC  
obviously differ from those of the Sherman Act. Thus, for instance. It is not open to the Commission or 
national authorities to refuse to apply that provision to certain types of abuse falling within its terms. 
Second, the Commission is confronted with the current case law of the European Courts. As I have 
discussed earlier, their approach under Article 82 EC is in general and In particular quite formalistic and 
form-based with regards to bundling.1273 Like a ballet dancer, the Commission is required to do the 
splits. On the one hand, the Commission must recognise these Court decisions as they are still valid, 
but, on the other hand, should seek to develop a more effects-based enforcement policy within the 
outer-limits o f the Courts. Third, as discussed above, EC competition is distinctly ‘European.’ It has 
therefore no unconditional trust in the functioning of the market, and takes a more long-temo perspective 
of competition matters.
1270 See Stier, T h e  Last of the Stream-Powered Trains: Modernizing Article 82" (2004) 243 ECLR.
See Regulation 1/2003.
1272 Notably, the Commission is also about to develop guidelines for vertical and conglomerate mergers. These guidelines 
could likewise benefit from the suggestions made here.
1273 For other examples of the form-based approach in relation to rebates, see Case T-219/99, British Airways v. 
Commission, decision of 17 December 2003 and Case T-203/01, Michelin v. Commission (Michelin It), decision of 30 
September 2003, not yet reported.
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7.2. The basics of the guidelines
7.2.1. Aim of the guidelines and starting point of analysis
If the Commission publishes these guidelines, the aim is, in my view, that they should be clear and 
focused on undisputable findings. They should not be based on specific theoretical models. Instead, 
they should elaborate on general economic insights that have gained on bundling over the years. One 
main finding is that the effects of bundling depend predominantly on the characteristics of the relevant 
market. It is therefore essential that the guidelines provide detailed instructions how to assess those 
markets.
It is important that, as a starting point of analysis, the guidelines recognise that both undertakings with 
and without dominance pursue bundling strategies. Bundling is a common practice, and enforcement 
policy should be based on this prior belief. This recognition does not imply that bundling should be per 
se legal. As seen in Chapter 1, it must be scrutinised carefully when pursued by a company with market 
power. Under these circumstances, bundling can have significant anti-competitive effects depending on 
the market circumstances.
7.2.2. Leveraging in the long term: foreclosure effect of bundling
The guidelines should principally not consider leveraging in the short term. It is very unlikely that 
bundling results in immediate price increases in a second market. The Chicagoans have cogently 
discredited this concern. Conversely, the guidelines must consider the anti-competitive effects of 
bundling in the long term. Bundling is an excellent instrument creating foreclosure in the second market. 
This strategy can be motivated by the wish to extend market power to that second market or to defend 
the original position.
By foreclosure, I mean that actual or potential competitors are completely or partially denied profitable 
access to a market. By the bundling practice, the dominant company reduces the number of potential 
customers that is available to its rivals in the second market. This may cause existing rivals to be 
marginalised to the extent that they exit the market and create a barrier for new entry. It is important for 
the guidelines to recognise that network effects and high entry barriers In the second market m ake such 
a foreclosure strategy more likely and successful.
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For bundling to be abusive, it should normally have an appreciable foreclosure effect on the second 
market. It is advisable to make such an assessment in two steps. First, it must be determined which 
customers are tied in the sense that rivals of the dominant undertaking cannot compete for their 
business. Second, it is then essential to assess whether these customers form a sufficient part of the 
market. In order to make the foreclosure assessment, the following factors may be useful, although they 
should not be applied in a mechanical way.
The first aspect to consider Is the market position in the main m arket If the main market is competitive, 
the bundle cannot force consumers to buy the bundled good as they can easily switch to competing 
goods that are offered without the bundle. Therefore, a necessary but insufficient condition for 
competitive harm is market power in the main market. The higher the market power, the easier it is for 
the undertaking to impose the bundle on its customers. The second aspect to consider is the m arket 
position in the second market. Bundling two products also bears the risk for the bundling firm to lose 
those customers who do not find the bundled product attractive and want to avoid it. This risk is higher if 
the company bundles it with an unattractive product with low m arket share. Leveraging is typically more 
likely if the second market already enjoys high popularity and remarkable market shares.
Third, the guidelines should focus on entry barriers. It should be considered if bundling forces new  
competitors to enter several markets at the same tim e, and thus raise market entry barriers and lower 
potential competition. Fourth, the guidelines should also consider the feasibility of counterstrategies. 
Competitors might form competing bundles leading to lower consumer prices. Strong buyer power could 
also prevent foreclosure effects.
7,2.3. Efficiencies can off-set foreclosure effects
Where there Is evidence of potential or actual foreclosure, the dominant undertaking’s behaviour cannot 
be considered as abusive if there are significant efficiencies.''274 The guidelines should therefore take 
into account possible efficiency-enhancing effects o f an alleged bundling .'*275 Cost reductions, quality 
improvements, safety issues or price discrimination might offset suspected anti-competitive effects. So
Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, stating that “it is therefore necessary to ascertain whether 
the discontinuance o f supplies by UBC in October 1973 was justified'’ (at 184).
Likewise Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of 
Concentrations between Undertakings, [2004] OJ C 31/03, noting that “0]t is possible that effidencies brought about by a 
merger counteract the effects on competition and in particular the potential harm to consumers that it might otherwise 
have''(emphasis added, at 76).
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far bundling-specific efficiency reasons have hardly been considered in the Commission practice. The 
guidelines can reach a major achievement in this context.
In order for bundling not to be abusive, it must be shown that all o f the conditions for exemption under 
Article 81(3] EC are fulfilled. This test will generally be hard to satisfy, as dominance has already been 
demonstrated. For a start, the undertaking must surely demonstrate that its allegedly anti-competitive 
behaviour generates the efficiencies. This means that the efficiencies must be a direct consequence of 
the bundling practice.‘*276 |t is important here that the Commission takes an ex ante perspective: only the 
efficiencies at the time of the decision to bundle should be considered. Furthermore, it must be 
established that the claimed efficiencies are dear and attributable effidencies.''2r7 Some of the benefits 
of these efficiencies must be passed on to customers in the form of lower prices or better products. 
Finally, the practice should be the least restrictive way of achieving the efficiencies, and competition 
should not be eliminated with regards to a substantial part of the products concerned. The Commission 
must balance the size of the efficiencies against with magnitude of the actual or potential foreclosure
harm.̂ 278
7.2.4. Multi-factor test to detenni ne separateness
W hat can be considered as distinct products should be determined by a  multi-factor test. By considering 
a spectnim of factors, this test reduces the risk of mistakenly finding two distinct products. The test 
should rely on the following three elements: (1) consumer perceptions (2) the view of manufacturers; 
and, (3) technological advance. An evaluation of the consumer’s views should take into account both 
demand at the time of bundling and demand once bundling has been in place for a  period of time. With 
regards to the manufacturers’ point of view, it is necessary to consider the actions of other 
manufacturers as well as the defendant’s intent in bundling the components involved. The third element 
is included as a sort of sanity check. Even if elements one and two, on balance, point to separate 
products, it must be assessed whether that would be the right decision considering the Innovative 
character of the bundle.
’276 Likewise Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of 
Concentrations between Undertakings, at 85.
’277 Likewise Guidelines on the Assessment o f Horizontal Mergers under the Coundl Regulation on the Control of 
Concentrations between Undertakings, at 86-88.
1278 For a different suggestion, see Advocate Genera! Cosmas, in Case C-344/98, Masterbods v. HB Ice Cream (2000) ECR 
1-11731, suggesting a stricter standard whereby the company under investigation must demonstrate that it could not do 
business without the alleged foreclosing behaviour (at 68).
267
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adams and Yellen, "Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly", Q uart J. Econ. 475 (1976)
Ahibom, Evans and Padilla, The J^titrust Economics o f Tying -  A Farewell to P erse Illegality (AEI-Brookings paper, 2003) 
Anderman, "Does the Microsoft Case Offer a New Paradigm for the ‘Exceptional Circumstances’ test and Compulsory 
Copyright Licenses under EC Competition Law?", CompLRev 7 (2004)
Andrews, “Aftermarket Power in the Computer Services Market The Digital Undertaking", E C LR 176 (1998)
Aniauf, "Severing Ties With the Strained Per Se Test for Antitrust Tying Liability: The Economic and Legal Rationale for a  
Rule of Reason", Hamline L. Rev. 477 (2000)
Areeda and Hovenkamp, Fundamentals o f Antitrust Law  (New York, 2002)
— , Antitnjst Law  (Aspen, 1999)
—  and Kaplow, J^titrust Ana/ys/s -  RroWems, Text, Cases (Boston, 1988)
Argentesia, Demand Estimation for Italian Newspaper The Impact o f Weekly Supplements (EUI paper, 2003)
Art and McCurdy, T h e  European Commission's Media Player Remedy in its Microsoft Decision: Compulsory Code Removal 
Despite the Absence of Tying and Foreclosure", ECLR 694 (2004)
—  and Uedekerke, “Developments In EC Competition Law In 1996 -  An Overview", CMLRev. 895 (1997)
Ayres and Nalebuff, “Going Soft on Microsoft? T iie  EU’s Antitrust Case and Remedy", The Economists' Voice 1 (2005)
B
Baden Fuller, "Artide 86: Economic Analysis of the Existence of a Dominant Position", ELRev423 (1979)
Bael, Van and Beilis, Competition Law o f the European Community {Oxfordshire, 1994)
Bailey, “Standard of Proof in EC Merger Proceedings: A Common Law Perspective", CMLRev. 845 (2003)
Baker, “A Preface to Post-Chicago Antitrust", in: Cucinotta and Pardolesi ef al. (eds.), Post-Chicago Developments in  
AnWrusf Law (Cheltenham, 2002), p.
— , “Lessons From Microsoft", Sedona Conf. J. 41 (2001)
—  and Ridyard, “Portfolio Power A Rum Deal?', ECLR 181 (1999)
— , T h e  Supreme Court and the Per Se Tying Rule: Cutting the Gordian Knot", Vir. L  Rev. 1235 (1980)
Baseman ef al., “Microsoft Plays Hardball: The Use of Exdusionary Pricing and Technical Incompatibility to Maintain 
Monopoly Power in Markets for Operating System Software", Antitrust Bull. 265 (1995)
Bauer, “Government Enforcement Policy of Section 7 of the Clayton Act Carte Blanche for Conglomerate Mergers?', Cal. L. 
Rev. 348 (1983)
— , “A Simplified Approach to Tying Arrangements: a  Legal and Economic Analysis", Vanderbilt L. Rev. 283 (1980)
Baxter and Kessler, Tow ard a  Consistent Theory o f the Welfare Analysis of Agreements", Stan. L  Rev. 615 (1995)
Bechtold, "Die Gnindzuge der Neuen EWG-Fusionskontrolle", RIW  253 (1990)
Bellamy and Child, European Community Law o f Competition (London, 2001)
Bergh, Van den, and Camesasca, European Competition Law and Econom ics- A Comparative Perspective (Antwerp, 2001) 
Bergman, “Editorial: The Bronner Case -  A Turning Point for the Essential Facilities Doctrine?", ECLR 59 (2000)
Biester, “What Lessons Result from the Appeals Court in Microsoft Case?", Legal Intelligencer (2  July 1998), p. 7
268
Bishop, *A Note on the Economics of the Microsoft Decision", Competition Law Insight, May 2004, p. 14 
—  and Walker, The Economics o f Competition Law (London, 2002)
Böge, “Der 'More Economic Approach’ und die deutsche Wettbewerbspolitik", WuW 726 (2004)
Bok, “Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics", Harv. L  Rev. 307 (1960)
Bork, The Antitmst P aradox-A  Policy at War with Itself {Hew York, 1978)
Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem", Yale L. J. 19 (1957)
Brandeis, T h e  Living Law“, in: Frankel, The Curse o f Bigness. Miscellaneous Papers of Louis Brandeis (New York, 1934), p. 
316
Brennan, Do Easy Cases Make Bad Law? Antitnjst Innovations or Missed Qpportun^es in United States v. Microsoft (AEI- 
Brookings paper, 2002)
Briggs and Rosenblatt, "GE/Honeywell -  Live and Let Die: A Response to Kolasky & Greenfield", Geo. Mason L  Rev. 459 
(2002)
Brodley, “Potential Competition Mergers: a Structural Synthesis", Yale L  J. 1 (1977)
Burnley, “Who’s Afraid of Conglomerate Mergers? A Comparison of the US and EC Approaches?“, W.Comp. 43  (2005) 
Buttery, “Blanket Licensing: a Proposal for the Protection and Encouragement of Artistic Endeavour", Col. L  Rev. 1245 
(1983)
Campell, “Fit to Be Tied; How United States v. Microsoft Corp. Incorrectly Changed the Standard For Sherman Act Tying 
Violations Involving Software", Loy. L. A. Ent. L  Rev. 583 (2002)
Carbajo, De Meza and Seidman, “A Strategic Motivation for Commodity Bundling", J. Ind. Econ. 283 (1999)
Carlton and Waldman, “How Economics Can improve Antitnjst Doctrine Towards Tie-in Sales’, Comp. Pol’y Int’l 27 (2005) 
— , and Waldman, T h e  Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries’ , Rand J. Econ. 
194(2002)
— , ‘A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal -  Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided", Antitrust L  
J. 659 (2001)
—  and Perioff, Modem Industriai Organization (Reading MA, 1999)
Carson W . Bays, Tying Arrangements Should Be Per Se Legal", Am. Bus. L  J. 625 (1989)
Celnicker, “A Response to Carson W . Bays' Call for Per Se Legality of Tying Arrangements', Am. Bus. L. J. 145 (1990) 
Chesterfield and Oppenheim, “Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy", Mich. L  Rev. 
1139(1952)
Choi, Tying and Innovatbn: a Dynamic Analysis o f Tying Arrangements (Columbia University paper, 1998)
—  and Stefanadis, "Tying, Investment and the Dynamic Leverage Theory", Rand J. Econ 52 (2001)
Clarke-Smith, “The Development of the Monopolistic Leveraging Theory and its Appropriate Role in Antitrust Law", Cath. U. 
L  Rev. 179 (2002)
Coase, The Nature o f the Firm (" *, 1937)
Cohen, ‘ Surveying the Microsoft Antitrust Universe“, Berkeley Tech. L  J. 333 (2004)
Congress, H.R. Rep. No. 6 2 7 ,63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914)
Cook and Kerse, EC  Merger Control (London, 2000)
CoumoL Researches into the Mathematical Principles of Vie Theory of Wealth (New York, 1929)
269
L l l l i j
Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets; The Consumer Protection Issues*, B.U. L  Rev. 661 (1982)
Crawford, The Discriminatory incentives to Bundle: The Case o f Cable Television (University of Arizona paper, 2001)
Creuss and Agustinoy, T h e  Operative System as an Essential Facility: An Open Door to Windows?*, W.Comp. 57 (2000) 
Creve, ‘US versus Microsoft Wie Won Wat? Een Overzicht van het Amerikaanse Hoofdstuk van de Microsoft saga*, SEW  
43(2004)
Crocioni and Veljanovski, ‘Price Squeezes, Foreclosure and Competition Law*, J N I28 (2003)
Cummings and Ruhter, T h e  Northern Pacific Case", J .L  & Econ. 329 (1979)
Daalen, Van, *De Rechterlijke Toetsing van Concentratiebesluiten; de zaak Tetra Laval”, AM 56 (2005)
—  and Geursen, *De Microsoft-Beschikking: Dwanglicenties en Opsplitsing van Geïntegreerde Producten", M&M 246  
(2004)
Demsetz, ‘Barriers to Entry*, Am. Ec. Rev. 47 (1982)
Derdaye, T h e  IM S Health Decision; A Triple Victory", W.Comp. 397 (2004)
— , ‘Abuses of a Dominant Position and Intellectual Property Rights: A  Suggestion to Reconcile the Community Courts 
Case Lavir”, W.Comp. 685 (2003)
Director and Levi, ‘ Law and the Future; Trade Regulation", North. U. L  Rev. 281 (1956)
Dolmans and Graf, “Analysis of Tying Under Article 82 EC: The European Commission’s Microsoft Dedsion in Perspective", 
W.Comp. 225 (2004)
—  and Pickering, ‘The 1997 Digital Undertaking*, E C LR 108 (1998), p. 110 
Doherty, ‘Just W hat Are Essential facilities?", CMLRev. 38 (2001)
Drauz, ‘Unbundling GE/Honeywell: The Assessment of Conglomerate Mergers under EC Competition Law*, in: Hawk (ed .), 
Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New  York, 2002), p. 159 
Duijvenvoorde, Van, Informatietechnologie en Europees Mededingingsrecht (Deventer, 1996)
Easterbrook, T h e  Limits of Antìtrusf, Tex. L  Rev. 1 (1984)
Ehlermann and Ratliff, ‘Mario Monti’s Legacy for Competition Policy in Article 82’ , (2005) Comp. Pol’y Intem’l. 79 
Eilmansberger, ‘How to Distinguish Good from Bad Competition under Article 82 EC: in Search of Clearer and More 
Coherent Standards for Anti-Competitive Abuses", CMLRev. 129 (2005)
Elhauge, “Combination Lock; the DC Circuit Incorrectly Applied an Integrated-Product Test in Microsoft Case", San Francisco 
Daily Journal, 14 July 14, at 4
Evans, “How Economists Can Help Courts Design Competition Rules: An EU and US Perspective", W.Comp. 93 (2005)
—  and Salinger, “Why Do Finns Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law", Yale 
J.on Reg. 37(2005)
—  and Padilla, Tying Under Article 82 and The Microsoft Decision: A  Comment on Dolmans and G raf, W.Comp. 503 
(2005)
—  and Salinger, ‘Competition Thinking at the European Commission: Lessons from the Aborted GE/Honeyweli Merger", 
Geo. Mason L  Rev. 489 (2002)
270
—  and Padilla, "Demand-side Efficiencies in Merger Control", W.Comp. 167 (2003)
— , Padilla and Polo, Tying in Platform Software: Reasons for a Rule of Reason Standard in European Competition Law", 
W.Comp. 509(2002)
— , Did Microsoft Harm Consumers? Two Opposing Views (Washington, 2000}
Facey and Assaf, "Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance in Canada, The United States, and The European Union: A 
Survey", Antitrust L. J. 513 (2002)
Farr, ‘Abuse of a Dominant Position -  The Hilti Case", EC LR 174 (1992)
Faull and Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition (Oxford, 1999)
Federico, "When Are Rebates Exclusionary?", ECLR 477 (2005)
Fierstra, Europees Mededingingsrecht (Deventer, 1993)
Fine, "NDC/IMS: A Logical Application of Essential Facilities Doctrine", ECLR 457 (2002)
Rsher ef a/.. Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated: Economic Analysis and US v. IBM  (Cambridge MA, 1983)
Flaherty. ‘DOJ's Microsoft Strategy Gutted’, The Recorder (24 June 1998)
Flyn, “Antitrust Protection of the Consumer Myth or Reality", Forum 939 (1978)
Fox, “What is Harm to Competìtìon? Exclusionary Practices and Anti-Competifve Effects’, Anöfrust L. J. 371 (2002)
— , T h e  Modernization of Antitrust A New Equilibrium", Cornell L. Rev. 1140 (1981)
Frey, Tying Arrangement - Tying Arrangement als Typus einer vertikalen Wettbewerbsbeschränkung im amerikanischen 
Anf/frusfrecftf (Munich, 1982)
FTC, The Merger Movement: A Summary Report (1948)
Furse, ‘Abusive Dynamics", ECLR 199 (2004)
Gastte and Boughs, ‘M iaosofl HI and the Metes and Bounds of Software Design and Technological Tying Doctrine", Va. J. L  
&Tech. 1 (2001)
Geier. ‘United States v. Microsoft", Berkeley Tech. L. J. 297 (2001)
Gellhom and Kovadc, Antitmst Law and Economics (S t Paul, 1994)
Geradin, "Limiting the scope of Article 82 EC: W hat Can the EU Learn from the U.S. Supreme Court’s Judgment in Trinko in 
the Wake of M/crosoft, IMS, and Deirfscbe Telekom T, CMLRev. 1519 (2004)
Gerber, Law and Competition in 2(P  ̂Cen/ury Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Oxford, 1998)
Gifford and Kaplan, Federal Antitnist Law: Cases and Materials (Cincinnati, 2002)
Giotakos, *GE/Honeywell: A Theoretic Bundle Assessing Conglomerate Mergers Across the Atlantic*, U. Pa. J. Inti Econ. L. 
469(2002}
Golberg, "The International Salt Puzzle", Res. Law & Econ. 31 (1991)
González Diaz, T h e  Reform of European Merger Control: Quid Novi Sub Sole?", W.Comp. 177 (2004)
Goyder, EC Competition Law (Oxford, 2003)
Grimes, T h e  Antirust Tying Law Schism: A Critique of Microsoñ III and a Response to Hylton and Salinger", Antitrust L. J. 
199(2003)
271
Groeben and Schröter, Kommentar Zum  EV/EG-Vetrag 2/1 (Baden-Baden. 1999)
Gyselen, 'Abuse o f Monopoly Power within the Meaning of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty: Recent Developments*, Fordham 
Corp. L  Inst 597 (1990)
— , 'Rebates: Competition on the Merits or Exclusionary Practice?", paper, 8 *  EU Competition Law and Policy Wortcshop. 
June 2008
H
Hancher, ‘Case Note on Oscar Bronner", CMLRev. 1289 (1999)
Harchuck, 'Microsoft IV: The Dangers to Innovation Posed by the Irresponsible Application of A Rule of Reason Analysis to 
Product Design Claim s', Nw. U. L  Rev. 395 (2002)
Hawker, 'Consistently Wrong: The Single Product Issue And The Tying Claims Against Microsoft*, Cal. W . L  Rev. 1 (1998) 
Hatzopoulos,'Case0 4 1 8 /0 1 ,/M SH eaflftG m bH v.N D C H eaiiftG m bH ", CMLf^ev. 1613(2004)
Heiner, 'Assessing Tying Claims In the Context of Software Integration: A  Suggested Framework for Applying the Rule o f 
Reason Analysis', U . Chi. L  Rev. 123 (2005)
Heilman, 'Entrenchment Under Section 7 of the Clayton A ct An Approach for Analyzing Conglomerate Mergers*, Loy. U . 
Chi. L J . 225 (1982)
Hettema, Tetra/S idel’ , NTER 55 (2003)
Heyer. ‘A World o f Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization o f Antitrust*, Antitrust L  J. 375 (2005)
Hildebrand, T h e  European School in EC Competition Law', W.Comp. 3 (2002)
Holzhauer and TeijI, Inieiding Rechsteconomie (Gouda, 1995)
Houdijk, 'Rechtspraak op het Snijvlak van Mededingingsrecht en Intellectuele Eigendomsrecht het Evenwicht tussen de  
Rechtsgebieden in het Arrest /MS H eattff, SEW  23 (2005)
House of Commons, Full-Une Forcing and Tte~ln Sales (London, 1981)
Hovenkamp, 'Exclusion and ttie Sherman A c f, U. Chi. L  Rev. 147 (2005)
— , Federal Antitrust P o licy - The Law  o f CompeW/on and Its Practice (St Paul, 1994)
Howarth, T e tra  Laval/Sidel: Microeconomics or Microlaw*, ECMR 369 (2005)
Hutchings. T h e  Competition Between Law and Economics*, ECLR531 (2004)
Hylton, Antitnjst Law -Econom ic Theory and Common Law Evolution (Cambridge MA, 2003)
—  and Salinger, Tying Law and Policy; A Decision Theoretic Approach*, Antitrust L  J. 69 (2001)
I
lacobucd, Tying as Quality Control: a Legal and Economic Analysis (University of Toronto paper, 2004)
Jaeger, 'Illiceità dei c.d. Tying Contracts nel Trattato Istitutivo della CEE e nelle Legi Americana Antitmsr, Riv. Dir. Ind. 474 
(1958)
Jansen, Die Kopplungsverträge im Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Berlin, 1968)
272
Jebsen and Stevens, “Assumptions, Goals and Dominant Undertakings: The Regulation of Competition under Artide 86 of 
the European Union“, Antitrust LJ. 443 (1996)
Joerges, “Die Europäisier ng des Rechts und die rechtliche Kontrolle von Risiken“, Kritische Viertefjahresschrift fi/r 
Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 416 {1991 )
Joliet Monopolization and Abuse of Dominant Position (The Hague, 1970)
Jones and Sufrin, EC  Competition Law  (Oxford, 2004)
K
Kaplow, “Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage", Col. L  Rev. 515 (1985)
Kareff, “The European Approach to Monopoly Leveraging", L  & Pol. in InfL Bus. 549 (1997)
Kattan, TTie Decline o f the Monopoly Leveraging Doctrine“, Anftfmsf 41 (1994)
Katz and Shapiro, “Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility", Am. Econ. Rev. 424 (1985)
Kenney and Klein, “The Economics of Block Booking", J. L  & Econ. 345 (1983)
Kiemel, "Zur Anwendung von A rt 85 Abs. 1, Buchstabe e), EWG-Verlrag auf Lizenzverträge“, NJW 2333 (1964)
Wein, T h e  Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts“, J. L. & Econ. 345 (1985)
Korah, An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice (Oxford, 1997)
— , Tetra  Pak II -  Lack o f Reasoning in Court’s Judgm enf, ECLR 98 (1997)
— , T h e  Paucity of Economic Analysis in the EEC Dedsions on Competition Tetra Pak ir , CLP 148 (1993)
—  and Rothnie, Exclusive Distribution and the EEC CompeWon Rules (London, 1992)
Körber, “Machtmißbrauch durch Multimedia - Der Fall Microsoft zwischen Produktinnovation und Behinderungsmißbrauch’. 
RIW 568 (2004)
Kramer, T h e  Supreme Court and Tying Arrangements: Antitrust as History“, Minn. L  Rev. 1013 (1985)
Kühn, Stillman and Caffarra, “Economic Theories o f Bundling and Their Policy Implications in Abuse Cases: An Assessment 
in the Light of the Microsoft Case", ECJ 85 (2005)
Lam, “Revisiting The Separate Products Issue", Yale L  J. 1441 (1999)
Langer, "Case T-201/04 R. Microsoft v. Commission', AM 7 (2005)
— , "De Microsoft-Zaak en de Leverage-theorie', AM 169 (2004)
— , “De Microsoft-zaak: de Schikking Tussen het Amerikaanse Ministerie van Justitle en Microsoft", AM 28 (2003)
Larouche, Competition Law and Regu/a//on in European Telecommunications (Oxford, 2000)
LazarofF, “Reflections on Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Sen/ices, Inc.: Continued Confusion Regarding Tying 
Arrangements and Antitrust Jurisprudence", Wash. L. Rev. 101 (1994)
Leslie, ‘Price Discrimination in Broadway Theatre", Rand J. Econ. 520 (2004)
Lessig, Brief As Amicus Curiae, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232)
— , Code and Other Laws o f Cyber Space (New York, 1999)
Levy, “EU Merger Control: From Birth to Adolescence“, W.Comp. 195 (2003)
— , T e tra  Pak II: Stretching the limits of Article 86?", ECLR 104 (1995)
273
Liebowitz and Margolis, “Network Effects and Externalities’, in; Newman (ed .), The New Paigrave Dictionary of Economics 
and Law {London, 1998), p.
Lindsay, EC Merger Regu/af/on; Substantive Issues (London, 2002)
Utan, “Antitrust and the New Economy", U. P itt L  Rev. 429 (2001)
Lofaro and Ridyard, “Beyond Bork: New Economic Theories of Exclusion in M erger Cases’ , E C LR 151 (2002)
Lopatka and Page, “Antitrust on internet Time: Microsoft and the Law and Economics of Exclusion’ , Sup. C t Econ. Rev. 157 
(1999)
Lowe, "DG Competition’s Review of the Policy on Abuse of Dominance", Fordham Corp. L  Inst (2004), p. 163
M
Mariotti, "Rethinking Software Tying", Yale J. on Reg. 367 (2000)
Matutes and Regibeau, "Compatibility and Bundling of Complementary Goods in a Duopoly", J. Ind. Econ. 37 (1992)
Manzini, "The European Rule of Reason -  Crossing the Sea of Doubts’, ECLR 392 (2002)
Mazziotö, “Did y^pie’s Refusal to Ucense Proprietary Infomiartion enabling Interoperability with its iPod Music Player 
Constitute an Abuse under Article 82 of the EC Treaty?", W.Comp. 253 (2005)
Meese, “Monopoly Bundling in Cyberspace: How Many Products Does Microsoft Sell?’ , Antitrust Bull. 65 (1999)
Mégret, Commentaire - te Droit de la CE  -  Concurrence (Brussels, 1997)
Memorandum on the Problem of Mergers/n the Common Market, Competition Series Study No. 3, [1966] 26 CMLR 
Memorandum on the Concentration o f Enterprises in the Common Market (1956)
Mestmacker and Schweitzer, Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht (Mùr)chen, 2004)
— , Europäisches Wettbewertsrecht (München, 1974)
Mitchell, Die Rechtliche und Wirtschaftliche Bedeuting von Tying Contracts - Eine vergleichende Darstellung nach 
deutschem und amerikanischem Recht (Cologne, 1961)
Mohammed and DeGraba, “Intertemporal Mixed Bundling and Buying Frenzies", Rand J. Econ. 694 (1999)
Monnet Mémoires (Paris, 1976)
Monti, Mario, “Antitrust in the US and Europe: a  History of Convergence", speech to the American Bar Association, 
Washington, 14 November 2001
— , “European Competition Policy for the 21®* Century", speech to 28* Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law
and Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 2001
Monti, Giorgio, “Article 81 EC and Public Policy", CMLRev. 1057 (2002)
Moschel, “Competition Policy from an Ordo Point of View", in: Peacock and W illgerodt (Eds.), German Neo-Uberals and the
Social Market Economy (London, 1989), p. 146
Motta, Competäion P o licy - Theory and Practice (Cambridge, 2004)
N
Nalebuff, Tied and True Exclusion’ , Comp. Pol’y. Intem'l. 41 (2005) 
— , “Bundling as an Entry Barrier", Q uart J. Bus. Econ. 159 (2004) 
— , Bundling, Tying and Portfolio Effects (DTI paper, 2003)
274
liliiÌÉÌÉMairt<aÌMBtl
— , ‘Competing Against Bundles’ , in: Hammond and Myles (eds.), Incentives. Organizatbn and Public Economics: Papers 
in Honour o f James Mirriees (Oxford, 2000), p. 321 
Navarro e t a i. Merger Control in the EU  (Oxford, 2005)
Nihoul and Rodford, E U  Bectronic Communicatbns Law  (Oxford, 2004)
OECD, Portfolio Effects in Conglomerate Mergers (Paris, 2002)
O’Keeffe, “Gerecht Laatdunkend over Concentratieanalyse Commissie*, SEW 212 (2003)
OPTA, Bundling: The Erniom ic Theory and a  Framework for Ex~M te Regulatory As^ssm ent (The Hague, 2004) 
Overbury, 'Politics or Policy? The Demystification of EC Merger Control", Fordham Corp. L  Inst. 561 (1992)
Padilla, 'A  Practical Approach to Analysing Bundling and Portfolio Effects cases’ , S* EU Competition Law and Policy EUl 
Workshop, June 2003
Pardolesi and Renda, T h e  European Commission’s Case Against Microsoft: Kill Bill?", W.Comp. 513 (2004)
Pester, 'Antitrust Law: Removing the Confusion in Tying Arrangement Jurisprudence", Ann. Surv. Am. L  699 (1990) 
Peterman, T h e  International Salt case’ , J. Law & Econ. 351 (1979)
Philips, The Economics o f Price Discriminatbn (Cambridge, 1993)
Pickard, T h e  Commission’s Patent Licensing Regulation -  A History*, EC LR 158 (1984)
Picker, “Unbundling Scope-of-Permission Goods: When Should W e Invest in Reducing Entry Barriers?*, U. Chi. L  Rev. 189 
(2005)
Pflanz and Caffarra, T h e  Economics of GE/Honeyweir, ECLR 115 (2002)
Porter, *Strategic interactions: Some Lessons from Industry Histories for Theory and Antitrust Policy*, in: Salop et a i. 
Strategy, Predation and Antitmst Analysis {FTC, 1981)
Posner, AnW/usf Law: an Economic Perspective (Chicago, 1976)
Prete, ‘From Mag/7/ to IMS: Dominant Firms’ Duty to License Competitors", E B LR 1071 (2004)
Price, *Abuse of a Dominant Position -  the Tale of Nails, Milk cartons and TV Guides", ECLR 80 (1990)
Rahnasto, Intellectual Buperfy Rights, External Effects and Anti-Trust Law  -  Leveraging IPRs in the Communicatbns 
Industry (Oxford, 2003)
Ridyard, Tying and Bundling -  Cause for Complaint?’ , ECLR 316 (2005)
Ritter ef al., European Competition Law: A Practioner's Guide (The Hague, 2000)
Robertson and Williams, "The Law and Economics of Freezer Exclusivity*. ECLR 7  (1995)
Salinger, ‘A Graphical Analysis of Bundling", J. Bus. 85 (1995)
275
Sanfìlippo, “Abuse of Freedom of Conduct Neighbouring Markets and Application of Artide 86’ , EBLR 71 (1995)
Sauter, Competition Law and Industrial Policy in the E U {O xioni, 1995)
--------, T h e  sector Inquiries into Leased Lines and Mobile Roaming*, speech IBC Conference on Communications and EC
Competition Law, Brussels, 17 September 2001.
Scherer and Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Boston. 1999)
Schmalensee and W illig (eds.). Handbook of Industrial Organisation (Amsterdam, 1989)
— , ’Commodity Bundling by Single-Product Monopolies’ , J. L  & Econ. 67 (1982)
Schmidt T h e  New ECMR: Significant Impediment or Significant Improvement", CMLRev. 1555 (2004)
Seidmann, ’ Bundling as a Facilitating Device: a Reinterpretation of the Leverage Theory", Economica 491 (1991)
Shapiro, ’Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense o f Kodak", Antitrust L. J. 483 (1995)
Shelanski and Sidak, "Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries", U. Chi. L  Rev. 1 (2001)
Sidak, An Antitnist Rule for Software Integration (Yale paper, 2001)
Sidak, “Debunking Predatory Innovation", Col. L  Rev. 1121 (1983)
Sindair, ‘Abuse of Dominance at a Crossroads -  Potential Effect, Object and Appredability under Article 82 EC", ECLR 491 
(2004)
Slade, The Leverage Theory o f Tying Revisited [GREOAM  paper, 1997)
Slawson, "A Stronger, Simpler Tie-ln Doctrine", Antitrust Bulletin 671 (1980)
Slot, ’A  View from the Mountain: 40 Years of Developments in EC Competition Law", CMLRev. 443 (2004)
Spector, "Loyalty Rebates: An Assessment of Competition Concerns and a Proposed Stmctured Rule o f Reason", Comp. 
Pol’ylntem ’l8 9 (2 0 0 5 )
Stigler, “United States v. Loew's Inc.: a Note on Block Booking", Sup. C rt Rev. 152 (1963)
— , "Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger", Am. Ec. Rev. 23 (1950)
Stocky and Levary, “Windows XP: Another Court Battle for Microsoft?", J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 193 (2002) 
Stothers, “IMS Health and its Implications for Compulsory Licensing in Europe", EIPR 467 (2004)
Strasser, “An Antitmst Policy for Tying Arrangements", Emory L. J. 253 (1985)
Stroux, EC Oligopoly Control (EUl Thesis, 2003).
Subiotto, "The Special Responsibility of Dominant Undertakings Not to Impair Genuine Undistorted Competition", W.Comp. 5  
(1996)
Sullivan and Grimes, The Law o f Antitrust: An Integrated handbook (S t Paul, 2000)
—  and Handbook o f the Law of Antitrust (SL Paul, 1977)
Temple Lang, “Anticompetitive Abuses under Artide 82 involving Intellectual Property Rights", 8*' EU Competition Law and 
Policy EUl Workshop, 2003
— , ‘Defining Legitimate Competition: Companies’ Duties to Supply Competitors and Access to Essential Fadlilies”, 
Fordham lnt’lL J .4 3 7  (1994)
— , “Monopolisation and the Definition o f‘Abuse’ of a Dominant Position under Artide 86 EEC Treaty", CMLRev 345 (1979) 
Tirole, T h e  Analysis o f Tying Case: A Primer", Comp. Pol’y. In fl. 1 (2005)
— , The Theory of/ndusfria/ Organization (Cambridge, 2001)
Towniey, Article 81: Putting Public Policy in its Place (EUl Thesis, 2004)
276
L
Treece, Tradem ark Liœnsing and Vertical Restraints in Franchising Arrangements*, U. Pa. L  Rev. 435 (1968) 
Turner, T h e  Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy, Cal. L  Rev. 797 (1987)
— , 'Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of The Clayton Act’, Harv. L. Rev. 1313 (1965)
— , T h e  Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws', Harv. L  Rev. 50 (1958)
U
Utton, Market Dominance and Antitrust Policy {Cheltenham, 2003)
Ullrich, Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection and Reductionist Competition Rules: A TRIPS Perspective (Berkeley 
Center for Law and Technology Paper, 2005)
Vanderwerf, 'Product Tying and Innovation in US Wire Preparation Equipment", Research Policy &3 (1990)
Venit, “In the Wake of Windsurfing: Patent Licensing in the Common Market", Fordham Corp. L  Inst 517 (1986)
Vesterdorf, “Standard o f Proof in Merger Cases: Reflections in the Light of Recent Case Law of the Community Courts", ECJ 
3 (2005)
Vickers, “Abuse of Market Power", Econ. J. 244 (2005)
— , “Competition Economics and Policy", ECLR 95 (2003)
Viscusi et a t, Economics o f Regulation and Antitnist (London, 1995)
Vogelenzang, “Abuse of a Dominant Position in Article 86; The Problem of Causality and Some Applications’ , CMLRev. 61 
(1976)
Voicker, “Leveraging as a Theory of Competitive Harm in EU Merger Control', CMLRev. 581 (2003)
W
Waelbroeck, Denis, T h e  Compatibility of Tying Agreements with Antitrust Rules: A Comparative Study o f American and 
European Rules’ , OxYel 39 (1987)
Weinstein, “Bundies of Trouble: The Possibilities for a New Separate-Product Test in Technological Tying Cases", Cal. L. 
Rev. 903 (2002)
Wesseling, The Modernisation of EC Antitnist (London, 2000)
Whinston, “Exclusivity and Tying In US v. Microsoft What We Know, and Don’t Know", J. Econ. Pers. 63 (2001)
— . Tying, Foredosure and Exdudons (NBER paper, 1989)
Whish, Competition Law (London, 2003)
— , “Should there be per se abuses under Article 82 EC?’, WuW 919 (2001)
Williamson. 'Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach’ , U. Pa. L  
Rev. 953 (1979)
— , ‘Economics as An Antitnist Defense: The W elfare Tradeoff, Am. Econ. Rev. 18 (1968)
Wollenberg, “An Economic Analysis of Tie-In Sales: Re-Examining the Leverage Theory", Stan. L  Rev. 737 (1987)
Woodrow De Vries, “United States v. M icrosoff, Berkeley Tech. L. J. 303 (1999)
Woude. van der and Steenbergen, “Het EU-Mededingingsrecht na 1 Mei 2004: Verordening 1/2003', SEW 192 (2004)
277
w m




Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière v. Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235  
Cases 56 & 58/64, Cönsfen & Grundig v. Commissbn [1966J ECR 299 
Case 5/69, Volk v. Vervaeke [1969] ECR 295 
Case 6/72, Continental Can [1973] ECR 215
Cases 6 & 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano v. Commisson [1974] ECR 223 
Case 27/76, United Brands [1978] ECR 207 
Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche [1979] ECR 461
Case 22/78, Hugin Kassaregister AB and Hugin Cash Registers Ltd v. Commission [1979] ECR 1869
Case 258/78, Nungesserv. Commission [1982] ECR 2015
Case 322/81, Michelin v. Commission (Michelin I) [1983] ECR 3461
Cases 29 & 30/83, Rheinzink v. Commission [1984] ECR 1679
Case C-193/83, Windsurfing v. Commission, [1986] ECR 611
Case 42/84, Remia v. Commission [1985] ECR 2545
Case 161/84, Pronuptia [1985] ECR 353
Case 311/84, Centre belge d’études de marché v. CLT (Télémarketing) [1985] ECR 3261 
Case 45/85, Verband der SachversicherereV v. Commission [1987] ECR 405  
Case C-62/86, AKZO v. Commissbn [1991] ECR 1-3359
Case 247/86, Société alsacienne et lorraine de télécommunications et d ’électronique v. Novasam (Alsatel) [1988] ECR 5987
Case 53/87, CICCRA v. Renault [1988] ECR 6039
Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng [1988] ECR 6211
Case C-320/87, Ottung v. Klee & Weilbach [1989] ECR 1185
Case 395/87, Ministère Public v. Jean Louis Tournier (Sacem) [1989] ECR 2521
Case 0234/89 , Delimitis v. Henniger Bräu AG [1991] ECR 1-935
Case 0260/89 , Elliniki Radiophonia Ttieorasi v. DEP  [1991 ] ECR 1-2935
Cases 0 2 4 1  & 242/91 P, RTE v. Commission (Magill) [1995] ECR 1-743
Case C-17/92, Fidicine [1993] ECR 1-2239
Case C-53/92P, Hilti AG v. Commission [1994] ECR 1-667
Case 0250/92 , Gottrup-Klim v. DLG [1994] ECR 1-5641
Case 0310 /93  P, BPB Industries Pic. v. Commission [1995] ECR 1-865
Case 0333/94P , Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission (Tetra Pak II) [1996] ECR i-59521
Case 0 7 /9 7 , Oscar BrDnner6n76H& Cô KG v. Ated/aprinf [1998] ECR I-7791
Cases 0 1 1 5  & 117/97, Brands [1999] ECR 1-6025
Case 0418 /01 , IMS Health v. NDCHeaHh [2004] ECR 1-5039
Case 0 1 2 /0 3  P, Commissbn v. Tetra Laval BV, decision of 15 February 2005
Case C-53/03, Synefa/rismos Faramkopoion Aitolias 8  AJomanias and others v. Gbxosmithklme iAEVE, opinion of 28 
October 2004, not yet reported




Case T-30/89, HiftiAG v. Commission [1990] ECR H-163
Case T-65/89, BPB Industries Pie. v. Commission [1993] ECR 11-389
Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak v. Commission (Tetra Pak II) [1994] ECR 461
Cases T -2 4 ,26/93 & 28/93, Compagnie Maritime Belge and others v. Commission [1996] ECR 11-1201
Cases T -3 7 4 ,375,384 & 388/94, European Night Sen/ices v. Commission [1998] ECR 11-3141
Case T-102/96, GencorLtd. v. Commission [1999] ECR 11-753
Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar v. Commission [1999] ECR II-2969
Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods v. Commission, 23 October 2003, not yet reported
Case T-112/99, Mètropole Télévision v. Commission [2001] ECR 11-2459
Case T-219/99, Brffis/i Airways v. C o m m isto , decision of 17 December 2003
Case T-184/01 R, IM S Health v. Commission, decision o f 26 October 2001, not yet reported
Case T-203/01, Michelin v. Commission (Michelin II), decision of 30 September 2003, not yet reported
Cases T-5/02 & T-80/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Commission [2002] ECR 11-4381
Case T-114/02, BabyUss v. Commission [2003] EC R  1-1279
Case T-119/02, Philips v. Commission [2003] ECR 1-1433
Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft v. Commission, decision of 22 December 2004, not yet reported 
European Com m ission 
Non-m erger cases
Case IV/400, Glass Containers [1974] OJ L 160/1.
Case IV/4204, Velcro/Aplix [1985] OJ L233/22 
Case lV/28.173, Campari [1978] OJ L170/69, at 34.
Case IV/29.290, Vaessen/Moris [1979] OJ L19/32.
Case lV/29.491, Bandengroothandel Friescheburg/Nederiandsche Banden-lndustrie Michelin (Michelin I) 1981] OJ L 353/33 
Case lV/29.395, Wndsurfing International [1983] OJ 19/32.
Case lV /30.178, Napier Brown v, British Sugar [1988] OJ L 284/41
Case lV/30.698, ECS/AKZO  [1985] OJ L 374/1
Case IV/32.318, London European-Sabena, OJ [1988] L 317/47
Case IV /31.043, Ebpak/Tetra Pak (Tetra Pak II) [1992] OJ L72/1
Case lV /30.178, Napier Brown v. British Sugar [1988] OJ L 284/41
Case IV/31.043, Tetra Pak II, [1992] OJ L72/1
Case lV /31.206, Rich Products/Jus-Rol, [1988] OJ L69/21
Case lV/32.318, London European [1974] OJ L 317/47
Case IV /34.395, Van den Bergh Foods Limited [1998] OJ L 246/1
Case COM P/34.493, DSD  [2001] OJ L 166/1
Case COM P/34.780, Virginmritish Airways [2000] OJ L 30/1
280
UWUliiAWftltiUlltiUMÉ
Case CO M P/37J92, Microsoft/W2000, decision of 24 March 2004 
Case COMP/37.859, De Pose-La Poste [2002] OJ L61/32 
Case COMP/38.044, NDC H ealth/IM S Health, decision of 3 July 2001 
Case COMP/39.116, Coca Cola, decision of 22 June 2004
Merger decisions
Case IV/M.53, ATR/Havilland [1991] OJ C 334/7
Case IV/M.68, Tetra P a m a ^ L a v a ^ [m ^ ] OJ L 290/35
Case IV/M.469, MSG Media Service [1994] OJ L 364/1
Case IV/M.553, RTUVeronica/Endemol [1996] OJ L134/21
Case COMP/M.833, Coca-Cola Conipany/Carlsberg A /S[iB9B] OJ L 288/24
Case 1V/M.938, Guinness/Grand Metropolitari [1998] OJ L 288/24
Case IV/M .1313, Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier [2000] OJ L 20/1
Case IV/1335, Dana/Glacier Vandervell [1999] OJ C 25/18
Case COMP/M.1601, ;U//ed Signai/Honeywell [2001] OJ L 152/1
Case COMP/M.1681, Akzo Nobet/Hoechst Roussel Vet [2000] OJ C 11/5
Case COMP/M.1736, UIAG/Cariye//Vidritz [2000] OJ C 14/7
Case COMP/M.1845, AOLHlme IVamer [2001] OJ L 268/28
Case COMP/M.1879, Boeing/Hughes [2004] OJ L 63/53
Case COMP/M.2220, GE/Honeywell [2004] OJ L 48/1
Case COMP/M.2268, Pernod Ricard/Diageo/Seagram Spirits [2002] C 16/13
Case COMP/M.2276. Coca-Cola/Nestle/JV[m ^] OJ C 308/13
Case COMP/M.2397, BC Funds/Sanitec, [2001] OJ C 207/9
Case COMP/M.2416, Tetra Laval/Sidel, [2004] OJ L 43/13
Case COMP/M.2608, INA/FAG [2001] OJ C 272/3
Case COMP/M.2621, SEB/Mouiinex [2002] OJ C 49/18
Case COMP/M.2803, Telia/Sonera, [2002] OJ C 201/19
Case COMP/M.3304, GBArnersham, not yet published, 21 January 2004
Case COMP/M.3697, Symantec/Veritas, not yet published, 15 March 2005
National courts
Germany
AOL V. Deutsche Telekom, K ZR 1/03, decision of 30 March 2004 




High Court Judgment [2003 No 8608P], The Competition Authority v. The Irish League of Credit Unions (TLCU"), 22 October 
2004
National authorities  
France
Decision 90-D-34, Mannesman Company, 20 October 1990
Dedsion 04-D -54, VirginMega v. Apple Computer France, 9 November 2004
UK
Ofcom, Pricing o f B T Analyst, 26 October 2004 
US Courts
Heaton Peninsula Button Fastening Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288 (6"' Ctr. 1896)
Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. O'Brien, 93 Fed. 200 (D . Mass 1898)
Coitelyou v. Carter's Ink Co., 118 Fed. 1022 (S .D .N .Y . 1902)
Northern Securities, 193 US 197 (1904)
Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Brooklyn Bottle Stopper Co., 172 Fed. 225 (E D .N .Y . 1909)
Standard O il v. United States. 221 US 1 (1911)
Henry v. A  B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912)
United States V. Sidney Winslow, 227 US 202 (1913)
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., 243 US 502 (1917)
Chicago Board o f Trade v. US, 246 US 231 (1918)
United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U S 451 (1922)
Carbice Corp. o f America Patent Development Corp., 283 US 27 (1931)
PickMfg. Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F. 2d 641 (7** Cir. 1935), afTd per curiam, 299 US 3 (1936) 
International Business Machines v. United States, 298 US 131 (1936)
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 US 661 (1944)
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)
United States v. G r im , 334 US 100 (1948)
Standard O il Co. v. United States, 337 US 293 (1949)
Times-Picayune v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953)
United States v. United Shoe Machinery, 110 F. Supp. 295 (D . Mass., 1953)
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U S 1 (1958)
Osborn V. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F. 2d 832 (4*> Cir. 1960)
United States v.Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), afTd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) 
Dehydrating Process Co. v. A O . Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1*̂  Cir. 1961)
U S v .L o e w 's ,3 7 1 U S 3 8 (1 9 6 2 )
282
BakerV. Simmons, 307 F. 2d 458 Gir. 1962)
Brown v. United States 370 US 294 (1962)
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 37A US 321 (1963)
Susserv. Carvel Corp., 332 F. 2d 505 (2d Gir. 1964), ceri, den, 381 US 125 
FTC  V. Brown Shoe Co., 384 US 316 (1966)
Von’s Grocery v. United States 384 US 270 (1966)
Automatic Radio Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 272 F. Supp. 744 (D.Mass. 1967)
United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F Supp 543 (N.D. ILL. 1968).
Scanlan v. Anheuser-Busch Ing., 388 F. 2d 918 (9th Gir. 1968)
Fortner Eniers. v. United States Steel Cö/p. {Fortner I), 394 U.S. 495 (1969)
Aluminium Co. o f America Inc. v. Sperry Prods., In c .,285 F.2d911 (eifC ir. 1969)
N.W . Controls, Inc. v. Outboard Mahne Coip., 333 F. Supp. 493 (D. Del. 1971)
Siegel V. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F. 2d 4 3 ,47  (9**’ Gir. 1971), cert, denied, 405 US 955 (1972). 
Kennecoff Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Gir. 1972)
Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 {N.D. Okla. 1973). 
Missouh Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Gir. 1974)
Emhah Corp. v. USM Corp., 527 F.2d 177 (1** Gir. 1975)
Response o f Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, In c , 537 F.2d 1307 (5 * Gir. 1976)
M iller V. Granados, 529 F. 2d 393 (5«> Gir. 1976)
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, 429 US 610 (1977) (Fortner I fi 
Moore v. Jash Matthews, 550 F. 2d 1207 {0^ Gir. 1977)
Kentucky Fried Chicken v. Diversified Packaging, 549 F.2d 368 (S» Gir. 1977)
ILC  Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 448 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Gal. 1978).
Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F 2d 263 (2"'* Gir. 1979)
Calif. Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM, 613 F. 2d (9“' Gir. 1979)
FmehaufCorp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Gir. 1979)
Ware v. Trailer Mart, In c , 623 F.2d 1150 (6« Gir. 1980)
Data General Corp. Antitnjst Litigation, 490 F. Supp. 989 (N.D. Gal. 1980)
Heublein, In c , 96 FTC. 385 (1980)
Hirsh v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343 ( ^  Gir. 1982)
Hirsch V. Martindale-Hubbell, In c , 674 F.2 1343 (9*> Gir. 1982)
Krehl v. Baskin-Robblns Ice Cream Co., 644 F.2d 1348 Gir. 1982)
Ethyl Corp., FTC 425(1983)
Beatrice Foods, 101 FTC. 733 (1983)
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 US 2 (1984)
NCAA V. Board o f Regents o f the University of Okiahoma, 468 US 85 (1984)
E l. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F. 2d 128 (2d Gir. 1984).
Innovation Date processing, Inc. v. IBM, 585 F. Supp. 1470 (D. N. J. 1984)
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 US 585 (1985)
Martino v. McDonald’s Sys., 625 F. Supp. 356 (N .D . Ill 1985)
Catlin V. Washington Energy Co., 791 F.2d 1343 (9*' Gir. 1986)
283
M W
Fox Motors, Inc. v. M azda Distribution, Ine., 806 F. 2d 953 (1O* Gir. 1986)
Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am. Ine., 833 F. 2d 1342 {9’*' Gir. 1987)
Grappane v. Subanj o f New England. 858 F.2d 792 (1*  ̂Gir. 1988)
Twin Labs. Ine. v. W eider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566 (2d Gir. 1990)
United States v. Rockford, Inc., 898 F.2d 1278 (7 * Gir. 1990)
Alaska Airlines, Ine. v. United Airlines, 948 F 2d 536 (9«' Gir. 1991)
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Im age Technicai Services 604 US 451 (1992)
Town Sound and Customs Tops v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468 (3d Gir. 1992), ceri, denied, 506 US 868 (1992) 
Specfmm Sports v. McQuillan, 506 US 447 (1993)
Breaux Bothers Farms V. Teche Sugar Co., 21 F. 3 d 83  (5*’ Gir. 1994), ceri, denied., 513 US 963 
United States v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Gir. 1995) [Microsoft l)
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Arch Assoc. Corp., 908 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
Howerton v. Grace Hospital, 96 F.3d 1438 (4®’ Gir 1996)
United States v. Microsoft, 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Gir. 1998) (Microsoft //)
United States v. Microsoft, 84 F.Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Finding of Fact)
Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D . Utah 1999)
United States v. SBC Communications, 99-0715 (TPJ) (D.D.C., 23 March 1999)
United Statesv. Microsoft, S7 F.Supp. 2d SO [D.D.C. 2000)
United States v. Microsoft, 253 F. 3d 34 (D.C. Gir. 2001
County o f Tuolumne v. Sonora Community Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148 (8**’ Gir. 2001 )
Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 2001 U S App Lexis 16590 
New York v. Microsoft Coqì., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D .D .C . 2002)
United States v. Microsoft Corp., F. Supp. 2d 2002 W L 31439450 (D .D.C . 2002)
Verizon Communications Ine. v. Law Offices o f Curtis V. Trinko (Trinko), 540 US 682 (2004)







LIU J U .l lU U U U U
mmîïî'WïîiîîWiViiii
í m
